SPECIAL REPORT: PROGRAM SETBACKS- Part 1
AFP modernization drive sputters

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadl...rticle_id=42164

By Yvonne T. Chua, Luz Rimban
Inquirer
Last updated 03:22am (Mla time) 01/08/2007


(First of three parts)

SOMEWHERE in Central Luzon—In the foothills of the Sierra Madre mountains, Army soldiers are on a mission to “achieve strategic defeat of the communist terrorist movement” in three years, just as their Commander in Chief has ordered.

But the soldiers wish they had helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to conduct air strikes, thermal-imaging weapons and night-vision goggles to locate the enemy in mountainous terrain even at night, bulletproof vests and helmets to protect soldiers’ “fatal body parts,” and secure, lightweight all-weather radios for quick contact with army base.

That’s all in their dreams. In their makeshift base, the soldiers do have a solitary Simba tank, as well as a few handheld radios. But they are basically going to war with only re-barreled or repaired M-16 rifles for firepower, a few night-vision goggles for increased visibility, and for communications, mostly personal cell phones loaded with prepaid unlimited text.

Apart from that, “we rely on God’s will, our training and common sense to protect us,” says one Army commander. Yet the soldiers continue to believe “we will win this war” against the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army, which are waging Asia’s longest-running insurgency.

By now, the Armed Forces of the Philippines should have been a modern, professional force capable of dealing with both external threats and internal security concerns. In December 1996, Congress approved Joint Resolution No. 28 in which both the Senate and House of Representatives gave their blessings to Republic Act No. 7898, known as the AFP Modernization Act.

The law envisioned a professionalized armed force, as well as “the acquisition and upgrading of appropriate technology and equipment” to bring the AFP into the 21st century.

Magnet for graft

Ten years and more than P11 billion later, there has been very little actual acquisition of new equipment for the AFP. Government auditors and budget officials have found that there are weak controls over funds of the AFP, whether for modernization or not, such as those intended for peacekeeping forces or “Balikatan” exercises.

Procurement officials likewise say the AFP has shown a disregard for procurement processes provided by law. As a result, the multibillion-peso AFP budget, its modernization fund included, has been a magnet for graft and corruption.

What has instead happened is that the modernization program, whose core component is capability, materiel and technology development, has turned into one of repair and refurbishment, with a huge chunk of the funds being spent on regular items like office supplies.

“I cannot consider that AFP modernization,” said Sen. Rodolfo Biazon, a retired AFP chief of staff who coauthored the AFP modernization law in the Senate.

In its present state, Biazon said, the AFP “is not capable of addressing the insurgency threats” from the CPP-NPA and the Moro secessionists.

Still in Square One

The government practically acknowledges that the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP) is still where it was 10 years ago—in square one. Last year, the Department of National Defense rolled off an 18-year plan called the Capability Upgrade Program (CUP), which takes over the equipment procurement functions of the AFPMP.

Under the CUP, the AFP will get P5 billion yearly, apart from its regular budget appropriations, for the next six years.

Defense and AFP officials acknowledge that the early years of the AFPMP were difficult ones. The program was intended to span 15 years, with a budget of P50 billion for the first five years—or P10 billion a year—over and above what the AFP would receive from the General Appropriations. The funds for modernization are supposed to come from the AFP’s share of proceeds from the lease and sale of former military camps and the income from the government arsenal.

But during President Fidel V. Ramos’ term, no funds were made available for the AFP modernization. It was only in 2000, under the administration of President Joseph Estrada, that the modernization started receiving income from the sale of Fort Bonifacio. And only in 2002 did Congress allocate funds for the AFPMP.

As of 2005, the total amount of money that had gone into the program stood at P11.8 billion, the bulk of which came from the lease of military property, disposal of AFP assets and congressional allocations.

At the time the AFP Modernization Law was passed, the AFP’s principal function was “to uphold the sovereignty and preserve the patrimony of the Republic of the Philippines.” The law had a different enemy in mind—external forces threatening Philippine territory, including the disputed Spratly Islands. The task of fighting the communist insurgency and other internal threats was the responsibility of the then newly created Philippine National Police.

But the internal threats—the communist insurgency, the Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front—proved too much for the PNP to handle. This forced a revision of the AFP’s priorities from external defense to internal security.

Unimplemented

This refocusing of priorities also resulted in several changes in the AFPMP priority projects, which were revised at least three times—in 2000, 2002 and 2004 with the drafting of the Integrated Priority Projects List. The program underwent another reinvention with the CUP.

In its annual report for 2005, the Commission on Audit found that out of 48 priority projects worth P10 billion scheduled for implementation by Dec. 31, 2005, only 24 percent had been completed. Eight projects worth P2 billion were ongoing while 26 projects totaling nearly P6 billion remained unimplemented at the time.

The COA said the AFP’s “failure to maximize the AFP modernization fund resulted in the delayed implementation” of the program … and will greatly affect its primary objective to modernize the AFP to a level where it can effectively and fully perform its mandate.”

As of the end of 2006, the program still had five ongoing projects and 20 more, worth P5 billion, still in the procurement process.

In its early years, AFP and defense officials cited a lack of funds and the cumbersome procurement process as among the reasons for the AFP’s failure to acquire equipment.

Even the Feliciano Commission, which investigated the complaints of disgruntled young officers who took part in what is now known as the Oakwood mutiny of July 2003, found out as much. “Procurement under the AFP Modernization Program is even lengthier and more complex than the ordinary AFP procurement process,” it said.

23 steps

The commission noted that it took the AFP 23 steps to procure weapons and other defense equipment—from the formulation and issuance of the Circular of Requirements or Bid Evaluation Plan (COR-BEP), to the bidding and award, and to project implementation.

The Feliciano Commission said a substantial bottleneck existed at the initial stages of this process. The COR-BEP is formulated at the headquarters of the Philippine Army, Philippine Navy or the Philippine Air Force, and then has to go to the AFP General Headquarters (AFP-GHQ) for another round of evaluation before approval is sought from the Department of National Defense. In certain cases, approval of the Office of the President must be obtained.

As a result, “not a single weapon or equipment had been acquired and upgraded” under the AFPMP from 2000 to 2002, a DND report said.

Conversion

Despite the failure to acquire new equipment during that period, the AFP was already spending the AFP Modernization Fund on items, like office supplies and catering, which have little to do with the program.

A special team from the COA found that from 2001 to 2004, certain transactions under the Modernization Fund became subject to conversion. Conversion is a long standing practice in the AFP and an issue that Oakwood mutineers raised.

The Feliciano Commission defined conversion as “the transforming of allocated funds into cash, most commonly in collusion with suppliers and some of the officers involved in the procurement process in an AFP unit.”

Converted cash, which can eat up at least 30 percent of the budget, usually ends up in the bank account of the commanding officer of the unit for whom the funds are intended, according to the commission.

The special COA team, headed by auditor Heidi Mendoza, was created in October 2004, shortly after Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, a former AFP comptroller, was charged with siphoning off AFP funds into his personal bank account. The team worked out of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Mendoza and her team presented their findings to top COA officials as well as to the Ombudsman for the military. But the team was not allowed to further investigate the AFP, and its findings were not acted upon. Mendoza, who later quit the COA out of disgust, declined to be interviewed for this report.

‘Office supplies’

Among the team’s findings was that as of 2003, for instance, out of the P160 million transferred to the Philippine Army from the modernization fund, 32.5 percent or P52 million went to office supplies.

In the case of the Philippine Air Force, about P24 million or 62 percent of its P39-million budget from the fund also went to office supplies.

At the AFP General Headquarters, P48.4 million went to office supplies between 2001 and 2004. “Purchases of supplies are made not to meet basic office requirements but more of a scheme to convert cash,” said the COA team.

It found that in 2001, as much as P17 million was spent on various office supplies, mostly printer ink, and all receipts were dated Dec. 28, 2001. It also found rigged bidding in the procurement of these supplies. The contracts also went to the companies whose owners were related to each other.

“Various office supplies were purchased at the last working day of December, which rendered the transactions doubtful as each entire transaction is completed within a day. All documents attached are dated Dec. 28. It is highly questionable that while the procurement directive was dated 28 Dec. 2001, the items directed to be procured are also delivered and inspected on the same date,” said the COA team.

Huge catering bill

The auditors also found that in the case of the AFP-GHQ P17.6 million was spent on food and catering from 2001 to 2003. The COA team found the figure unusually large and documents pertaining to it questionable. There were even separate invoices that showed catering services contracted for activities happening at the same time at the same venue.

More than half the amount, or P9 million, went to only one “caterer”—Alvenru Enterprises, which is also a supplier of printer ribbons, computer forms and other office items.

On the food and catering expenses, the COA team also found that:

The agenda of the meetings for which the caterers were hired showed the same names of participants and notices of conferences, which the COA auditors said were “recycled.”

As a result of recycling, then Brig. Gen. Generoso Senga came out looking like he had presided over 22 out of 32 meetings of the bids and awards committee to discuss infantry weapons and mobility.

The list of participants did not tally with the invoice. The participants listed in some meetings numbered only 20, but the invoices showed that the food served was for 100 people.

Unreported interest earnings

The audit findings also point to weak controls in the handling of the modernization fund. In particular, the auditors took issue with the AFP’s failure to report P11.7 million in interest earnings on its P271.1-million share from proceeds of the lease agreement with Ayala Land Inc. for the modernization program.

The AFP collected the sum on Feb. 12, 2002, but held on to it for more than a year before remitting it to the Bureau of Treasury, according to the COA team. All the while, it had invested the money in a special savings deposit with Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) that yielded P11.7 million.

“Yet (the deposit) was unrecorded and the interests accrued out of the special savings, undeclared and unrecorded (in the AFP’s books),” the COA team said.

The regular audits the COA did on the AFP in 2004 and 2005 came across the same problem. In the 2005 audit, the unrecorded interest income on the AFPMP’s 103 current and saving deposits with LandBank and DBP reached nearly P79 million.

Uncollected

Unlike other units at the AFP-GHQ, the program accounts for a tiny fraction of the P310 million in cash advances that remained unliquidated as of Dec. 31, 2005. The advances totaled a minuscule P839,309, according to the COA report for 2005.

But also unlike the rest, the program was the only unit that ran into one major problem when asked by the COA to send demand or collection letters to the accountable officers to settle their accounts.

“Demand letters were not sent to the accountable officers due to the absence of records to locate their whereabouts,” the COA report said

...

SPECIAL REPORT- Favored suppliers bag AFP deals Part 2

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadl...rticle_id=42331

By Yvonne T. Chua, Luz Rimban
Inquirer
Last updated 01:25am (Mla time) 01/09/2007


(Second of three parts, read part 1)

AS HE prepared to leave the Department of National Defense last November, then Defense Secretary Avelino Cruz asked concerned citizens to closely guard the P10-billion fund that will be released for the Armed Forces of the Philippines' latest modernization plan called the Capability Upgrade Program.

To be sure, reforms designed to safeguard AFP funds are already being put in place. There is the 10-point Philippine Defense Reform Program meant to improve DND and AFP operations and manpower. A defense acquisition committee and internal audit offices have been established. Representatives of the private sector, such as the Makati Business Club and the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference, have been allowed to observe bidding procedures. Measures to streamline procurement procedures throughout the AFP are being implemented.

Despite these reforms, government auditors and defense and budget officials worry that a culture of inefficiency and corruption continues to plague the AFP. A string of problematic transactions illustrates why they say reforms in the AFP are going to be an uphill battle:

In 2003, the government authorized the AFP to purchase 12,000 units of handheld very high frequency radios worth P900 million for the Philippine Army. The voice-encrypted radios are basic equipment that could spell life and death for soldiers in the field. But after three years, the DND and AFP still have not resolved whether to buy them by direct contracting or public bidding.

Last year, the Army asked the Department of Budget and Management Procurement Service to purchase, through public bidding, some 1,400 sets of tires for trucks worth more than P12 million. After the notice of award was issued to the winning bidder, the Army blocked the awarding of the contract. The purchase remains stalled.

Since 2000, the Army has refused to honor a P201-million contract to repair 30 Scorpion tanks that would have given soldiers added firepower in the field. The budget, meanwhile, for the repair is dwindling, with millions of pesos having gone to storage fees for spare parts and to bank charges.

"If the AFP can't resolve these problems, how much more the bigger contracts under the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP)?" asked an official involved in AFP procurement contracts.

Indeed, officials in the defense and budget departments fear that scarce government resources may go to waste because of bad procurement practices that remain uncorrected in the AFP.

A study done in 2006 by the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) found "a high level of noncompliance" by the AFP with Republic Act No. 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act. The law is intended to streamline government purchases and prevent corruption that has arisen out of procurements.

"There is no integrated or comprehensive strategy to implement procurement reforms in line with RA No. 9184 in the AFP," said the GPPB report.

Splitting purchase orders

The GPPB assessment noted deviations from procurement procedures in the AFP, and the military's preference for shopping, using cash advance, and direct contracting over public bidding, as well as for splitting purchase orders. These problems are likewise documented in annual audits done on the Army, Navy and Air Force by the Commission on Audit.

The GPPB's attention was also drawn to the creation of multiple bids and awards committees under the various service commands and the lack of a pool of competent and trained personnel for assignment to the AFP bids and awards committee.

Officials also point to other problems. One is that military officers lack the financial, management and technical expertise required to handle multibillion-peso transactions which, some say, arose partly from the AFP's decades of dependence on the United States for the bulk of its defense spending on materiel until the American bases in the Philippines were closed in 1992.

To make matters worse, a hierarchical organization, like the AFP, with its bonds of brotherhood and code of silence, discourages transparency and scrutiny of misdeeds, according to those interviewed for this report.

And while the AFP top brass wrangle over knotty contracts, equipment on which the lives of ordinary soldiers depend remains lacking in the field.

Handheld radios

The minimum requirement for Army units is tactical communication, including simple handheld radios, which allow secure contact between units. The AFP's total requirement for handheld radios is 14,002 units.

In November 2003, the AFP was allowed to purchase 12,046 VHF/FM radios worth P930.8 million under the AFP Modernization Program's Re-Prioritized Projects Lists for 2000 and 2002. This was supposed to supplement the 1,946 already purchased from Harris Corp., an American firm.

The AFP, under then Chief of Staff Gen. Narciso Abaya, recommended that the radios be bought, again from Harris Corp., this time through direct contracting for interoperability and security reasons. Abaya's proposal was approved by then Defense Secretary Eduardo Ermita, endorsed by then Justice Secretary Simeon Datumanong and then Director General Romulo Neri of the National Economic and Development Authority.

The negotiations were completed and a contract ironed out nearly a year later in October 2004. A new set of officials led by then Presidential Legal Counsel Avelino Cruz moved into the DND and decided to refer the contract to the GPPB. The GPPB recommended the renegotiation of the contract in keeping with RA No. 9184.

In April 2005, Abaya signed an amended contract with Harris and sent this to Cruz who, in turn, sent it to the GPPB for review. By this time, President Macapagal-Arroyo had issued an order requiring government contracts of at least P500 million to be submitted to the GPPB to determine whether they are exempt from public bidding.

The GPPB declared that the radios were best procured through public bidding. It also ruled that without Cruz's approval and certification that the contract was exempt from public bidding, it had to be bid out.

For direct contracting

The AFP, now under Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr., stands firm on direct contracting as the mode to procure the radios. The DND's defense acquisition committee and its bids and awards committee, meanwhile, had recommended to Cruz shortly before he quit his post the purchase of the units through negotiated procurement.

The fate of the contract lies with Ms Arroyo, concurrently the defense secretary. As head of the procuring agency, her approval is needed for the contract to move.

In the meantime, one procurement official said: "Our soldiers in the field are complaining due to lack of communication equipment ... That's why in combat operations, lagi tayo nahuhuli (we always lag behind)."

Scorpion tanks

In December 2000, the British company Alvis Logistics clinched the P201-million contract to supply spare parts and maintain the Army's 30 Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (CVR) Tracked Scorpion tanks. Then AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Angelo Reyes approved Alvis Logistics' price list.

Funded out of the contingency fund of then President Joseph Estrada, the contract provided a 30-percent or P60-million down payment to Alvis Logistics, whose exclusive distributor in the Philippines is Bairam Enterprises. As with the supplier's previous contracts with the Army, the rest of the payment was to be released on a staggered basis, upon delivery of the spare parts and repair of the tanks.

But when Alvis Logistics delivered the first shipment worth about P40 million in April 2001, the Army, then under Maj. Gen. Efren Abu, refused to release the amount, raising allegations of overpricing and insisting that the British firm first use up the P60 million down payment. Reyes, by then the defense secretary, suspended the contract.

Bairam representative Rosario Ong later filed charges with the Ombudsman for the military in connection with the Scorpion tanks contract. News reports at the time quoted her as asking the Senate blue ribbon committee to investigate Reyes' alleged abuse of authority, and accusing him of wanting to give the contract to another supplier.

When Eduardo Ermita became defense secretary in 2003, he ordered the Army to honor its contract with Alvis Logistics. The COA, meanwhile, recommended that the supplier be partially paid on top of the down payment. The Army, however, refused to release another payment--whether full or partial--for the spare parts.

Sources familiar with the contract said the DND and Ong finally came to a settlement. Ong withdrew the case with the Ombudsman with the understanding that the contract would be implemented as originally agreed upon. Apparently, the settlement in the end fell through.

By August 2004, when Cruz became defense secretary, the GPPB, to which the issue had been raised, ruled that Alvis Logistics should first exhaust the downpayment it had gotten. Still insisting on payment per delivery, Alvis Logistics has refused to ship the rest of the spare parts and send its technicians to repair the tanks.

Letters of credit

All this time, the P141 million that remained of the contract has been sitting idle at Land Bank of the Philippines, where a letter of credit had been opened as mode of payment. It does not earn interest because, based on rules of the Bankers Association of the Philippines, "deposits against foreign and domestic letters of credit are received by banks merely as collateral security, consequently, no interest is to be allowed on said deposits."

Instead, the government has had to pay the bank several hundreds of thousands of pesos for every renewal. Earlier, it had to pay storage fees to the international airport for holding the spare parts while it argued its case with Bairam.

The Scorpion tanks contract was not awarded under the AFPMP, but the risks of letter of credit payments are not lost on the special COA team that looked into the modernization procurements. After all, most transactions entered into by the program with foreign suppliers are covered by such payments, including purchases of squad automatic weapons and the initial batch of Harris radios, refurbishing of Jacinto Class Patrol Vessels, and the procurement of a Geographical Information System.

"(The) amount of contracts funded out of modernization funds and paid through letters of credit are deposited in full in advance at the drawee bank even before the actual delivery of the subject of the contract, which usually takes as long as seven months, therefore depriving the agency of the beneficial use of the fund," the COA team said.

As the experience with the Scorpion tanks demonstrates, letters of credit can be left lying in banks earning no interest for as long as six years. A regular COA audit found last year that the Army had 11 other idle LCs with LandBank after foreign contractors failed to deliver the goods. "Considering the meager resources of the (Army), we are concerned that government funds and resources are wasted," the COA said.

Lack of expertise

Defense and budget officials attribute the procurement malpractice prevalent in the AFP not only to a lack of financial expertise but also to a lack of experience and knowledge of what items exactly they are procuring.

The DBM Procurement Service, which buys common supplies for government agencies, cites the contract to purchase 1,458 sets of tires for Army trucks. Last year, the Army asked the DBM-PS to procure the tires through public bidding for an approved budget of P8,720 each or a total of P12.7 million. Unfortunately, beyond the size and the ply, it did not indicate any other specifications.

A bidding conducted in February 2006 failed because bidders submitted incomplete documents. Another bidding was conducted in May. Because the Army did not have any other specifications, the DBM-PS did not require a testing of the items. "There was nothing to test because the Army did not specify the chemical composition, bursting strength, tensile strength, extent of elasticity, air capacity. Nobody (in the Army) knows that," said DBM-PS Executive Director Estanislao Granados.

Based on the specs the Army itself gave, the DBM-PS issued a notice of award to Prisma Gold, the lowest bidder which had complied with the specs and offered to supply each tire set for P7,232.80. But the Army opposed the awarding, claiming an overprice. One of the losing bidders, a company called Capital, had submitted to the Army a canvass of quotations that were lower than Prisma's--after the bidding. To this day, the dispute remains unresolved.

Procurement officials say that up to now, the military still has no clear-cut specifications even for simple items that fall under combat, clothing and individual equipment (CCIE) like combat shoes, which are made either of canvas or nylon, and for exactly what shade of green and camouflage are the clothing material they use for uniforms.

"The camouflage has five different colors there, including brown, green, black, khaki. If one color doesn't match, reject. Sakit ng ulo (It makes your head ache)," Granados said.

As a result, procurements for these simple items get stalled for as long as two years, as in the case of P9.8 million worth of safety boots the Navy needs. The items have still not been bid out after the Navy failed to submit the specifications to the DBM-PS.

Delayed deliveries by the DBM-PS are borne out in COA reports. By the end of 2005, it still had to deliver CCIE and other items amounting to P597.9 million to the Army; P97.7 million to the Navy; and P72 million to the Air Force.

This lack of expertise has been a hallmark of AFP procurement, according to budget and defense officials. It has caused ill-advised purchases such as the 402 Squad Automatic Weapons, which were bought without the belt-fed ammunition.

"Ano 'yan? Batuta? (What are those? Police batons)?" an exasperated defense official equipped when he learned of the incomplete purchase.

Dependent on suppliers

Because of this lack of expertise, the military tends to become dependent on suppliers who dictate what items to buy and what the specifications are, usually tailor-made to match their own product lines.

Military suppliers interviewed for this report say it is common knowledge in the DND and AFP that with each reorganization in the military, a new general brings in his own set of favored suppliers who corner procurement contracts while that official and his subordinates or Philippine Military Academy classmates remain in the service.

Usually, suppliers start developing relationships with military officials early in their careers. "Major pa lang ang mga yan, inaalagan na bilang kontak (We nurture the relationships even when they are still majors)," said one supplier.

Relationships such as these develop to the point where the supplier gets to dictate the items that the military should purchase, usually from the supplier himself or herself, in the process influencing the unit's plans and priorities.

"Of course, there is a bidding, pero pag alam mo na may anointed supplier, 'di ka na sasali (If you know the anointed supplier, you don't join anymore)," said another supplier who now no longer wants to do business with the AFP.

Send-off checks

This practice enriches the select group of suppliers while leaving out other legitimate companies. When the general retires, these suppliers also chip in to give him a fat send off paycheck, known in military circles as "pabaon," suppliers said.

But the lines between the military and its suppliers are sometimes blurred, especially when a supplier is a retired general or colonel, or the wife of either a retired or active official. Suppliers can easily point to a number of defense manufacturing firms whose representatives are former high-ranking officials of the AFP.

Former AFP comptroller Carlos Garcia is one AFP official who had many dealings with suppliers. Garcia, found guilty by court-martial of amassing ill-gotten wealth, is serving a two-year prison term.

His wife Clarita, in defending her husband's questionable wealth, had said: "My husband also receives cash for travel and expenses in Europe and Asia that are awarded contracts for military hardware. He also receives gifts and gratitude money from several Philippine companies that are awarded military contracts to build roads, bridges and military housing."

"Garcia was not an anomaly in the AFP," said a bureaucrat who has dealt with the AFP many times. "There are a thousand Garcias in the AFP, but only one got caught."

...

part 2 - SPECIAL REPORT

Favored suppliers bag AFP deals

By Yvonne T. Chua, Luz Rimban
Inquirer
Last updated 01:25am (Mla time) 01/09/2007


(Second of three parts, read part 1)

AS HE prepared to leave the Department of National Defense last November, then Defense Secretary Avelino Cruz asked concerned citizens to closely guard the P10-billion fund that will be released for the Armed Forces of the Philippines' latest modernization plan called the Capability Upgrade Program.

To be sure, reforms designed to safeguard AFP funds are already being put in place. There is the 10-point Philippine Defense Reform Program meant to improve DND and AFP operations and manpower. A defense acquisition committee and internal audit offices have been established. Representatives of the private sector, such as the Makati Business Club and the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference, have been allowed to observe bidding procedures. Measures to streamline procurement procedures throughout the AFP are being implemented.

Despite these reforms, government auditors and defense and budget officials worry that a culture of inefficiency and corruption continues to plague the AFP. A string of problematic transactions illustrates why they say reforms in the AFP are going to be an uphill battle:

In 2003, the government authorized the AFP to purchase 12,000 units of handheld very high frequency radios worth P900 million for the Philippine Army. The voice-encrypted radios are basic equipment that could spell life and death for soldiers in the field. But after three years, the DND and AFP still have not resolved whether to buy them by direct contracting or public bidding.

Last year, the Army asked the Department of Budget and Management Procurement Service to purchase, through public bidding, some 1,400 sets of tires for trucks worth more than P12 million. After the notice of award was issued to the winning bidder, the Army blocked the awarding of the contract. The purchase remains stalled.

Since 2000, the Army has refused to honor a P201-million contract to repair 30 Scorpion tanks that would have given soldiers added firepower in the field. The budget, meanwhile, for the repair is dwindling, with millions of pesos having gone to storage fees for spare parts and to bank charges.

"If the AFP can't resolve these problems, how much more the bigger contracts under the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP)?" asked an official involved in AFP procurement contracts.

Indeed, officials in the defense and budget departments fear that scarce government resources may go to waste because of bad procurement practices that remain uncorrected in the AFP.

A study done in 2006 by the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) found "a high level of noncompliance" by the AFP with Republic Act No. 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act. The law is intended to streamline government purchases and prevent corruption that has arisen out of procurements.

"There is no integrated or comprehensive strategy to implement procurement reforms in line with RA No. 9184 in the AFP," said the GPPB report.

Splitting purchase orders

The GPPB assessment noted deviations from procurement procedures in the AFP, and the military's preference for shopping, using cash advance, and direct contracting over public bidding, as well as for splitting purchase orders. These problems are likewise documented in annual audits done on the Army, Navy and Air Force by the Commission on Audit.

The GPPB's attention was also drawn to the creation of multiple bids and awards committees under the various service commands and the lack of a pool of competent and trained personnel for assignment to the AFP bids and awards committee.

Officials also point to other problems. One is that military officers lack the financial, management and technical expertise required to handle multibillion-peso transactions which, some say, arose partly from the AFP's decades of dependence on the United States for the bulk of its defense spending on materiel until the American bases in the Philippines were closed in 1992.

To make matters worse, a hierarchical organization, like the AFP, with its bonds of brotherhood and code of silence, discourages transparency and scrutiny of misdeeds, according to those interviewed for this report.

And while the AFP top brass wrangle over knotty contracts, equipment on which the lives of ordinary soldiers depend remains lacking in the field.

Handheld radios

The minimum requirement for Army units is tactical communication, including simple handheld radios, which allow secure contact between units. The AFP's total requirement for handheld radios is 14,002 units.

In November 2003, the AFP was allowed to purchase 12,046 VHF/FM radios worth P930.8 million under the AFP Modernization Program's Re-Prioritized Projects Lists for 2000 and 2002. This was supposed to supplement the 1,946 already purchased from Harris Corp., an American firm.

The AFP, under then Chief of Staff Gen. Narciso Abaya, recommended that the radios be bought, again from Harris Corp., this time through direct contracting for interoperability and security reasons. Abaya's proposal was approved by then Defense Secretary Eduardo Ermita, endorsed by then Justice Secretary Simeon Datumanong and then Director General Romulo Neri of the National Economic and Development Authority.

The negotiations were completed and a contract ironed out nearly a year later in October 2004. A new set of officials led by then Presidential Legal Counsel Avelino Cruz moved into the DND and decided to refer the contract to the GPPB. The GPPB recommended the renegotiation of the contract in keeping with RA No. 9184.

In April 2005, Abaya signed an amended contract with Harris and sent this to Cruz who, in turn, sent it to the GPPB for review. By this time, President Macapagal-Arroyo had issued an order requiring government contracts of at least P500 million to be submitted to the GPPB to determine whether they are exempt from public bidding.

The GPPB declared that the radios were best procured through public bidding. It also ruled that without Cruz's approval and certification that the contract was exempt from public bidding, it had to be bid out.

For direct contracting

The AFP, now under Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr., stands firm on direct contracting as the mode to procure the radios. The DND's defense acquisition committee and its bids and awards committee, meanwhile, had recommended to Cruz shortly before he quit his post the purchase of the units through negotiated procurement.

The fate of the contract lies with Ms Arroyo, concurrently the defense secretary. As head of the procuring agency, her approval is needed for the contract to move.

In the meantime, one procurement official said: "Our soldiers in the field are complaining due to lack of communication equipment ... That's why in combat operations, lagi tayo nahuhuli (we always lag behind)."

Scorpion tanks

In December 2000, the British company Alvis Logistics clinched the P201-million contract to supply spare parts and maintain the Army's 30 Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (CVR) Tracked Scorpion tanks. Then AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Angelo Reyes approved Alvis Logistics' price list.

Funded out of the contingency fund of then President Joseph Estrada, the contract provided a 30-percent or P60-million down payment to Alvis Logistics, whose exclusive distributor in the Philippines is Bairam Enterprises. As with the supplier's previous contracts with the Army, the rest of the payment was to be released on a staggered basis, upon delivery of the spare parts and repair of the tanks.

But when Alvis Logistics delivered the first shipment worth about P40 million in April 2001, the Army, then under Maj. Gen. Efren Abu, refused to release the amount, raising allegations of overpricing and insisting that the British firm first use up the P60 million down payment. Reyes, by then the defense secretary, suspended the contract.

Bairam representative Rosario Ong later filed charges with the Ombudsman for the military in connection with the Scorpion tanks contract. News reports at the time quoted her as asking the Senate blue ribbon committee to investigate Reyes' alleged abuse of authority, and accusing him of wanting to give the contract to another supplier.

When Eduardo Ermita became defense secretary in 2003, he ordered the Army to honor its contract with Alvis Logistics. The COA, meanwhile, recommended that the supplier be partially paid on top of the down payment. The Army, however, refused to release another payment--whether full or partial--for the spare parts.

Sources familiar with the contract said the DND and Ong finally came to a settlement. Ong withdrew the case with the Ombudsman with the understanding that the contract would be implemented as originally agreed upon. Apparently, the settlement in the end fell through.

By August 2004, when Cruz became defense secretary, the GPPB, to which the issue had been raised, ruled that Alvis Logistics should first exhaust the downpayment it had gotten. Still insisting on payment per delivery, Alvis Logistics has refused to ship the rest of the spare parts and send its technicians to repair the tanks.

Letters of credit

All this time, the P141 million that remained of the contract has been sitting idle at Land Bank of the Philippines, where a letter of credit had been opened as mode of payment. It does not earn interest because, based on rules of the Bankers Association of the Philippines, "deposits against foreign and domestic letters of credit are received by banks merely as collateral security, consequently, no interest is to be allowed on said deposits."

Instead, the government has had to pay the bank several hundreds of thousands of pesos for every renewal. Earlier, it had to pay storage fees to the international airport for holding the spare parts while it argued its case with Bairam.

The Scorpion tanks contract was not awarded under the AFPMP, but the risks of letter of credit payments are not lost on the special COA team that looked into the modernization procurements. After all, most transactions entered into by the program with foreign suppliers are covered by such payments, including purchases of squad automatic weapons and the initial batch of Harris radios, refurbishing of Jacinto Class Patrol Vessels, and the procurement of a Geographical Information System.

"(The) amount of contracts funded out of modernization funds and paid through letters of credit are deposited in full in advance at the drawee bank even before the actual delivery of the subject of the contract, which usually takes as long as seven months, therefore depriving the agency of the beneficial use of the fund," the COA team said.

As the experience with the Scorpion tanks demonstrates, letters of credit can be left lying in banks earning no interest for as long as six years. A regular COA audit found last year that the Army had 11 other idle LCs with LandBank after foreign contractors failed to deliver the goods. "Considering the meager resources of the (Army), we are concerned that government funds and resources are wasted," the COA said.

Lack of expertise

Defense and budget officials attribute the procurement malpractice prevalent in the AFP not only to a lack of financial expertise but also to a lack of experience and knowledge of what items exactly they are procuring.

The DBM Procurement Service, which buys common supplies for government agencies, cites the contract to purchase 1,458 sets of tires for Army trucks. Last year, the Army asked the DBM-PS to procure the tires through public bidding for an approved budget of P8,720 each or a total of P12.7 million. Unfortunately, beyond the size and the ply, it did not indicate any other specifications.

A bidding conducted in February 2006 failed because bidders submitted incomplete documents. Another bidding was conducted in May. Because the Army did not have any other specifications, the DBM-PS did not require a testing of the items. "There was nothing to test because the Army did not specify the chemical composition, bursting strength, tensile strength, extent of elasticity, air capacity. Nobody (in the Army) knows that," said DBM-PS Executive Director Estanislao Granados.

Based on the specs the Army itself gave, the DBM-PS issued a notice of award to Prisma Gold, the lowest bidder which had complied with the specs and offered to supply each tire set for P7,232.80. But the Army opposed the awarding, claiming an overprice. One of the losing bidders, a company called Capital, had submitted to the Army a canvass of quotations that were lower than Prisma's--after the bidding. To this day, the dispute remains unresolved.

Procurement officials say that up to now, the military still has no clear-cut specifications even for simple items that fall under combat, clothing and individual equipment (CCIE) like combat shoes, which are made either of canvas or nylon, and for exactly what shade of green and camouflage are the clothing material they use for uniforms.

"The camouflage has five different colors there, including brown, green, black, khaki. If one color doesn't match, reject. Sakit ng ulo (It makes your head ache)," Granados said.

As a result, procurements for these simple items get stalled for as long as two years, as in the case of P9.8 million worth of safety boots the Navy needs. The items have still not been bid out after the Navy failed to submit the specifications to the DBM-PS.

Delayed deliveries by the DBM-PS are borne out in COA reports. By the end of 2005, it still had to deliver CCIE and other items amounting to P597.9 million to the Army; P97.7 million to the Navy; and P72 million to the Air Force.

This lack of expertise has been a hallmark of AFP procurement, according to budget and defense officials. It has caused ill-advised purchases such as the 402 Squad Automatic Weapons, which were bought without the belt-fed ammunition.

"Ano 'yan? Batuta? (What are those? Police batons)?" an exasperated defense official equipped when he learned of the incomplete purchase.

Dependent on suppliers

Because of this lack of expertise, the military tends to become dependent on suppliers who dictate what items to buy and what the specifications are, usually tailor-made to match their own product lines.

Military suppliers interviewed for this report say it is common knowledge in the DND and AFP that with each reorganization in the military, a new general brings in his own set of favored suppliers who corner procurement contracts while that official and his subordinates or Philippine Military Academy classmates remain in the service.

Usually, suppliers start developing relationships with military officials early in their careers. "Major pa lang ang mga yan, inaalagan na bilang kontak (We nurture the relationships even when they are still majors)," said one supplier.

Relationships such as these develop to the point where the supplier gets to dictate the items that the military should purchase, usually from the supplier himself or herself, in the process influencing the unit's plans and priorities.

"Of course, there is a bidding, pero pag alam mo na may anointed supplier, 'di ka na sasali (If you know the anointed supplier, you don't join anymore)," said another supplier who now no longer wants to do business with the AFP.

Send-off checks

This practice enriches the select group of suppliers while leaving out other legitimate companies. When the general retires, these suppliers also chip in to give him a fat send off paycheck, known in military circles as "pabaon," suppliers said.

But the lines between the military and its suppliers are sometimes blurred, especially when a supplier is a retired general or colonel, or the wife of either a retired or active official. Suppliers can easily point to a number of defense manufacturing firms whose representatives are former high-ranking officials of the AFP.

Former AFP comptroller Carlos Garcia is one AFP official who had many dealings with suppliers. Garcia, found guilty by court-martial of amassing ill-gotten wealth, is serving a two-year prison term.

His wife Clarita, in defending her husband's questionable wealth, had said: "My husband also receives cash for travel and expenses in Europe and Asia that are awarded contracts for military hardware. He also receives gifts and gratitude money from several Philippine companies that are awarded military contracts to build roads, bridges and military housing."

"Garcia was not an anomaly in the AFP," said a bureaucrat who has dealt with the AFP many times. "There are a thousand Garcias in the AFP, but only one got caught." (To be concluded Wednesday.)



Copyright 2007 Inquirer. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

a very sad case, they even got their UN peacekeeping pay deducted....

SPECIAL REPORT
RP peacekeepers dealt ‘unkindest cut of all’
(Last of three parts)

By Yvonne T. Chua, Luz Rimban
Inquirer
Last updated 04:40am (Mla time) 01/10/2007




FILIPINO peacekeepers in Haiti know the perils of their mission all too well.

On Dec. 21, four of them came under fire from suspected gang members as they were escorting an official of the United Nations Stabilization Mission through the violent neighborhood of Cite Soleil.

The four Filipinos escaped unhurt in what was already the fourth incident in as many weeks involving the 200-strong Philippine military and police contingent in the capital Port-au-Prince. The scene of the attack was the same place where Army Staff Sgt. Antonio Batomalaque was shot dead in April 2005, the first Filipino peacekeeper to die in combat.

In three separate incidents between Nov. 18 and 22, demonstrators opposing the continued UN presence in Haiti attacked UN personnel, wounding two members of the Philippine contingent.

The Philippine Mission to the UN in New York describes the latest incidents as the “worst outbreak of violence” directed against Filipino peacekeepers—or “Blue Helmets”—since the April 2005 attack that killed Batomalaque.

The security of Filipino peacekeeping contingents and military observers in Haiti and elsewhere has always figured high among the concerns of the Philippine mission. Since early last year, however, the Philippine mission has had to deal with another worry: The low morale and restiveness among many of the 329 military Blue Helmets stationed mainly in Haiti and Liberia.

For the first time since the Philippines began sending contingents abroad, Filipino peacekeepers are complaining. The object of their ire is the decision of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to slash their monthly allowance of $1,000 by as much as 40 percent.

DFA and DOJ not consulted

The AFP directive cutting troop allowances, unprecedented since the country resumed in 1991 the deployment of troops and police officers to UN peacekeeping missions, was issued without consulting the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of National Defense. It took effect in January 2006.

In a statement, the Philippine Mission to the UN said the pay cut covered only the peacekeepers from the AFP assigned to the Force Headquarters Security Units of the UN missions in Liberia and Haiti. Military officers assigned as military observers get their pay in full because the allowance they received are not coursed through the AFP. The Philippine National Police contingent—325 personnel in Liberia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan, East Timor and Ivory Coast—also gets full pay.

The Philippine mission said that when it learned of the pay cuts, “we recommended that the reductions be placed on hold and that the peacekeepers be paid in full.” But with the resignation of Avelino Cruz as defense secretary last November, the matter remains hanging. Cruz had repeatedly assured the DFA he would try somehow to help.

The peacekeepers, who signed up for the dangerous UN missions to augment their meager pay, have also appealed to President Macapagal-Arroyo through an open letter to restore their allowances to $1,000.

But the pay cuts are by no means the only issue government needs to urgently address when it comes to UN money it receives in exchange for sending troops to peacekeeping missions. A special team of government auditors found “highly questionable” certain transfers of the UN fund, projects and activities by the AFP done in the name of UN peacekeeping. The team also found signs of fraud in procurement deals, running into hundreds of millions of pesos, supposedly for the UN contingent. All these took place under the Arroyo administration.

These include charging the UN various expenses, such as fuel and helicopter repairs, that had already been charged to other AFP funds and money the government got from the United States for the RP-US Balikatan exercises, according to audit findings.

Audit team chief resigns

The special team, created by the Commission on Audit in October 2004, disbanded early this year after completing its investigation and presenting its findings to the Ombudsman for the military and top COA officials.

Shortly after, the team’s leader, Auditor Heidi Mendoza, left public service in disgust after failing to get the COA’s nod to further investigate the AFP, particularly the funds it obtains from the UN and the United States. Mendoza declined to be interviewed for this report.

The Philippines first participated in UN operations in 1951 when it deployed the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea. It did not join UN missions during the Marcos administration because it was focused on internal security concerns. In 1991 the country resumed contributing to UN operations, deploying the Blue Helmets to Iraq.

Second largest

As of Nov. 30, 2006, the Philippines had 672 military and police personnel deployed to seven UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. This makes it the second largest contributing country in Southeast Asia and the 27th in the world. Of the 672 peacekeepers, 329 are from the Army, Air Force, Navy and the Marines, and 325 from the Philippine National Police. The rest are military observers.

Under an agreement, the UN reimburses the AFP what it spends for personnel or troop allowances; contingent-owned equipment such as vehicles and generators; and “sustainment,” including medical equipment and storage.

UN reimbursements

From 2001 to 2004 it released to the AFP a total of P1.47 billion, according to the auditors’ report. In 2005, the military received P227.5 million in troop allowances, plus P23.6 million for equipment used in Liberia from December 2004 to September 2005, data from the Philippine mission in New York show. Reimbursements for equipment used in the Haiti mission are estimated at P28.9 million as of February 2006.

The reimbursements were deposited directly in a Land Bank of the Philippines account until 2002, when the AFP opened a savings account at the United Coconut Planters Bank’s Alfaro branch in Makati. In May 2004 it opened another UN account at the UCPB’s Salcedo branch, also in Makati.

P52-M discrepancy

The bank accounts themselves were problematic. The COA team uncovered transactions between May 20 and Aug. 17, 2004—involving P86.4 million in debit and P34.3 million in credit—“deleted” from the UCPB-Alfaro passbook the AFP had submitted for audit. The deletions, resulting in a P52-million discrepancy in the account balance, were detected when the team obtained a bank statement.

About P22 million of the “deleted” entries covered payments to 11 suppliers. Another entry purged from the Alfaro passbook pertained to P36 million moved on May 20, 2004 to the AFP’s new account at UCPB—Salcedo and ended up as payments to mostly the same suppliers.

By the auditors’ reckoning, a staggering P176.2 million transferred by the AFP to the Air Force, Navy and the Army’s 51st and 54th Engineering Brigades from 2002 to 2005 and charged to releases from UN funds went to “questionable projects and activities.” Of the amount, P94.3 million remained unliquidated at the time of the audit, with the Air Force accounting for P69 million or three-fourths of the sum.

Funds were transferred and disbursement vouchers drawn without documents that would validate the purpose for which fund transfers were being made, the auditors said. Money also went to activities totally unrelated to UN peacekeeping activities.

In a lot of instances, funds were actually used only after one year, sometimes two, following the transfers, “proving that at the time the transfer was made, there was no felt need,” the auditors concluded.

Multiple charging of expenses

The COA team came upon nine checks amounting to P84.2 million issued between January 2002 and May 2004 to the 51st Engineering Brigade, “the purposes of which were unknown at the time of transfer.” Only two other checks totaling P35 million stated the reasons: the phase and land developments of the AFP Peacekeeping Operation Center facilities.

A total of P120 million transferred to the Air Force from 2002 to 2005 for the repairs of at least six C130 helicopters at the 220th Airlift Wing particularly caught the audit team’s attention. Most of these aircraft had either been repaired or were undergoing repair under the Depot Maintenance Program funded by the Joint US Military Assistance Group (Jusmag), it reported.

Records obtained by the auditors show, for example, that the C130 with tail number “4593” was inputted into the Jusmag program in February 2004. From March to September 2004, when the Air Force supposedly spent P5.9 million of UN money to fix it, Lockheed Martin was repairing the aircraft at the hangar of its local supplier—at Jusmag’s expense.

Multiple charging of fuel expenses was also a practice. A separate audit of the Balikatan funds showed that the US had reimbursed the AFP about P9 million in fuel expenses supposedly incurred for the 2002 joint military exercises. The Philippine military, however, reported these very same expenses to the UN that same year and got reimbursed, according to audit findings.

US funds single account

The audit team questioned the AFP practice of depositing in a single bank account reimbursements from the United States and other fund transfers from government agencies such as the National Irrigation Administration and the Department of Public Works and Highways. “The multiple and material amount of funds for different purposes but kept in a single account proved to be a fertile ground for juggling and conversion of funds,” it said.

Purchases of office supplies charged to UN reimbursements also struck auditors as being as “doubtful” as those bought using other funds at the AFP’s disposal. The purchases have long been the objects of “conversion” in the military, which involves transforming allocated funds into cash, most commonly in collusion with suppliers and some of the officers involved in the procurement process in an AFP unit.

Even after the Government Procurement Reform Act or Republic Act No. 9184 came into force in 2003 and measures to reform the military procurement system were adopted, conversion and other questionable buying practices persist.

Rigged selection of suppliers

“Selection and award to suppliers (were) rigged, with participating suppliers owned by one and the same individual or group of individuals,” the auditors said. “These are the same contractors who cornered transactions from (the AFP’s) regular accounts, interest account, Balikatan and even Modernization funds,” the audit team said.

The team found many suppliers lacking a specific product line: They would peddle office supplies at one time and render catering services at another. The AFP also bought medicines from suppliers without license from the Bureau of Food and Drugs.

The auditors disclosed that splitting of purchase orders, which enables officials to keep contracts within their signing authority, and awarding of contracts to suppliers even before any canvassing was made remained rampant practices in the military.

Account of same person

Curiously, checks paid to a minimum of four to six companies sometimes ended up being deposited in only one account. For example, those issued to Alvenru Enterprises, PHU Enterprises, Cherub Equipment Rental Services, ETHC Builders, CURM Enterprises and ILAMU Sales were deposited in the same bank account by the same person, Pacita H. Umali.

In the case of the Balikatan funds, the audit team said reimbursements of at least P31 million amounted to fund conversion. A number of transactions were “fictitious,” with suppliers allowing the AFP use of their documents such as official receipts and delivery receipts for these, auditors said. Undated, antedated or postdated documents “lend to the bogus nature of these transactions,” they added.

DFA officials in Manila and New York have yet to be apprised of the audit findings, but their attention has been drawn to alleged corruption in the military by Philippine troops in Haiti and Liberia complaining about the cuts in their monthly allowance of $1,000.

AFP justification

The AFP justified the reduction, citing the need to upgrade the country’s peacekeeping capabilities by acquiring new equipment and funding the construction of the proposed training center in Capas, Tarlac. It said the uniform rates violated the principle of commensurate pay.

The AFP further said that the amount withheld from troop allowances would also help offset what it had spent to train peacekeepers. The AFP Peacekeeping Operations Center reported losses of as much as P4 million in sending a 145-member peacekeeping contingent overseas.

Under the directive approved by then Chief of Staff Gen. Generoso Senga, officers serving in UN peacekeeping missions will receive allowances equivalent to 2.5 times their base pay while enlisted personnel will be entitled to allowances equivalent to three times their base pay. This means a full colonel with a monthly base pay of P19,499 will receive P48,747.50, and a corporal with a base pay of P9,668 will get P29,004.

Carton boxes as beds

Filipino peacekeepers said, however, they are skeptical that the proceeds of the new revenue-generating scheme will go to their intended purpose.

The Philippines has been reimbursed nearly $7 million or P357.8 million from the UN since 2000 for equipment used and “sustainment” of troops posted in East Timor and Liberia. But some reports said the AFP was unable to provide spare parts for some equipment, which were described as “aging.”

Although they have night-vision capability, some of the heavy equipment deployed were Vietnam-vintage surplus trucks turned over by the United States, according to peacekeepers.

Some of those deployed to Liberia recalled what it was like when they first arrived at the post: They turned carton boxes into beddings and bought their own blankets.

The Blue Helmets also said the AFP at first issued them duffel bags originally intended for trainees, and not the extendable deployment bags suited for their mission. The deployment bags were later sent to them but these, they said, were the same supplies the Army Support Command had allegedly rejected because they were below standard.

Eat-all-you-can sardines

In January 2005, peacekeepers in Haiti nearly staged a mutiny after being made to subsist on sardines for two straight months. “It was eat-all-you-can sardines—tomato sauce, or olive oil, spicy, not too spicy,” a member of the contingent said.

Data from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations show that troop contributing countries like the Philippines are actually paid $1,028 for every peacekeeper. Even before Senga issued his directive, the AFP had been automatically withholding $28 to offset the cost of vaccination and other deployment-related administrative expenses, leaving only $1,000 for each soldier.

Baja: Stop pay cuts

In a memorandum to Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo, Ambassador Lauro Baja, head of the Philippine Mission to the UN, sought the suspension of the pay cuts. Romulo, in turn, relayed Baja’s recommendation to then Defense Secretary Cruz through a confidential memorandum.

“Our peacekeepers have brought pride and honor to our country. The controversy generated by the recent pay cuts may create the misimpression that the Philippines is exploiting the troops it sends on peacekeeping assignments,” Baja said. “It erodes some of [the] respect and goodwill we were able to establish in the United Nations.”


...

Another sad case where the country's warriors are armed with toothpicks, fork and spoons.... why can't they just spend their money on basic armaments for the individual troops....as for the field radios, they don't need to equip each trooper with a radio, perhaps there something wrong with their section make-up... I mean if they operate in sections, each section with a radio is good enough communication....why every trooper?? Perhaps another money making scam again...

As for their other hardware requirements, I think if they acquire surplus UH1H from US or ourselves, it would suffice their current transport roles, for gunship too...an additional Cobra or two wouldn't hurt them too much.... I feel that they need to cut their cloth according to the amount of cloth allocated to them and not have grandeous thoughts.....just like the Emperor's new clothes' story.

i dont understand the cobra part....the rebel will not be stupid enough to fight in the open, it will be in a jungle....most of the time the gun will be used but Defender can also be armed with gun and rockets....they still need foot soldiers to get them one by one on the ground not in the air....their current inventories consisting of the huey and defender is good enough all they need is more of those.

South China Sea (May 23, 2006) - A Philippine Navy visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team prepares to enter the bridge of amphibious dock landing ship USS Tortuga (LSD 46) during a boarding. The boarding was part of exercise Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism (SEACAT), a week long at-sea exercise designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-national coordination within a scenario that gives participating navies practical maritime interception training opportunities. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class John L. Beeman (RELEASED)


South China Sea (May 23, 2006) - Philippine Navy visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team leader Lt. Cmdr. Carlos Garcia ascends a ladder as he makes his way to the flight deck of amphibious dock landing ship USS Tortuga (LSD 46) during a boarding. The boarding was a part of Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism (SEACAT), a week long at-sea exercise designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-national coordination within a scenario that gives participating navies practical maritime interception training opportunities. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class John L. Beeman (RELEASED)

060523-N-4104L-006 South China Sea (May 23, 2006) - U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement trainer Ensign Tom Osborn briefs Philippine Navy visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team members on search techniques during a boarding exercise aboard USS Tortuga (LSD 46). The boarding exercise was part of exercise Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT). SEACAT is a weeklong at-sea exercise designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-national coordination within a scenario that gives participating navies practical maritime interception training opportunities. U.S. Navy photo by Senior Chief Journalist Melinda Larson (RELEASED)


060523-N-9851B-011 South China Sea (May 23, 2006) - A Philippine Navy visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team makes their way across the deck of amphibious dock landing ship USS Tortuga (LSD 46) during a boarding. The boarding was part of exercise Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism (SEACAT), a week long at-sea exercise designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-national coordination within a scenario that gives participating navies practical maritime interception training opportunities. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class John L. Beeman (RELEASED)


060523-N-9851B-006 South China Sea (May 23, 2006) - A visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team of the Philippine Navy approaches USS Tortuga (LSD 46) in a rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) in preparation for carrying out a boarding of the ship. The boarding is a part of exercise Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT). SEACAT is a week long at-sea exercise designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-national coordination within a scenario that gives participating navies practical maritime interception training opportunities. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class John L. Beeman (RELEASED)


060523-N-9851B-008 South China Sea (May 23, 2006) - Philippine Navy visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team leader Lt. Cmdr. Carlos Garcia takes the cover behind a crane on the flight deck of amphibious dock landing ship USS Tortuga (LSD 46) during a boarding. The boarding was a part of exercise Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism (SEACAT), a week long at-sea exercise designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-national coordination within a scenario that gives participating navies practical maritime interception training opportunities. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class John L. Beeman (RELEASED)


060523-N-9851B-009 South China Sea (May 23, 2006) - Philippine Navy visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team leader Lt. Cmdr. Carlos Garcia, right, listens as U.S. Coast Guard Ensign Tom Osborn explains the objectives of the boarding of amphibious dock landing ship USS Tortuga (LSD 46). The boarding was a part of exercise Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism (SEACAT), a week long at-sea exercise designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-national coordination within a scenario that gives participating navies practical maritime interception training opportunities. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class John L. Beeman (RELEASED)

HAVE NOT DOUBTS ABOUT THE PHILIPPINE SOLDIERS' FIGHTING ABILITIES. MY FRIEND FROM 3SIR HAD TRAINED WITH THEM BEFORE, HE SAID THAT THEY ARE GOOD WITH STANDARD INFANTRY TACTICS....THEIR ONLY LETDOWN SEEMS TO BE THEIR WEAPONS COS' DURING AN EXERCISE, THEIR MG KEPT JAMMING...NOT BECOS OF POOR MAINTENANCE BUT BECOS ITS ALREADY VERY OLD....THE SOLDIER TOLD HIM ITS ABOUT 20 YEARS OLD ALREADY!!! ALSO, WHEN THEY SAW THE ATGM - MILAN - THEY WERE VERY IMPRESSED AS THEY WERE ONLY USING THE WW2 BAZOOKAS!! WHEN THEY SAW THE NUMBER OF M203 OUR TROOPS HAD THEY WERE ALSO SHOCKED AND WORST WAS WHEN THEY SAW OUR SAW (ULTIMAX 100)...THEY ASKED WHY ARE WE EQUIPPED WITH SO MUCH FIREPOWER.... MY FRIEND EXPLAINED THAT BECOS WE ARE SMALL ARMY, WE NEED HEAVIER WEAPONS WITH BIGGER FIREPOWER TO FIGHT OFF BIGGER OPPOSITION...

THOSE TROOPS IN THE PICTURES LOOK VERY SEASONED AND SHOULD BE VETERANS... THEY ARE GOOD SOLDIERS BUT ARE HELD BACK BY POOR WEAPONS.... SO SAD...

The PMC is innovative in their own way

They have made their own sniper rifles from modified M16s and spec-op SMGs from old grease guns
http://www.navy.mil.ph/Dloads/PMC%20Sniper...e%20article.htm
http://www.timawa.net/m3/m3gen2.htm
but there you need old arms to modify with in the first place and if you got a shortage of even that ....

Sometime I wonder what kind of training that AFP soldier receive during their BMT. after I have read this:

From this thread:

http://timawa.net/forum/index.php?topic=6469.0

and I quote:

When SEATO was established, only Philippines & Thailand fm SE Asia is part of it. Back then, both Philippines & Thailand (besides Vietnam) were one of best armed military forces in SE Asia....so much have changed since. Hope the Filipino forces catches up...they need to due to the local insurgency situation.

Seems like the local insurgents there are not cut from the same cloth as the Viet Congs etc
I guess when the OpFor are not up to scratch, the PAF standards drops as well ....

Quite true, but the rebel numbers are far smaller than the troops and yet they have always had the upper hand... if only they were better equipped and supplied, then situation would not be as bad today.... the troops have always been short-changed, so how to gain upper hand in the fight??

As I mentioned earlier...they are still using bazookas!!!

base on what i read in their forum all this years is that the rebel just bribe the soldiers to escape.....infact some officers got a percentage cut of the ransom given to release the hostage near sabah sometime ago....

Not only that, there are also reports that AFP soldiers actually selling weapons and ammo stolen from the armoury to rebels.

The current situation suits the political establishment in the Philippines. It keeps the military weak, corrupt and inefficient and the insurgency quietly burning without escalation. This means that is less challenge towards the status quo and less likelyhood of a coup. Even if it happen, nobody gets hurt, everyone is forgiven and some 'steam' is let off, until it happens again.

unless you get someone like Honasan ... people died in his coups and he became a senator??? :blink:
well, 3rd strike out for Gringo ....

their military are to politicised....their media have too much freedom, too free, it's free for all.....any false claim will be believable.

Activist group: US troops engaged in combat in southern RP


By Oliver Teves
Associated Press
Last updated 06:34pm (Mla time) 01/15/2007


MANILA -- US troops have engaged in combat operations in the Philippines despite an arrangement limiting them to humanitarian work and training Filipino soldiers fighting Al-Qaeda-linked guerrillas, activists said Monday.

The activist group Focus on the Global South, citing US military writings, doctrines and eyewitness accounts, called for an independent investigation into whether the alleged operations violated the Philippine Constitution.

US Embassy spokesman Matthew Lussenhop disputed the allegation.

"Visiting US troops in the Philippines advise, assist, share information with their Philippine counterparts, but they do not engage in combat and they have no direct role in combat operations. Any combat operations are 100 percent Filipino," he told The Associated Press.

A US Special Forces contingent has been deployed in the south since 2002, nearly a year after the Muslim extremist group Abu Sayyaf kidnapped three Americans and 17 Filipinos from a resort. One of the Americans was beheaded soon after the kidnapping, and another was killed during a US-backed military rescue operation the following year.

Lussenhop said the number of Special Forces troops average "no more than a few hundred at any one time."

Herbert Docena, who wrote the report for Focus on the Global South, which promotes human rights and fair trade, said US troops may also be violating the Philippine constitutional ban on the stationing of foreign military bases in the country, since they have not left the south since they arrived five years ago.

Lussenhop, however, said the facilities and camps being used by the Americans were only temporary.

US military presence in this former American colony is a sensitive issue that recently heightened following the conviction of a US Marine on rape charges. The Marine was not part of the US task force.

Docena said US official and military documents show the US forces in the Philippines are deployed as part of Washington's global campaign against terror, and reportedly confirm the US "right to strike what it considers threats even inside countries that they are not at war with."

He also said eyewitnesses allegedly claim to have seen US troops in the vicinity of hostilities, operating military equipment, defusing land mines and performing other war-related activities.

Docena said US troops also operate spy planes -- including an unmanned one that crashed last year -- over areas of hostilities.

Muslim Prof. Octavio Dinampo said he personally saw US troops in November 2005 provide a "sort of a blocking force" in a coastal village as Filipino soldiers pursued Abu Sayyaf gunmen in Indanan town on southern Jolo island, a known militant stronghold.

Last year, Dinampo said he saw two vehicles carrying US troops in a convoy of Filipino soldiers heading to an alleged Abu Sayyaf camp also on Jolo.

Senator Rodolfo Biazon, head of the Senate defense committee, said US troops are supposed to remain only in the headquarters or camps of Philippine troops they have been assigned to and are explicitly banned from joining Filipino troops in combat patrols or operations.

US forces, however, are allowed to fire back if they come under attack, he said.

Embedding’ journalists in military operations eyed for ‘transparency’

By GILBERT BAYORAN
TODAY Correspondent

BACOLOD CITY - While media groups have raised the alarm against a proposal by the Armed Forces to “embed” Army soldiers as “regular reporters” in Mindanao, the military is also eyeing of embedding journalists into military operations against lawless groups, allegedly for“ transparency.”

The proposal made Tuesday drew mixed reactions from media practitioners and Army spokesmen on Negros and Panay islands.

AFP spokesman Daniel Lucero said the proposal is aimed at promoting transparency and accountability of the military as public servants of the Filipino people, as well as to gain public support in its counterterrorism campaign.

Lt. Col. David Tan, 303rd Infantry Brigade Civil Military Operations officer, Tuesday recalled that in the 1980s, several broadcasters in Iloilo accompanied the military in some operations.

However, he added, that the practice was stopped not only because it placed in jeopardy the lives of media practitioners, but because some of them were observed to be reporting their operations in “blow-by-blow” accounts, which led to negative results for the mission.

Maj. Lyndon Sullesta, spokesman for the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, shared the observation of Tan and said there should be some limit in embedding media into the military operations, primarily taking into account the safety of journalists.

Dolly Yasa, Negros Press Club president, said the proposal is welcome in the name of transparency as long as it will not jeopardize the impartiality of journalists.

Yasa, also former president of the Negros Occidental Defense Press Corps, used to cover the military beat at the height of insurgency problem in Negros.

On the contrary, Alex Vidal, newly elected president of the Iloilo Press Club, said he is not in favor of the proposal, saying that the media would be exposed to harm.

“We would become more vulnerable to attacks,” Vidal said.

In the spate of kidnappings by Abu Sayyaf bandits in Mindanao, the military noted that local and foreign journalists defied the warnings of AFP not to enter the war zone or no man’s land just to get an exclusive story.

Sullesta said that specific guidelines should be spelled out in allowing journalists to cover military operations.

Meanwhile, Lucero assured the public and the media that the soldiers who will be trained in public affairs will not be used to “spy” on journalists, contrary to insinuations.

He said the AFP believes in the principle that the more soldiers understand the role of the media, the more effective the military will be in relaying its messages to the Filipino nation.

“These soldiers who will be trained in media affairs will be taught the principles of press freedom, freedom of speech, how to answer questions from the radio, television and print effectively, and be indoctrinated on the importance of the role of the media in a liberal democratic system.” Lucero said.

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/NewsStory.aspx?...ncial&OID=57556

Alleged mutiny leader goes online to make 'friends'
By Joel Guinto
INQ7.net
Last updated 09:27pm (Mla time) 12/15/2006


(UPDATE) HE is a "gentleman and romantic" who likes watching the Hollywood movies "Jerry Maguire" and "Master and Commander," and listening to Filipino pop band Side A and 80s singer Mike Francis.

Call him "Sonny" for short, and he wants to meet "anyone" online.

This was how Navy Lieutenant Senior Grade Antonio Trillanes IV, rebel soldier-turned Senate hopeful described himself in his profile on the social networking website Friendster.

Trillanes activated his Friendster account several days ago, before he registered as a voter in Caloocan City last Sunday, when he announced plans to run for the Senate in next year's mid-term elections.

As of Friday, Trillanes had 24 "friends" on his Friendster network.

A source close to the alleged mutiny ringleader said Trillanes' "campaign people" maintain the Friendster account with his approval.

"He wants to touch base with the Internet crowd, so that they can get to know him and so that he can get his message across," the source said.

"The Internet is something new to him. He learned about Friendster while in detention," the source added.

On his Friendster blog or online journal, Trillanes posted the full text of his article "The Greenbase Expose," which detailed the military's alleged involvement in the string of bombings in Mindanao in early 2003.

This, and alleged corruption in government are the main grievances of the Magdalo, a 300-strong band of junior officers and enlisted men who seized the Oakwood luxury apartments in the financial district of Makati on July 27, 2003.

Trillanes shot to fame as spokesman of the rebel group during the day-long siege. While several of his comrades have reaffirmed allegiance to the government, he has remained defiant.

In his Friendster profile, Trillanes wrote "Magdalo" as his affiliation and "AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] officer" as his occupation.

Trillanes posted a close-up shot of himself, smiling, with the Philippine flag behind him, as his main photo, accompanied by three pictures of his registration last Sunday, which showed him posing with and waving to supporters.

The Navy officer also gamely answered several scrapbook questions. He said his favorite authors are Robert Ludlum and Frederick Forsyth.

Trillanes, who is detained at the Philippine Marine Custodial Center in Fort Bonifacio, said his hobbies include "malling with my family" and playing tennis, badminton and basketball.

He is facing coup d'etat charges before the Makati regional trial court and for violation of Article of War 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) before a general court martial.

No more adventurism, military chief assures Arroyo
By Joel Guinto
INQUIRER.net
Last updated 09:00pm (Mla time) 12/21/2006


ARMED Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief General Hermogenes Esperon Jr. assured President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on Thursday that "putting an end to adventurism" is "foremost" on the military's agenda.

Esperon told his commander-in-chief that with the key suspects behind the failed February coup d'etat facing court martial, restive troops would "think twice" before attempting to topple government.

Speaking at the 71st anniversary celebrations of the AFP in Camp Aguinaldo, Esperon said "internal transformation" would be pursued alongside Oplan Bantay Laya 2, the military's new internal security master plan, which will be launched in January.

"Foremost on our agenda is putting an end to adventurism and institutionalizing professional among our personnel," Esperon said.

"We have made great headway in this regards, as we have shown our resolve to prosecute transgressors. Now, adventurists would think twice, knowing that they would be dealt with the full force of the law," he added.

Esperon told Arroyo that military reforms are being pursued
"tirelessly" to prevent "coup-mongers" from exploiting soldiers' grievances.

He also thanked Arroyo profusely for addressing soldiers' needs on housing and health care and for supporting the AFP capability upgrade program. He said the words "thank you" five times in less than a minute.

"We could not ask for more," Esperon said, as Arroyo, who was seated onstage, smiled.

The expression of gratitude was reversed from last year's AFP anniversary when Arroyo thanked then military chief Generoso Senga for keeping the soldiery apolitical amid the political storm triggered by the "Hello Garci" wiretapping scandal.

The wiretapped tapes purportedly caught Arroyo speaking to former elections commissioner Virgilio Garcillano about plans to rig the 2004 election results in her favor.

Twenty-eight officers linked to the failed February uprising are set to be arraigned before a general court martial on January 11 on mutiny charges for allegedly planning a mass withdrawal of support from Arroyo last February 24 by joining anti-government street demonstrations.

Ex-marine commandant Major General Renato Miranda, Army Brigadier General Danilo Lim and Marine Colonel Ariel Querubin lead the accused.

Even before the original group of 30 officers were arraigned last December 14, Esperon absolved two -- Marine Lieutenant Colonels Romulo Gualdrapa and Valentine Hizon -- due to lack of evidence.

The arraignment was originally scheduled on December 14 but was reset to January 11 due to numerous manifestations by defense counsels.

FILIPINO peacekeepers had just been in Dili, East Timor, for one month when they discovered a lucrative business.

In July last year, they began the brisk trade of selling duty-free beer in the black market. Many times a week, more than 20 officers and men would shop in the commissary located in the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, or UNTAET headquarters, a compound in the city center, and buy more than their allowed limit. Ordinarily, each is entitled to purchase one case of beer a week.

Using either a UN or Philippine vehicle, these soldiers would then haul their goods and sell them to restaurants, disco joints, and pubs. Prices of food and drinks are artificially high in Dili, say those who have lived there, because the city is populated by foreigners, mostly from the UN. Imported beer sells at about 4 dollars each and lunch can go for at least 7 dollars. The demand for beer in this market has hardly ebbed since late 1999 when the UN set up offices in Dili -- after East Timor voted to be independent from Indonesia.

The illicit business went on for about four months -- until a furious Gen. Diomedio Villanueva learned of the misdemeanor. In November, he ordered the immediate repatriation of the erring soldiers, cutting their six-month stint short. "We were alarmed," says Brig. Gen. Efren Abu, deputy chief of staff for operations. "The swift action showed one thing: the Armed Forces does not condone this violation."

The black market scandal is the worst to have hit Philippine troops abroad. The last embarrassing incident with Filipino peacekeepers was in 1993 when a few police officers and men brought home Russian-made weapons from Cambodia -- which they kept as souvenirs. They were unaware of their violation until they were found out by Philippine customs officials. The men were reprimanded.

Snitching is usually frowned upon in organizations like the Armed Forces that put a premium on fraternal ties. Thus, news of the Dili racket reached the AFP chief of staff only when he received a letter from an Australian officer supposedly assigned there, reporting the anomalous behavior of some members of the Philippine contingent. While trying to check this out, the AFP found that the Australian had indeed served in East Timor but had already moved to a new assignment, the Congo. Army officers who were based in East Timor are convinced that a Filipino wrote the letter. "He had to use another name, to hide his identity," one source says.

The AFP then asked Col. Noel Coballes, commander of the Philippine Battalion based in Manatuto, a district outside Dili, to get to the bottom of the scandal. Coballes was able to get records from the UNTAET commissary showing excessive purchases of beer by 26 Filipino officers and men. The commissary, Coballes also found out, was lax.

The black market group was led by Army Colonel Allan Bontuyan and included three Air Force officers: Majors Jose Harry Barbers, Esteban Fajardo, and Basilio Rabaja. The rest were enlisted personnel, mostly from the Air Force. (At any one time, there are about 50 to 70 Filipino soldiers stationed in Dili.)

2 Filipino peacekeepers now deserters in US
First posted 03:52am (Mla time) Aug 11, 2005
Dona Pazzibugan/Inquirer News Service


Editor's Note: Published on page A2 of the August 11, 2005 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer


TWO Filipino soldiers who were part of the country’s peacekeeping contingent to Haiti have gone AWOL (absent without leave) after a trip to the United States.

The military is trying to track down Navy Lieutenant Valintin Memphin and Marines Sergeant Geoffrey Geslani in the US.

The two reportedly failed to return to their unit in Haiti after going on mission and R&R (rest and recreation) in the US, military documents said.

“It is dreadful to note that two of our peacekeepers have turned into illegal economic migrants,” Colonel Daniel Lucero, the most recent commander of the Haiti contingent, said when reached for comment.

“They have given an awful name to our UN mission in Haiti. They have breached the trust that their commander have given to them,” he added.

He said the Armed Forces had requested the Philippine permanent UN mission in New York to cancel the passports of the two soldiers as early as June.

Lucero and his team returned to the country last month, after an almost yearlong mission in the strife-torn Carribean island nation.

Last April, a member of the contingent, Army Staff Sergeant Antonio Batomalaque was shot dead by Haitian gangsters.

2 soldiers of peacekeeping force in Haiti hunted in US

By Anthony Vargas, Reporter

THE Armed Forces of the Philippines is tracking two members of its Haiti peacekeeping force who failed to report back to their unit after going on a rest and recreation trip to the United States.

A two-man investigating team is searching for Navy Lt. Senior Grade Valintin Memphin and Marine Sgt. Geoffry Geslani in two US east coast states.

Military documents said the two officers failed to return to their station in Haiti after finishing their mission and pleasure trip to the United States.

Col. Daniel Lucero, head of the Haiti peacekeeping unit, said Memphin and Geslani could have turned into illegal economic migrants in the United States.

“They have given an awful name to our UN mission in Haiti. They have breached the trust of their commander,” Lucero told reporters in Camp Aguinaldo.

Lucero said the Armed Forces had taken steps to have the two soldiers brought back to the Philippines with the help of its unit’s counterpart in the United States.

“Coordination has been made with our UN Permanent Mission in New York and with the Department of Foreign Affairs for the cancellation of their passports,” Lucero said.

The peacekeeping contingent returned to the Philippines last month following a yearlong duty on the Caribbean island which had been racked by a civil war.

In April the contingent lost a member when a Haitian gangster went on a shooting rampage. Killed was Army Staff Sgt. Antonio Batomalaque, who was manning his post in Port Au Prince.

posted 05:54am (Mla time) Aug 12, 2005
Inquirer News Service

“A DISGRACE to the Philippines and to the United Nations.”

The country’s envoy to the UN dropped all “diplomatese” in denouncing the two Filipino soldiers who, three months ago, reportedly deserted their peacekeeping contingent in Haiti and were now believed to be in the United States as illegals.

Ambassador Lauro Baja Jr. Thursday said the government has made initial contacts with US authorities to seek their help in tracking down Navy Lieutenant Valentino Menpin and Marine Sergeant Geoffrey Geslani.

Baja said the two soldiers will be “repatriated and prosecuted for bringing shame to the country. They are a disgrace to the Philippines, the Filipino people and the Filipino peacekeepers who are proudly serving in UN missions worldwide.”

Menpin and Geslani face charges before a military court for violation of the Articles of War as deserters, he said.

The embassy is now just waiting for the Armed Forces of the Philippines to file charges against the two deserters before formalizing the request for US assistance, he added.

Colonel Daniel Lucero, commander of the 155-member Philippine force in Haiti, told reporters in Manila on Wednesday that two officers have gone AWOL (absent without leave) when they failed to return from R&R trips to the US in April.

Menpin did not report back to his unit when his leave ended in late April, Lucero said in his report to Baja. Geslani, meanwhile, left for Florida to visit his brother Gary, a member of the US Navy, but has since not returned well after his leave ended in the first week of May.

UN peacekeepers are paid around 90 dollars per day for a six-month tour of duty. The Philippines sent troops to Haiti last December to support a Brazilian-led multinational force tasked to keep peace and stability in the strife-torn Caribbean island nation. Volt Contreras

DFA not consulted in pay cuts of RP peacekeepers--exec

By Veronica Uy
INQ7.net

THE ARMED Forces of the Philippines (AFP) failed to consult the foreign affairs department in pay cuts of 335 Filipino troops sent in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Haiti and Liberia, an official said.

“We were not really informed of the pay cut. We were not consulted by the AFP,” Jesus Domingo of the DFA's United Nations and International Organizations (UNIO) told INQ7.net.

Domingo said the issue was first brought up by the Philippine UN Permanent Representative in New York.

The unilateral move by the military to slash wages by as much as 40 percent was contrary to the framework and guidelines set for Philippine participation in UN peacekeeping efforts, said Domingo, also the director of UNIO's International Political, Legal, and Security Affairs.

Under the guidelines, he said an interagency coordinating office attached to and within the DFA will “be responsible for the review, recommendation, and implementation of substantive and administrative policies for Philippine participation in UN peace operations.”

Some members of the Filipino contingent of the UN peacekeeping operations criticized last week the AFP for the pay cut starting January.

But Colonel Dante Balao, head of the AFP Peacekeeping Operations Center, said a "study committee" has found that the military loses as much as four million pesos whenever it sends a 165-member contingent for a six-month peacekeeping mission.

The AFP argued the pay cut was needed to cover operational costs of deployed Filipino peacekeepers, including the provision of uniform, communication equipment, training, and vaccinations.

These expenses, Balao said, were shouldered by the Philippine government and not reimbursed by the UN.

As of February 6, the Philippines has deployed a total of 548 peacekeepers, 374 of whom are soldiers and 174 policemen, to eight UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, UNIO records showed.

UN provides 1,000 dollars a month for each peacekeeper, but the AFP allegedly cut it down by 40 percent.

http://news.inq7.net/breaking/index.php?in...&story_id=75954

Peacekeepers’ allowance

Living up to our commitment to the United Nations to help restore peace and order in troubled countries, the Philippines has sent troops to join UN peacekeeping efforts in parts of the world.

The Philippines has the largest troop contribution to UN peacekeeping in Southeast Asia—548, of whom 374 are from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and 174 from the Philippine National Police.

A soldier or policeman in a UN peacekeeping mission faces life-threatening risks 24 hours a day. Our troops are assigned mostly to countries racked by civil wars. In violence-plagued Haiti, a Filipino peacekeeper, S/Sgt. Antonio Batomalaque, was killed in a clash between his UN unit and a roving street gang. He is a global hero. He was awarded a posthumous UN medal.

What draws our soldiers to join the UN peacekeeping force is the cash incentive. Each peacekeeper is given US$1,000 (over P50,000) monthly as "troop cost allowance," in addition to his monthly salary, which the AFP or PNP continues to pay.

Given their lowly economic plight, most Filipino soldiers will volunteer to join the UN force, attracted to the dollar allowance. For many years Filipino peacekeepers have enjoyed getting the dollar allowance they richly deserve in addition to their regular AFP wage. Much of the troops allowance goes to their families to uplift them from poverty.

Recently, however, the AFP announced a move to get 40 percent of their dollar allowance to recover the cost of their "deployment." The deployment cost refers to expenses in training them for service abroad and in providing them with uniforms and communication equipment.

This AFP move has jolted our men in the UN peacekeeping force. Taking 40 percent of their troop allowance means a monthly loss of $400 from their UN income.

The plan to deduct from the Filipino peacekeepers’ money has stirred up a controversy between the military and the Department of Foreign Affairs. The DFA’s United Nations and International Organization division has complained that it was not consulted by the AFP on the matter.

Director Jesus Domingo of the UNIO’s international, political, legal and security affairs section describes the pay cut as "contrary to the framework and guidelines set for Philippine participation in UN peacekeeping efforts."

Of course, news of the AFP plan, which is supposed to take effect in January next year, was received with pain and disbelief by Filipino members of the UN peacekeeping force and their families.

The AFP’s reason for taking 40 percent of the troop allowance is mean, embarrassing, self-defeating and maybe even unpatriotic. It claims that it spends as much as P4 million when it sends a 165-man peacekeeping force for a six-month stint with the UN. It says much of it is spent on the training of soldiers before deployment.

The Philippines, like many other countries, is bound by our commitment to the UN to serve the cause of world peace. We have pledged to help in the global fight against terrorism. We send our soldiers to embattled nations through the UN peacekeeping force to keep our solemn pledge and to show a dignified face to the world.

We should not show the world how petty the Philippine military command is, how willing it is to beggar soldiers who go abroad.

The military high command does not have the respect of a segment of the officer corps and the rank and file. This is admitted by some of the top generals themselves. This AFP plan to take a bite from the overseas income of our soldiers contributed to the UN missions will add to the ugliness of the generals in the eyes of some of the soldiers they command.

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=39155

AFP to get donations from South Korea
By Jaime Laude
The Philippine Star 01/06/2007

South Korea will donate 134 pieces of heavy military equipment to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for use in civil-military operations in the countryside.

Defense Secretary for Operations Ricardo Blancaflor said the heavy military equipment is expected to arrive next month or before President Arroyo relinquishes her post as acting defense chief.

The equipment consists of bulldozers, pay loaders, graders, and heavy-duty trucks, Blancaflor said.

Last year, the Chinese government gave the defense department dozens of heavy military equipment. The DND is aggressively pursuing similar arrangements with other friendly states.

"There are many out there who are willing to help our military. And we can get more help if we just work on it harder," he said. But he did not name those countries.

Blancaflor said the defense department had already determined where to deploy the Korean heavy equipment.

"We intend to use these South Korean heavy military equipment in our Kalayaan Barangay program," Blancaflor said.

The Kalayaan Barangay program involves the building of roads, bridges and highways to connect far-flung villages with town and city centers.

The military calls the program its "right hand" approach to insurgency, in contrast to its "left hand" approach, which is dealing with the rebels by force.

Kalayaan Barangay is hampered, however, by logistical limitations, according to the military.

"Once these heavy military equipment have been delivered, the defense department will be turning them over to various Army Engineering units to hasten the Kalayaan Barangay projects in insurgency-affected areas," Blancaflor said.

http://philstar.com/philstar/NEWS200701060413.htm

NPA goes high-tech in ‘poll tax’ collection

By Delfin Mallari Jr.
Inquirer
Last updated 04:59am (Mla time) 01/16/2007

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venessa_Fisher

LUCENA CITY -- Everyone is going high-tech these days.

The communist New People’s Army in Quezon province has started collecting “permit to campaign” (PTC) fees from officials running in the May elections, a Quezon town mayor said Sunday.

Unlike in the past, however, the NPA now conducts collection negotiations through mobile phones and, in some cases, via the Internet.

“I was contacted by an NPA cadre sometime last month and informed of the new process. I was told that once the initial contact by a duly authorized rebel representative had been made, each candidate will be given a password to authenticate succeeding talks over the phone,” the mayor who requested anonymity for security reasons, told the Philippine Daily Inquirer in an interview.

He also asked that his municipality not be identified.

The source said candidates that had Internet access would be contacted through their e-mail addresses for more detailed instructions.

He said the NPA emissary had several mobile phone numbers.

“But our assigned passwords [would] assure us that we’re always talking to the same person,” he said.

“Once the negotiations are over, the NPA will furnish us with a bank account number where we will deposit our payments,” the local official said.

“It seems the NPA is now taking [extra] safety measures. They now avoid face-to-face talks. But it’ll be much better for us. Talking with them is quite a [nerve-wracking experience]. We don’t know what could happen during [face-to-face] negotiations,” he said.

He told the Inquirer newspaper that in his last mobile phone talk with the spokesperson of the Ma. Teresa de Leon Command in Quezon, he was told there was a plan to change the PTC collection process.

But he did not divulge the details of the new plan.

The local NPA command spokesperson could not be contacted for comment. Neither could the rebels’ national spokesperson, Gregorio “Ka Roger” Rosal.

The source admitted that he paid P30,000 in PTC fees in the last elections.

“They also asked me for groceries, medicines and a medical kit,” he said.

“The NPA emissary during the last election was a female cadre. But I learned that she was killed in an encounter with the military last year. She was a good negotiator, very persuasive and convincing,” he said.

The communist movement, through the NPA, traditionally collects PTC fees during election periods.

Candidates who refuse or fail to make payments either in cash or in kind face harassment and even attack by the rebel group.

The PTC amounts vary, depending on the position a candidate is seeking.

According to the local official, the rebels suffered a huge defeat in his municipality last year.

“Some of their best cadres in our [area] were killed in encounters. Despite that, however, they still imposed PTC fees. We could not do anything but accede and negotiate for a smaller amount,” he said.

With the successive typhoons that recently ravaged his town, the mayor said he would haggle for a smaller PTC this year.

“I also spend from my own pocket. But I am sure the NPA will listen. In our experience, the rebel emissary is most often understanding,” he said.

One Quezon official who will seek reelection has asked the communist rebels to “get rid of pseudo-PTC fee collectors.”

“Most of us are willing to pay but we want to be sure that we’re giving the money to the right person. Fake NPA collectors abound every election,” said the official, a councilor in one of the towns in Quezon.

Another reelectionist candidate, however, said he would no longer pay the PTC.

“I’ve had enough of their extortion activities. Our entire slate has agreed not to entertain the PTC fee demand. We might as well seek the protection of the police and the military in our area. These terrorists operating in our place no longer have that intimidating [a] force,” said the official from the central part of the province.

The military has urged candidates in the May polls not to pay the PTC fees, saying this was tantamount to extortion.

Military intelligence reports have said the NPA had become increasingly dependent on its extortion activities to finance its rebellion as its foreign funding sources had dried up due to the decline of communist movements all over the world.

AFP gearing up for final battle to wipe out Abus

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=64080

There will be a "surge" in government troops and operations in Mindanao as the military steps up its offensive to finish off the Abu Sayyaf, which has been weakened by the deaths of its leaders, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief Gen. Hermogenes Esperon said Sunday.

"The tempo of our offensive now would be faster and more ferocious. We’ll give them no quarter. We have to hit all the remaining leaders while they’re in crisis," Esperon vowed.

He said the intelligence community went on high alert on warnings that the Abu Sayyaf might strike back.

The warnings came a day after Esperon announced that DNA tests carried out by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) confirmed that a body recovered in December in a shallow grave in Patikul, Sulu was that of Abu Sayyaf chieftain Khadaffy Janjalani.

At Malacañang, President Arroyo said Janjalani’s death "marks the mortal turning point for the Abu Sayyaf."

The confirmation of Janjalani’s death came four days after Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Solaiman, one of Janjalani’s possible successors, was killed in a clash with government troops in Talipao, Sulu.

Also on Saturday eight soldiers were wounded after being attacked by heavily armed men in Barangay Salday in Parang, Sulu.

The military said the wounded soldiers were part of a large military contingent chasing the Abu Sayyaf when they were attacked.

Aside from stepping up assaults against the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu, a Marine contingent would be deployed in nearby Basilan to help hunt Abu Sayyaf remnants there and undertake humanitarian projects, Esperon said.

There will also be operations in Tawi-Tawi, where Abu Sayyaf has staged attacks.

Government troops would focus on hitting the groups of remaining Abu Sayyaf leaders Radulan Sahiron and Isnilon Hapilon, two of the likely successors to Janjalani, and more than 300 rebels fighting with top Indonesian terror suspects Dulmatin and Umar Patek, who are believed to still be on Jolo island, Esperon said.

Dulmatin and Patek are blamed for the 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia that killed 202 people, and also have provided bomb-making training to homegrown extremists.

The deaths of Janjalani and Solaiman, who oversaw Abu Sayyaf’s battles and logistics, has considerably weakened the bandit group, Esperon added, quoting information based on the most recent battle assessments.

"Their volume of fire has really become weak and they’ve lost their capability to rapidly maneuver after they lost their leaders," he said.

Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita said President Arroyo had ordered Esperon to seize the momentum and deal the final blow on the Abu Sayyaf.

Ermita predicted it would just be a matter of time before the remaining Sayyaf leaders – Isnilon Hapilon, Radullan Sahiron and Dr. Abu Pula – would be neutralized.

"The world of terrorists in the Philippines or even in the region is getting smaller everyday," Ermita said.

National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, for his part, said the President ordered him to refine the nation’s threat board following the death of Janjalani and Solaiman.

He said the government’s new security plan would include fundamental and long-term measures that would prevent the resurgence of extremist elements in the country.

Gonzales admitted the government’s current security plan was focused on military strategies against the Abu Sayyaf.

AFP Information Office chief Lt. Col. Bartolome Bacarro said the killing of Janjalani and Solaiman had created a "leadership vacuum."

"They have a leadership vacuum now and are disorganized. We will take the advantage by keeping up the tempo and continuing the operations against them," Bacarro said.

He said it would take some time for the scattered Abu Sayyaf bandits to regroup under one command, but conceded desperate militants could stage random attacks.

Bacarro said the AFP leadership had advised its troops against being complacent and maintain a high level of alertness and vigilance for possible retaliatory attacks.

"All of the units have been forewarned... and we have increased the level of alertness to preempt probable retaliatory attacks and the same to those in the intelligence who are now gathering information to preempt attacks," Bacarro said.

In Metro Manila, the National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) has also placed its entire police personnel on heightened alert over the weekend following the announcement of the military that Janjalani and Solaiman were killed.

NCRPO chief Deputy Director General Reynaldo Varilla said police intelligence units were ordered to keep "open their eyes and ears" to thwart possible retaliatory attacks in Metro Manila.

Varilla said there were no intelligence reports indicating the Abu Sayyaf would launch retaliatory attacks in Metro Manila. "But I placed our men in heightened alert so we would be on our toes at all times," he said.

The Presidential Security Group (PSG) led by Col. Romeo Prestoza also went on red alert along with police forces in Metro Manila on the possibility of a revenge attack.

Reports and text messages circulated Sunday that the Abu Sayyaf would attack Metro Manila before Feb. 15 to avenge the deaths of Janjalani and Solaiman.

Varilla, however, assured the public that security forces are now deployed in the metropolis, which would "make it hard for the Abu Sayyaf terrorists to launch any kind of attacks."

The sacrifice pays off

As proof of the soldiers’ high morale following the killing of Janjalani and Solaiman, Esperon said that although he recently allowed some of the troops involved in Oplan Ultimatum in Sulu to take a break, virtually nobody took the offer.

"They can feel that the final battles are at hand and they want to be part of those final battles," Esperon said.

Anti-terror Task Force Comet chief Brig. Gen. Ruben Rafael said the sacrifice made by the soldiers chasing the Abu Sayyaf since Aug. 1 when Oplan Ultimatum was launched finally paid off.

"This is the effect of our sacrifice during the Christmas season," Rafael said.

He stressed most of the soldiers in the field skipped their Christmas break to go after the Abu Sayyaf and its leaders, tagged by the military as "high-value targets."

"But we have not eased up on any of the operations until all the terrorists would be neutralized wherever they may be hiding," Rafael said.

Rafael pointed out that a large number of Abu Sayyaf guerrillas are still to be pursued because they could regroup and launch retaliatory attacks.

A military official said security in Jolo, the capital town of Sulu, has remained high in anticipation of retaliatory attacks from the bandit group.

Col. Antonio Mark Supnet, commander of the Army’s 104th Brigade based in Jolo, said the police and military have fielded enough forces downtown.

Elsewhere in Sulu, troops are being attacked by gunmen initially believed to be Abu Sayyaf rebels.

Army spokesman Maj. Ernesto Torres said troops from the Army’s 35th infantry battalion and 53rd reconnaissance company were attacked while on their way to relieve troops in an Army post in Silangkan last Saturday

The armed men were crossing the street when they fired at the soldiers after hearing the military trucks coming in their direction, officials said.

The wounded soldiers were identified as Privates First Class Marcelo Devila, Cesar Cunanan, Winlove Carinugan, Kyran Cuntapay, Christopher Gatutos, Rodel Atabog, and Staff Sgt. Antonio Castillo.

Torres added the soldiers were part of a large military contingent involved in Oplan Ultimatum chasing the Abu Sayyaf. He said they are still determining if the gunmen are members of the Abu Sayyaf after six of the suspects were arrested.

Torres pointed out it was not a deliberate ambush since the gunmen had not positioned themselves for the attack.

Meanwhile, in Isabela City, Basilan, security had remained tight while residents are in a passive mood upon learning of Janjalani’s death, according to provincial information chief Cris Puno.

"After learning that it was confirmed through the DNA that Khadaffi is dead, residents and officials here remained in passive mood. They are in wait-and-see attitude," he said.

Based on random interviews with some members of the business community and residents here, news of Janjalani’s death does not have much impact.

"Except for the victims they are happy about the news of Khadaffy’s fate and his other commanders because they have finally been given justice," Puno said.

‘Mortal turning point’

Janjalani’s death was confirmed after DNA tests of the FBI compared tissue samples taken from remains found buried last month in the jungles near Patikul town with those of Janjalani’s imprisoned brother, Hector.

Janjalani was apparently wounded in a Sept. 4 clash with troops and later died, the military said.

The US embassy, which offered a $5-million bounty for Janjalani for a series of attacks on Americans, said Janjalani’s death marks "an important and positive step forward in the ultimate goal of eliminating the ruthless and dangerous Abu Sayyaf group, and in destroying its links with international terrorist groups" such as Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah.

US forces have provided combat training and weapons, including night-vision goggles, to Filipino troops battling the Abu Sayyaf. They have also helped track down militants with high-tech surveillance equipment but have not engaged in direct combat.

The President said the success against the top Abu Sayyaf leaders was made possible by the vigilance of the people and the assistance given by the US government and neighbor allies.

"The death of Khadaffy Janjalani marks the mortal turning point for the Abu Sayyaf. All in all, Armed Forces tactical prowess, the fusion of intelligence and training with the United States and our allies in the region and most of all, the vigilant support of the people and communities–have combined to breach the deadly ring of evil, put its cells in disarray and laid them open for the final blow," Mrs. Arroyo said.

Janjalani and his key commanders have been accused of several deadly attacks in the Philippines, including the 2004 firebombing of SuperFerry 14, killing 116 people in one of Southeast Asia’s worst terrorist strikes.

They also carried out mass kidnappings, including the abduction of 17 Filipinos and three American tourists – missionary couple Martin and Gracia Burnham and Guillermo Sobero – from a resort in Palawan in May 2001.

Sobero was beheaded by the bandits and Martin was killed during a military rescue in June 2002 in which his wife Gracia was wounded. With Non Alquitran, Roel Pareño, John Unson, Paolo Romero, AP, AFP

AFP confirms death of ASG's 'engineer'

The military confirmed Wednesday the death of the Abu Sayyaf Group's "engineer" in an encounter with the Philippine Army's Special Forces in Talipao, Sulu Tuesday morning.

Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Armed Forces chief of staff, announced in a press conference that Abu Solaiman was killed by a team of the Army's 8th Special Forces Batallion led by 1st Lt. Almerante Mejares in a clash in Mount Dajo in Talipao town at 9:45 a.m.

The military earlier claimed that Solaiman was only wounded in the encounter. Solaiman's death was confirmed after military field agents ascertained that the body recovered from the encounter site belongs to the bandit leader.

Esperon said Solaiman's body was identified based on an eyelid mole and teeth placements. The military chief said there is a gap between Solaiman's two front teeth.

Esperon said Solaiman, a former engineer, had major involvements in a series of atrocities committed by the al Qaeda-linked group in the country.

"We are even confident that [with] the death of Solaiman, who is actually the number one planner of most of the activities of the Abu Sayyaf Group, [ASG] will continue to go down," Esperon said.

Esperon cited several cases that were allegedly "engineered" by Solaiman.

He said the ASG leader planned the kidnapping of 21 foreign tourists in Dos Palmas Resort in Puerto Princesa, Palawan in May 27, 2001; hostage-taking of 116 people, including a priest, in Jose Torres Hospital in Lamitan, Basilan in June 2, 2001; series of bombings in Zamboanga City, particularly the blast in Malagutay municipality in Oct. 2, 2002; and an airport bombing in 2003.

The military chief said Solaiman was among those who planned the worst maritime terrorist attack in history, the SuperFerry 14 bombing, in Feb. 27, 2004 that killed 116 passengers. The ASG leader also masterminded the Valentine's Day bombings in Makati, General Santos and Davao cities in 2005.

Esperon said Solaiman plays an important role in ASG. He said Solaiman could also be considered as higher ranked than the group's chieftain Khadaffy Janjalani.

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=63444

AFP bares: Abu Solaiman caught literally with pants down
01/25/2007 | 06:31 PM

Abu Solaiman, the second highest leader of the Abu Sayyaf who planned high-profile bombings and kidnappings of the militant group, was caught by troops literally with his pants down before he was killed almost two weeks ago in Sulu, the military said Thursday.

On January 16, troops swarmed into Mt. Dajo in Talipao town to pursue the bandits.

Solaiman was relieving himself in a heavily forested area of the mountain when one of the Army troopers chanced on the Abu Sayyaf leader.

At gunpoint, Solaiman was asked by S/Sgt. Raul Suacillo to surrender but the former resisted.

“I waited for him (Solaiman) to finish (relieving himself). So that we will not be compromised, I called him because I want to apprehend him. We even had an eye contact. I told him ‘don’t make a noise’," said Suacillo.

Suacillo said instead of surrendering, Solaiman ran and chanted “Allahu
Akbar (God is great)."

He said he opened fire at Solaiman to stop him from shouting that could warn other Abu Sayyaf members.

Suacillo was among the six soldiers promoted by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on
Wednesday night for their role in the operation against Solaiman.

Suacillo’s team leader, 1Lt. Almerante Mijares, said they believe that Solaiman did not know the troops were closing on him “because it was foggy and the place is thickly-forested."

“When he was already through, he was surprised that an M14 was already pointed to him," Mijares said.

Mijares said after the incident, troops assaulted the Abu Sayyaf camp and at the height of the gunbattle two of Solaiman’s men also shouted Allahu Akbar.

“The last shout followed by a burst of fire. They withdrew; there was no longer resistance [from them," said Mijares, adding that they conducted clearing operations in the area after making sure that all of Abu Sayyaf men had already gone.


Mijares said they took pictures of Solaiman before burying him.

The troops also seized including documents from the Abu Sayyaf camp before burning it down. - GMANews.TV

http://www.gmanews.tv/story/28151/AFP-bare...with-pants-down

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Slain Abu Sayyaf leader lived in floral ‘paradise’


By Dona Pazzibugan
Inquirer
Last updated 04:24am (Mla time) 01/26/2007


ABU SOLAIMAN, the notorious deputy of Abu Sayyaf chieftain Khadaffy Janjalani, had been living in “paradise” in the jungles of Sulu before troops finally caught up with him on Jan. 16.

Solaiman (real name Jainal Antel Sali) was described by the military as the chief planner of the Dos Palmas kidnapping in 2001, the blasting of SuperFerry 14 in 2004 and the Valentine’s Day bombings in Makati, Davao and General Santos cities in 2005.

The last moments of Solaiman were recounted in a news conference yesterday by soldiers who on Wednesday night received medals and promotions from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in ceremonies at Malacañang.

“You are the soldiers of the people in the finest tradition of the uniform,” Ms Arroyo said.

“You have repulsed the armed tormentors of the people by the gallant shield of the Filipino soldier.” She said the remaining Abu Sayyaf guerrillas were just remnants. “Retaso na lang sila sa inyo. Nakuha na ninyo yung mga ulo (They are just rags. You have their heads),” she said.

In all, 78 soldiers and officers received awards during the affair that was also attended by visiting US Undersecretary of State Karen Hughes.

Army 1st Lt. Almirante Mijares, head of the 8th Special Forces Company that killed Solaiman, was amazed at Solaiman’s dwellings on Mount Dajo in Talipao, Sulu.

Mijares, 30, said his men found 17 bunkers believed to be used by VIPs, like Solaiman and other Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah commanders.

Flowers and perfumes

Each hut had two beds, chairs and a makeshift bathroom for women decked with flowers and stocked with bottles of perfume.

Some 200 meters away, the troops found 27 smaller bunkers believed to be used by the Abu Sayyaf fighters.

The encampment had a cellular phone signal, which is rare on Jolo island, and natural water sources.

“There were flowers leading to the bunkers and around the bunkers. It was like paradise,” Mijares said.

Lt. Col. Monico Batle, head of the 3rd Special Forces Battalion, said that based on the growth of flowering plants the camp was probably set up two to three months ago.

“It was a well-developed camp,” said Batle, citing the fortifications and the water sources.

He said that after receiving intelligence information that Solaiman was in the vicinity, he deployed 60 men from the 8th Special Forces Company led by Mijares to scout the area.

VIP bunkers

The soldiers moved during the night to get to the foot of Mount Dajo.

At the break of dawn on Jan. 16, the soldiers scaled the steep mountainside to slip past the Abu Sayyaf camp’s “forward security” made up of the 27 bunkers, to position themselves behind the 17 main “VIP” bunkers.

“They took the longer and harder route to get there,” said Special Forces Regiment commander Brig. Gen. Arturo Ortiz. “You would think no one lives in that mountain,” he added.

Mijares said he and his men heard sounds from the area, including women’s voices. Scouts reported seeing people moving about as well as clothes, including camouflage jackets, hung around.

Solaiman was killed as he got close to one of the soldiers in hiding, said Cpl. Raul Suacillo, the lead scout.

Suacillo said he was four to six meters away from Solaiman, who was wearing a sando, pajamas and combat boots, when the Abu Sayyaf leader went to relieve himself in the bush.

The fog and thick vegetation provided the soldiers good cover, and Solaiman realized too late that Suacillo’s M-14 rifle was aimed at him.

“We looked at each other. I told him, ‘Come with me, be quiet (Halika, huwag ka maingay).’” Instead of stepping forward, Solaiman ran away and shouted “Allahu Akbar (God is Great),” recalled Suacillo, who did not recognize Solaiman at the time.

He said Solaiman yelled to warn his two aides who stood some 15 meters away.

Suacillo, 32, opened fire and hit Solaiman in the shoulder from the back. Solaiman tumbled into a ravine, and Mijares signaled his men to open fire.

The gun battle lasted from 9:20 a.m. to 12:15 p.m., according to Mijares.

But when the soldiers had finally overrun the camp, none of the rebels were left behind except Solaiman’s body that his aides failed to retrieve from the ravine, according to the military. Two soldiers were slightly wounded by M203 grenade shrapnel.

Mijares said his men took pictures of the body before they buried it in the encounter site, as they were instructed by their superiors.

$5-million reward

Upon their return to their base, the soldiers showed the pictures to intelligence operatives who recognized the wanted Abu Sayyaf leader who carried a $5-million reward on his head.

The soldiers later returned to exhume the remains and bring them back to their base, and military officials announced on Jan. 17 that they had “neutralized” Solaiman.

Suacillo showed reporters the Olympus digital camera which he said was used to take the slain Abu Sayyaf’s remains. But he said his men had erased the pictures from the camera’s memory card.

Ortiz said there were unconfirmed reports that Jemaah Islamiyah bomb expert Dulmatin, who has a $10-million price on his head, and Abu Sayyaf commander Al Bader Parad were injured in the encounter.

On Jan. 20, the military also announced that a US Federal Bureau of Investigation DNA test confirmed that remains dug up in Patikul, Sulu, last Dec. 27 belonged to Janjalani.

Janjalani was killed in a Sept. 4 encounter in Patikul town between 27 troops from the Marine Force Reconnaissance Platoon led by 2nd Lt. Romulo Dimayuga and about 200 rebels. Six Marines were killed and 16 wounded, while 67 rebels, including Janjalani, were killed.

Part of the job

Asked if he thought himself as a hero, Suacillo, who has been promoted two ranks to staff sergeant, replied: “That is normal for us. That is how our job is.”

Sen. Richard Gordon yesterday introduced a resolution in the Senate commending the soldiers for taking a “substantial step toward the weakening of terrorism in the country.” With reports from Christine O. Avendaño and Cynthia D. Balana

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadl...rticle_id=45717

Dulmatin wounded in Sulu clash - officials
01/25/2007 | 12:13 PM

Indonesian bomber Dulmatin was said to be wounded during last week's clash in Talipao town in Sulu province where Abu Sayyaf subleader Jainal Antel Sali alias Abu Solaiman was killed, military officials said Thursday.

"Based on signal and human intelligence, Dulmatin was allegedly wounded and also his other companions," said Army 1Lt. Almerante Mijares, commander of the 8th Special Forces Company that engaged the group of Sali on January 16.

For his part, Army Special Forces chief Brig. Gen. Arturo Ortiz said they have yet to receive official confirmation on the supposed wounding of the Jema'ah Islamiyah bomber.

"There have been information to that effect but there is no confirmation yet," Ortiz told reporters.

At present, the group of Dulmatin is said to be being secured by Abu Sayyaf bandits led by Albader Parad, Mijares said.

Ortiz and Mijares were at Camp Aguinaldo Thursday where they recounted the clash that led to the death of Sali, the self-proclaimed spokesman of the Abu Sayyaf said to be involved in a number of bombing operations in Mindanao and Metro Manila.

Officials, however, could not say whether Omar Patek, another JI operative, was also with Sali's group at the time.

Both Dulmatin and Patek are wanted for allegedly masterminding the October 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia where 200 persons, mostly Australian tourists, were killed. - GMANews.TV
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/28096/Dulmatin...ash---officials

Khadaffy Janjalani is dead. Period.


ABS-CBN News
By DJ STA. ANA

The Philippine government couldn’t contain its glee when it learned Abu Sayyaf leader Khadaffy Janjalani was killed in a clash with a Philippine Marine Force Recon unit in Sulu. The United States, however, thought it would be best to make sure.

Was it really Janjalani? That question hung like the proverbial Sword of Damocles over the heads of Manila and Washington. The DNA test done at the FBI’s Quantico facility settled that – thanks to saliva samples from Janjalani’s brother Hector (he didn’t know he gave the sample).

But Manila and Washington have their own reasons for making sure that the remains dug up in Sulu were that of the Abu Sayyaf leader.

For the Americans, they have five million reasons for making sure it is Janjalani. In fact, FIVE MILLION DOLLARS. That’s the reward that will be given to the informant or informants who lead authorities to Janjalani. The Americans just want to make sure that the $5M goes to the right person who gave the right information and not to a double agent who wanted to double cross them.

For the Philippine Government, it is a matter of pride… or better yet – avoiding embarrassment. While there are some who have said the remains dug up in Patikul are that of Janjalani – the government, even President Arroyo, had been wary on declaring that the Abu Sayyaf leader is dead.

And it is not without reason. Remember the case of Abu Sayyaf leader Commander Radulan Sahiron alias Kumander Putol? In November 2005, then PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao declared they had captured Sahiron - they were sure they had the right man. President Arroyo lauded the PNP for their good work and that their success struck a critical blow on the terrorists.

Their confirmation that they had the right man? He had one arm amputated. And yes, Sahiron did have one arm amputated.

The problem was: Sahiron had his right arm amputated. The man the PNP had: the left arm was amputated.

Then there was the case of Abu Sabaya. Sabaya was killed when the Navy’s Special Warfare Group and Marines ambushed him off Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte on June 2002. Officials reports said Sabaya was struck down by bullets fired from a .50 caliber machine gun and fell into the water.

Sabaya’s body was never recovered. The only things recovered were his trademark wrap around black sunglasses, his backpack, his knitted headgear and his satellite phone – which he used to give interviews and taunt the government.

Needless to say, rumors abound that Sabaya was still alive. Take your pick at the following conspiracy theories: his death was faked by the US and Philippine governments in exchange for information about the Abu Sayyaf and JI activities; that he survived and is living a quiet life under an alias with a promise to the Philippine government that he will remain dead.

But since we haven’t heard anything from media hungry Sabaya, it is safe to assume he is dead (or is living a comfortable quiet life either somewhere in the Philippines or the United States or somewhere in the world)

Who should get the money

Who should get the $5 million reward money? Determining who should get the money may not be as easy it seems.

There are number of military assets who did give information of the general location of Janjalani, there are also those who pointed to the location of Janjalani’s body.

Priority will go to the person who provided information that Janjalani was in Patikul, Sulu which led to the encounter and which led to his death. Informants who led the Marines to where Janjalani was buried will also likely a share of the reward.

Admittedly, a lot of people have come forward saying they were the ones who gave the information. Philippine and US authorities, now based in Zamboanga City, are going over all the claims and verifying these with the information the 3rd Marine Brigade got.

The United States has so far paid $62 M to informants under the Rewards for Justice program. In the Philippines, over $2 M have been paid out to informants.

- In October 2004, three Basilan residents got P18.7M each for information on the location of Hamsiraji Sali. Sali was killed in a firefight with government forces.

- In 2005, $100,000 was given to informant who gave information which led to the arrest of Abu Sayyaf terrorist Toting Hanno

- In May 2006, two Filipinos got $500,000 each for information which led to the neutralization of terrorists.

Janjalani and slain Abu Sayaf spokesman Abu Solaiman each had a $5-million bounty.

But they are not the last of the high value targets with million-dollar bounties for their death or capture.

- JI bomber Dulmatin - $10 million

- Abu Sayyaf leader Isnilon Hapilon - $5 million

- JI bomber Umar Patek - $1 million

- Abu Sayyaf leader Radulan Sahiron - $200,000

- Abu Sayyaf leader Abu Pula aka Dr. Abu - $100,000

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=64349

Janjalani's voice drew Marines to him

By Arlyn dela Cruz
Inquirer
Last updated 02:14am (Mla time) 01/22/2007

IT WAS NOT A GLOBAL positioning device (GPS) or some other sophisticated monitoring equipment that finally ended the run of Khadaffy Janjalani.

Janjalani’s own voice in the early hours of Sept. 4, 2006, as he sang and prayed hymns from the Koran led to the discovery of his hiding place in the jungles of Sulu province.

But it was the instinct of a young lieutenant to immediately attack that delivered the deadly clincher, ending the long and costly hunt for the mysterious Abu Sayyaf chieftain.

At least, that was the view from the side of the hunters -- given by the soldiers who had been deployed in Sulu to hunt down the Abu Sayyaf and their Jemaah Islamiyah allies.

When the Marine reconnaissance platoon led by 2nd Lt. Romulo Dimayuga chanced upon a small group of armed men resting in hammocks in the forests of Upper Tanum in Indanan town, they had no idea that among that group was the country’s most wanted Abu Sayyaf leader.

Dimayuga said he could not forget the distinct, plaintive voice rising from the midst of the group. The man sounded like he was singing and praying while everyone else was asleep, or just resting and listening to him.

The lieutenant, fresh from the Philippine Military Academy and out on his first field assignment, could not tell for sure if the hymn he was hearing in those wee hours of morning was in Arabic or Tausug.

“I can’t understand Arabic and Tausug. All I was thinking at the time was that, maybe, he was the one in charge because it was early morning, almost 5 o’clock, and he could afford to make noise,” Dimayuga recounted in an interview with the Philippine Daily Inquirer the other day.

“It struck me that whoever he was, he must have been somebody who could afford to make such a noise without being reprimanded or stopped.”

Close quarters combat

Using his night-vision goggles, Dimayuga said he could see that some of the men had awakened and had started to prepare breakfast.

He had no idea what Janjalani looked like and the man who was singing had his head bowed, as though he was reading lyrics from a small book.

Only five meters separated Dimayuga’s men and the armed group.

“We could have waved at each other,” Dimayuga recalled. “A few movements and our bodies would have bumped. That was how close we were, so we had to make a quick decision.”

Attack begins

Being the platoon leader, Dimayuga said his instinct told him he should waste no time. Quietly, he signaled his men to start throwing grenades in the direction of the voice, at the men in the hammocks.

The grenade blasts were followed by volumes of fire from Dimayuga’s troops. Roused from their sleep, the surprised group answered with their own fire.

Sense of panic

“There was heavy firing from them. They were used to close quarters combat. Immediately, there were wounded on our side,” Dimayuga said.

Six of Dimayuga’s men, all on their first field assignments like him, died in the exchange.

Then they heard the distinct voice again, this time issuing commands in a language that Dimayuga and his men could not understand, and assumed it was either Tausug or Arabic.

The cries that came from the voice seemed to create panic among the armed group.

Bullet silences the voice

Then the man stood up.

In seconds, a bullet struck him in the neck and he fell instantly.

As snipers, Dimayuga’s men had been trained to aim at specific targets. Who exactly fired the shot that cut down Janjalani, Dimayuga could not tell for sure.

“I can’t really tell whose bullet hit him fatally since it was still dark when we started the attack,” Dimayuga said.

Reinforcements come

Suddenly, Dimayuga had a sense that he and his men had been surrounded by a bigger group that seemed to have come from nowhere to help their besieged comrades.

Dimayuga was wounded by the firing from the reinforcements.

He said the size of the new group gave him a hint that he and his men must have chanced upon a really important personality.

“The way they retaliated indicated that they had suffered a great loss, but at that moment, we had no idea who it was.”

DNA test

Dimayuga was in Ternate, Cavite, undergoing yet another training, when the Inquirer newspaper reached him on Saturday and broke to him the news: The results of a DNA test taken from a body which the Marines had dug up in the jungle showed that the man they took out with a bullet in the neck was the “emir” (commander or chief) of the country’s fiercest bandit group -- a man linked to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network.

He received the news calmly -- and with pride. The confirmation of Janjalani’s death, he said, brought honor to his platoon.

A worthy cause

“It also meant that the death of my fellow Marines and the wounding of 16 others were for a great cause,” he said.

Did he think Janjalani’s death would put an end to the Abu Sayyaf threat?

Dimayuga said the Abu Sayyaf might take a while to find a successor to Janjalani, but he was certain someone would eventually take over.

Is he willing to be deployed in Sulu again to go after the remaining Abu Sayyaf members?

“Yes, if I am ordered to go back,” he said. “I am a soldier; it’s my duty to fight.”

‘Gateway to Heaven’

Dimayuga was a member of the First Recon Class 12 trained specifically to hunt Janjalani and his band. The platoon was trained by Recon Marine head Maj. Robert Velasco, who was among the first Marine officers that fought the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan in 1993.

When Dimayuga and his men first arrived in Sulu, they had reported to 3rd Marine Brigade Commander Brig. Gen. Juancho Sabban -- an intelligence and tactical officer that overran the first camp of the Abu Sayyaf in Upper Kapayawan, Isabela.

That camp was called Al-Madinah. It meant “Gateway to Heaven.”


http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadl...rticle_id=44760

The Operation

The Marines who clashed with Janjalani’s group on September 4, 2006 did not know they were tracking down Janjalani himself.




Marine 2Lt. Romulo Dimayuga (3rd from left) with members of Force Recon Class 12 undergoing high speed boat casting exercises off Sangley, Cavite




Marine Force Recon Class 12 undergoing helocasting exercises; Huey hovers 20 feet and Marines jump out.




Marine Force Recon Class 12 undergoing high speed boat casting in full battle gear.




Marine Force Recon Class 12 prepare for military scuba training
photos provided by Marine 2Lt. Romulo Dimayuga


In an interview with Arlyn de la Cruz, Marine 2Lt. Romulo Dimayuga, who led the Marine unit that clashed with Janjalani, said they were on patrol in Patikul when his point man came up on an encampment in the jungle. They had closed in on the Abu Sayyaf by as much as four meters. Dimayuga said he and his men stayed put and did their best to be invisible while keeping an eye on the terrorists.

Dimayuga said the area is heavily forested and it is not unusual that you would just be meters from your adversary and not even know it.

Dimayuga and his men were from the Marines’ Force Recon unit – they had trained as a team and deployed as a team. They were skilled in stealth and operating deep in enemy territory. Not all of them were issued night vision goggles, Dimayuga himself had a laser designator on his M4 assault rifle – the laser can only been seen if one wears night visions goggles.

They remained hidden overnight – all the while the Abu Sayyaf did not know that the Marines had them in their sights. At dawn, Dimayuga said they heard a distinct voice singing and shouting orders to the others.

Their instincts told them that the one talking is a leader, thus a high value target.

So who shot Janjalani? Dimayuga said it was hard to say who got Janjalani – given the confusion in firefight. Dimayuga lost six of his men in the operations against the Abu Sayyaf; he himself was wounded when an Abu Sayyaf bullet ricocheted off his rigger’s belt and dug into his abdomen.

Dimayuga is now undergoing training with the Marine Force Recon in Cavite – training another class of Marines who will be deployed to Sulu in three months’ time. Their target: the new Abu Sayyaf leader Radulan Sahiron who was reported to be hiding in Patikul.