http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw100118_2_n.shtml
only an extract...

We're on the cover of this week's JDW
http://www.zinio.com/browse/issues/index.jsp?skuId=416113754

SCAN!!!

Alamak, get it in Singapore Aerospace 2010 la...

Mai kan cheong, just wait for the friendly neighbourhood spidey. :P

ok no need already. finished reading using my 3-zooms :D

but hor on the last page it says "ex-Swedish Challenger class, RSS Archer…" :o

I'm sure that issue will definately be distributed at the SG airshow, though sigh! on the sub mistake.

Managed to read thru the 3 sample pages..nothing juicy, all are known facts avalaible on public domain. Just add in some author's perception. B)

Singapore's Third-Generation force may be nearing completion but the country has no plans to rein in defence spending

When Singapore first became an independent state in 1965 there was little question that investment in defence needed to be at the top of its agenda. The small island nation faced a severe security environment: there was the risk of deteriorating relations with Malaysia, the federation from which Singapore had just seceded; the new country's other near neighbour, Indonesia, was in political turmoil; and, with war in Vietnam escalating, there were fears that a Communist wildfire was about to tear across Southeast Asia.

Without a credible military deterrent, it was uncertain whether Southeast Asia's youngest and smallest country would survive this harsh security outlook. Yet the island was quick to establish its credentials as one of Asia's 'miracle' economies; and high, dependable levels of economic growth meant that the Singaporean government was able to ring-fence a sizeable defence budget year after year for its highly ambitious military procurement plans.

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) of 2010, by far the most advanced military force in Southeast Asia, are the outcome of a long-held policy of allotting defence up to 6 per cent of GDP. While defence spending has dipped below this level in recent years - it was 4.3 per cent in 2009, an allocation of SGD11.4 billion (USD8.2 billion) - this remains very high by regional standards. As the Indonesian defence minister recently lamented, Singapore (population less than five million) spends more on defence in real terms than Indonesia (population 230 million).

'Third-Generation' force
The SAF not only enjoy a clear capability advantage over other Southeast Asian militaries, but it is also now close to becoming the 'Third-Generation' armed force, which recent procurement and reforms have been designed to produce. The question, then, is whether the Singapore of today - whose security environment appears far more benign than in the 1960s and whose economic growth rate is more modest than in previous decades - needs or even intends to keep investing so heavily in defence.

Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Teo Chee Hean, has answered these points quite clearly. Asked in early 2009 whether he thought that the global economic crisis would force the country to lower defence spending, he replied that "security threats do not disappear during an economic downturn" and that steady defence spending "sends a strong signal" that Singapore, though small, remains heavily protected. In 2008 Teo also outlined the government's appraisal of the local security climate: it was not benign at all, he said, with the rise of China and India in particular creating a "complex and fluid regional security environment" that would require robust deterrence, as well as diplomacy, in response.

The development of the SAF has not therefore been achieved; it "is a process, and it goes on forever", explains Tim Huxley, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies - Asia. "The Singaporean government are not the sort of people to say 'We've done that, now we'll focus on something else'. As far as they are concerned, if they can't provide defence, then what are they there for?" Singapore, he argues, remains inherently vulnerable in a variety of ways. "It is still a very small, largely ethnic Chinese nation that is prosperous and surrounded by a sea of nearly 300 million people who are largely not Chinese," he points out. The fact that the region is prone to terrorist threats from Islamist extremists - as witnessed most recently in the Jakarta bombings of July 2009 - is also important to Singapore's security planning, Huxley adds. "They have a policy of keeping a lead in military technology, and there is no question that they have a lead, but it needs constant attention. Malaysia has recently acquired MBTs [main battle tanks] for the first time, for example; that will have required Singapore to develop an anti-tank capability. Singapore simply takes external defence more seriously than most other Southeast Asian countries."

Bernard Loo, Associate Professor of Strategy and War at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, agrees: "The level of spending is not going to drop for the foreseeable future." The government's principle of not spending beyond its means could in theory result in the 6 per cent ceiling becoming restrictive in times of economic pressure, he says, "but in times of hardship, the government has tried never to stop a big programme mid-stream, so they've resorted to extra-budgetary measures," he explained.

As well as investing consistently in its defence apparatus, Singapore operates a policy of 'Total Defence', whereby it harnesses society and industry to contribute to a comprehensive, all-embracing defence strategy. The country's limited manpower means that this includes a continuing dependence on compulsory military service - although this was recently cut to a maximum of two years - as well as reservists: a situation that is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

The SAF's symbiotic relationship with Singapore Technologies (ST) Engineering, the Singaporean defence industry prime contractor, has also underpinned the government's cross-society approach. "With the Total Defence concept, defence means the whole country," explained Patrick Choy, executive vice president for international marketing at ST Engineering. "We are part of the system. We have this synergy to help [the SAF] work towards what they want to do." He adds, though, that a competitive business environment has forced local industry to keep improving. "The army does not exclusively give us everything - a lot of things are [decided by] open tender. We compete on a level playing field, and so have had to keep pace with what the armed forces want in order to be competitive and offer value for money."

Domestic industry has been instrumental in the realisation of the Third-Generation SAF - not just in building new platforms, but in terms of integrating the SAF's different components and developing a fully networked force. Choy cites the 'Forging Sabre 09' exercise held in November at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as a prime example of the kind of networked warfighting that ST Engineering has been helping the SAF to develop. During the exercise the SAF's new High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) operated in co-ordination with F-16 fighter aircraft and Apache and Chinook helicopters, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (the SAF operates Elbit Hermes 450 and IAI Searcher II UAVs).

Besides these systems, the SAF's integrated strike force concept also includes networked infantry STrike ObseRvers Mission (STORM) teams, as well as other aircraft and armoured vehicles, all of which act as sensors for the central Division Strike Centre (DSC) and Air-Land Tactical Command Center (ALTaCC).

Meanwhile, armoured vehicles like the Bionix II infantry fighting vehicle are no longer "just vehicles, they are mother ships", says Choy, which act as critical nodes in the network.

The SAF have put clear ground between themselves and other militaries in the region in terms of network enablement and C4ISR capabilities. The 'revolution in military affairs' has arguably been as dramatic in Singapore as anywhere in the world and ST Engineering hopes that it will be able to export tailored versions of this networked model to other Southeast Asian countries. "The emphasis has been on networking, effective use of ISR assets, precision targeting at greater distances and manoeuvrability," agrees Huxley. "The Leopard 2 [MBTs] have come into service and they'll be co-ordinated with artillery and infantry, which will themselves be harder hitting; and this is combined with the modernisation of soldiers' equipment, better communications and heavier firepower."

The fact that Singapore has invested so heavily in big-ticket platforms in recent years will necessarily mean a shift in the focus of the country's defence investments, Choy explained. "The scenario will be one where there won't be a lot of capital buy, but there will be opportunities in training and systems," he said.

Investment in personnel has become a high priority for the SAF, as major equipment programmes come to fruition. Retention of experienced personnel has always been a problem, with the result that the SAF have had to be innovative in their attempts to "hold onto their good, experienced people for longer", Huxley explained. One significant reform came in early 2009, when the retirement age for SAF officers was raised to 50: a bid to retain experienced personnel in a military whose top commanders are often only in their early forties. "The new Military Domain Experts Scheme is also a very interesting development," said Huxley. "It enables you to join as a senior NCO - as a 'specialist' - but you have the prospect of going up to lieutenant colonel without having to go through a commissioning process. It's a reflection of the contemporary situation; it brings in people with substantial skills who may not be obvious officer candidates in the first instance."

International role
If technology has been the SAF's main strength, then a lack of operational experience has perhaps always been their most serious weakness. However, an increasing willingness to participate in international operations is helping the SAF to give their personnel much-needed time in the field. "In grappling with the issue of manpower retention, as well as introducing all kinds of schemes to make a military career as attractive as possible, they've also come to see overseas missions as a way of reducing turnover," argued Loo.

Having assisted reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the form of C-130 tactical transport aircraft, KC-135 aerial refuelling aircraft and tank landing ship (LST) deployments, Singapore brought its international involvement to a new level in 2009. As well as dispatching the LST RSS Persistence and its complement of two Super Puma helicopters to participate in Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), the joint anti-piracy mission off Somalia, in early 2009, the SAF were also set to assume command of the task force in early 2010: the first time they will have led a major multilateral effort since peacekeeping operations in East Timor in 2002. In October 2009 the SAF also deployed two ARTHUR (ARTillery HUnting Radar) weapon location systems to Afghanistan to help protect Australian, Dutch and US troops at Forward Operating Base Ripley/Camp Holland in Uruzgan Province.

"The SAF hasn't changed its mission statement for all of its existence," says Loo. "That mission is to deter potential aggression and to deliver swift and decisive victory. So you can perhaps question how the SAF's participation in Afghanistan or the Gulf of Aden contributes to that, but the SAF says their contribution provides personnel with operational experience, which they are sorely lacking. So you will see the SAF getting involved in more operations farther afield; this gives the SAF a sense of validation."

Choy says there is recent emphasis on the armed forces not just looking at defence in terms of war, but also disaster relief, international terrorism and piracy. "Singapore recognises that it has international obligations and duties. Every country when it reaches a certain stage of development wants to do what it can afford to do," he said.

Traditionally, the most important multilateral defence structure in which Singapore was involved was the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA), comprising the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore: a legacy of the colonial era whereby the partners remained committed to defence co-operation while stopping short of guaranteeing military support to one another in the face of serious threats. "The FPDA is still worth having," said Huxley. "It's a way of keeping the Australians, the British and the New Zealanders involved in Singapore's defence, but without any treaty obligations - which is useful from Singapore's point of view." Its other most important function, he added, is that it provides a channel for exchange with the Malaysians.

However, Loo observes that Singapore's "security environment has evolved over time [and that] the security threats are largely non-state": a reality that has persuaded the government to be more proactive in its international involvements.

In Singapore's own neighbourhood, this has chiefly entailed co-operation with Malaysia and Indonesia in the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) project, which was inaugurated in 2004 and augmented the following year with the addition of joint air patrols. "The piracy problem was never huge," remarked Huxley, "and it ended not because of the MSP but because of the end of the conflict in Aceh."

The MSP has helped to promote stable relations between the three partners, he argues, partly alleviating concerns that Singapore has about its security environment. Nonetheless, tensions within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Singapore is a member, have made the Singaporeans generally pessimistic about the prospects for regional stability, Huxley argues, pointing to the threat of conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, tensions between the Thais and the Burmese and disputes between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur and their repeated naval confrontations. "Regional institutions are not actually doing very well at the moment," he suggested. "In fact, their role seems to be atrophying."

Singapore's response has, naturally, been to continue developing its own relations with other countries and militaries, irrespective of regional difficulties. An overarching defence agreement with Indonesia has proven elusive: the Defence Co-operation Agreement signed by the two countries in 2007 fell apart within a year, with Jakarta blaming Singapore for demanding joint training regimes that were too intensive. However, annual bilateral exercises have continued, most recently in November 2009. Singapore also signed memoranda on defence exchanges with Japan and South Korea in December and, more significantly, held its first joint exercise with Chinese forces in June 2009 (after cementing a security pact with Beijing in early 2008).

Good relations with China will become increasingly central to Singapore's security planning, Loo said. "Singapore will have to start looking at China in a much different way from how it does now," he said. "A couple of years ago China offered Hainan to Singapore as a training ground if they gave up [its training grounds] on Taiwan. [At the time], Singapore said that it was not prepared to discuss that issue. I can't see that kind of attitude carrying on because China is just becoming too big to ignore. China is starting to ask why the Singaporean government should see the United States as the ultimate guarantor of regional security, instead of seeing China as that." In spite of Beijing's complaints, Singapore's defence alliance with the US - where the SAF does much of its training and from where it receives much of its more advanced equipment - is unlikely to weaken.

Air force
"Singapore's air force is far and away the largest and most sophisticated of the regional air forces," said Loo, "and air power is going to continue to be a very high-priority item. We've always understood the need for an air force that is far and away the best in the region, and you will continue to see high levels of interest in the air force and its components."

The delivery of the Republic of Singapore Air Force's (RSAF's) first four F-15SG fighter aircraft in May 2009 was a landmark in the SAF's modernisation plans; 20 more F-15SGs will be delivered from 2010 onwards, in preparation for the retirement of the service's A-4SU Super Skyhawk aircraft. The RSAF also stood up its F-15SG training detachment at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, in November: a facility that will also train the SAF's S-70B Seahawk maritime helicopter crews.

Last year also marked a step change in the RSAF's early warning capabilities, as it received the first of four Gulfstream G550 Conformal Airborne Early Warning (CAEW) aircraft in early 2009. These new CAEW platforms will replace the RSAF's ageing E-2C Hawkeye fleet.

An announcement is expected imminently on whether the RSAF intends to procure the Aermacchi M-346 and KAI T-50 Golden Eagle to fulfil its advanced jet trainer requirement. An even larger procurement decision awaiting the air force in the next couple of years is whether the RSAF will convert its Security Co-operation Participant status in the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme into a firm order or step back from the project. The RSAF has been rumoured to be contemplating buying up to 100 JSFs to replace its F-16s (of which it operates 60), but suspicion is growing that the aircraft could be too pricey even for Singapore's big-spending authorities. "There is talk that the Singapore air force will be the first regional air force to deploy the F-35," said Loo, "but I personally have my doubts stemming from the sheer cost of that project. I think it's going to be just too expensive."

The most likely scenario, Loo says, is that the F-15SG will form the backbone of the future RSAF, while Singapore's F-16C/Ds will be put through an extensive modernisation programme - as the Skyhawks were previously - to keep them in service for another decade or more.

Navy
The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) has also experienced a capability revolution as the result of a series of major procurement programmes coming to fruition. This transition was embodied in the retirement of the RSN's 30-year-old Sea Wolf-class fast attack craft in 2008 and in their replacement with six new Formidable-class frigates, the last of which were commissioned in early 2009. The six embarked S-70B Seahawk helicopters ordered in 2005 to complement the frigates are expected to be integrated with the ships by the end of 2010.

The SAF regard the new frigates as one of the core components of their new Third-Generation force, describing them as "key nodes in the Integrated Knowledge-based Command-and-Control (IKC2) network". The Formidable class also features an indigenously developed combat management system, which the SAF believes gives it a clear advantage in terms of battlefield awareness over other Southeast Asian navies.

The most likely investment priority for the RSN over the coming decade will be "further interest in sub-surface and anti-sub capabilities", Loo predicted. The first of the RSN's two ex-Swedish Challenger-class submarines, RSS Archer , was relaunched in mid-2009, with the second, RSS Swordsman , expected to follow in mid-2010. However, a rash of submarine purchases in Southeast Asia - the most recent order having been placed by Vietnam for six 'Kilo'-class submarines at the end of 2009 - could see Singapore investing further, especially in anti-submarine warfare systems.

Army
Singapore's land forces are the least likely of the country's three services to see further heavy investment over the next few years, Loo suggests, with a number of major programmes having recently been completed.

The HIMARS, added in late 2009, along with two other new artillery systems - the 155 mm Primus self-propelled artillery system and the 155 mm Pegasus lightweight howitzer - are expected to combine to give the SAF far more firepower and accuracy than they had enjoyed previously.

Meanwhile, the SAF's 66 refurbished Leopard 2 MBTs have reportedly overcome difficulties operating in the humid Southeast Asian climate and have now begun to enter service. The new ST Kinetics-developed Terrex 8x8 infantry carrier vehicle entered production in October 2009, with the SAF expecting its 135-vehicle order to start arriving during 2010. Furthermore, selection of the Singaporean Bronco all-terrain tracked carrier by the UK Ministry of Defence (which will operate the system as the Warthog) in late 2008 underlined the calibre of Singapore's armoured vehicles and signifies a breakthrough for local industry.

So while Singapore's era of heavy capital outlay on big-ticket platforms, such as frigates and F-15s, may be coming to an end, further investment in technology and people is likely to ensure that the SAF retain their asymmetric advantage over the other militaries in the Southeast Asian region. "It will continue to make sense for Singapore to provide a strong deterrent - to show there's a line beyond which Singapore cannot be aggravated," said Huxley. As the transformation of the newly capable Third-Generation SAF nears completion, it seems that only a handful of the world's armed forces would have the ability to cross that line.

fascinating paragraph

hainan island in exchange for starlight, i wonder whats the purpose ? anyone got any idea when was this mooted ? was this in the late 1990s or early 2000 ? (just trying to get a feel of the context then)

I heard about this in the early 90s'. It's a political thing - getting Singapore to switch sides from Taiwan to China.

early 1990s would place it squarely in the period where china diplomats naively asked ASEAN nations to reject the US security presence and influence in the region, and iirc, asked them to recognise a more fair and balanced international system (presumably one in which chinese influence is dominant)

the period when china was being socialized into ASEAN and other multilateral organizations. interesting interesting.

i wonder if china makes this offer again in 2027/2028 if goldman sachs is right, how would we respond ?

no mention of our Venus USV project...no comment until its officially procured by RSN?

Yes, must trust the good old 'Spidey Sense' ! :D

Whilst MOU with Japan and SK is significant if one has a china focus, the DCA agreement with Vietnam in Sep 2009 is more significant to SG and is failed to be mentioned. Similarly, agmts with NZ (May 2009), Australia (2008), US (2005) and India (2005) are not highlighted which has more significance to SG than ROK or Japan. Additional agmt with AU in 2009 to extend training not highlighted.

The delivery of the F-15SG started in Nov 2008. In the interim, RSAF was training at Seymour Johnson AB. It was only in May 2009 that the first four F-15SG were sent to Mountain Home. It is factually inaccurate to state that 4 were delivered in May 2009.

The A4-SU have already retired in 2005.

Its also to replace the F-5s of which there are 5X of which at least 3X are operational which makes 90+ to 110+ a/c which on a one-for-one basis would mean 90+ to 120/144 (for 5/6 sqns).

Didn't 90c say there was more...

Other important 2009 events missed out:

- GBU-54 LJDAM acquisition not reported. 1st customer (jointly with Germany) outside USAF.
- No word on Victory MCV life extension announced in Feb 09.
- No word on Bedok class upgrade (contract awarded in 09).
- Nothing stated on the ACMS (All significant contract awarded in Jun 09).
- Locally produced trailblazer/skyblade uav not highlighted.

Tactfully, the blacklisting of ST was not highlighted.

A few stray thoughts on things missed:

(i) ACMS, Terrex and body armour - is a very different way of fighting from the past... It's the integrated approach for motorised infantry transformation that seems to be missing in the way the article describes the 3G development. This also means our infantry have better tools for more dangerous missions in future.

(ii) Lockheed Martin is proposing the Korean plane in NZ for our advanced jet training - that seems to be missed.

(iii) The CH-47F upgrade and restructure of our special forces (NDU & SOF) to SOTF. We've also got deployed a Chinook for search and rescue, which confirms our ability to operate and affect the deep battle.

(iv) We may have French designed Formidable but we are using American issued senors - Seahawks, Scan Eagle, new ST USV (using the same design house for the hull as the US and our work with the USN for other USV efforts) and we are training in the US - so basically, we up our level of integration with the USN (at higher end war fighting) and are more heavily involved in OOTW with the Fifth Fleet via CTF-151. Increasingly, RSN = USN partner (just not called ally).

(v) M3G flat bridge and trailblazer are armour mobility upgrades. Coupled with the 2A4s our armour is faster. IMO the missing bit is news on potential upgrades to the CEVs, CETs and also on the idea of a new light tank (to replace the AMX-13 SM1).

if there are replacements for the M728 CEV I would expect it to be a complete replacement exercise for both the M728 and M60 AVLB, and logically we should replace it with the Leo 2 based CEV and AVLB. The real problem with the M728 and M60 AVLB is their mobility. They are not very fast, not even fast enough to catch up with the stock M113A1.

Yup, forgot about the AVLBs... thanks.

sry OT, but its this very piece of info that makes me think that's why we've got a CoA with Infantry background this time around

A consideration and an interesting point of view. :D

Took me a day to find this.

http://www.flickr.com/photos/cyberpioneer/4127611814/

There's at least 6 in the pic and faint outline of s/no 0009.

The pic already shows more than 4 F-15SGs delivered by Nov 2009. Definitely less than 20 F-15SG will be delivered from 2010 onwards...