Israel: Ready for harder military tacticsAs Israel seems to perceive a rising 'threat factor' on its borders, military leaders seem prepared to go for harder and more overt tactics regardless of international opprobrium.
By Brooks Tigner in Brussels for ISN Security Watch (01/11/07)
Attitudes among Israeli government and military leaders are hardening over the use of military power to guarantee the country's security, as evidenced by the numerous reports of Israel's strike in early September against a nascent nuclear facility in adjacent Syria.
Yet while Israel makes no bones about not tolerating any nuclear weapons capability in its region (other than its own), the 6 September operation was highly covert and continues to be shrouded with "no comments," with officials neither confirming nor denying the strike.
The wider policy question is: Does Israel perceive a rising "threat factor" around its borders and, if so, will it go for harder and more overt military tactics in general than in the recent past?
Recent discussions with government, industry and policy experts here suggest the likely answer is "yes" - and nevermind the attendant international opprobrium such a course might entail. They spoke with ISN Security Watch on the condition of anonymity.
The government's three most immediate security concerns are:
Its ever-simmering tensions with the densely populated Palestinian Gaza Strip and the Hamas political leadership at the country's southwestern flank border with Egypt
Its top-of-the-map frontier with southern Lebanon, where the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) fought a short and sharp but less-than-satisfactory war in summer 2006 with Iran-supplied Hizbollah militants
The Golan Heights frontline between Israeli and Syrian forces
"We see relentless terrorist attacks from Gaza against our citizens in southern Israel and a restocked Hizbollah [with Iranian-supplied Katyusha rockets] in southern Lebanon. Yes, you could argue the threats are rising," an Israeli government official in Jerusalem told ISN Security Watch in Brussels on 22 October.
While opinion is divided within Israel about the IDF's substandard performance during the so-called Second Lebanon War - bad doctrine, inexperienced officers and slashed budgets for reserve-unit training are three explanations proffered - IDF military commanders on the ground have no doubt about what needs doing the next time.
"Equipment and capability were not the issues [during the war with Hizbollah]," a local IDR infantry commander told ISN Security Watch in Brussels on 23 October, pointing a finger toward villages visible across the border into southern Lebanon.
"We knew exactly where the [enemy's] missiles were: we had the ability to identify, target and respond to them quickly, but we didn't do this like we should have," he said, referring to Hizbollah missiles fired from special bunkers under private homes or from mobile launchers that immediately redeployed after firing on public buildings such as schools or mosques.
"No, we took the softer 'more correct' approach: issuing advance warnings to villagers, or forcing them away from target areas by using smoke or other techniques to minimize civilian deaths. Well, we saw the results of that policy. [Civilian casualties in Israel and a public relations victory for Hizbollah]. That won't be the same the next time. The gloves come off if there's another conflict with Hizbollah."
Further east, Israeli security experts refer to quiet but increasing tension behind the Golan Heights, the Israeli-controlled territory seized from Syria 40 years ago.
"Syria is buying sophisticated weapons and equipping large units of soldiers with anti-tank missiles and the means to carry out guerrilla warfare," a government security analyst in Tel Aviv told ISN Security Watch.
"They've purchased thousands of anti-tank missiles from Russia in the last year, for example, and they're looking to acquire the ability to build long-range missiles in Syria. The overall combat goal is asymmetric, with Syria using Hizbollah [in southern Lebanon] as a first line to divert Israeli soldiers prior to a move against the Golan Heights. They are not ready yet, as we think it will take another year or so."
"Meanwhile," the analyst said, "we are hearing strange rhetoric coming from Damascus about the Golan. There have been troop movements on their part, and they see our training maneuvers [on the Heights]. We think they've put short-range rockets near their border with Israel and are building farms in the area, [under the assumption that] it would make it more difficult for us to take action against them."
Further south at Gaza tensions are also rising among Israeli security and military circles due to the near-daily attacks by Hamas and other militant groups inside the enclave against Israel's adjacent territory.
These come mainly in the form of handcrafted Qassam rockets, simple weapons fashioned from metal pipes and a homemade explosive mixture. The latest version, however, has a range of up to 20 kilometers. Though their wobbly trajectory is unguided, each one means that Israeli populations within range have less than 30 seconds to seek shelter. Ten were launched on 23 October, for example, though the daily average has been three since the IDF withdrew from the Gaza in 2005.
While the Qassams are a minor weapon and deaths have been few, their mental impact on local populations has been great, according to officials.
"Imagine growing up under those conditions," an Israeli diplomat in Jerusalem told ISN Security Watch. "There's a whole generation of young school children down there with serious psychological problems. The rocket attacks are in the news nearly every day and when one is coming down on their village they have to run for their lives."
Due to the higher-than-usual number of Qassam attacks in late October, the government clamped down on Gaza by selectively cutting electricity and fuel supplies, though hospitals and other urgent services were not targeted. Such commercial pressure is not enough, argued one expert.
"The time is growing near where we'll have to have a ground operation against Gaza," said one former high-ranking Israeli defense official. "In my view, this should have been done a year ago as soon as it was apparent that the territory was being used as a regular launching pad. IDF armed forces should have gone in and cleared the area. They did this in the West Bank and the terrorism [from there] has stopped."
Better defenseSome officials still in government tacitly agree. "We know where the launch areas are in Gaza - just beyond the no-man's land that separates their territory from ours," an Israeli security policy official told ISN Security Watch in Tel Aviv. "There is a strong rationale for moving the tanks and troops back into the strip to clear out those areas and keep it clean."
Israel's other military option is to rely on better defenses, which it is also trying to do.
The Defence Ministry's co-called Iron Dome project calls for deployment of mobile air defense systems within two years capable of instantly detecting and countering short and medium-range rockets by launching an interceptor.
Israel's state-owned defense company, Rafael Ltd, is developing the system, though some experts are doubtful whether such spot-on capability can be fully achieved by then.Rafael is under heavy pressure to deliver a foolproof system, however, due to fears that Hamas and other groups within Gaza will get their hands on weapons more powerful and deadly than handmade rockets such as advanced-design Katyushas with their 50-70 km range.
Hizbollah has carried out repeated attempts to smuggle the rockets into Gaza via underground tunnels along the Strip's border with Egypt, according to Israeli officials - a reality that swings the threat-factor compass around to the main danger they see on the distant horizon: Iran.
"Those [in the international community] who say Iran is a responsible actor are wrong," an Israeli diplomat told ISN Security Watch. "Iran has not been a responsible player in the past, so why should it be now?"
Referring to Tehran's nuclear ambitions and its effort to master the so-called cascaded centrifuge enrichment process for producing bomb-grade U-235, the diplomat said "the worst-case scenario would be for Iran to master this technique by mid-2008 to produce low-level enriched uranium and then another two to three years of keeping its centrifuges running to produce highly enriched uranium. At that point it's a problem of stability for everyone, and not just Israel. Having Iran go nuclear will change the whole international scene."
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