Electronic warfare (EW) is the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to deny its effective use by an adversary.
Electronic warfare has three main components:
• Electronic Attack (EA)
This is the active or passive use of the electromagnetic spectrum to deny its use by an adversary.
An older term for EA is electronic countermeasures (ECM).
Active EA includes such activities as jamming, deception, active cancellation and EMP use.
Passive EA includes such activities as the use of chaff, towed decoys, balloons, radar reflectors, propelled and unpropelled winged decoys and stealth.
Many modern EA techniques are considered to be highly classified.
• Electronic Protection (EP)
This includes all activities related to making enemy EA activities less successful by means of protecting friendly personnel, facilities, equipment or objectives. EP can also be implemented to prevent friendly forces from being affected by their own EA.
Older terms for EP are electronic protective measures (EPM) and electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM).
Active EP includes such activities as technical modifications to radio equipment (such as frequency-hopping spread spectrum).
Passive EP includes such activities as education of operators (enforcing strict discipline) and modified battlefield tactics or operations.
• Electronic Support (ES)
This is the passive use of the electromagnetic spectrum to gain intelligence about other parties on the battlefield in order to find, identify, locate and intercept potential threats or targets.
An older term for ES is electronic support measures (ESM).
This intelligence might be used directly as fire missions for artillery or air strike orders, for mobilization of friendly forces to a specific location or objective on the battlefield or as the basis of EA/EP actions.
EA operations can be detected by an adversary due to their active transmissions. ES, however, can be conducted without the enemy ever knowing it. Its counterpart, SIGINT, is continuously performed by most of the world's countries in order to gain intelligence derived from other parties' electronic equipment and tactics.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_warfare



Pse also read:
http://homepage.mac.com/cheethorne/Palladi...onicwarfare.htm



- Electronic Warfare and EWSs
- ECM and ECCM Rules
- Electronic Wartare systems (EWS)s


Useful link on principles of Radar

http://www.radartutorial.eu/index.en.html

http://www.radartutorial.eu/02.basics/rp04.en.html

Raytheon to be Prime Contractor on Radar Common Data Link Program

EL SEGUNDO, Calif., Jan. 11, 2007 /PRNewswire/

Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) has won a $9.7 million contract from the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory to design and develop the next-generation wideband common data link for active electronically scanned array radar systems.
The objective of the Radar Common Data Link program is to enable tactical assets such as combat aircraft to quickly pass on non-traditional ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) data to users in the military and intelligence communities.

"The Radar Common Data Link program will provide fast tactical communications in the battlespace," said Nick Uros, vice president for the Advanced Concepts and Technology group of Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems. "But perhaps even more significant, it also can serve as a linchpin for a network-centric warfare environment linking various computer and communication systems to ensure that timely, secure and accurate information is available to a wide range of military users."

Raytheon has developed and deployed AESA radar systems for the Air Force F-15 and the Navy F/A-18. The Air Force also employs the company's AESA technology in radar systems for the B-2 and the F-22A.

The five-year program calls for Raytheon to develop specifications and open-standards interfaces for a radar common data link to determine how it would operate with current and future AESA systems, to formulate concepts of operations with the Air Force, and to demonstrate feasibility.

The Department of Defense considers the program especially significant to non-traditional ISR tactical fighter missions. Air crews could use wide-band communication links to transfer imagery and other high-bandwidth information to and from AESA-equipped tactical, surveillance and bomber aircraft.
"A high-speed communication capability for tactical platforms without the addition of a radio unit or alteration of the airframe represents a cost- effective proposition," Uros said. "Providing the modern warfighter with the ability to publish time-critical information products to users on the global information grid offers exceptional transformational capability today."

Raytheon is teamed with L-3 Communications and Boeing on the program. L-3 will provide experience with common data link waveforms. Boeing is the platform partner for integration of the AESA technology on the F-15 and F/A-18 aircraft.
Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems is the leading provider of sensor systems giving military forces the most accurate and timely information available for the network-centric battlefield. With 2005 revenues of $4.2 billion and 13,000 employees, SAS is headquartered in El Segundo, Calif. Additional facilities are in Goleta, Calif.; Forest, Miss.; Dallas, McKinney and Plano, Texas; and several international locations.

Raytheon Company, with 2005 sales of $21.9 billion, is an industry leader in defense and government electronics, space, information technology, technical services and business and special-mission aircraft. With headquarters in Waltham, Mass., Raytheon employs 80,000 people worldwide.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/lib...-raytheon01.htm

SOCOM orders Silent Knight terrain-following radar
January 10, 2007
http://www.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=2473356


U.S. Special Operations Command has awarded Raytheon a $135 million contract to develop a new terrain-following/terrain-avoidance radar for fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
Initial installation of the Silent Knight radar will be aboard the Army’s MH-47Gs and plans are to field the system aboard the MH-60M, MC-130H and CV-22 Block 30 aircraft.
The initial cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, potentially valued at $164 million, contains an option for six low-rate initial-production units. Raytheon plans to perform the work in Dallas and McKinney, Texas. Partners in the program include Rockwell Collins, DRS Technologies and AIC.
Raytheon said Silent Knight will allow airborne forces to fly safely at low altitudes in adverse environments using a lighter system with a lower power demand than earlier TFRs. The new radar is also designed to furnish pilots with navigation, ground-mapping and weather information.

AN/ALQ-131 Jammer Pod
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/equi...q-131-arm1c.jpg

Description
The pod provides self protection jamming for tactical fighter aircraft and is designed to operate in a dense, hostile environment of radar directed (RF) threats that require high duty cycle (pulse doppler) or CW jamming techniques. The ALQ-131 is modularly constructed, containing numerous receivers, antennas, and transmitters, active over up to five frequency bands, designed to jam, deceive, and confuse threat radar homing missiles. Because the ALQ-131 pod is modular, the system can be configured to cope with a range of threats by selecting individual modules for inclusion in the pod.

The AN/ALQ-131 pod is capable of producing both "white noise" and deception jamming signals. The pod is controlled from the cockpit by both automatic and manual systems. Basic hardware components include an Interface and control module, 2 or 3 Band modules that cover a portion of the pod's total frequency range, and the Receiver/Processor (R/P) module.

The R/P module combines an accurate signal identification capability with power management. An important function of the R/P is the management of "look through" which permits periodic surveillance of the threat environment while jamming is in progress. The AN/ALQ-131 pod is certified for use with All American tactical aircraft as well as many Western or NATO tactical aircraft.


http://www.dsd.es.northropgrumman.com/rf/ANALQ131.html
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/equip/an-alq-131.htm


http://tech.military.com/equipment/view/88...an-alq-131.html

New SAR radar in works for Predator
May 08, 2007

Lockheed Martin has a won a $40 million U.S. Army contract to incorporate low frequency synthetic aperture radar (SAR) into the Predator class of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Work on this Tactical Reconnaissance and Counter-Concealment Enabled Radar (TRACER) is slated to include the development and testing of two VHF/UHF dual-band SARs. These, according to Lockheed Martin, will provide imagery in all-weather, day or night conditions.A data link will allow “processed results to be downlinked to ground stations immediately,” the company said, and the program includes upgrades to ground stations providing mission planning and image exploitation.
All work on the SAR systems will be conducted at Lockheed Martin facilities in Phoenix, Ariz.; the program is expected to last 32 months.
TRACER will be based on earlier work on foliage penetration technology that Lockheed Martin developed in the late 1990s in a bid to detect vehicles and structures in forested areas.
John Mengucci, a Lockheed Martin executive, said in a statement that TRACER development “follows the roadmap to smaller, more flexible and more powerful sensors.”



http://www.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=2742691

AESA Radar Systems

An Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA), also known as active phased array radar is a type of radar whose transmitter and receiver functions are composed of numerous small transmit/receive (T/R) modules. AESA radars feature short to instantaneous (millisecond) scanning rates and have a desirable low probability of intercept.

As solid state devices, AESA radars have vastly simpler mechanical designs. They require no complex hydraulics for antenna movement nor hinge appendages that are prone to failure. The AESA radar occupies less space than typical radar, because of its lesser infrastructure requirements and of course its absent range of motion. The distributed transmit function also eliminates the most common single-point failure mode seen in a conventional radar. With these improvements, maintenance crews are far less severely taxed, and the radar is much more reliable.

Main advantages over mechanically scanned arrays are extremely fast scanning rate, much higher range, tremendous number of targets being tracked and engaged (multiple agile beams), low probability of intercept, ability to function as a radio/jammer, simultaneous air and ground modes, Synthetic Aperture Radar.

Mechanical steering may be added to AESA radars for increased radar field of view; The movement performance of the antenna would not need to be nearly as great as that of a traditional radar, as the radar sweep is not integral to the contact update rate.

AESA radars have:

* High ECM resistance:
o The extremely fast scan of the radar makes it difficult for an ECM device to find the correct azimuth and elevation in which the radar's main lobe is currently directed.
o High gain associated with AESA radars gives them high ERP, which makes it difficult for an active ECM device, using noise jamming techniques, to successfully jam such a radar.
* The extremely fast scan of the emitter gives it LPI features.
* Less suspectibility to voltage failures, due to the relatively very low voltage in which each and every single radiating element operates; This is combined with graceful degradation.

The difference between AESA and PESA

In a passive electronically scanned array (PESA), the microwave feed network in the back of the antenna is powered by a single RF source (magnetron, klystron, TWT, etc.), sending its waves into phase shift modules (usually digitally-controlled), which, in turn, feed the numerous emitting elements.

An AESA, instead, has an individual RF source for each of its many transmit/receive elements, making them "active".

This provides for a graceful degradation, so that many T/R modules may fail and the radar would not stop functioning.

AESA radars replace the traditional radar RF sources (magnetron/klystron/TWT), which usually require extremely high operating voltage and power, with multiple solid state RF sources operating at low voltage (40 to 60 volts). Solid state electronics use silicon or gallium-arsenide technology and benefit from mass production techniques developed for consumer electronics.


List of AESA radars

Airborne systems

* Northrop Grumman/Raytheon AN/APG-77, for the F-22 Raptor
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/APG-77

* Northrop Grumman AN/APG-80, for the F-16E/F Block 60 Fighting Falcon
* Northrop Grumman AN/APG-81, for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
* Northrop Grumman Multi-role AESA, for the Boeing Wedgetail (AEW&C)
* Raytheon AN/APG-63(V)2 and AN/APG-63(V)3, for the F-15C Eagle
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/APG-63_and_APG-70_radars

* Raytheon AN/APG-79, for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/APG-65%2C_APG...d_APG-79_radars

* Raytheon AN/APQ-181 (AESA upgrade currently in development), for the B-2 Spirit bomber
* AMSAR, from the European GTDAR consortium, for Eurofighter and Rafale fighters
* SELEX Seaspray 7000E, for helicopters
* Elta EL/M-2075 radar for the IAI Phalcon AEW&C system
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EL/M-2075

* Mitsubishi Electric Corporation AESA for the Mitsubishi F-2 fighter
* Ericsson Erieye AEW&C and NORA AESA for JAS 39 Gripen
* Phazotron NIIR Zhuk-AE, for MiG-35
* Tikhomirov NIIP Epaulet-A
* Elta EL/M-2083 aerostat-mounted air search radar

* Elta EL/M-2052, for fighters
http://www.iai.co.il/ELTA.aspx?FolderID=33796&lang=en
http://www.defense-update.com/features/du-...aradar_2052.htm
http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2005/05/...aesa-radar.html


Ground and sea-based systems

* APAR multi-function radar, primary sensor of Dutch De Zeven Provinciën and German Sachsen class frigates
* Elta EL/M-2080 Green Pine ground-based early warning AESA radar
* AN/SPY-3 multi-function radar for U.S. DD(X), CG(X) and CVN-21 next-generation surface vessels
* Raytheon U.S. National Missile Defense X-Band Radar (XBR)
* SAMPSON multi-function radar for UK. Type 45 destroyers
* MEADS's fire control radar
* THAAD system fire control radar[B][/B]

new french dedicated SIGINT ship, Dupuy de Lôme

fire up your babelfish or google translation webpage...(webpage below is in french)

http://www.netmarine.net/bat/divers/minrem/

A Brief History of Chinese Naval Radar and EW Developments



http://www.china-defense.com/naval/plan_ra...%20and%20EW.pdf

Electronic fortress

Taiwan’s military grapples with a major C4ISR upgrade
By Wendell Minnick

Deterring and perhaps confronting the armed might of the People’s Republic of China might seem a tall order, but Taiwan is investing billions in modern defense systems, with new C4ISR technology at the top of the list.
The Asian economic powerhouse is acquiring new and upgraded radar systems, long-range early warning ultra high frequency phased array radar, and upgrade of its air defense command-and-control capabilities, Link 16 and improved battlefield intelligence hardware.
Current projects include an expansion of regional air defense command centers (Anyu 4), installation of the Management Information and Commitment Control System, Ta Chen (Grand Conglomeration) C3I data link system ship-to-ship/ship-to-shore high-frequency (HF) communications project, domestic manufacture of a Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (Sincgars), Link 16 (Po Sheng) project, and the Army Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE) program.
The catalyst for the decision to upgrade Taiwan’s C4ISR system came with the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, in which China fired several Dong Feng (East Wind) missiles across the Taiwan Strait. The event shook up Taiwan’s military establishment and forced a major rethink about its defenses.
An evaluation by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and the Pentagon concluded that Taiwan had an urgent requirement to upgrade its C4ISR capabilities.
At the time, fighter aircraft could not communicate with naval vessels. Army units relied more on cell phones because of antiquated radios and unreliable computer links. The navy lacked real-time intelligence not only on Chinese naval movements, but also commercial shipping passing through the strait.
Taiwan’s military communications network consisted of fixed telephone lines (coaxial and fiber optic), microwave and HF/VHF radio. However, Taiwan has begun replacing many of the fixed lines with a broadband fiber-optic cable communications network.
In 2000, Taiwan’s army also began incorporating the IMSE system. The system was first used during the catastrophic 1999 earthquake, which destroyed fixed lines of communications and left much of the island cut off from Taipei. The earthquake also showed the ease of disrupting islandwide communications.
Taiwan was also experiencing its first taste of cyber warfare. Mainland Chinese hacker attacks exploded in the late 1990s. Since 2000, every government and military computer has been attacked. Attempts to identify the attackers have, in many cases, led to computer facilities in Fujian Province believed to belong to the Chinese military.
Taiwan has since upgraded its anti-cyber warfare capabilities. It has beefed up the Communications, Electronics, and Information Bureau’s efforts by creating new units to fight hacker attacks. The military conducted its first cyber war exercises in 2000.
Although at present the cyber attacks are relatively harmless, there are fears that China is developing “acupuncture warfare” that could be used to paralyze Taiwan’s military command, as well as energy, transportation and banking systems in a pre-invasion strategy designed to cause panic.

ANYU 4 UPGRADE
The Anyu Program was initiated to upgrade Taiwan’s air defense command-and-control capabilities. It is divided into four programs. Anyu 1-4 entailed the purchase of 11 FPS/ TPS-117 surveillance radars (four mobile and seven fixed), an upgrade of TPS-43 radars to TPS-75 standards, constructing a new radar station, and the creation of a Automated Air Defense System and Regional Operations Control Center (AADS/ROCC), dubbed the Anyu 4 program, to replace the aging 10-1-E Strong Net (Chiang Wang) system.
Strong Net is based on a system of 35 radars on 21 radar stations that are able to identify enemy aircraft up to 600 kilometers. Built by Hughes, the system was able to integrate the navy, army and air force air defense capabilities using the E-2 Hawkeye aircraft. Taiwan acquired four Northrop Grumman E-2Ts in the 1990s and an additional two E-2C 2000 aircraft in 2005.
Strong Net incorporates fighter aircraft and a variety of air-defense missile batteries that dot the island. Taiwan uses Patriot PAC-2 Plus batteries to protect the capital city of Taipei. The rest of the island is protected by indigenously produced Tien Kung (Sky Bow) air defense missile batteries. Plans to purchase PAC-3s have met opposition from pro-China supporters in the legislature, and anti-war activists managed to pass a referendum that bans the purchase for the time being.
Now, Strong Net is being replaced by the AADS/ROCC system (Anyu 4). Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, with a subcontract for software with the Israel-based Ness Company.
Strong Net was viewed as too vulnerable to attack. Taiwan relied on a central Air Operations Center in southern Taipei. Should it be destroyed by a missile attack from China, Taiwan would lose its air defense command and control. The Anyu 4 program automates the system and expands the number of centers from one to four.

EARLY WARNING RADAR
Fear of saturation missile attacks from China increased after the 1996 crisis. China’s collection of Dong Feng-11 (M-11) and DF-15 (M-9) short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan has grown from 400 in 1996 to 800 at present. China’s 2nd Artillery Corps has been adding about 50 missiles a year to its inventory in Fujian Province.
Acquiring a long-range phased array UHF early warning radar (EWR) capable of penetrating deep inside Chinese territory became a major goal of the military. Discussions first centered on the AN/FPS-115 Pave Paws radar but finally settled on a modified version of the radar built by Raytheon.
Critics of the program argued that a large stationary radar would be susceptible to China’s anti-radiation missiles or simple sabotage, and would not survive long enough to provide valuable intelligence on China’s course of action. However, others argue that the new radar would serve also as surveillance radar that could collect intelligence on Chinese aircraft movements before an attack.
In addition, some critics have argued that Taiwan has sufficient radar coverage of China, including two long-range radars built recently on Tungyin Island, part of the Matsu Island chain and 16 kilometers from the Chinese coast. Additional radars are further south on Kinmen Island, also near the Chinese coast.
At present, the new radar is being built on Loshan Mountain near Hsinchu, northern Taiwan, at an estimated cost of $830 million. Originally, a second EWR was planned for Longshan Mountain in Pingtung County, but because of funding cuts, the second was scrapped. Some have complained that this will limit Taiwan’s overall surveillance capability.

PO SHENG/LINK 16
Taiwan launched its biggest C4ISR program, dubbed Po Sheng (Broad Victory), in 2003. Po Sheng is a foreign military sales program designed to enhance C4ISR capability for the air force, navy, army, joint defense platforms, and command and operations centers.
This system will include only U.S. aircraft and systems. Taiwan has about 60 French-made Dassault Mirage 2000-5 fighters that will not be incorporated into the system. Its six French-built Lafayette-class frigates also will be excluded.
The program will provide Link 16 capability, via the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System/Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), to all branches of the military. The overall value of the program is about $1.5 billion. A subset to the program is the installation of 102 MIDS/Low Volume Terminals and 20 MIDS On Ships Terminals.
Taiwan has an assortment of U.S. equipment, including F-16, F-5, C-130 and E-2 Hawkeye aircraft and Perry-class, Knox-class and Kidd-class warships.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) is involved in a major signals intelligence (SigInt) collection program with the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Although the U.S. and Taiwan do not have diplomatic ties, both countries share a wide variety of intelligence on China’s military activities. The relationship stretches back to the Cold War era when the U.S. had a close working relationship with the Nationalist government in power in Taipei.
The NSA and NSB established a SigInt antenna facility at Pingdun Li on Yamingshan Mountain, just north of Taipei. The facility was begun in the late 1980s, when the U.S. and the United Kingdom began closing the U.K.’s SigInt facility (Project Kittiwake) at Chung Hom Kok, Hong Kong, in preparation for the 1997 handover to Beijing.
The Pingdun Li facility has 10 fixed HF/DF dipole antenna masts arranged in an interlaced oval design that is similar to a spider web. The facility has undergone numerous upgrades since its completion and the technical work is contracted out by the NSA to Summit Telecom Systems (STS) in Maryland. STS sources have said the facility is a major producer of SigInt on Chinese military communications.
One U.S. officer from the NSA’s Sigint Liaison Branch manages the facility.
Taiwan is in a unique geographic position that gives it access to southeast Chinese military communications. The U.S. has similar sites in Japan and South Korea, but these facilities are too far north to capture radio communications coming from Guangdong and Fujian Province.
Taiwan also has a variety of SigInt antenna facilities around Taiwan that serve a variety of functions. These include a large 90-plus-direction-finding antenna facility in Linkou in northwest Taiwan and an air force SigInt facility similar to Pingdun Li in Dahzi near Sungshan Air Force Base.

SATELLITE CAPABILITIES
Taiwan’s intelligence-gathering capabilities include the ROCSAT-2 satellite, launched in May 2004 from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., on a Taurus XL rocket.
Built by EADS Astrium for $70 million, the satellite is described as a scientific platform by Taiwan’s National Space Organization (NSO).
Although the NSO has denied ROCSAT-2 is a spy satellite, there leaves little doubt among sources connected to the program that the primary mission of the platform is military.
ROCSAT-2 is fitted with an image-processing system that provides 2m resolution that combines with a front-end X-band antenna, allowing for complete satellite image-data receiving and processing. The 750-kilogram ROCSAT-2 is a low-earth-orbit remote-sensing satellite that circles the Earth 14 times a day at an altitude of 891 kilometers. It crosses over Taiwan twice daily.
It has since been learned that the satellite has been hobbled by pressure from China. Astrium reportedly placed technical limitations on the ROCSAT-2, which included shutter controls that blinded the satellite over China.
Taiwan is planning a $300 million program to replace the satellite with a more advanced ROCSAT-3. Debate is raging over buying, building or borrowing. In the past, Taiwan has contracted satellite services from US Space Imaging (Ikonos), Israel’s ImageSat (EROS) and the French Spot Image (SPOT).
Taiwan’s overall C4ISR upgrade program involves a wide variety of domestic and international companies. Local companies include state-run Aerospace and Industrial Development Corp., state-owned China Shipbuilding Corp., military-run Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, and the National Defense Industrial Association of Sino.

www.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=2366056

Paris Air Show: Raytheon touts AESA radar technology for India's fighter fleet
23 June 2007
Le Bourget, Paris: US defence major, Raytheon, has come out with yet another India-specific gambit, this time offering technology transfer of sophisticated AESA radars, which it says can be uploaded even on the indigenously developed light combat aircraft (LCA) Tejas. Raytheon officials, however, cautioned that such technology transfers would be subject to governmental approvals, given their sensitive nature.
Active electronically scanned array (AESA) are dual mode radars that are capable of tracking targets in the air, as well as on the ground.
"The technology is scalable and we could scale the electronic antenna of the AESA radar to put it in the LCA," Michael Henchey, director of business development for Raytheon's Tactical Airborne Systems, told PTI here on the sidelines of the Paris Air Show.
The technology and its applications can be adapted for different platforms, according to Henchey, including new aircraft like the LCA, and can also be retrofitted on older aircraft like the Indian Air Force's existing fleet of jets.
He, however, cautioned that the transfer of such technology would depend totally on negotiations between the Indian and US governments. This would include the right of the US government to decide on the sophistication level of the AESA radar technology that it would be willing to share with New Delhi.
"It would all depend on the country to country negotiations," he said.
Unlike conventional radars, AESA radars can track targets on the ground and transmit the information to ground stations and other aircraft to provide a near real time picture of the battlefield. They can also be used in an electronic warfare role.
The AESA radar is a key element of the effort by US companies to pitch the F-16 and F-18 combat jets for India's planned purchase of 126 MRCA fighters. Raytheon, he said, was also looking to partner Indian defence firms in view of New Delhi's 30 per cent offsets policy for all defence deals worth over Rs300 crore. "We have already tied up with Tata Power and will announce some more partnerships with Indian firms later this year," said Henchey

http://www.domain-b.com/aero/June/2007/20070623_raytheon.htm

Northrop ready to move against Raytheon in radars
By Stephen Trimble
June 2007

Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems is set make to make a number of strategic moves against rival Raytheon in the growing worldwide market for active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars.
The two companies currently split the US market for airborne tactical fighter radars, with Northrop the supplier for Lockheed Martin's F-22 and F-35 and Raytheon the supplier for Boeing's F-15, F/A-18E/F and EA-18G. That roughly equitable balance is about to be challenged for the first time since the Joint Strike Fighter downselect in 2001.

The first step for Northrop will be an attempt in October to usurp Raytheon's position as sole supplier for radar technology on the Boeing F-15. The US Air Force has received proposals from both companies to upgrade about 200 F-15Es with AESA. A decision is expected in October.
"We're constantly looking at market adjacencies. The F-15 is a market adjacency," says Jim Pitts, president of Northrop's electronic systems sector.
AESA technology has fast become a key competitive discriminator for tactical aircraft, with countries such as India, Japan and Singapore seeking access to the technology as part of any future fighter purchase.

Northrop is basing its proposal for the F-15E radar upgrades contract on a derivation of the APG-81 developed for the F-35 Lightning II JSF. It was previously thought that Northrop would offer the Lockheed F-22's APG-77 radar, but its lack of anti-tampering software for export customers shifted Northrop to the JSF system, Pitts say.
Raytheon has equipped the F-15E fleet with the APG-63(V)1 radar. The company will offer the air force the APG-79 radar for the Block II F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the EA-18G Growler.

Boeing is managing the competition for the air force, and claims no allegiance to their long-term supplier Raytheon. "They both have their strengths and weaknesses," says Chris Chadwick, Boeing's vice-president and general manager for Global Strike Systems. "Northrop's a great radar house and they can leverage the development they have in the F-35."
In India, Northrop is supporting Lockheed's campaign to tailor an F-16 for India's pending requirement for 126 fighters. The F-16 model could be all-new or largely based on the F-16 Block 60, which features Northrop's APG-80 AESA. A less-expensive option also could involve selling the F-16I sold to Israel, which includes Northrop's mechanically scanned radar, Pitts says. That option also may avoid export control issues, as the product has already been approved for export.
"My sense is the higher the technology the Indians go after, the more difficult it will be for export approval," Pitts says. "This all revolves around the India-US relationship, and if that solidifies a lot of good things can happen."

Another part of Northrop's long-term strategy is to focus on the air force's requirement for a next-generation long range strike aircraft by 2018 to introduce the next huge leaps in AESA technology: conformal load-bearing antennas and the use of radar as a directed energy weapon. The company has experimented with a technology called load-bearing structural arrays.


http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/...-in-radars.html

AESA has demonstrated that it can disable missiles and aircraft.

June 20, 2007:

The U.S. Air Force has successfully tested having an AESA radar double as a communications device, transmitting data from an aircraft, via its radar, to a ground station. The speed of transmission was about a hundred times faster than a typical high speed Internet connection (2-3 megabit DSL). Using AESA like this takes a big load off satellite communications, and allows aircraft to send video from their cameras, directly to ground stations.

AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar also can track vehicles on land, and ships at sea. Such radars are already installed in JSTARS aircraft, Global Hawk UAVs and many fighters. AESA radar consists of thousands of tiny radars that can be independently aimed in different directions. A sufficiently powerful AESA radar can also focus enough energy to damage aircraft or missiles.

The U.S. has already been doing this with the high-powered microwave (HPM) effects generated by similar AESA radars used in F18, F35 and F22 aircraft. This is sort of like the EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse) put out by nuclear weapons.

AESA has demonstrated that it can disable missiles and aircraft.
AESA in a Global Hawk could disable electronics on the ground.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htecm/art...aspx?comments=Y

LITENING AT pods

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images...ening_AT_lg.jpg

Ultra Electronics Holdings announces that its Sonar & Communication Systems business, based in Greenford, Middlesex, has been selected by the UK Ministry of Defense to supply and support LITENING III variant surveillance & targeting pods for the RAF's Eurofighter aircraft. Ultra will act as the prime contractor and assemble the pods in the UK, with its Sonar & Communication Systems business unit running the project. LITENING designer RAFAEL of Israel will act as the principal sub-contractor.
The Eurofighter has initially been produced and delivered in its air defense version; full muti-role capabilities are still several years away. The addition of the LITENING pods is a fast way to upgrade the aircraft's ground attack capabilities, and make it more relevant to the Global War on Terror and other likely contingencies. With respect to the contract's cost, and the pods' additional features¡K
The total value of the initial contract for 20 pods was expected to be about GBP 15 million (USD $26.5 million). The UK Ministry of Defense announced that it intends to make a single source, off the shelf procurement for the UK that follows a competitive assessment carried out in 2000 by Eurofighter GmbH/NETMA on behalf of all four nations participating in the Typhoon programme. A subsequent August 10, 2006 release from the UK MoD noted that the LITENING IIIs "will provide a ground attack capability for the UK in advance of a more comprehensive air-to-surface package which is planned by all four partner nations (Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) later in the decade."
A subsequent July 17, 2006 contract between the British MoD and Ultra turned out to be GBP 56 million (about $102.43 million). The deal also includes 20 years of in-service support. As Ulta Electronics plc notes:
"The targeting pod to be provided is the Litening EF (Gen III) which is the latest version of Rafael's Litening pod. It will provide the Typhoon aircraft with a vital air-to-ground targeting capability including the ability to laser-designate a ground target for attack by other assets. This version of the Litening pod also provides a ground reconnaissance and scanning capability, even when the Eurofighter is flying at maximum speed at low altitudes and undertaking combat manoeuvres. The pod can store the digital record of the imagery to facilitate post-mission analysis for training purposes.
The versatile Litening pod has various additional operating modes including air-to-air targeting to enhance Eurofighter's traditional air superiority role. The pod is also equipped with third-generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensors, the images from which can be fed into the pilot's Head-Up Display (HUD) to assist low altitude supersonic night flying.
Ultra will be providing the UK with a sovereign operational capability for Litening pod. Technology will be transferred from Rafael to Ultra in the UK so that the equipment can be supported and upgraded as necessary for the next 20 years. Ultra will also undertake a specialist role of supporting the security accreditation of the pod. Ultra will be providing the RAF with a guaranteed level of equipment availability for operations under a Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) arrangement."
LITENING appears to be moving toward a de facto position as the default choice in this sector. DID has covered this system several times ¡V including Australia's similar-value Australia's $100M purchase of 37 LITENING AT pods plus support, the this pod is also a standard option with the JAS-39 Gripen.
Meanwhile, a July 20, 2006 release from Eurofighter GmbH sets this effort in the context of the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) contract for the integration of a Laser Designator Pod (LDP) and the Enhanced Paveway II Laser Guided Bomb on Royal Air Force Typhoons. Eurofighter CEO Aloysius Rauen also said: "With this new contract we will boost Eurofighter Typhoon's capabilities beyond the contracted Tranche 1 performance. It will definitely make the aircraft even more attractive to potential export customers¡K."
Additional Readings & Sources
„X Ultra Electronics (Sept 27/05) ¡V Ultra Selected To Provide Targeting Pod For RAF Typhoon Aircraft
„X Ultra Electronics (July 17/06) ¡V Ultra Wins GBP 56m Contract To Supply Targeting Pods For UK Eurofighter Typhoon Aircraft.

July 18, 2007
Pentagon urged not to use ability to degrade GPS signals By Bob Brewin bbrewin@govexec.com July 17, 2007

A newly formed multiagency advisory board argues that the Defense Department should never again intentionally degrade the performance of the Global Positioning System.
At its first meeting held in March, the National Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board decided that, although the Air Force has the ability to degrade signals from the constellation of GPS satellites through a process known as "selective availability," board chairman and former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger says he "cannot conceive any scenario in which SA has any credibility today," according to minutes of the meeting, which the board released this month.
The last time Defense intentionally degraded the civilian signal was in 1990, and its reason for doing so was not made public. The Air Force intends to add the ability to degrade the signal in its next-generation GPS III satellites, which it plans to launch in 2013.
The PNT board includes members from the departments of Defense, Transportation, Commerce, State, Homeland Security, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NASA, as well as representatives from academia and U.S. industry. Representatives from Australia, India, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and Great Britain also sit on the board.
The Air Force started development of GPS during the Cold War and included the ability to degrade the accuracy of signals sent for civilian use, which are globally available, to an accuracy of about 100 meters instead of the current 10 meter or better level of accuracy. In May 2000, President Clinton declared that the United States would no longer degrade the civilian GPS signal.
President Bush issued a revised PNT policy in December 2004, which promised "uninterrupted access" to civilian GPS signals. But Bush added that the United States would include capabilities to deny hostile use of the GPS system "without unduly disrupting civil and commercial access" to GPS signals.
Chet Huber, a PNT board member and president of OnStar, a vehicle navigation and security system that relies on the GPS system, told the meeting that the 2 million users of OnStar need assurance of signal stability. GPS-equipped OnStar units help responders locate emergencies more quickly, Huber said, and "there would be a high price due from applying SA."
Retired Air Force Gen. James McCarthy, a former pilot who currently serves as a national security professor at the Air Force Academy and is a PNT board member, told the meeting that SA can be eliminated "with the right set of arguments, which have not yet been made or articulated." McCarthy added that in his view there is no need for SA, although he would not have said that five years ago.
The United States turned off its ability to degrade the GPS signal seven years ago, but James Miller, a senior GPS technologist with NASA, told the board meeting that many countries still do not trust GPS because of "the international perception that continuing with SA capability enables GPS to be turned off at any time."
Accuracy for both military and civilian users also will be improved by insuring that the GPS constellation remains at its current level of 30 satellites, according to Schlesinger and other board members. Schlesinger said the Air Force only guarantees 24 satellites. An increase would boost GPS accuracy, and he said 30 satellites are the minimum needed to support ground forces operating in varied terrain.
Aviation users also say they need 30 satellites to support aircraft navigation. Capt. Joseph Burns, director of flight standards and technology at United Airlines and a board member, said he is concerned about accuracy being degraded by interference.
Board member Timothy Murphy, a technical fellow with the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, said the company's vision is "tightly wrapped" around the notion that there will be a "robust" satellite navigation system based on 30 satellites.
Retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Robert Rosenberg, chairman of the Air Force Space Command GPS Independent Review Team, told the board that the GPS system must be robust enough to work in challenging environments, such as mountains and urban canyons, which require more than 24 satellites. Rosenberg said all users today are used to the service that 28 to 30 satellites provide, and a reduction in that number of satellites would have a potentially "enormous adverse impact."
But it may be difficult to keep that number of fully functional satellites in orbit in the near term, he said. By next year, 11 GPS satellites will have reduced capabilities and the number of satellites in the constellation may have to be cut.
Future funding for GPS may be limited and "more must be done with the same or less finding," Rosenberg said. Col. Allan Ballenger, commander of the Air Force GPS Wing, which is the acquisition arm for the GPS program, says his funding runs between $900 million and $1 billion a year.

HEZBOLLAH ELECTRONIC WARRIORS
A year after the terror group's war with Israel, Hezbollah's sophistication continues to surprise. Not only did the Islamists blend high-tech missiles and drones with an "open source" command structure. They also managed to survive some of Israel's electronic and network assaults. Retired Israeli Colonel David Eshel describes in this month's Journal of Electronic Defense (which is subscriber-only, alas). Here's a snip:
Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had provided Hezbollah with a [system] capable of circumventing large segments of Israel's sophisticated EW [electronic warfare] network in the combat zone...

Entering into captured Hezbollah command bunkers , Israeli EW experts were surprised by the sophisticated protective mechanisms attached to Hezbollah's Iranian-made communications networks, which were discovered to be connected by optical fibers not susceptible to electronic jamming. The Iranian electronic engineers' success proved such that on Wednesday August 9, nearly four weeks into the war, Hezbollah's communications networks were still operating at points only 500 meters from the Israeli border.Eshel also confirms that Hezbollah was able to track Israeli officers' movements by listening in on their cell phones (not to their military radios, as some reported).
Israel scored some high-tech wins of their own. Using their drones, the Israelis were able to track Hezbollah rocket caches -- to the rented rooms inside civilians homes where they were hidden.
http://blog.wired.com/defense/comms/index.html

Extending China’s reach
A people’s army evolves into a modern, net-centric force
By Wendell Minnick,August 01, 2007

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is transforming itself into a modern force that can challenge the U.S. military in conflicts that could include naval and air clashes over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, territorial disputes in waters claimed by Japan or a war over Taiwan.
Toward that end, China has devoted an enormous amount of energy and resources to the construction of a “world-class C4ISR capability” and has “made substantial progress in this direction,” said Richard Fisher, vice president of the Washington-based International Assessment and Strategy Center.
“Inside the Chinese mainland it is possible to conclude that the central command authority and all regional command levels possess modern digital automatic command facilities that are trebly linked via space, HF radio and broadband connections,” he said. “Mobile units, land, air and sea also have radio and space coms, and troposcatter for fixed sites, too.”
Despite the best efforts by the PLA to embrace modernization, for the most part the PLA is not yet a uniformly high-technology force. Larry Wortzel, commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, believes there are a number of systems able to work at sophisticated levels, but across the spectrum of its military systems, the PLA cannot field a fully digitized force.
“The PLA is working to apply network-centric warfare concepts, but lacks a comprehensive set of the data transfer systems necessary to field a force that employs these technologies in a uniform way,” Wortzel said. “It may be two to five years until, in the Asia-Pacific region, the PLA achieves anything close to the level of networking that U.S. forces can apply globally today.”
China’s military theorists watch the U.S. military’s C4ISR technology and how it is applied in real combat environments with an almost obsessive manner. This obsession is partly due to China’s belief that the U.S. is the most likely military threat in the near term, and dealing with and countering U.S. capabilities is a high priority.

DATA OBSESSION
The White Paper on National Defense prepared by China’s State Council in December stated that “a revolution in military affairs is developing in depth worldwide,” noting “military competition based on ‘informationalization’ is intensifying.”
Wortzel believes that China has developed a means to attack and counter joint U.S. data systems and communications. By consulting dozens of corporate Web sites and tactical data link operator guides, as well as NATO and U.S. military manuals, he said, China has produced a virtual guidebook for electronic warfare to disrupt critical U.S. cooperative target engagement and C4ISR data links.
“To engage in modern war the PLA must be able to attack the enemy’s knowledge systems and such high-value targets as communications, carrier battle groups and aviation warfare units,” Wortzel said.
Bernard “Bud” Cole, a China military specialist at the National War College in Washington, D.C., also points to China’s growing ability to protect and manage C4ISR capabilities.
“During the past decade China has laid miles of buried land lines to carry communications, which greatly increases communications and data transfer security,” Cole said.
Cole also believes that another important development, one much harder to evaluate, is the degree of autonomy given to subordinate military commanders. “The PLA is very much the child of the Soviet system of extreme centralization of military planning and decision making, even at the tactical level,” he said. “Since the early 1990s it’s been moving away from that degree of centralization.” As centralization decreases, he said, “the PLA will increase its operational proficiency very significantly.”
China has fielded a national automated command-and-control system called Qu Dian, which is a redundant military-region system linking the General Staff Department headquarters and the PLA’s services with regional combat headquarters and their subordinate major organizations.
For full effectiveness, however, “the system requires satellite data-exchange support and airborne radio and communications relay, which China still lacks,” Wortzel said.

AWACS TURBULENCE
China has a variety of airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft programs fielded or in the works. An AWACS built around the Russian A-50 aircraft is equipped with Chinese-made phased-array radar, a data link capability, a data processing system, a C3I capability, and a friend-or-foe identification system. This and China’s own Xian Y-8 AWACS aircraft can exchange data with other aircraft and naval ships equipped with compatible data links.
Fisher believes China has built three or four A-50 AWACS for testing and operational transition purposes. “It is not known whether they are now considered operational, but more should be expected to be built,” he said. “This program began as the A-50/Phalcon integration, but the U.S. forced Israel to halt the radar transfer in June 2000.”
“Nevertheless, Taiwanese sources have long stated that the A-50s now flying give a signal profile consistent with that of the Phalcon. So, at a minimum, the Chinese A-50 contains a phased array system. It is estimated that a combination of Chinese, Russian and perhaps Ukrainian engineers helped the Chinese complete the radar installation.”
There are two Y-8 AWACS programs: the Y-8 Balance Beam and the Y-8 Cheek Array. The prototype Balance Beam crashed in 2006, killing 35 Chinese and Pakistani engineers and five crew members. Though the crash devastated the program and literally wiped out its top engineers and program managers, it is still considered extremely important to the PLA.
Fisher said the Balance Beam phased array radar is clearly patterned on the Swedish Ericsson Erieye, although repeated questions to Saab and Ericsson have yielded consistent denials of any connection.
“Its advantage is that it is lightweight and less expensive than the A-50, thus, more can be purchased,” he said. “For regional operations along China’s periphery, this system is ideal for anti-air and anti-ship missions. It is now ironic that Pakistan will likely be operating both the Saab/Erieye combo and the Y-8 Balance Beam.”
The Y-8 Cheek Array was unveiled in 2005 with Premier Wen Jiabao in attendance. It features two large “cheek” phased array antennae. Almost nothing has been publicly disclosed about this system. The radar might be a version of the phased array developed for the navy’s Luyang 2 destroyer.
“This makes sense given the shape of the array on the Y-8,” said Fisher. “If true, then the mission of this aircraft could range from simple AEW to ground mapping to advanced microwave emitter for weapon purposes. All are possible developments of phased array radar technologies.”
There are also indications of a mysterious navy AWACS version under development. Fisher said that in 2005 a “Chinese magazine article inadvertently revealed a corner of what appears to be a model of an E-1 Tracer-sized AWACS [aircraft] during the visit by a Chinese political leader to the design bureau. This would certainly be consistent with PLA carrier ambitions. The real deal, however, has yet to be seen.”
Wortzel points to other PLA combat systems able to act as an airborne command post and assist with combat data exchange. “The enhanced Sukhoi Su-30MKK2 fighter under development for China will be capable of tasking and controlling up to 10 other aircraft on a common [communications] net,” he said. “The model already delivered to the PLA, the Su-30MKK, will control up to four Su-27s.”

ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Andrei Chang, a China military specialist with the Hong Kong-based Kanwa Information Center, said that judging from the electronic warfare (EW) operational systems introduced by China National Electronic I/E Corp. at IDEX 2007, it is quite obvious that China has attached greater importance to the integration of its EW operation systems, especially the diversification of the means in collecting and analyzing electronic intelligence.
“This latest trend indicates that China is attempting to integrate the EW operation systems to other national-level and combat theater-level C4ISR networks,” Chang said, while acknowledging that defense exhibitions have their limitations.
“China normally only [displays] its C4ISR concepts at international exhibitions rather than the actual C4ISR hardware, so it’s hard to know how effective these systems are in real combat operations,” he said. “But due to the fact that China received assistance from Belarus, its design of EW operational software may be already in the stage of practical application.”
Chang believes the integration of EW operation systems has started to involve reconnaissance, collection and analysis of electronic intelligence in all three services — a break with the past practice of focusing on a single service.
China’s ELINT hardware facilities have also become systematic, and the PLA has so far received the submarine-based SRW209, surface ship-based SRW210, the land-based ERR-107A and DZ9001/2, and the airborne-based KE800 ELINT [electronic intelligence] systems, according to Chang.
“Compared with the systems in the 1990s, China now has quite diversified and automatic ELINT systems for different equipments,” he said. “The antenna of these operational systems alone indicates that those ELINT systems similar to DZ90001/2 have already appeared in the Chinese military exercises many times, and the PLA’s collection of electronic intelligence ... is now automatic, giving it much enhanced mobility.”

TOWARD C4KISR
As the PLA moves toward a net-centric force, new emphasis is being placed on integrating precision-guided weapons into the larger capability. According to Fisher, this push to integrate weapons control will result in “placing a ‘K’ [for kill] inside C4ISR, allowing the PLA to rapidly compress its sensor-to-shooter loop.”
Wortzel believes that China is close to fielding a C4ISR architecture that will enable it to fight a campaign out to about 2,000 kilometers from the Chinese coast.
“For the United States, this means that we must continue to develop and stay ahead in the areas of kinetic and directed energy weapons, electronic warfare and information warfare,” he said. “When it deploys satellite tracking and data relay systems missiles with maneuverable warheads, the PLA may well achieve its goal of targeting deployed naval battle groups.
“Thus, China is close to achieving a viable anti-access strategy that, as a minimum, would impede U.S. and Japanese military operations. This capability may be only two to five years away.” •
http://www.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=2824146

Lockheed Martin to Provide Long-Range, Air Surveillance Radar for the Royal Thai Air Force

(Source: Lockheed Martin; issued Aug. 9, 2007)

SYRACUSE, NY. --- Lockheed Martin has been contracted by the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) to provide a TPS-77 long-range, air surveillance radar, which will complete a multi-phase national air defense system for Thailand.

The radar, which will be made at Lockheed Martin's Syracuse, NY facility, will be installed and operational in 2009. This is Lockheed Martin's first direct commercial sale to the government of Thailand.

The TPS-77 is the latest configuration of the world's most successful 3-D solid-state radar design. This transportable radar provides continuous high-quality 3-D surveillance on aircraft targets at ranges out to 250 nautical miles. The TPS-77 shares commonality with Lockheed Martin's FPS-117 radar with regard to maintenance activity and Line Replaceable Units (LRUs). There are 26 TPS-77s and 127 FPS-117 systems operational in more than 20 countries. Many have performed for years completely unmanned in remote areas, and in a wide range of operational environments.

"Our customer told us that this radar was chosen because of its successful track record world wide," said Greg Larioni, Lockheed Martin's vice president, ground-based surveillance and airborne radar. "In addition to past performance, they also appreciated the effort our team made to listen to their requirements and work to meet them."


http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/c...k&modele=jdc_34

Here's an interesting tidbit regarding a new stealthy radar technology. It seems to take the general concept of the F-22 Raptor's AN/APG-77 radar and build on it. The "77" is considered stealthy because it generates seemingly random RF and that is not easily detected by the enemy's SIGINT assets.
This new concept is however a bit different and I must say, sounds intrguing...


STEALTH RADAR SYSTEM SEES THROUGH TREES, WALLS -- UNDETECTED
The radar can be tuned to penetrate solid walls -- just like the waves that transmit radio and TV signals -- so the military could spot enemy soldiers inside a building without the radar signal being detected, Walton said. Traffic police could measure vehicle speed without setting off drivers' radar detectors.
COLUMBUS, Ohio -- Ohio State University engineers have invented a radar system that is virtually undetectable, because its signal resembles random noise.
The radar could have applications in law enforcement, the military, and disaster rescue.
Eric K. Walton, senior research scientist in Ohio State's ElectroScience Laboratory, said that with further development the technology could even be used for medical imaging.
He explained why using random noise makes the radar system invisible.
"Almost all radio receivers in the world are designed to eliminate random noise, so that they can clearly receive the signal they're looking for," Walton said. "Radio receivers could search for this radar signal and they wouldn't find it. It also won't interfere with TV, radio, or other communication signals."
The radar scatters a very low-intensity signal across a wide range of frequencies, so a TV or radio tuned to any one frequency would interpret the radar signal as a very weak form of static.
"It doesn't interfere because it has a bandwidth that is thousands of times broader than the signals it might otherwise interfere with," Walton said.
Like traditional radar, the "noise" radar detects objects by bouncing a radio signal off them and detecting the rebound. The hardware isn't expensive, either; altogether, the components cost less than $100.
The difference is that the noise radar generates a signal that resembles random noise, and a computer calculates very small differences in the return signal. The calculations happen billions of times every second, and the pattern of the signal changes constantly. A receiver couldn't detect the signal unless it knew exactly what random pattern to look for.
The radar can be tuned to penetrate solid walls -- just like the waves that transmit radio and TV signals -- so the military could spot enemy soldiers inside a building without the radar signal being detected, Walton said. Traffic police could measure vehicle speed without setting off drivers' radar detectors. Autonomous vehicles could tell whether a bush conceals a more dangerous obstacle, like a tree stump or a gulley.
The radar is inherently able to distinguish between many types of targets because of its ultra-wide-band characteristics. "Unfortunately, there are thousands of everyday objects that look like humans on radar -- even chairs and filing cabinets," he said. So the shape of a radar image alone can't be used to identify a human. "What tends to give a human away is that he moves. He breathes, his heart beats, his body makes unintended motions."
These tiny motions could be used to locate disaster survivors who were pinned under rubble. Other radar systems can't do that, because they are too far-sighted -- they can't see people who are buried only a few yards away. Walton said that the noise radar is inherently able to see objects that are nearby.
"It can see things that are only a couple of inches away with as much clarity as it can see things on the surface of Mars," he added.
That means that with further development, the radar might image tumors, blood clots, and foreign objects in the body. It could even measure bone density. As with all forms of medical imaging, studies would first have to determine the radar's effect on the body.
The university is expected to license the patented radar system.

http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/noiserad.htm

AGM-88E - The forget you not missile !

The latest version of the U.S. anti-radiation missile, AGM-88E, makes is nearly impossible for enemy radars to be turned on, and avoid destruction.
The missile, also called the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided
Missile (AARGM), was developed jointly by U.S. and Italian firms. The original
AGM-88 has been in use since the 1980s, and the original 1960s anti-radiation missile quickly evolved into what was called HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile).

The AGM-88E version defeats the favorite trick of anti-aircraft units, shutting down their radars when they note a HARM is on the way.
The AGM-88E remembers where the radar is when it was on, and carries its own high resolution (mm wave) radar to make sure it gets the radar. Finally, the AGM-88E can transmit a picture of the target, just before it is hit, so the user can be certain of what was taken out. Currently, there are orders for over 2,000 of these
missiles from the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, Italy and Germany.
Production begins this year.

Pix of the AGM 88E HARM
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:AGM-88_HARM_on_FA-18C.jpg



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-88_HARM

Fly and Listen: The AN/ALQ-22 ALFS Sonar System
20-Aug-2007 14:05

The AN/AQS-22 Airborne Low-Frequency Sonar (ALFS) will equip the US Nay's new MH-60R multi-mission helicopters, and will serve as their primary anti-submarine sensor system. The new FLASH sonar operates at lower frequency and higher power waveforms than existing dipping sonars, which will increase the opportunities for long-range detections; indeed, the AQS-22 dipping sonar claims 4x area coverage compared to current systems and includes both active or passive sonar modes. Submarine tracking, localization, classification are all covered. A winching system with up to 2,500 feet of cable raises and lowers the sonar, and the complete system also includes active or passive sonobuoys, enhanced shallow water capability via processing improvements, underwater communication and environmental data collection capabilities, and other advanced characteristics.
ALFS is a cooperative venture between Raytheon Corp. and Thales Underwater Systems, which supplies a modified version of its FLASH wide-band sonar. Thales' Folding Light Acoustic System for Helicopters (FLASH) helicopter-borne dipping sonar is widely popular, and has been chosen by the the US (MH-60R), France (NH90 NFH), Norway (NH90 NFH), Sweden (NH90 NFH), UAE (Naval Cougar), and UK (EH101 MERLIN); it is also currently proposed for the German Navy's NH90.
Pix of AN/AQS 22 in action
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images...-22_ALFS_lg.jpg

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/154m-f...rs-et-al-03643/

http://www.raytheon.com/products/alfs/index.html

China Tests New Electronic Battlefield System

09/19/07
By WENDELL MINNICK, TAIPEI

China revealed its version of the “digital soldier” concept at its annual North Sword 0709 live-fire exercise, begun Sept. 18 at the Zhurihe training base in northern Inner Mongolia. According to a Xinhua press report, the exercise involved 2,000 soldiers, tanks and other vehicles equipped with electronic devices that instantly relayed data about battlefield conditions back to the command center. The system collected data on causalties, food, ammunition and supplies.
“The system could let us know the exact conditions our troops are in under combat; how much ammunition, water and food remain; and when we should support them with logistics,” said Zhang Jixiang, vice commander of the Zhurihe training base, according to Xinhua.
Richard Fisher, vice president of the Washington-based International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the system is China’s attempt at creating a digital soldier system. The system would “shrink and graft computer/satnav/digital-video connectivity to the individual soldier,” Fisher said. “The idea is for the individual soldier to be able to broadcast intimate details of his combat condition and receive data of a magnitude to give him a thousandfold more situational awareness than before. Weight, power supply and ruggedness issues have been the main technical barriers.
“In 2002, the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] revealed a limited digital soldier rig following a special forces exercise,” Fisher added. “It involved an unwieldy-looking digital camera and a small viewing screen lashed to a helmet. It did not look like it would really survive a jump from a helicopter, but it at least signaled the PLA work in that area.”
Larry Wortzel, commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, said this is part of the Qu Dian System, or Project 995 Regional Integrated Electronic System.
“This is probably a full test of the Qu Dian system,” he said. “It’s important. And it means that the PLA now has a redundant, China-wide, multilevel command-and-control system. Clearly, they have mastered the challenges of the information age. Now, when we talk about the PLA using electronic means, missiles, information warfare and anti-satellite weapons, it is no longer an asymmetric form of attack. Many of the PLA’s systems are similar to those used by the U.S. and other advanced militaries. They are a modern fighting force, even if they are somewhat behind the U.S.”
The Qu Dian system is an advanced theater-level command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target-acquisition and reconnaissance network. As an automated battlefield management system, it combines the air force, navy and army communications networks. The heart of the system is the Feng Huo-1 military communications satellite, launched in 2000, that provides China’s military units with C-band and ultra-high frequency communications.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3052071&C=airwar

It was reported somewhere in Janes that the APS-77 radar can change frequency at about 100times per sec, which makes detecting its signal and identification extremely difficult...

err so you can't use it like a spycam like they did in that movie - was it "true lies " or "terminator "? all the radar return can give you is a fuzzy image of what's in the room - but if it moves, you know someone's inside and that's good enough for military or disaster-relief purposes.

i wonder if this Ohio State U radar project uses AESA-style T/R modules. although LPI technology as mentioned is achieveable without the use of AESA (as on F-15E APG-70) i believe it is only a matter of time before AESA finds its way to the commercial market, even if on small-scale applications like this. interestingly, it was stated that the hardware costs for this system is less than $100 - very cheap.

Hmmm, So are they canceling the ARM-capability of the AMRAAM-D?

AMRAAM D version was never projected have any anti-radar capability, AFAIK.

Israel used electronic attack in air strike against Syrian mystery target

Oct 8, 2007
By David A. Fulghum and Douglas Barrie

Mysteries still surround Israel’s air strike against Syria. Where was the attack, what was struck and how did Israel’s non-stealthy warplanes fly undetected through the Russian-made air defense radars in Syria?
There also are clues that while the U.S. and Israel are struggling in the broader information war with Islamic fundamentalists, Tel Aviv’s air attack against a “construction site” in northern Syria may mean the two countries are beginning to win some cyberwar battles.
U.S. officials say that close examination of the few details of the mission offers a glimpse of what’s new in the world of sophisticated electronic sleight-of-hand. That said, they fault the Pentagon for not moving more quickly to make cyberwarfare operational and for not integrating the capability into the U.S. military forces faster.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said last week that the Israelis struck a building site at Tall al-Abyad just south of the Turkish border on Sept. 6. Press reports from the region say witnesses saw the Israeli aircraft approach from the Mediterranean Sea while others said they found unmarked drop tanks in Turkey near the border with Syria. Israeli defense officials finally admitted Oct. 2 that the Israeli Air Force made the raid.
U.S. aerospace industry and retired military officials indicated the Israelis utilized a technology like the U.S.-developed “Suter” airborne network attack system developed by BAE Systems and integrated into U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle operations by L-3 Communications. Israel has long been adept at using unmanned systems to provoke and spoof Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, as far back as the Bekka Valley engagements in 1982.
Air Force officials will often talk about jamming, but the term now involves increasingly sophisticated techniques such as network attack and information warfare. How many of their new electronic attack options were mixed and matched to pull off this raid is not known.
The U.S. version of the system has been at the very least tested operationally in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last year, most likely against insurgent communication networks. The technology allows users to invade communications networks, see what enemy sensors see and even take over as systems administrator so sensors can be manipulated into positions where approaching aircraft can’t be seen, they say. The process involves locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages that allow a number of activities including control.
Clues, both good and unlikely, are found in Middle East press reports. At least one places some responsibility for the attack’s success on the U.S.
After the strike, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Watan reported that U.S. jets provided aerial cover for Israeli strike aircraft during the attack on Syria. Similar statements of American involvement were made by Egyptian officials after the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel.
More interesting is the newspaper’s claim that “Russian experts are studying why the two state-of-the-art Russian-built radar systems in Syria did not detect the Israeli jets entering Syrian territory,” it said. “Iran reportedly has asked the same question, since it is buying the same systems and might have paid for the Syrian acquisitions.”
Syria’s most recent confirmed procurement was of the Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) short-range mobile SAM system. It uses vehicle-mounted target-acquisition and target-tracking radars. It is not known whether any of the Tor systems were deployed in the point-defense role at the target site struck by Israeli aircraft. If, however, the target was as “high-value” as the Israeli raid would suggest, then Tor systems could well have been deployed.
Iran bought 29 of the Tor launchers from Russia for $750 million to guard its nuclear sites, and they were delivered in January, according to Agence France-Presse and ITAR-TASS. According to the Syrian press, they were tested in February. Syria has also upgraded some of its aging S-125s (SA-3 Goa) to the Pechora-2A standard. This upgrade swaps out obsolete analog components for digital.
Syrian air defense infrastructure is based on for the most part aging Soviet SAMs and associated radar. Damascus has been trying to acquire more capable “strategic” air defense systems, with the country repeatedly associated with efforts to purchase the Russian S-300 (SA-10 Grumble/SA-20) long-range SAM. It also still operates the obsolescent S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) long-range system and its associated 5N62 Square Pair target engagement radar. There are also unconfirmed reports of Syrian interest in the 36D6 Tin Shield search radar.
There remains the second mystery of the actual site of the target and its use. Israeli news reports contend it was a compound near Dayr az-Zwar in north central Syria, and not Tall al-Abyad farther north. The site of the attack has been described as a transshipment point for weapons intended for the Hezbollah in Lebanon to restock missile stores that were used in last summer’s fighting with Israel. Others contend it is a site with nuclear materials that may be associated with Iran’s nuclear bomb program. Mentions are also made of a North Korean ship arriving in Syria only days before the attack and the presence of North Korean workers in Syria for several months.
“There are always indications the North Koreans are doing something they shouldn’t, Vice Adm. Robert Murrett, director of the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA), told Aviation Week & Space Technology in response to a question about the shipment of nuclear materials from North Korea to Syria, which were subsequently bombed. “They are a high priority. We work as a key element . . . on the trafficking of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and high-interest arms shipments anyplace.”
It’s part of a growing NGA role in spotting the proliferation of weapons technology “which may be coming from East Asia to the Middle East . . . that we don’t want to cross borders.” Other crucial boundaries for surveillance include the borders in all directions in Afghanistan and Iraq—which includes Syria and Iran—as well as semi-governed areas such as the Horn of Africa. The use of automation to aid rapid analysis is improving, but that’s being balanced by the fact that “the sheer volumes of data we are ingesting now . . . continue to increase by a couple of orders of magnitude on an annual basis,” he says.

http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/20-419.aspx


Related article

http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/W...srael_10_05.asp

Passive Radar use FM signals to defeat Stealth

The system is Thales Air Systems, Homeland Alerter 100 Passive Surveillance Radar

This is a new anti-stealth radar for France to compete with existing solutions.
HA 100’s Multi-static radar works with 8 FM sources and is able to detect a stealth aircraft 100 km away.

First 3 radars are covering Paris, West France and Rhone River valley.
The French’s HA 100 system was deployed at the Cazaux Air Base, while the second unit have been procured by Norway and is on trials

Mounting interest is coming from NAT0 and Asian countries.


http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/aw/dti1007/index.php
(page 32)

Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-TRIP) for Global Hawk

The MP-RTIP-equipped Global Hawk(Block 40) is scheduled to roll off the production line around 2011, to meet Air Force operational needs. The MP-RTIP equipped Global Hawk defines the Global Hawk Block 40 configuration which provides persistent ISR, including GMTI, SAR imaging, and limited AMTI capabilities.

Click this link for details
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/mp-rtip.htm
http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/ASD/broc...rne/MP-RTIP.pdf


Background :
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/cat/ai...reconnaissance/
http://www.defenselink.mil/transformation/.../ta050906a.html

5 Dec 2006, Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in San Diego, CA received a $6.6 million fixed-price-incentive-firm contract modification for engineering changes to prepare one RQ-4 Global Hawk Air Vehicle to receive Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) capabilities. It also covers preliminary modifications to a second Air Vehicle in preparation for MP-RTIP insertion, and includes an option for aircraft ballast. At this time, $3.3 million have been obligated. Solicitations began October 2005, negotiations were complete November 2006, and work will be complete by February 2009. The Headquarters Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH issued the contract (FA8620-05-C-4692/P00009).

Cutaway view of Global Hawk
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images..._Cutaway_lg.jpg

The MP-RTIP radar is an important part of the USA's future surveillance capabilities. This AESA radar is slated to equip future Block 40 Global Hawks, and will also feature in NATO's AGS battlefield surveillance program and future E-8 J-STARS upgrades or successors. DID recently covered MP-RTIP testing on Rutan's unusual-looking Proteus.

Latest developments:
http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articl...wire/128689.htm

Israel Air Force to Be Equipped With Elbit Systems Lizard Laser-Guided Bombs

http://www.elbitsystems.com/data/Lizard-3.pdf
Elbit Systems Ltd. has been selected to equip the Israel Air Force (IAF) with its Lizard laser-guided bombs. Contract value is several $Millions and the initial supply of the systems to the IAF has already begun. Lizard, a sophisticated new generation laser-guided bomb incorporates decades of Elbit Systems in-house technological expertise. The system which will be used for air-to-surface attack of diverse targets inflicts pinpoint damage while substantially reducing collateral damage. The current laser designator is designed for warheads of various sizes.

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Israel_Air..._Bombs_999.html

AN/APG-63(V)3 AESA Radar

The Raytheon APG-63v3 AESA radar combines APG-63v2 AESA software with the hardware advances that went into the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet Block II's AN/APG-79 AESA radar. Whereas the AP-63v2 had a square profile, the APG-63(V)3 radar can be recognized by the rounder shape of its array, and uses lighter and more advanced AESA technologies that include a tile array arrangement and a new processor. Singapore's new F-15SG Strike Eagles will use the APG-63v3 radar, and Japan has reportedly expressed interest in it as a fleet upgrade possibility.
Read somewhere that....APG-63V3 costs approx US$8.5 million per unit :unsure:


PDF Brochure of the AN/APG-63(V)3 AESA Radar
http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/...ms04_017911.pdf


Cutaway view of the AN/APG-63(V)3 AESA Radar
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/wp/ima..._Labeled_lg.jpg
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/wp/ima...N-APG-63_lg.jpg


Updated on 3rd Nov 2007

Has previously speculated and discussed, it is now confirmed that the US will field two types of APG-63 AESAs.

The USAF F-15Es will receive all new APG-63(v)4 sets (ala Singaporean F-15SG). These are built from the ground up with an APG-79 based backend and a 1m class antenna using the T/R modules employed in the APG-79. In essence it will be a 1000mm version of the 700mm F-18E/F Block II AESA radar -- 0.785 sq-m vs 385 sq-m.

The ANG F-15Cs on the other hand will receive the APG-63(v)3. These uses the same antenna as the (v)4, but retains the APG-63(v)1 backend with the appropriate software upgrades. The (v)3 offers a more economical upgrade path by allowing existing APG-63(v)1 radar sets to be upgraded without having to also replace the back end processor.

When the upgrades are completed the the USA will field an all AESA F-15 fleet.

Raytheon claims AESA upgrade contract for F-15E

Raytheon has defended its claim as the sole radar supplier for the US Air Force Boeing F-15 fleet, defeating a bid by Northrop Grumman to offer an active array radar upgrade.

Boeing selected the Raytheon APG-63(V)4 active electronically scanned array radar to upgrade the APG-70 for 179 USAF F-15Es.

The APG-V(4) combines the front-end antenna of the APG-63(V)3 AESA and the back-end, dual-mode radar processor for the APG-79, which has entered service on the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.

The award is a disappointment for Northrop, which viewed its bid as a strategic opportunity to unseat its most significant rival on an incumbent programme. Northrop had offered a repackaged version of the APG-81 AESA being developed for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

The F-15E radar modernization programme is the latest in a wave of retrofit programmes involving AESA technology.

h ttp://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/11/01/219095/raytheon-claims-aesa-upgrade-contract-for-f-15e.html


http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/6-49031.aspx

Deception Killer Radar

January 31, 2008:
A U.S. radar manufacturer (Lockheed Martin) has developed a new capability for phased-array radars that enables incoming targets to be more precisely identified. In particular, the new digital beam forming feature enables fake missile warheads to be detected. This makes it possible to make more attacks on real warheads, and fewer anti-missile missiles wasted on the deceptions.

In addition, the design of the individual nodes in a phased array radar has been changed, using more sturdy materials, and enabling each of the thousands of nodes (in a typical ship radar) to use more power. This provides more range and precision. Phased array radars are used in ships, aircraft and in large ground based systems, as well as space satellites.

Digital beam forming is just the latest new development of radar technology, forming part of a trend that began over 70 years ago, when the first radar entered service. Cheaper and more abundant computer power has led to many improvements, by being able to get more information from the signals bounced back.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htecm/art...aspx?comments=Y

Any one have any articles about Singapore's EW capabilities and assets? :D

Two-Way Video Datalink for the Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod

February 24, 2008:
The U.S. Air Force has developed a two-way video data link for its Sniper targeting pod.
This will enable troops on the ground to see what the pilot is seeing, and mark items for the pilot in real time. This is particularly critical for situations where the ground level view is more accurate, and this eliminates any confusion over what the troops want a smart bomb to hit. This minimizes the risk of friendly fire losses (including innocent civilians), and makes it more certain that the enemy will be hit when the ground troops expect it. This is critical because the troops like to be on a bombed target as quickly as possible, to deal with any enemy survivors, and to capture any documents before those survivors can destroy them.

The latest generation of these pods contain FLIR (video quality night vision infrared radar) and TV cameras that enable pilots flying at 20,000 feet to clearly make out what is going on down there. The pods also contain laser designators for laser guided bombs, and laser range finders that enable pilots to get coordinates for JDAM (GPS guided) bombs. Safely outside the range of most anti-aircraft fire (five kilometers up, and up to fifty kilometers away), pilots can literally see the progress of ground fighting, and have even been acting as aerial observers for ground forces. These new capabilities also enable pilots to more easily find targets themselves, and hit them with highly accurate laser guided or JDAM bombs. While bombers still get target information from ground controllers for close (to friendly troops) air support, they can now go searching on their own, in areas where there are no friendly ground troops. With the two way communication, the pilots can remain aware of how the friendly troops are moving around there.

These new targeting pods, and smart bombs, have revolutionized the way warplanes support ground troops. The accuracy of the laser or GPS guided bombs greatly reduces friendly fire losses, and makes the bomber much deadlier. Basically, one bomb takes out one target. Previously, a fighter-bomber had to come in low and slow, to drop several dumb bombs with much less accuracy. Often, friendly troops were hit. The new targeting pods make the bomber much more effective, in ways no one believed possible two decades ago.

There are other benefits as well. For example, the number of IEDs spotted by Predators, or F-16 targeting pods is very low. The army has been having much more success with specialized photo-recon aircraft (that take pictures of the exact same area, a few hours later, so that any recent digging or bomb placing will be obvious.) With these two way data links, the targeting pods can be linked to the army catalog of ground images.

The air force will being introducing the two-way data links later this year. The Sniper pods are currently used on the F-15E, F-16, F-18, A-10, B-1, and Harrier.

Links:
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/press_r...eoDatalink.html

http://strategypage.com/htmw/htecm/articles/20080224.aspx

F-35 Distributed Aperture System (EO DAS)

Watch the video:
http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/solution...eodasvideo.html

Northrop Grumman has developed the only 360 degree, spherical situational awareness system in the electro-optical distributed aperture system (DAS). The DAS surrounds the aircraft with a protective sphere of situational awareness. It warns the pilot of incoming aircraft and missile threats as well as providing day/night vision, fire control capability and precision tracking of wingmen/friendly aircraft for tactical maneuvering.

Designated the AN/AAQ-37, and comprising six electro-optical sensors, the full EO DAS will enhance the F-35's survivability and operational effectiveness by warning the pilot of incoming aircraft and missile threats, providing day/night vision and supporting the navigation function of the F-35's forward-looking infrared sensor.

The DAS provides:
Missile detection and tracking
Launch point detection
Situational awareness IRST & cueing
Weapons support
Day/night navigatio

Source:
http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/solution...ting/index.html

If that is real time video of the DAS in operation in the second half of the video, I would say that it is really amazing! Not to be frivolous, but the comparison can be made to Ace Combat 6 or HAWX in terms of tracking/id of enemy aircraft/ground targets. I'm abit more leery about the comments about the redundancy of maneuverability in air combat though.

Now..I can see you !

October 16, 2009:
A U.S. Department of Defense program to develop a foliage penetrating radar, that can detect people, vehicles and structures underneath trees and other foliage, recently completed twenty successful flight tests, which included over 50 hours in the air. The FORESTER (Foliage Penetration Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Tracking and Engagement Radar) system was carried on a A160T helicopter UAV. Foliage penetrating radars were developed from ground penetrating radars, and use powerful computers and software to sort out what is underneath the foliage. This is a major military advantage, as ground troops have traditionally been able to hide from aerial reconnaissance by going into forests.

The A160T is a small helicopter, able to fly under remote control or under its own pre-programmed control. The two ton vehicle has a top speed of 255 kilometers an hour, and was originally designed to operate for up to 18 hours carrying a payload of 300 pounds, but it can carry a ton of cargo for several hours. Maximum altitude was to be about 30,000 feet, and its advanced flight controls were to be capable of keeping it airborne in weather that would ground manned helicopters.

The advantage of a helicopter UAV carrying FORESTER, is that this allows the radar to concentrate on a bit of jungle, at close range, long enough for the radar to gather enough data for the pattern analysis software to figure out what's going on down on the ground.

ARTHUR Makes A Comeback

November 14, 2009:
Italy us buying five Swedish ARTHUR mobile artillery-hunting radar systems, for about $24 million each. ARTHUR was developed in the 1990s, and was found wanting during its first combat use recently in Afghanistan . Canadian forces there reported that, of 3,200 "incoming objects" ARTHUR reported, only two turned out to be real. There were other problems as well, but the large number of false positives was particularly worrisome. These were often caused by friendly aircraft, or distant electric transmission line towers, being mistook for incoming fire. The Swedes hustled to fix these problems, at least to the satisfaction of potential customers.

ARTHUR is carried in a Bv206 tracked vehicle. The radar can detect shells or rockets fired from up to 40 kilometers away. Within a few seconds, the systems computer can calculate the location of the firing artillery to within two meters. Given the availability of GPS guided shells (Excalibur) and rockets (GMLRS), you can have return (counterbattery) fire on the enemy artillery within a minute. But Italy, like other ARTHUR users, wants to use it to detect and go after irregular forces firing mortars and rockets at bases during peacekeeping operations.

ARTHUR has been selling to many NATO countries, as it is of more recent vintage than the American FireFinder, and has gotten rave reviews from existing users. But these reviews were based on peacetime tests, not actual battlefield use. The Canadian experience had a chilling effect on ARTHUR sales, at least for those nations planning to use it in peacekeeping operations.

The combat experiences of FireFinder and ARTHUR should inspire developers of this kind of equipment to come up with more realistic testing procedures, especially for peacekeeping operations. Both the U.S. and Sweden modified their artillery detection systems based on the problems encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan.
For example, FireFinder often failed to catch incoming fire, either because of equipment failure, or because the enemy was using tactics that fool the radar. For example, in Iraq, American bases were generally on higher ground than the mortars firing at them. Putting bases on the high ground enables you to watch more of the surrounding area. But FireFinder needs a line-of-sight to get a good fix on the firing weapons position. If the mortar is too far below the radar, FireFinder cannot accurately spot where the fire is coming from.

Another problem is that if the mortar is too close, FireFinder is much less likely to quickly determine where the fire is coming from. So the enemy mortar teams get as close as they can before they open up. This still makes the mortar teams vulnerable to counterattack by coalition troops, but not the immediate (in a few minutes) artillery fire that FireFinder can make happen under the right conditions.

Fm StrategyPage

Read more:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARTHUR_(military)


Video on ARTHUR in action
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=3aa_1189642012

That's interesting... Hopefully our own ARTHUR deployments are having a better experience.

whoa, that's a lot of false positives. hope our ARTHURS will not become nuisances in Kamp Holland...

btw was there any news of STK playing around with our ARTHURS?

hmmm... I doubt it is STK who is playing with them...