The blog, Malaysia Defence had a discussion on MiG-29s and the following eight posts below are reactions to this comment by James Chong and this article by some Malaysians called, 'The Impact of Singapore’s Military Development on Malaysia’s Security' (which contains many mistakes and misconceptions about the Malaysian and Singaporean military capabilities). In fact, Trefor Moss, writing for Janes had on 18 Jan 2010 said:-

"The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) of 2010, by far the most advanced military force in Southeast Asia, are the outcome of a long-held policy of allotting defence up to 6 per cent of GDP. While defence spending has dipped below this level in recent years – it was 4.3 per cent in 2009, an allocation of SGD11.4 billion (USD8.2 billion) – this remains very high by regional standards. As the Indonesian defence minister recently lamented, Singapore (population less than five million) spends more on defence in real terms than Indonesia (population 230 million)... The SAF not only enjoy a clear capability advantage over other Southeast Asian militaries, but it is also now close to becoming the 'Third-Generation' armed force, which recent procurement and reforms have been designed to produce."

Common Malaysian Illusions - Part 1:

Malaysia is trying to modernize but is not very effective at it. The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) is forced to buy too many expensive things that they do not need. The result is that the Malaysians are buying a little of everything but not enough of anything, and the pace at which they are modernizing can in no way keep up with Singapore. The gap is so big that Malaysia will not catch up in one generation. The Malaysians should just be honest about the potential threats and plan accordingly. Let me explain my point of view below:


1. The worse case and more likely scenario (but not most likely scenario) for armed conflict for Malaysia with it's neighbors is not Thailand or Singapore. It is with Indonesia that is the far bigger potential threat (the TNI has 400,000 active & 400,000 reserves - not including Marines and paramilitary forces).

(i) From 1962-1966, there was the Konfrontasi. Further, Malaysians forget that on 7 December 1975, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor and subsequently annexed it as its 27th province in 1976. Operasi Seroja (Operation Lotus) was an invasion of East Timor by Indonesia with about 20,000 to 30,000 troops. It involved naval bombardment of Dili, landing of troops from the sea and a paratrooper assault.

(ii) In fact, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia on 22 December 1978 with 120,00 troops supported by artillery and armour (Phnom Penh fell to the advancing Vietnamese armoured forces in 17 days). Thailand was the front-line ASEAN state, serving to insulate Malaysia from the late 1970s until Vietnam became a full member of ASEAN in 1995.

(iii) It is silly to identify Thailand and Singapore as threats but yet leave out the most obvious potential threats to East Malaysia, which would include disputes with external parties like Indonesia, China, Taiwan and Philippines. I would define a threat as circumstance, intent plus capability. For Thailand and Singapore, there is capability (which to some extent can be quantified as numbers plus force multipliers) but not the circumstance nor intent to be a threat. And most importantly for Malaysians, Singapore is also not a military threat to Malaysia as long as our national service system is in place - this is because to go to war means to shut down our economy. However, this is different from the desire to escalate bilateral tensions for a political purpose by Malaysian politicians.

(iv) Let us examine the Indo-Malaysian relationship, in particular, at Indonesian intent and circumstance (though Indonesia lacks current capability). East Malaysia shares a longer and more porous border with Indonesia (with illegal immigration issues) and the two countries have active boundary disputes and naval stand-offs¹ from the two countries (I'm sure the Malaysians, given their past behaviour had a part to play in this). The bilateral relationship between the two countries have suffered and we see the emergence of 'anti-Malaysia' groups in Indonesia (see story on one such group - link). In fact, the TNI is going to establish two new armor battalions in 2011 and 2012, both based on the island of Kalimantan/Borneo. This coincides with the fact that the Indonesian army is planning to create a new regional command ("Kodam"), in Kalimantan this year (see this news report on concerns on the reactivation of Mulawarman military command - link). For the TNI, a Kodam is comparable to a division in strength and task. Further, there are also conflicting EEZ claims in the South China Sea (that relate to the claims in the Spratley islands) that also involves Philippines, Vietnam, China and Taiwan.

So which is the threat that Malaysia is really preparing for? Further, the force structure and capabilities required to fight a country like Singapore is quite different from that required to fight Indonesia. Conflicting EEZ claims in the South China Sea also requires that Malaysia invest in different tools than what is required for land warfare. IMO, the key advantage that the MAF have over the Thai and Indonesian armed forces is that the MAF is not politicized and they are professionally orientated.

2. How can the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) can prevail against larger and better trained forces like the Royal Thailand Air Force (RTAF) and the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF)? The RMAF has only 9 F/RF-5Es, 10 MiG-29Ns, 8 F/A-18Ds and 18 SU-30MKMs (for a total of 43 frontline fighters, if we exclude the 14 Hawks). The RMAF can't possibly hope to establish air superiority² against RSAF or RTAF - but it is entirely a different matter when they are measured against the TNI-AU, which has a total of 17 frontline fighters (10 Su-27/30s and 7 F-16As, if we exclude the 25 Hawks & 2 OV-10s from the count). The RTAF operates 57 upgraded F-16A/Bs plus 6 Gripens, all with BVR missiles before counting their upgraded F-5Es. The air combat arm of Singapore with 5 fighter squadrons is more than 2 times the size of RMAF's air combat arm. The RSAF has at least 60 F-16C/Ds, 24 F-15SGs, 26 F-5Ss and 9 F-5Ts - for a total of at least 119 fighters and there's a even bigger gap in capability and training, given that the RSAF has tertiary capabilities (which the RMAF do not have). Malaysians like James would do well to start with some basic reading on air power, as follows:

(i) 'The Air Campaign: Planning for Air Combat' by Col. John A. Warden III;

(ii) '10 propositions regarding air power' by Col. Philip S. Meilinger; and

(iii) USAF's doctrine (a 118 page PDF document).

3. After reading the above links, it would be clear that the RMAF is not structured to achieve air superiority against a capable opponent with tertiary capabilities. Rather, it is resourced for air parity² against lesser regional opponents. Keep in mind that achieving air superiority is systems orientated and usually not just platform orientated. Air superiority is rarely is an end in itself but is a means to the end of attaining military objectives. In the case of Singapore, air superiority enables our army to conduct amphibious operations and to conduct heli-borne operations to aid in maneuver and resupply - which greatly aid offensive operations. Air power also provide combined arms support for our armoured forces. Further, the RSAF is capable of a full spectrum of air operations including: CAP, SEAD, CAS, BAI, ISR missions, Rebro for comms, insertion of recce elements and pathfinders, air assault, aero-medical evacuation, battle damage assessment, aero-resupply, SIGINT and EW. In contrast, the then Maj. Dana Dillion (US Army), writing on 'Security Challenges in Southeast Asia' in 1997 said:

"...To support its total defense policy, Singapore has concluded that the most economical means for a small country to build an effective military and co-opt all its citizens into nation-building is through universal national service for all Singaporean men. As a result of its need to include all citizens in defense, Singapore's army is the largest of the three services. The air force and navy are sophisticated and balanced, but technical services simply cannot absorb large numbers of people as can a citizen army. However, the similarities in security policy discussed here should not disguise the fact that Singapore's ground forces are considerably more competent tactically than those of its neighbors...

...From 1985 to 1993, Malaysia and Singapore spent roughly the same amount of money... Yet in all respects, Singapore's military is far more capable than Malaysia's armed forces...

...In most competent military organizations, weapon purchases are made based on the recommendations of the military services, predicated on an evaluation of the national defense mission and available resources. In Malaysia, however, weapon purchases are made after consultations between the finance minister and the prime minister. Although the opinions of the military are voiced through the minister of defense, they are frequently overridden by the political players. Consequently, expensive high-tech weapons are purchased according to political criteria instead of the needs of soldiers, sailors, and airmen expected to operate and maintain them...

...The MAF, on the other hand, still has shortfalls in operational efficiency, readiness, and sustainability." Further, "to replace one aircraft, the A-4, RMAF has purchased: the MiG-29, the F/A-18, and the Hawk-200. Further exacerbating the problem is the low number of each aircraft purchased, which makes buying spare parts and services relatively more expensive and retention of an adequate number of qualified crews considerably more difficult...

...The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are specifically designed, equipped, and trained to conduct military operations on the Malay peninsula. Should widespread internal instability in Indonesia or Malaysia... threaten Singapore directly or indirectly, or threaten the island state's extensive economic investment in those countries, the SAF is clearly capable of protecting Singapore's interests however it chooses to define them..."

4. Beyond the above mentioned, the MAF is also not structured to defeat other armies that have heavy divisions (only the Malaysian 3rd Division has MBTs, APCs/IFVs, artillery and MLRS systems). In particular, countries with heavy divisions that are equipped with MBTs/IFVs that massively out number the Malaysian armoured forces (Thailand has 178 M-60A3s and Singapore has at least 102 Leopard 2A4s - just to name one type of tank each in the respective inventories of these two countries).

(i) The Thai army (306,600 active & 200,000 reserves - not including para-military forces) is at least 3 times bigger than the Malaysian army (110,000 active & 41,600 reserves - not including para-military forces) and they also have the Thai 1st Armoured Division (which a heavy division and deployed in the North of Thailand).

(ii) In the case of the Singapore army (72,500 active & 312,500 reserves), we have at least 3 forward deployable Combined Arms Divisions (CADs) that are trained to operate in echelon in a divisional battlespace. West Malaysia is a peninsular with a limited width in the frontage, hence the terrain is only suitable for the deployment of a division++ sized force against an enemy divisional sized force in defence (unless Malaysia wants to engage in a static defence and which is even less effective). Just because the Malaysian army's armoured division can engage one of Singapore's three CADs (3 Division, 6 Division and 9 Division), does not mean that the other two Singapore divisions are doing nothing in our scheme of maneuver.

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Footnote 1:
For more info read 'Naval Standoff Between Indonesia, Malaysia' in World Politics Review and this July 2009 article on 'Preventing Incidents at Sea' published in RSIS Commentaries.

Footnote 2:
Singaporeans have long realised that technology provides an imperfect solution to the problem and don't just bet on technical solutions. This means that we view the technology as only part of the solution. IMO, given current resources, the RMAF is not expected to be able to establish 'air superiority', much less 'air supremacy' or the improbable goal of 'air dominance' (see this post on air-superiority-101). Other critical considerations include logistics, training, processes and doctrine, which affects the ability to achieve air superiority. Let's define some basic terms below:

(i) Air Parity / Air Denial = the lowest airpower state where friendly aircraft can conduct air operations sufficient enough to deny the enemy air dominance while conducting those airpower activities necessary to halt an initial enemy advance, eg. during certain periods at the Battle of Britain in 1940, the UK was only able to achieve air parity over the sky above Britain

(ii) Air Superiority = three different ways to think about it: One, control of space, two, control of time, and finally, control of geography or a combination of those three. Depending on the commander's intent and tasking, we can seek to attain air superiority over a specific area, eg. Allied air superiority during the Normandy Landings in June 1944

(iii) Air Supremacy = a degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference, eg. The Israeli air force achieved a very lopsided victory over the Syrian air force and their SAM units at Bekaa Valley in June 1982

(iv) Air Dominance = highest airpower state when the requisite effectiveness of airpower is achieved, eg. The Israeli air force achieved air dominance during the Six-day War of 1967 by destroying nearly the entire Egyptian and Jordanian air forces, and half the Syrians' air force on the ground

-Continued below-

Common Malaysian Illusions - Part 2:

(iii) The combined armoured forces of Thailand and Singapore are designed to fight a substantial force like that of the Vietnamese army (484,000 active & 5 million reserves with over 1,300 tanks) in echelon at Corps or higher level operations - the level of Singaporean commitment to Thai defence is not small and in the past, our forces conducted joint patrols at Thailand's northern border. At a geo-strategic level, in December 1978, differences between Malaysia and Singapore (due to Singapore's traumatic birth) disappeared in the face of a potentially bigger threat, with Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, during the cold war. To give one historical example that can now be stated. Singapore's AWACs were not bought primarily to engage in the defence of Singapore within Singapore borders. They were bought to assist in the defence of Thailand against the then Vietnamese/Soviet threat. All 3 ASEAN countries then had a unity of purpose and position.

(iv) The MAF in comparison is a bit lighter than the Singaporean and Thai forces. The MAF has one true CAD (with the other divisions structured as light infantry) at the moment. I know that the MAF is setting up a 2nd CAD (see paragraph 10 for details of the 2nd MLRS purchase) but there's no money budgeted for more PT-91Ms or attack helicopters at this moment. So as I see it, the MAF is currently embarked on a journey of transformation into combined arms warfare. The MAF is becoming more capable in conventional war fighting capabilities over time but their journey of transformation is still incomplete.

5. One key to success in modern armoured warfare at the first echelon fight between the divisions in contact lies in the ability to find your enemy's tanks and armoured vehicles. If the opposition is strong, two divisions could leap frog each other in the scheme of maneuver or alternately, the two divisions could fight abreast to speed the advance in the the first echelon fight. The secret to winning is not in numbers alone. This also means winning the armoured recce battle and setting up screening for your main thrust. And once you can find, you can fix and destroy in place (which could entail the use of artillery or air power rather than just a tank battle) or even by-pass enemy strong points and leave the clearing to follow on forces. Notice the strong emphasis on find - see also proposition 4 by Col. Meilinger (air power, targeting and intelligence) and paragraph 34 below.

Source: Mindef

For those who are interested in a more in-depth look at comparative force structures, there's a 2006 look at 'The Asian Conventional Military Balance' (link). While the data is a little old, it shows how far behind Malaysia is in terms of her conventional war fighting capabilities. Given the gap that exists, the purchase of one battalion of 48 PT-91M tanks and one squadron of 18 Su-30MKMs will add to her capabilities but does not change the balance of power in the region. If you ask me, the Malaysian Divisional Table of Organisation & Equipment (TO&E) lacks heft (eg. in the cold war era, a Soviet division facing NATO forces comprises of between 10,500 to 13,500 troops, and between 188 to 272 tanks). In other words, the Malaysians do not have sufficient heavy divisions - MBTs with IFV support³. In fact, a retired Malaysian army officer has asked the question: 'The PT 91M MBT – Was it a worthy buy?'

6. There's a strong emphasis on force multipliers for the SAF and likewise for the MAF. In this case, force multipliers like artillery for the army (artillery includes mortars, howitzers and MLRS) and the air force. The two characteristics of artillery and air delivered munitions unique to artillery and air power. Only these two can:

(i) deliver highly destructive ammunition at long ranges - the destructive power of artillery projectiles and air delivered Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), like JDAMs and Paveways, is larger than other direct fire ammunition types available; and

(ii) strike distant targets in seconds or minutes, whereas other ground forces need time (hours) to move into position to employ their direct direct fire weapons, and because artillery and air power strike from afar, enemy troops on the ground have a significantly reduced ability to defend themselves against artillery or air strikes. However, it is important to remember that traditionally, artillery provides indirect fire support to area targets (and not point targets).

Let me explain the significance of sub-paragraph 6(ii) - range (see also propositions 3, 6 and 7 by Col. Meilinger, where air power is offensive, capable of parallel operations and redefined the meaning of mass). Artillery weapons and aircraft in range can mass to deliver devastating fires within minutes. This could have terrible consequences on enemy tanks and infantry. Even the fastest maneuver units require hours to move to each target and attack it across the same range or distance that artillery cover.

7. The introduction of precision guided munitions is a refinement of accuracy that has been continuing from the earliest days of indirect fire and CAS (Greg Goebel has an excellent intro to the subject called 'Dumb Bombs & Smart Munitions'). These refinements allow the reduction of quantities of ammunition to achieve the desired destruction or effect on a target. Reduced time needed to achieve the effect is also a useful benefit from increased accuracy for the first echelon forces in contact (read Richard P. Hallion's 'PGMs and the New Era of Warfare' for the meaning of precision from a historical perspective). Increasingly precision weapons are getting smarter and warhead trends are moving towards smaller firepower. With smarter and smaller warhead precision weapons can be very precise and destruction can be controlled to minimize collateral damage, eg. focused lethality munitions (FLM) in the SDB and the new MK 82 (FLM) mated with a JDAM kit. The goal of FLM is to kill occupants of a crudely made structure without destroying the structure, which will be tremendously useful in complex terrain like urban areas. For an idea of the complexity involved, read 'The USMC Approach to CAS in Fallujah (Part 1, Part 2 & Part 3)'. In the 2004 battle of Fallujah (Operation Al-Fajr and Operation Phantom Fury), US aircraft dropped or fired approximately 318 precision bombs, 391 rockets and missiles, and 93,000 machinegun or cannon rounds. The CAS deployed was further augmented by over 6,000 artillery rounds and close to 9,000 mortar rounds in direct support.

8. Unfortunately, artillery and air power can only attack and destroy but has little ability to physically occupy ground (compared to infantry or tanks), therefore we still need boots on the ground (infantry and tanks) to hold physical terrain. The relationship between boots on the ground and force multipliers (like artillery and air power) is akin to the blades of a pair of scissors: both are necessary if the scissors are to cut. In other words, even a platoon sized force supported by artillery and air support can be devastating against a much larger sized force.

9. With choices in munitions and types of weapons comes complexity. One common issue for all modern armies is the management of complexity in a constantly shifting, subtle and nuanced battlefield (both SAF and MAF will have similar problems in this regard). Networking alone does not solve the problem of data entry for the artillery formation. Simple systems tracking the locations of 'blue forces' in of it self is not sufficient. Higher HQ also needs to keep track of gun locations, ammunition locations, ammunition lot numbers, location of our ISR assets and even the forward observers - in fact, at Division/Corps level 60% to 75% of this information will change every 4 hours. Given that the location of friendly troops that are constantly moving this becomes a complex task - with mechanised forces, speed is a factor. All this info is needed to prevent fratricide and to deliver supplies like water, food, fuel and bullets to the front. So we not only have to worry about the enemy (whose goal is to be as unpredictable as possible), we have to worry about not killing our own guys and keeping them supplied with the correct stuff.

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Footnote 3:
In a conventional battle, an IFV will typically operate with MBTs as part of an Armoured Brigade / Division / Corps. Typically, an IFV carries a turreted automatic cannon and it will stick around once it has dropped off its armoured infantry to support them. Basically, IFV equipped armoured infantry, working with MBTs are called armoured or heavy ground forces. Armoured forces are ideal for offensive operations or for counter-attacks in mobile defensive operations. IMO, the dividing line between IFVs and APCs is not the thickness armour but the presence or absence of offensive armament (which affects your dismounted infantry tactics). The Israeli Namer has tracks and more armour than any IFV on the planet, but it is classed as an APC due to the lack of offensive armament. APCs are armoured taxis, usually with machine guns for self-defence. After it has dropped off its infantry it will retreat to cover. Therefore APC equipped infantry will have slightly different tactics and roles. Singapore armoured infantry are mostly carried in Bionix II IFVs and they are meant to function as part of a heavy or armoured spearhead (along with our Leopard 2A4 MBTs, supported by shooters like the Primus tracked self propelled howitzer, HIMARS and Apaches) in a conventional war. The best way to explain is this. You can use knife to open a tin can but a can opener will do a better job. Because the Singapore army fields both light heli-mobile light infantry (our Guards units) and armoured or heavy infantry we have a mix of tools to respond to different threat scenarios. The newly inducted Terrex ICV bridges the gap between light infantry and heavy armoured forces, with a medium force, thereby giving the SAF more tactical choices. In 2009, the SAF placed an initial order for 135 Terrexs (that's a brigade worth of vehicles at 45 vehicles per Terrex equipped battalion) in 7 variants.

-Continued below-

Common Malaysian Illusions - Part 3:

10. Further, to defeat fast moving armoured formations in the first echelon, Malaysia would need more than force multipliers (like air power & artillery), they will also need:

(i) to be supported by more extensive ISR (than what they have now); and

(ii) a C4I/BMS system that is resistant to enemy attempts to disable their communications systems (click here to read about Singapore's BMS),

so that they can call for support from their artillery (which includes amongst other things, 28 G-5 howitzers (22 in initial order + 6 in subsequent order) and 36 Astros II MLRS) against advancing armour formations. They also need systems in place to enable their forward elements to call for indirect fire from their artillery formation (which is fairly advanced - as the Malaysians operate howitzers, MLRS and weapon locating radar systems). While Malaysia has the Astros II (which is useful for grid square fire support on area targets), Singapore has a 18 launcher HIMARS Battalion, which has guided rockets that provides Singapore artillery with a precision strike capability that can be used to strike high value land targets (and also in air defence suppression). Keep in mind that unguided rocket artillery systems like the Astros II is even less accurate than fire support provided by howitzers. Fyi, the MAF purchased 36 Astros II systems in two batches on November 2000 and on August 2007, respectively. The second regiment, 52 Artillery Regiment, is based in the state of Kedah as part of the Malaysian 2nd Division (which will eventually be the MAF's 2nd CAD). With the purchase, Malaysia became the second ASEAN country operating an MLRS system after Thailand (See link - Thailand has developed a 160 mm MLRS with a 40-kilometer range). Unfortunately for the MAF, when compared to the SAF, their artillery formation suffers from both a quantitative and a quantitative disadvantage⁴.

11. If war does break out Malaysia and her more powerful neighbours, I expect the MAF to suffer the same fate as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) that was sent to France in 1914. This is in part due to the size disparity of the MAF viz a viz other immediate neighbours. On a man-for-man basis, the BEF was arguably the best fighting force in Europe. The problem with BEF was it's size (or rather it's lack of size), at only four infantry divisions plus some cavalry brigades (it was smaller than the army of “neutral” Belgium). Though the BEF gave a good account of itself, it was chewed up in high-intensity combat. Based on the above historical analogy of the BEF and the explanation in paragraph 5 above, even if the MAF is able to deal with the first echelon forces, there will be follow on forces in the 2nd echelon (which is really a numbers issue, when we come down to the crux of it). This means that in the best case scenario the MAF's 3rd Division is resourced in such a way that it will have to fight and win 3 times to prevail - which is why I think the MAF is too small in size and it is also cursed with a government that is buying a little of everything but not enough of anything, if they are planning for contingencies against larger forces like that of Thailand or Singapore. IMO, the range of contingencies that the MAF is planning for is often not fully understood by some in the mainstream Malaysian media.

Source: DSTA/TechX Challange

12. The key to successful integration of the various systems requires R&D. In Singapore's case, 4% of our defence budget is allocated to R&D or ~S$400 million a year (US$286 million) and external parties recognise Singaporean capabilities to develop systems (ST Kinetics was 1 of 2 vendors chosen by the Försvarets Materielverk (FMV) to develop a future light support weapon system for them). Without constant R&D funding and the proper R&D organisations, you cannot build capability in the defence industry (see Prof Lui's 2008 presentation on the 'Lessons Learnt in development of IKC2 capability for the SAF'). According to Dzirhan, writing in the April 2010 issue of Asian Military Review, Malaysia's Science and Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE) was only allocated MYR17.5 million (US$5.1 million) for the 2006-2010 timeframe. This level of funding obviously precludes any significant R&D programmes by STRIDE. Sadly for Malaysia, informed Malaysians believe that a number of Malaysian national interest projects like the Aludra UAV project (if deployed would give the MAF a '80s UAV capability) and the NGPV (which are less survivable that Singapore's Victory Class vessels) are failures but have not been admitted by their government as such (see comments in this Malaysian blog). If you are interested in other Malaysian comments on the latest Malaysia 8x8 project, you should read the comments of this retired Malaysian army officer, here and here.

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Footnote 4:
Malaysia is a smart buyer of howitzer systems, but Singapore is a smart maker of artillery systems (see link on developmental history), which includes:

- the FH-2000 (155mm/52 calibre) towed howitzer that is able to shoot extended range (ER) ammunition at distances beyond 42 km;
- the Pegasus heli-mobile light weight howitzer (155mm/39 calibre) with a range of 30 km with ER ammunition; and
- the Primus SP Howitzer (155mm/39 calibre) with a range of 30 km with ER ammunition and made for a shoot and scoot role,

giving Singapore a complete range of artillery pieces and different types of ammunition for every type of fire mission. On another note, as of 19 April 2010, the iFH-2000 has reached India for their towed artillery trails and with every successful overseas sale, such as the 120mm SRAMS sale to UAE, these foreign buyers help Singapore recoup part of our R&D investments. Beyond selling artillery systems, Singapore Artillery also has a weapon locating team in Afghanistan and is planning, along with the Australians, to send 6 to 10 Singaporeans to set up an artillery training centre for the Afghan National Army.

Further, the closer an army can push howitzers to the FEBA, the lower the CEP (which means indirect fire support that is more accurate). For any artillery projectile to reach a long range takes time. During a long trajectory the number of variables affecting the projectile will not only multiply but can inflict their degrading effects to a greater extent. By the time the projectile lands on target it will do so within a much larger footprint area than that produced at the shorter ranges. The problem is increased dispersion means the need to fire more shells for the same effect on a given target - there is trade-off between range and dispersion/accuracy. I suspect that 42 km (52 calibre) / 30 km (39 calibre) is the limit for acceptable dispersion with base bleed ER munitions. Beyond these stated ranges, flight control needs to be introduced into the shell. This is why Singapore's heli-borne forces are supported by heli-borne artillery and Singapore's armoured forces are supported by tracked self propelled artillery. Keeping artillery close enhances the ability to provide danger-close fire support to troops in contact (it is essential to understand the inverse relationship between the circular error probable (CEP) and range). Let's give you some numbers in the trade-off between range and CEP, below:

(i) at 15 km range, you may have a CEP of 95m;
(i) at 20 km range, you may have a CEP of 112m; and
(iii) at 30 km range, you might have a CEP of 260m.

13. Why measure against Singapore? As a sovereign country, Malaysia can buy whatever weapons their government wants (likewise the same for Singapore). According to SIPRI data, Malaysia's defence spending as a percentage of GDP from 1995 to 2007 (2008 and 2009 figures were not available) and the amount spent for defence in constant (2005) US dollars were stated [side by side with Singapore's figures] as follows:

1990 - Malaysia: 2.6% (US$1,241 m) --------[Singapore: 4.9% {US$ 1,679 m}]
1991 - Malaysia: 3.2% (US$1,690 m) --------[Singapore: 4.7% {US$ 2,486 m}]
1992 - Malaysia: 3.0% (US$1,679 m) --------[Singapore: 4.7% {US$ 2,643 m}]
1993 - Malaysia: 2.9% (US$1,784 m) --------[Singapore: 4.3% {US$ 2,727 m}]
1994 - Malaysia: 2.8% (US$1,933 m) --------[Singapore: 4.0% {US$ 2,818 m}]

1995 - Malaysia: 2.8% (US$2,055 m) --------[Singapore: 4.4% {US$ 3,376 m}]
1996 - Malaysia: 2.4% (US$1,976 m) --------[Singapore: 4.4% {US$ 3,698 m}]
1997 - Malaysia: 2.1% (US$1,858 m) --------[Singapore: 4.6% {US$ 4,150 m}]
1998 - Malaysia: 1.6% (US$1,365 m) --------[Singapore: 5.4% {US$ 4,700 m}]
1999 - Malaysia: 2.1% (US$1,847 m) --------[Singapore: 5.4% {US$ 4,788 m}]

2000 - Malaysia: 1.6% (US$1,677 m) --------[Singapore: 4.7% {US$ 4,631 m}]
2001 - Malaysia: 2.1% (US$2,086 m) --------[Singapore: 5.0% {US$ 4,741 m}]
2002 - Malaysia: 2.2% (US$2,370 m) --------[Singapore: 5.1% {US$ 4,999 m}]
2003 - Malaysia: 2.6% (US$3,022 m) --------[Singapore: 5.1% {US$ 5,048 m}]
2004 - Malaysia: 2.3% (US$2,917 m) --------[Singapore: 4.6% {US$ 5,143 m}]

2005 - Malaysia: 2.3% (US$3,120 m) --------[Singapore: 4.6% {US$ 5,464 m}]
2006 - Malaysia: 2.1% (US$3,054 m) --------[Singapore: 4.4% {US$ 5,670 m}]
2007 - Malaysia: 2.1% (US$3,409 m) --------[Singapore: 4.1% {US$ 5,806 m}]
2008 - Malaysia: not available (US$3,479 m) --[Singapore: not available {US$ 5,831 m}]

14. In the SIPRI data set, Malaysian defence spending as a percentage of GDP was highest in 1991, at 3.2% (US$1,690 m) [Singapore: 4.7% {US$2,486 m}] in constant (2005) US dollars. Based on the above SIPRI figures, in 1991, Singapore spent US$796 m more than Malaysia. By 1995, Singapore spent at least US$1.3 billion more than Malaysia.

(i) The gap in spending moved from less than US$800 m a year in 1991 to more than US$1.3 billion a year by 1995. By 2008, Singapore spent over US$2.3 billion more per year than Malaysia (keeping in mind that Malaysia spends less than US$3.5b a year on defence). Not only is the spending gap is growing, the spending gap is also more than 67% of Malaysia's annual defence budget in 2008 (measured in constant 2005 dollars cited above).

(ii) When the difference is measured over a 10 year period, the spending gap is even more astounding (a difference of US$25.14 billion). From 1999 to 2008, Malaysia spent US$26.98 billion on defence and over the same period, Singapore spent US$52.12 biliion. Such a large spending gap affects the ability to raise, train, equip and sustain the respective armed forces.

(iii) There cannot be an arms race between Singapore and Malaysia - because it would not be a race. If I may use an analogy, it's a race between a normal athlete [Singapore] and a man with one leg (Malaysia). The Malaysians not only spend less than Singapore, their government also spends their defence dollars more ineffectively. This is an opinion held not just by me but also by an external observers (see quote from Dana Dillion in paragraph 3 above).

(iv) If you look at the above SIPRI data, there was no Malaysia-Singapore arms race. Rather, Malaysia spent money on defence whenever her budget allowed for it. The figures in Red are years where there was a decline in defence spending. As you can see, there were six years where Malaysia's defence spending declined and ONLY one year where Singapore's defence spending declined.

With the latest acquisitions, there is no doubt that the Malaysian air force has greater reach, the Malaysian army has better mobility and the Malaysian navy more capabilities. However, the question I ask myself is:- Do the above acquisitions change the balance of power in the immediate region? The answer is - NO. There is no change in the balance of power in the immediate region. For those that are interested in analysis of the above data, Robert Karniol, writing for the Straits Times has an article called 'Arms resurgence in SE Asia' (See link) that places the arms spending in context.

15. Yes, ideally, the purchases should not be politically motivated. But we know that has never been the case because Dr M has set the precedent for political interference by forcing their armed forces to buy what they don't want. In some cases, the equipment bought was not the equipment evaluated. They were just not serious about defence in the past but this is changing.

16. Yes, Malaysia should plan realistically with logistics and sustainability in mind. But that is again NOT the case. IMO, the biggest threat to Malaysian Defence at times seems to be Malaysian politicians. See these two stories on how murky arms deal are linked to international pattern of kickbacks. Despite efforts to bury it, the submarine acquisition achieved considerably notoriety after the murder of Altantuya Shaariibuu, where she was shot and her body was blown up with military explosives by two bodyguards attached to Najib's office (see links here and here). However, I caution that not all internet rumours are true. At the very least, the Malaysians have some program management issues which can happen to anyone. The issue is always risk management and that is common to all countries.

17. Hueys and AB212s are so small that they cannot meet Malaysia's basic troop lift and CSAR requirements. BTW, EH-101s are way beyond Malaysia's budget (it's powered by 3 turboshafts - making it one of the more expensive medium lift helicopters in the market - despite the fact that it is used to replace the S-61/SH-3 in some services). The dimensions of the EH-101 are as follows:

fuselage length 19.5 meters (64 feet)
length (with rotor) 22.8 meters (74 feet 9 inches)
height (with rotor) 6.65 meters (21 feet 10 inches)
empty weight: 10,500 kg (23,150 pounds)

Even the NH90s maybe slightly beyond Malaysia's budget (despite it's superficial similarity to the EC-725) and it's dimensions are set out below:

fuselage length 15.88 meters (52 feet 1 inch)
footprint length 19.56 meters (64 feet 2 inches)
height (tail rotor) 5.44 meters (17 feet 10 inches)
empty weight 6,800 kg (14,995 pounds)

There's quite a significant size and payload capacity differences between the various types James lists. He may need to look at the specs again before suggesting a type.

18. Let me put it in a way that a Malaysian can understand - Mi-17s are like the Proton Saga of medium lift, in contrast, the AW-101/EH-101 which is like a Mercedes-Benz R-Class with a 6.2L engine by comparison. The most cynical way of looking at a Malaysian statement that the AW-101/EH-101 was considered - is to assume that it is put there to make other medium lift choices like the EC-725 (like the Honda Civic) and S-92 (like the Toyota Altis) look cheap in comparison. The Hueys can be likened to the Toyota Echo which exists in the compact segment. All very different products for different market segments. It's not really possible to compare the different types in the manner James has lumped them together.

19. The Malay Mail says that: "Apart from the Cougar, three other helicopters were offered in the tender – the Agusta-Westland AW101, Mil Mi-17 and the Sikorsky S-92." Can the main stream press in Malaysia even smell BS from the people they interview, when it's blown right up their face? If the Malaysian have drawn the specs that would result in the evaluation of the AW-101/EH-101, they cannot be considering the Mi-17. These two helicopters do not serve the same market segment. Even between the EC-725 and the AW-101/EH-101, there's a world of difference in specs and price. Either they are saying that their MOD does not know how to draw up specs or that they don't understand what was being communicated to them by their source. The only other way to see it is that the Malaysian press have quoted what was said but failed to put the quote within a proper context. Keep in mind that whichever helicopter the Malaysians choose, it would be operated by the RMAF and it must also be able to perform CSAR on top of troop lift.

-Continued below-

Common Malaysian Illusions - Part 4:

20. The conduct of modern warfare requires a strong focus on logistics and without the necessary logistics, an army cannot:

(1) prosecute,
(2) project,
(3) promote,
(4) persist, and
(5) maintain a presence,

(the 5Ps, a concept often cited by a Mod in another forum). Watch this video on SAF's approach to logistics and outsourcing, read this SAP testimonial and this DSTA chapter on performance based logistics. To give you an idea of the scale of change over a historical period, see the table below on the changing area occupied by 100,000 strong force over time, on the expanding battlefield below (if you are interested in more details, please read this Pointer article by MAJ Sean Tan):

Source: Mindef/Pointer

(i) in WWII, this sized force occupied 2,750 sq. km, with a front of 48 km & a depth of 57 km;
(ii) in 1973, at the Yom Kippur War (October War), this sized force occupied 4,000 sq. km, with a front of 57 km & a depth of 70 km; and
(iii) in the 1991 Gulf War, this sized force occupied 213,200 sq. km, with a front of 400 km & a depth of 533 km,

which shows that not only do modern armies have tougher logistic challenges, it is increasing in difficulty. IMO, it would be clear that it would not be easy for a reasonably well equipped Singapore army with a modern logistics system to occupy and engage in the 5Ps over a front of 400 km and a depth of 533 km. BUT it would be impossible for a Malaysian army to do the same, over the same area of operations, simply because the Malaysians lack the logistics sophistication and the requisite TO&E. Based on what I have written, most readers would understand that MAF is not a military threat to Singapore because of three reasons:

one, a lack of capability to conduct the 5Ps in relative terms;
two, an inadequate force ratio and combat power to achieve a semblance of a 'victory' (unless there is support from 'allies' or partners); and
three, an insufficient focus on logistics and networked communications tools for sustained offensive operations (BTW, the driving distance from Singapore to KL is less than 350 km).

21. Malaysian politicians like Dr Mahathir (Dr M) continue to sprout misinformation in an attempt to defend his terrible prior track record in defence spending management. Now that he has left office, the Malaysian press are once again free to expose his lies (see example - Malaysian press expose Dr M's lies on the source code issue). In fact, many informed Malaysians agree that the Malaysian Fulcrums had significant problems with spares and also faced problems of low availability. Or to put it differently, Dr M is lying about the capabilities of US weapons systems to suit his domestic political agenda. Even in retirement, he is trying to shift blame on his past policy mistakes. Further, informed Malaysians like Dzirhan have said the following in posts in other forums (link to original post provided):

"To understand some of the procurement problems associated with the MAF, you need to understand as OPSSG has stated that much of the problems stemmed from Tun Mahathir's outlook on defence, which was never really his priority, any defence purchase was really based on how it could benefit Malaysia on a political, economic or technological development aspect rather than the military operational aspect and there was always no problem in postponing continuous MAF development and funding in the interest of the country's financial situation.

It goes back to the MiG-29 and Hornet purchase, the decision was to purchase the MiGs (mainly to open the Russian market to Malaysian business) but the US sent a delegation to lobby for the Hornet and it was decided to buy 8 Hornets and the general understanding among the RMAF was that a follow-on buy of at least 8 more Hornets would follow, unfortunately various financial issues not to mention the 1997 economic crisis all contributed to this never being realised and later on the politics of Malaysia's attitude towards the US post-Sept 11 and during the Iraq invasion all made a purchase politically impossible and at the end of the day, any US purchase would have to paid in cash, no barter/part payment in goods.

The Sukhois decision were primarily made in mind with the final costs and the fact that an astronaut slot was offered, the RMAF wanted the western avionics because in the end the Sukhois was what they were going to get whether they wanted it or not and the only to offset that choice was to get the western avionics on it so to avoid the same problems that the MiGs had, which was the inability to share data with the RMAF's largely Western equipment..."

The problem is that Dr M is still treated with respect in Malaysia, therefore his statements are often not queried. This is changing as some members of the Malaysian press are starting to question Dr M's agenda. Thankfully, Malaysia-Singapore relations are much improved since Dr. M left office.

22. When you look at the Malaysian defence spending pattern, it has quite a bit of ups and downs - demonstrating that it is not their national priority. According to the above SIPRI data, from 1998 to 2008, Singapore out spent Malaysia by US$28.5 billion (in constant 2005 dollars). The difference/gap in spending is larger than Malaysia's total defence spending over the same 10 year period. Therefore Singapore has been able to really move ahead via consistency (in an April 2010 interview with Defence News, Singapore's DPM Teo Chee Hean revealed that Singapore spends about 4.5 percent of GDP on defence). Today the gap is even bigger, with the Singapore 2010 budget for defence set at S$11.46 billion dollars (or US$8.13 billion). However, I do have some concerns about the fidelity of SIPRI data - because not all Malaysian defence acquisitions are under the defence budget. Rather, certain large weapons acquisition programmes of national importance are allocated under the national procurement budget. For example, if a Malaysian acquisition is made under a national procurement program rather than a ministry program, it doesn't come out of that ministry's budget.

Source: Malaysiakini

23. War mongering⁵ by UMMO Youth goes down in Malaysia when it is clear to the Malaysian general public that the MAF are not resourced to win a war against Singapore - therefore it is now an information management issue. This is perhaps why there were two rebuttals to the MiG-29 article by Azmi Hassan of the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) and Visiting Fellow at ISIS Malaysia. Only idiots like Azmi Hassan would make the ridiculous claim that SU-30 is better that the F-22 Raptor. To be fair, there are also Singaporeans who are equally irrationally hawkish, who fail to recognise the constraints on Singapore and our inability to dominate the information battlefield should war come upon us (beyond SAF's current institutional incompetence in media management, there are also structural factors that ensure that Singapore will fail in information management at a time of war). There must be a difference between being willing to defend your country from external aggression to advocating the use of the threat of war to settle bilateral disputes. Just because the SAF has military capability does not mean that the SAF will or can used as a means to settle bilateral disputes UNLESS casus belli has been provided. With a 10.8% share of total Singapore trade, Malaysia is Singapore's 2nd largest trading partner after the EU (12.3%) - see link. So it would be fair to say that Malaysia's continued economic health and wealth is a Singaporean concern. My main concern when interacting with some Malaysians is their failure to understand that while Singapore values the bilateral relationship with Malaysia, somethings are NOT NEGOTIABLE. The sovereignty of Singapore, for example, is NOT NEGOTIABLE. And when the Singapore Government identifies an issue as a sovereign issue (as in the case of Pedra Branca), they cannot negotiate away Singapore sovereignty - the best they can do is seek adjudication. Malaysian UMNO Youth members and Tun Dr Mahathir are often the ones most vocal about accusations of institutional racism in the SAF and in Singapore. In particular, they stress the need to protect 'Malay Rights' in Singapore. Over the last 40 years, these trouble making Malaysians have engaged in an active misinformation campaign in an attempt to stir up racial and religious strife in Singapore for their domestic political purpose in Malaysia. Some of it is so out of hand that, Singaporean Malays sick of such misrepresentations by UMNO, have written rebuttals here and here. According to a 2010 Newsweek article on the world’s best schools (Singapore schools are ranked 4th), Singapore narrowed its achievement gap among ethnic minorities from 17 percent to 5 percent over 20 years.


---------------------
Footnote 5:
This includes threatening to unilaterally cut-off water supplies to Singapore in violation of binding agreements/treaties signed by Malaysia. Singapore aims to be self-sufficient in water by 2061 when its second water agreement with Malaysia expires. According to Professor Mauzy, in the last 50 years, there have been 37 violent conflicts between states involving water rights and access to water. International law has provided little help in the prevention or permanent resolution of these conflicts, although 200 other water-sharing treaties have been signed globally. For a more in-depth look, read this ISEAS paper and this backgrounder. Let's take a look at a selected chronology of events for an idea of the undercurrents (read this article on the 1991 and 1998 mobilizations to set the context).

(i) Pedra Branca has been a source of bilateral tension between Singapore and Malaysia since 21 December 1979 (when Malaysia unilaterally redrew their maps and claimed Pedra Branca as their territory) and these incidents of tension have been documented by Prof. S. Jayakumar and Prof. Tommy Koh in a 2009 book called "Pedra Branca: The Road to the World Court". I note that in 1989, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohamad (Dr M) made an unannounced visit to the vicinity of Pedra Branca. His boat was intercepted by Singapore naval vessels. To avoid an international incident, he directed his boat to leave. And yet despite Dr M's role in instigating of some of these events, in the interest of maintaining bilateral relations, LKY has said:

"And when the Youth Wing of the Malaysian Islamic Party or PAS threatened to invade Pedra Branca to plant a Malaysian flag, Dr Mahathir Mohamad stopped them and warned that it could lead to war."

Beyond the above incidents, it is also a matter of ICJ court record that Malaysia which had in the past arrested Singapore's fishing vessels to increase tensions, including through the use of physical violence against Singapore fishermen in the vicinity of Pedra Branca. In contrast, Singapore has never arrested any Malaysian fishermen in Pedra Branca waters. Singapore's policy towards fishermen in Pedra Branca waters was clearly stated in Singapore's diplomatic note to Malaysia dated 16 June 1989:

"Singapore Marine Police and Navy patrols often find Malaysian vessels in Singapore territorial waters, fishing in what they claim to be traditional fishing grounds. Singapore has not arrested these boats. Wherever possible, it has allowed them to continue fishing. Where this is not possible for security or other reasons, the Singapore authorities have asked them to leave instead of arresting them."

Further, at page 46 of the book by Prof. Jayakumar and Prof. Koh, the two authors stated that:

"Of particular concern was a marked increase in the number of intrusions of Malaysian Government vessels in the waters around Pedra Branca. For example, from the period 1990-2000, there were some 64 incidents. However, in the next eight years from the period 2000-2008, there were a total of 563 recorded intrusions with the highest number of incidents (167) in 2007 alone. These Malaysian actions did not make any sense to us because the Court would take into account only the conduct and activities of both sides prior to the critical date."

The incidents quoted above are a clear indication of hostile intent by the Malaysian Government as they try to create 'alert fatigue' for the Singapore forces deployed there. The fact that incidents after 24 July 2003, made no legal sense at all (as that was the date both countries issued a joint notification to the Registrar of the ICJ, with regards to the agreement to adjudicate the dispute), is an indication of Malaysian hostility (which contributes to the bilateral trust deficit). Looking at the pattern of behaviour, it is clear that the Malaysians were potentially planning an incident if the ICJ ruling was unfavorable (but thankfully, UMNO were able to claim that the ICJ judgment was win-win). Just because the Singapore Government and Singapore media outlets do not play-up these Malaysian initiated incidents from 2000-2008 does not mean that it was not happening. The SAF needed to be prepared for the relevant contingency that may arise from Malaysian actions with the appropriate escalation options to deter them. Thankfully, on 23 May 2008, the ICJ, found that Singapore has sovereignty over Pedra Branca; that Malaysia has sovereignty over Middle Rocks; and that sovereignty over South Ledge belongs to the state in the territorial waters of which it is located.

(ii) On 17 March 1985 and on 21 December 1986, Palestinian terrorists set off more bombs at or around Faber House, along Orchard Road in Singapore. We believe the bombs were targeted at the Israeli embassy (then located at Faber House) but no one was killed. One of the Palestinian terrorists, Fuad Hassin al-Shara confessed to the bombings when he was captured by the Israelis in 1991. The 21 December 1986 bombing occurred slightly more than 1 month of the then Israeli President Chaim Herzog's visit to Singapore in November 1986. According to Tim Huxley (at page 45 of his book: 'Defending the Lion City'), a state visit by the Israeli President in Nov 1986 "triggered anti-Singapore demonstrations in Malaysia and political controversy lasting several months." Further, I note that Malaysia has diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

(iii) On 26 March 1991, four Pakistani terrorists, claiming to be members of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), hijacked SQ 117 from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur with 129 passengers and crew. On 27 March 1991, members of our Special Operations Force (SOF) stormed the plane, killing the four Pakistani hijackers and freeing all passengers and crew. Kindly note that Singapore only officially acknowledged that the SOF existed as unit in 1997, as such, all prior news releases attributed the action to our Commandos. The late Ms Benazir Bhutto issued a denial of PPP's involvement. However, it should be noted that Asif Ali Zardori, the husband of the late Ms Bhutto and current President of Pakistan was included among several Pakistani prisoners whom the hijackers of SQ117 wanted released. However, this is not the only terrorist related activity that is linked to events occurring in Malaysian territory - RSIS has some details here. Please note that I'm not saying that the Malaysian Government has any thing to do with these events (rather that there are security events that occur on Malaysian soil and we need to work with their security agencies).

(iv) After the SQ117 hijack from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur on 26 March 1991 (instead of expressing sympathy, promising to tighten security or increasing security cooperation, as Malaysia had done with the US in the aftermath of Sept 11), the MAF under Dr M chose to conduct, an airborne assault exercise, codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for 'Total Wipeout') on 9 August 1991, with a drop zone in southern Johor just 18km from Singapore. Singapore's response was measured and confident. We triggered an Open Mobilisation on the eve of Singapore's 26th National Day. This mobilization meant that many thousands of Singaporean families could not spend time together (by virtue of the fact that Singaporeans were reporting to camp) on a public holiday because our neighbours decided to saber rattle. I note that 9 August 1991 was Singapore's 26th National Day.

(v) There have been a number of incidents where a decision made by the Malaysian government/armed forces that triggered mobilization in Singapore. According to a senior MAF officer, the MAF was put on alert in late 1998 as politicians argued over the status of the Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) checkpoint. Military officials on both sides privately acknowledged that heightened military preparedness did occur. It indicated a tacit acknowledgement on the part of Malaysia's defence officials that they could not allow the CIQ issue to flare into a casus belli. In fact, we, as a country had to develop a system of rotational alertness levels to cope with the need for rapid mobilization in the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities.

-Continued below-

Common Malaysian Illusions - Part 5:

24. When confronted with hard data as shown above, Malaysian chauvinists from UMNO Youth and idiots like Azmi Hassan have resorted to relying on the time honoured myth that Singapore has had sacrifice economic growth by spending more than Malaysia on defence. The same Malaysian chauvinists also like to state that Singapore spends up to 6% of our GDP on defence - which they imply is a struggle. Further, they also hold the mistaken assumption that higher levels of defence spending is harmful to economic growth (it depends on how it is done and the nature of the Singapore economy). I'll use five simple points to debunk these myths:

(i) The SIPRI figures show that Singapore never spent more than 5.4% of our GDP on defence (and not the 6% figure claimed). For 15 years out of the 19 years (1990-2008), Singapore defence spending was in the range of between 4% to 5% of the GDP.

(ii) Compared to Malaysia (see paragraph 12 for some Malaysian failures), Singapore has a much larger local arms industry that makes our own ammo, rifles, machine guns, artillery pieces, armoured vehicles, UAVs, USVs and even our own ships ensuring that a much larger proportion of our defence spending benefits our local economy. Developing an arms industry enhances Singapore defence posture and keeps our costs down. Further, some of these Singapore made weapons are successfully exported as well, giving us a credible presence in the international arms market (eg. the Warthog for UK - see UK video report and the Endurance Class for Thailand, just to name 2 big ticket export items) and a source of revenue.

(iii) From Singapore's independence in 1965 to 2008, the Singapore Government has a track record of spending within it's means (2009 was the only time the Singapore Government tapped into our national reserves). This is to be contrasted with the Malaysian Government's track record of deficit spending over the last decade and dependence on energy for revenue (which comprises almost 40% of all government revenue).

(iv) Some Malaysians are known to assume that Singapore's higher defence spending hurts Singapore's economy⁶ but that is not the case. The defence industry is a potential engine for economic growth in Singapore. The truth is Singapore's economy is more efficient in allocative terms than the existing Malaysian Bumiputra-first economic model, which creates market distortions (the preferential tax regime to support the Malaysian car industry alongside with approved permits to enable cronies to bypass the same tax regime is an example of irrational management at a national level - read link). The Malaysians also spend a fortune in various subsidies (see a 2010 Malaysian online analysis for the growing Malaysian deficit). According to a Malaysian Minister in the PM's office, in 2010, Malaysia has a rising debt of RM362 billion, which is 52% of the country’s GDP. This results in their economy being less competitive because of market distortions. The lack of subsidies has enabled the Singapore Government to offer Singapore companies lower corporate taxes, ensuring that we have a more business friendly open economy than Malaysia's economy⁶.


(v) Correctly understood, Malaysia’s loss of economic competitiveness is rooted in politics and a significant brain drain. According to the Malaysian Employers Federation (MEF), in 2010, there are 785,000 Malaysians who work overseas, and an estimated two out of every three among them are likely to be professionals. The MEF added that of the Malaysian professionals who work abroad, 44% are in Singapore and 28% in other parts of Asia, with the rest residing in other parts of the world. Further, Malaysia is caught in ‘the middle-income trap’ – unable to remain competitive as a low-cost producer, and yet incapable of moving up the economic ladder to a high-value economy. This is in part due to the collapse of private investment (foreign and local) which has been hovering around 10% of GDP since the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis – a far cry from its pre-crisis height of 37%. Malaysia’s loss of grace with investors is most vividly illustrated in its massive capital flight - Malaysia's 2008 FDI outflow of US$14.1 b exceeds its FDI inflow of US$ 8.1 b by 70% (see link).

25. Beyond spending more than the Malaysians on defence (because Singapore's economy can afford to do so), Singapore has developed a procurement system that is widely admired for selecting solutions that are most suited to our needs. To give you an idea of how globally we source our defence products - here's a limited list of countries that the SAF have bought weapons from, over the last few years:

(i) Swedish built submarines (Challenger and Archer class submarines) and mine sweepers (Bedok Class);

(ii) French designed Frigates (Formidable Class), French built Super Pumas & Cougars, the Life Extension Programme of RSN's Swedish built Bedok class mine-countermeasure vessels performed by Thales and so on;

(iii) German made tanks (IBD evolved Leopard 2s for urban warfare, with the L44 gun), the M3 float bridges and the Lürssen designed Corvettes (Victory Class);

(iv) American aircraft like F-15SGs, F-16C/Ds, Apaches, Chinooks, KC-135Rs and Seahawks naval helicopters;

(v) Russian designed SAM missiles (Igla); and

(vi) Israeli supplied G550 CAEWs and the Barak missile system on the Victory Class vessels,

making our supply network truly global. Singapore's arms procurement agency, DSTA has a reputation as a smart and cost conscious global weapons buyer. Singapore does not just buy platforms, rather we seek to gain capabilities (as such, the ability to provide training plays an important part in our selection criteria). We also have a systems approach to capability development. In many cases, there are technology inserts from different countries into one platform so that the platform acquired is enhanced. Despite having a larger budget than Malaysia, the SAF still buys 2nd hand weapons like the Swedish submarines and the Leopard tanks, when these products are able to meet our needs (not everything the SAF buys is new and there is a strong focus on getting value for money). Having said the above, a reader can be forgiven in thinking that I'm happy with each and everyone of Singapore's arm's purchases. That is not the case. In actual fact, I have some concerns about capability gaps, deployability and sustainability due to platform age. Some of the equipment in service like the AMX-13 SM1 tanks, the V-200s, the M-728 Combat Engineer Vehicles, and the Challenger submarines are very, very old platforms and I would like to see some of those listed retired.

26. Remember, earlier, I defined a threat as 'circumstance, intent plus capability'. If Malaysia is a threat (with the requisite capability), MAF officers would not be allowed on our custom engineered Fokker 50 MPAs (there would also be no coordinated 'Eyes-in-the-Sky' counter-pirate patrols) and Malaysian F/A-18Ds would not be training in Australia with Thai and Singaporean F-16s who are vectored by our E-2C during Ex Pitch Back. Since the 2003 SARS incident, the Singapore government is more worried about biological threats (like the bird flu), chemical threats (sarin gas attack) and terrorist bombings or attacks on land or in the maritime domain (see article on 'The Future of Terrorism'). Hence the billions spent in preparing against biological and chemical threats, in maintaining maritime domain awareness and so on, benefits Malaysia too. According to Tim Huxley, "the key to understanding Singapore's strategy, is that the SAF's clear capability to inflict severe damage on Malaysia (by implication creating serious political and economic repercussions for Singapore) is not intended to be used. The capability is a deterrent - a sort of regional 'doomsday machine' intended to manipulate Singapore's regional threat environment by forcing neighbouring states to treat the city state with a degree of respect and caution which might otherwise be absent." Clearly, Singapore's force structure is capable of a pre-emptive strike. However, with a conscript army and our strong reliance on mobilization to stand-up our army means that Singapore is not willing to get into any unnecessary fight unless our survival is threatened.

27. Having read all the above, you must be wondering: Why does the SAF continue to invest in defence at the same rate? There are two main reasons (which are driven by factors within Singapore):

(i) Singapore lacks strategic depth and our forces cannot retreat from the city into the jungle or country side. Therefore, it is crucial for us to at least maintain air parity, or if possible, establish air superiority so that we can protect the city from aerial bombardment and employ our air power to our advantage. Further, we are not a true island like NZ or the UK (where there is a sea-land gap or a natural barrier of water that any potential invader has to overcome), as we are physically connected by 2 land bridges to Malaysia (and therefore connected by land to the rest of mainland Southeast Asia). In WWII, the causeway was demolished by the British but the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) were able to cross it in a few hours and bring over their troops, tanks and supplies. So IMHO, a strong army is essential in any land battle (keeping in mind that the IJA invaded Singapore by a land route). To make matters worse, all of Singapore's air and naval bases are with artillery range from Johor and some of the Riau Islands.

(ii) Singapore's demographics ensure that the SAF will be much smaller in future - our "2009 total fertility rate" is less than 1.3, i.e. for every 2 serving NSFs/soldiers - only 1.3 will available to replace them in future (unless we import significantly more new citizens - which we are already doing). The replacement fertility rate is 2.1. This downward demographic trend means a continued and unrelenting decline in the number of Singapore men available to serve in the SAF (at least - 35% force reduction). To give you an idea of the scale of immigration into Singapore (to make up for our demographic trend), in May 2010, Senior Minister of State for Law and Home Affairs Ho Peng Kee said of the 124,600 applications for PR and 24,000 application for Singapore citizenship received during the year [from April 2009 to March 2010], 46,300 and 19,300 of them were approved respectively. And of the 70,300 applications for long-term visit passes (LTVPs) received during the same period, about 56,300 were successful. The large scale importation of new citizens by Singapore Government policy is not politically sustainable at the current levels.

Our investments in training, technology and logistics are but tools to enable the SAF to act decisively in accordance with our mission statement⁷. That is why I take a considered view that our defence of Singapore against any external aggression must be dynamic, considered and utilizing all the tools are our disposal. However, Singapore must guard against operational complacency and the unfounded assumption that our enemy at war would want to meet the SAF in decisive engagements. Toppling a noxious regime may result in the rise of an accidental guerrilla to resist the foreign invader (the David Kilcullen school of thought argues that countries should avoid entanglements and wars that necessitate counterinsurgency unless a vital national interest is at stake). Singaporeans would do well to remember that the enemy gets a vote on how he chooses to fight. IMHO, the escape of Mas Selamat in February 2008, despite the deployment of thousands of police, soldiers and even UAVs to hunt for him is a symbol of such complacency.


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Footnote 6:
Singapore’s GDP will cap its fastest annual growth in 2010 since independence, rising as much as 15 percent to about $210 billion, while the economy of Malaysia, will expand 7 percent to $205 billion, government forecasts show. Both nations are scheduled to release their 2010 data by February. According to CIA Factbook, in 2009:

(i) Singapore's GDP (Purchasing Power Parity): US$ 235.7 billion
Source: Malaysia Today

(ii) Malaysia's GDP (Purchasing Power Parity): US$ 381.1 billion

However, neither GDP nor GNP are satisfactory measures of the true wealth of Singapore. This is because the Singapore Government and Singapore companies have significant investments and sources of domestic and foreign sourced revenue. This includes two large sovereign wealth funds - GIC (~US$247.5b in funds managed) and Temasek Holdings (~US$122b in funds managed). And at a domestic economy level, foreign residents and MNCs make significant contributions to the GDP figure (see a further discussion on Singapore's economic figures here). The economic foundations of Singapore were laid under the leadership of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew (read what Henry Kissinger says of LKY), Dr. Goh Keng Swee and later with Mr. Goh Chok Tong with advice from Dr. Albert Winsemius. Fyi, Dr. Winsemius, a Dutch economist, was Singapore's long-time economic advisor from 1961 to 1984 and he played a crucial role in enabling the Singapore Government to chart Singapore's economic growth. See also the World Competitiveness Yearbook released by the Lausanne-based Institute for Management Development (IMD), which ranks Singapore at number 1 and Malaysia at number 10 (see link to IMD's 2010 Scoreboard).

Footnote 7:
The mission of the SAF:
'To deter aggression, and should deterrence fail to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor.'

-Continued below-

Common Malaysian Illusions - Part 6

28. I would suggest that the goal of the RSAF is to render any notional opponent deaf and blind via EW and strike at them from a far, with a 'secret-edge advantage⁸'. IMO, the developmental goal is to make the AESA radar and EW suite on the F-15SG another node to augment the info gathering capabilities of the G550 Conformal Airborne Early Warning aircraft (CAEW). Let us list some of the known capabilities of each in turn:

(i) Sunho Beck, writing in Aviation Week (1 Oct 2007) said that the G550 CAEW can detect fighter sized targets up to 370 km away and carries unique dual-band, phased-array radar with 2 L-band side antennas and 2 S-band end antennas which are connected to a common radar unit. The system software has been optimised by DSTA and the local defence industry. The G550 fly as high as 41,000 feet and has an endurance of more than 9 hours. The CAEWs are acquired to replace the E2C Haweye (for an overview, please see the IAI video here). And AEW aircraft is something that the Malaysians don't have.

(ii) Although some details of the F-15SG are classified, the EW systems are possibly similar to the F-15K, including updated ALQ-135M system (manufactured by Northrop Grumman). The new ALQ-135M system uses a PowerPC based architecture instead of multiple processors, thus utilizing significant speed and memory enhancements. It also features sophisticated microwave power module (MPM) transmitter technology to reduce weight and increase jamming effectiveness. Band 1.5 and Band 3 are available with the new tool. The F-15SG most probably includes BAE Systems' ADDS. Unconfirmed alternative analyst views suggest the EW systems may be similar to the Israeli F-15I (click to see F-15I differences from the F-15E).

(iii) However, it is confirmed that the F-15SGs are equipped with the General Electric made F-110- GE-129 engines, the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), the Sniper ATP (in fact Singapore is also upgrading her F-16s with the Sniper ATP) and the AN/APG-63(V)3 AESA radar which makes them suitable for a limited EW or jamming role. BTW, the AN/APG-63(V)3 AESA radar is not intended to give the F-15SG a "standoff jamming" capability by itself. AESA radar confers some important advantages to older traditional radars. When operating as a radar, the AESA radar transmits waveforms that change from burst to burst, and are sent at random frequencies. This means that the changing signal is very difficult for an enemy to detect. The AESA radar can also simultaneously emit several tight beams to perform different functions, including locating electronic systems, classifying them, and alerting the pilot to possible threats or high-priority targets. If another aircraft does manage to detect the signal, it must then try to get a radar lock on. The AESA radar analyzes the enemy's radar and sends out a jamming burst to disrupt the lock (this burst will last for less than 1 second in time). The radar then goes on to other tasks until the enemy radar begins its lock cycle again. The F-15SG's AESA radar can detect (by gathering information on an aggressor's electronic order of battle via emissions analysis) and disrupt (using EW to neutralise or disrupt emitters) the ability of an aggressor's fighter at longer ranges giving RSAF pilots a greater ability to gain the initiative in air to air combat. ASEA radar is also harder for the aggressor to jam and can continue working even when the F-15SG is jamming the aggressor's electronic emissions. And by the time the other fighter manufacturers introduce ASEA radar on their own systems, the RSAF's suppliers (US and Israel) would have introduced more advanced features to their radar and EW systems. Read these two articles: 'Converting F-15Cs to radar jammers' and 'Upgraded F-15Cs to protect F-22s' for background. Boeing has provided further good news for the RSAF's F-15SG purchase as they are developing the F-15SE on their own cost and have recently won arrival from the US Government to export the product, should S. Korea be interested. This of course benefits the RSAF via providing more choices for upgrades.

(iv) According to Martin Streetly, in March 2010 issue of Asian Military Review, the RSAF acquired some AN/ALQ-131(V) podded radar jammers along with our F-16s and it works as a radar warning receiver and electronics warfare control system (see brochure). And these pods have been spotted on RSAF F-16s as early as 2000. The Northrop Grumman/BAE Systems AN/ALQ-131(V) has a block II that has been exported to 8 countries beyond it's use in the USAF. Depending on the model, the ALQ-131 has two or three modular jamming transmitters, and two or three modular receiving transmitters, which can be selected for the most likely frequency bands on which threats are expected. However, I note that USAF Vipers are currently equipped with the newer AN/ALQ-184(V) electronic warfare pods. The AN/ALQ-184(V) both contain a radar jammer, and can tow an AN/ALE-50 decoy. Version 11 AN/ALQ-184(V) added more intelligence, in both a noise generator (i.e. brute-force jamming) and deceptive transponder mode. It is programmable not to start responding to a radar until it senses a certain number of hits from the threat, so the jammer does not become a beacon. For the avoidance of doubt, there are no sources that suggest the AN/ALQ-184(V) is in service with the RSAF. I have merely mentioned it in passing to explain why I suspect that Martin Streetly's EW info on the RSAF is dated.

Source: LaoTiKo (How long can the RSAF F-5S/T continue to fly?)

(v) In a recent photo, a RSAF F-5 was spotted with a pair of ECM pods, which some have speculated that is the EL/L-812/22, which works against radar guided weapons systems. The above picture shows the RSAF's commitment to ensure that even our old fighters are up-to-date in electronic counter measures.

(vi) Further, Singapore is a security cooperation participant in the F-35 program and the F-35 is pre-wired for the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ). With the NGJ, 'cooperative EW' for Blk5 and the fact that the APG-81 AESA radar can go active for jamming, the US F-35 development road map has more than just an exclusive focus on passive stealth. And again the Malaysians do not have AESA equipped aircraft nor do they have the full range of EW tools.

29. I believe that the RSAF achieved technological superiority viz a viz Singapore's neighbours like Malaysia since RSAF's E-2Cs turned operational in 1987. Singapore no longer thinks in terms of plane vs plane contest and has taken tentative steps to developing some space capabilities (with the Singapore built X-Sat micro-satellite due to be launched in June or July 2010). IMO, the RSAF has succeed in making it's case for more resources because it seeks capabilities to provide 'air power', rather than seeks to buy ever more platforms as an 'air force'. In other words, to deliver 'air power' so as to enable the sister services (army and navy) to maximize their combat power. This distinction is crucial. The growth of the RSAF is not just a function of success at service rivalry, rather, the organisation seeks to deliver combat or other elements of state power by 'joint forces'. RSAF's key contribution is to enable the SAF to focus on the larger scheme of maneuver and tempo of operations rather than just a myopic focus on a specific service (in other words, the RSAF has made itself relevant to both the air-land campaign and the air-sea campaign). However, for the RSAF to deliver 'air power', it must first win the air war, if high intensity combat occurs.

30. To get an idea of how the RSAF seeks to win the air war, we must describe the organisation's approach to technology. At a seminar in February 2007, Singapore's former chief defence scientist stated that Singapore's goal was to:

(i) acquire capability rather than hardware; and

(ii) invest in key technologies that ensure a clear lead.

The key technology enabler to ensure the RSAF has a clear lead in any air warfare engagement is not only stealth (or the preferred term - VLO) but also AESA radar. Fyi, Northrop Grumman has an AESA write up here worth reading. For an idea of the advantage the AESA radar brings, let us state some speculative information from Aviation Week below:

"...Ranges of the new lines of AESA radars are classified. But they are estimated at about 90 miles for the smallest (aimed at the F-16 radar-upgrade market). The F/A-18E/F and F-35 (with radar ranges of 100 miles) are followed by the F-22 (110-115-miles). The largest is carried by the upgraded F-15Cs and Es (125 miles). By comparison, the range for a mechanically scanned, F-15C radar is 56 miles according to Russian air force intelligence. U.S. aerospace officials agree that an AESA radar "at least doubles" the range over standard military radars.

When coupled with the electronic techniques generator in an aircraft, the radar can project jamming, false targets and other false information into enemy sensors. Ranges for electronic attack equal the AESA radar plus that of the enemy radar. That could allow electronic attack at ranges of 150 miles or more. The ability to pick out small targets at a long distance also lets AESA-equipped aircraft find and attack cruise missiles, stealth aircraft and small UAVs...."

31. All discussions that are focused only at a platform level (be it about a particular fighter plane, tank or artillery) is totally meaningless and without context if we don't look at the systems supporting that particular platform. To me a platform is just a tool. The war fighting environment is complex and the generals of modern professional armies would prefer to be concerned about adapting faster rather than just basic trade competencies of a specific service arm. In my analysis there is a strong focus on CAPABILITIES, rather than the platform. This is because the gaining of such capability is often enough to reduce the alternatives available to the other party. Historically, we know that the outcome of a battle is often influenced by something in the leadership, something in the training and proper use of reserves at a time and place of the commander's choosing that won the battle.


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Footnote 8:
Teo Ming Kian, former Permanent Secretary (Defence Development), said:
“Our belief was not just to buy another weapon system from the market which anyone else could buy. But it was to build or incorporate extra value into the system which would give that element of surprise. How to make it customised to our needs, terrain, environment. And how you could build in a secret-edge advantage.”

-Continued below-

Common Malaysian Illusions - Part 7:

32. In the end, battles are won by four things:

(i) the courage of the soldiers/airmen;

(ii) the quality of the leaders;

(iii) the excellence of the training; and

(iv) the right tactics (which would include the proper use of a reserve).

That’s why in equipping a force, we must ensure that force ratios come down into some reasonable proportions - something that the Malaysian Government and/or the MAF do not seem to explain well in their public statements/ informational releases. IMHO, the TO&E of individual MAF divisions seem to lack combat power in a conventional warfare scenario (probably because they have not completed their journey of transformation due to budget restrictions). I could be missing something here as I do not have an adequate understanding of the thinking process behind MAF's modernization and procurement plan. The Malaysians have called their armed forces modernization plan - the 4th Dimension MAF (4-D MAF) capability plan (I'm waiting for more elements of 4-D MAF to be unveiled under the 10th Malaysia Plan of 2011 - 2015, so that I can see the direction it takes).

33. In the prior paragraph, I included the right tactics as an important element for victory in battles. In high intensity warfare, the effective use of a reserve by a general can turn the tide of a battle. Without effective, deployable and mobile reserves, a Malaysian division commander can't conduct counterattacks at times and places of his own choosing. Further, the TO&E of a division should be the product of planning for a particular type of battle. Without this sort of prior planing/war gaming it is impossible to develop a package of tactics, force structure, equipment, and training to suit that battle. Therefore, the most effective way to choose new equipment is to see if the new equipment acquired would enhance capabilities for a Malaysian division over the entire threat matrix (please note that the 8 man Malaysian infantry section under their Brigade Infantry Standard is fairly well equipped, despite the lack of NVGs and body armour). In procurement, most planners try to acquire equipment that can be used to solve more than one problem - which is why procurement teams have a set of complex evaluative criteria for each acquisition.

34. Once you move beyond the brigade, at Division or Corps level and above, the level of complexity increases exponentially. In fact, the moment you have different echelons, the action-reaction dynamic changes and the second echelon forces can be used to gain the initiative. To use a boxing analogy, the first echelon forces is the left jab (which would include the Soviet concept of the operational maneuver group) and the second echelon forces is the KO punch on the right. I'll cite two relevant historical examples, in 2003 and in 1945, that would apply to Singapore's use of armour (and referred to either in Mindef publications or the DPM and Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean in his speeches):

(i) Attacking an aggressor's rear areas is a key feature of any Singapore's forward defence and you will find that from time to time, the Defence Minister will refer to the deep battle in his speeches. This is so because the main fight for Singapore forces must be with the second echelon, otherwise it will become a battle of attrition. The 1945 Soviet campaign in Manchuria, under Marshal K. A. Meretskov, is instructive with regard to the deep battle. Soviet forces were able to quickly crush the Japanese Kwantung Army, deployed in formidable defensive lines, in a matter of weeks. By attacking in the dark, on a broad front, along multiple attack axes, often across terrain the Japanese considered impassable, Soviet forces exerted maximum pressure on the surprised Japanese defenders. Soviet bypassed Japanese defensive positions, thrust across the undefended, yet formidable, terrain of the Grand Khingan Mountains, and erupted deep in the Japanese rear¹⁰. Japanese miscalculation, combined with the Soviets' ability to achieve strategic surprise and to use imaginative operational and tactical techniques, produced the rapid and utter defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army, despite the determined resistance. Combined-arms divisions of front first echelons created the penetration, and mechanized divisions acted as front mobile groups to exploit success into the depths of the defense¹⁰. And the Soviet air force conducted an "aviation offensive," designed to support ground forces advancing through and beyond enemy defensive positions (see this link for a historical perspective).

(ii) Recently, the SAF unveiled an upgraded Leopard 2A4 EVO and it is clear that the upgrade is the logical outcome of the discussions at SAF's 2006 Land Defence Asia Conference (link). In particular, I recommend reading MAJ Goh Si Mien's article, Thunder Runs: Panacea for Urban Operation?' This article was inspired by the 2003 American Thunder Runs into Baghdad. Some of the fiercest fighting pursuant to the 2nd American Thunder Run (7 to 8 April 2003) occurred at the 3 objectives at a series of east-west road junctions along Highway 8, named Curley, Larry, and Moe. Each of these 3 objectives along Highway 8 were seized by a company sized combined arms team from TF 3-15 Infantry (click here for details of the fight at Curley, Larry, and Moe) to hold the 3 objectives so as to keep the MSR (Highway 8 to Baghdad) open to enable resupply of the armoured forces of 2nd BCT that were involved in the 2nd Thunder Run into Baghdad. After reading MAJ Goh's article, it is clear that in 2006, the SAF intended to acquire the capability that is finally being unveiled in 2010. The acquisition of the Leopard 2A4 EVO and it's supporting platforms is designed to enable the army to conduct a Thunder Run¹¹ into the aggressor's centre of gravity. And as you can see, it took the SAF 5 years from concept to execution but the focus is not on a single platform, rather, it is on delivering a capability (supported by ISR, a range of sympathetic platforms and systems) with a strong focus on the army's ability to prosecute, project, promote, persist and maintain a presence in an urban environment.

Source: Spiderweb6969 (Straits Times, 2007)


IMO, ISR and mobility provides the means to mass in time and place arriving at a reasonably matched force ratio. The intelligent use of terrain and mobility maximizing one’s own capabilities will help minimize one’s own vulnerability. To that end, the annual Exercise Wallaby, with the use of Armour Live Firing System (ALFS), at Shoalwater Bay Training Area¹² is essential in maintaining the proficiency of Singapore's Armoured Battle Group (ABG) in operating within a divisional framework. The ALFS increases the realism in training of the ABG.


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Footnote 10:
Once you talk about echelons, you are really talking about the deep battle (for additional background reading, I recommend reading "Soviet military operational art: in pursuit of deep battle" by Col. David Glantz and "Press On!: Selected Works of Gen. Donn A. Starry Vol. I & Vol. II" who had applied his mind to addressing the issue of Soviet Deep Battle Doctrine as exemplified by the operational art of Marshal Zhukov). Of particular interest to me are the 1983 Leavenworth Papers No. 7 and No. 8 (link to the US Army Combined Arms Center Index), also by David Glantz, that highlight Soviet tactical doctrine and operations in Manchuria - links to the introductions to Paper No. 7 (which sets the broader context of war on the whole front) and Paper No. 8 (which provides the case studies from the Manchurian campaign and focus on Soviet small unit tactics and how the Soviets tailored forces to achieve success) are provided. I highly recommend reading at least Chapters 1, 2 and 4 of Paper No. 8, the links of which are provided below:

(i) Chapter One: 'Army Penetration Operations', where success depended on the ability of Soviet troops to overcome difficult terrain, strong in-depth fortifications, and a determined, though understrength and unsuspecting, enemy.

(ii) Chapter Two: 'Division Advance in Heavily Wooded Mountains', where the Soviets were to advance to a depth of 150-180 kilometers in eighteen days, across difficult terrain with mountain ranges with elevations running up to 1,000 meters. Soviet operational art ensured that Japanese forces failed in their mission to delay the Soviets at the forward defensive positions, and also prevented the Japanese from conducting an effective fighting withdrawal to other defensive positions to the rear.

(iii) Chapter Four: 'Set Piece Battle', at the battle of Mutanchiang. The battle of Mutanchiang was a series of engagements from 12 to 16 August conducted on two axes converging on the city of Mutanchiang and culminating with the Soviet seizure of the city. The capture of this strategically crucial city (which housed the headquarters for the Japanese First Area Army) helped seal the Japanese fate in Manchuria.

Footnote 11:
The concept of a Thunder Run is to thrust a sizeable force into the heart of the enemy’s nerve centre and establish itself there to threaten the physical sanctuary of the enemy’s leaders and psychologically defeat them. For some background, I also recommend reading David Zucchino's book, 'Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad' and watching this Charlie Rose interview with Col. H.R. McMaster, famous for his successful counter-insurgency tactics at Tal Afar in OIF and the Battle of 73 Easting in Desert Storm.

Footnote 12:
Singapore and Australia have an agreement, whereby they provide access to the Shoalwater Bay facility for not more than 45 days between August and December each year to allow the SAF to conduct Exercise Wallaby. Singapore is permitted to deploy up to 6600 troops, 150 armoured vehicles, 150 soft skinned vehicles, 250 special purpose engineering vehicles, 70 motorcycles and 30 other vehicles as part of the exercises. The last time the economic impact of Exercise Wallaby was measured, in 2004, it was found that the Exercise injected approximately A$6 million into the local economy. The Australian Department of Defence believes the financial benefits have increased in the intervening years. In fact, Rocky Regional Development Ltd has calculated the benefits of the Singaporean exercises to the local economy as A$30 to A$35 million. Australian companies that have benefited from Exercise Wallaby include Rocky’s Own, a transport company based in Rockhampton that has been engaged by the SAF to provide logistic support for that exercise (link).

Common Malaysian Illusions - Part 8:

35. I suspect that Malaysia is making the classic mistake of trying to mimic the defence efforts of other countries like Singapore via setting up of a full spectrum of capabilities. This would range from elite light infantry to self propelled artillery, armoured forces, multi-role fighters, an integrated air defence system and a range of naval vessels, including submarines. At our present spending levels, even I am unsure of how wise it is for Singapore to raise and sustain the SAF's current force structure (or that we should make more radical changes in view of our decreasing numbers). Let me stick my neck out on the chopping block to make three suggestions:

(i) Prioritize: Only equipment absolutely key to a country's defensive plan should be bought. Examples of such key equipment could include jam-resistant radios, buried fiber-optic cables at certain key installations and possibly also equipment that's necessary for specific key actions. In fact, I think that Singapore's level of defence spending and force size is probably the smallest possible to adopt such a course (and the SAF has had to made trade-offs too - it's just not as obvious). The MAF is planing to do so with less money and a smaller number of troops - IMO, an impossible task. One of the problems the Malaysians face is the budget. Given the smaller Malaysian defence budget, it creates the necessity of very efficient spending - which even Malaysians acknowledge is not happening. Compromises are necessary - even compromises that say "no" to certain standard capabilities of bigger militaries. Further, 1 or even 2 squadrons of Su-30MKMs will not make a difference against a high intensity land invasion by a numerically superior land force (assuming future buys) - that is why Desert Shield was required and Saudi Arabia asked for US help against Saddam Hussein despite operating F-15S Eagles and Panavia Tornados. Malaysians should note that Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore all have numerically superior land forces. Without guaranteed mobility between East and West Malaysia, the MAF is unable to reduce the size of it's army. However, prioritizing equipment acquisitions is never straight forward. This because equipment acquisitions often involves investing in a mix of capabilities and assessing the adequacy of the capabilities acquired for meeting a variety of different objectives. Informed Malaysians rightly point out that the MAF is not structured for high intensity conflict - rather their resources are spread to meet low to medium intensity conflict scenarios (be it in the maritime domain or on land). And it is Malaysia's potential disputes and security issues in the maritime domain that I'm most worried about (in other words, I would suggest buying more MPAs and upgrading existing navy ships).

(ii) Focus on Training to specific Planned Scenarios within Threat Matrix: IMO, success in armoured warfare requires skills, equipment and resources that's unlikely to be found in small armies with a limited training budget (eg. the Australians estimate that Singapore spends more than A$10m a year for one exercise each year to train one armoured brigade for combined arms warfare at Exercise Wallaby and the tank crews alone fired over 600 120mm rounds in one exercise - so unless there's sufficient spending on training, there is no gunnery proficiency). The real value of scenario based planning is develop a conceptual “lens” through which to view future MAF acquisitions and once you look at MAF acquisitions through this lens, it would make more sense. A country that has a strong capability development focus, would include in their capability acquisition budget, simulators. OTOH, a country that has a platform focus will keep buying new platforms without thinking through the budget needed to train their own people to operate the equipment acquired to a high standard (in other words, the MAF should be allowed to buy simulators, when they buy tanks). If a new capability is not properly developed, due to politically motivated funding restrictions, the Malaysian Government should not plan to move onto the next new acquisition. Currently, the MAF have a plan but their problem is often the execution or rather their inability to execute to plan possibly due to the political considerations of people in Putrajaya. The defence of either East or West Malaysia against numerically superior invaders is a tough job (but not both). If Malaysia had to plan to defend both at the same time against multiple external threats, it would be an impossible task. A single PT-91M tank battalion, supported by some IFVs isn't a large force even by modern standards (but the equation changes if allied support can be counted on). IMO, a battalion of PT-91Ms deployed in West Malaysia, with crews that are lacking in gunnery proficiency and simulator support for training, is the last thing that a larger more capable force like the SAF, with German trained Leopard 2 tank crews and US trained Apache equipped air force, is not prepared to defeat. If the MAF plans to use a company of PT-91Ms to defend East Malaysia (the addition of one tank company in support of 10th Para Brigade's deployment to East Malaysia would make a huge difference there), Malaysia's navy must be able to do so in the face of potential opposition. Malaysians must remember that Indonesia also operates two submarines and are capable of sea denial too.

(iii) Seek Regional Allies: Malaysia's best prospect for success is a tailored approach to national defence. Malaysia must also some thought about the potential contribution to other regional powers they can bandwagon with rather than take a go it alone approach. This means that the Malaysians will have to cultivate one or two partners/allies, for the short to medium term, rather than try to alienate/compete with the them. The way to do this is to co-join common interests (beyond just technical cooperation) with another regional power. In the immediate region, they should pick at least one of the four listed: Australia, Indonesia, Thailand or Singapore¹³. Right now Malaysia does not have a strategic plan for alliance building - though they have taken some tentative steps and have continued to benefit from historical ties with Australia due to the FPDA. OTOH, the SAF has been steadfast in joining and embedding with Australian and NZ forces in their overseas operations in East Timor, Iraq, and even Afghanistan. In the case of Thailand, in the past, Singapore forces conducted joint patrols at the northern Thai border after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. Further, each year, Singapore also takes part in joint sea, air and land exercises there and all our operational infantry units have gone for training in Thailand (and the Thai army knows that this enhances their country's security). As a demonstration of this strategic relationship, Singapore has transferred 7 F-16A/Bs to the Thai air force and the Thai navy has chosen to buy an Endurance class vessel from Singapore's ST Marine. The thing to remember is to be there when your security partner/ally needs you.


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Footnote 13:
(1) Thanks to UMMO's promotion of the idea of 'Ketuanan Melayu' and given the past history of incidents of bilateral tension documented in footnote 5, at a strategic level, the Singapore Government has decided that they cannot and will not rely on Malaysia to act in a manner that advances common interests.

(2) While the blame for this situation should be shared equally by politicians from both sides of the causeway, the Singapore Government is not in the driver's seat with regards to Malaysia-Singapore bilateral relations. Therefore, despite the fact that Malaysia is Singapore's second largest trading partner, Singapore is working to reduce dependence on Malaysia, be it in the supply of fuel, food or water - both Water Agreements when they expire will not be renewed. For example, Singapore used to buy most of our pork, chicken and duck from Malaysia but that has significantly changed. A large portion of our imported fresh vegetable are still from Malaysia. However, today, countries like Indonesia and Australia have permanently replaced a significant number of Malaysian food suppliers to Singapore. In the case of pork, it a major dietary component of the Chinese who make up 75 percent of the population. However, Singapore has totally banned Malaysian pork products since 1999 (upon the discovery of the Nipah virus). Currently, pork products in Singapore are largely from Australia, China, France, Netherlands, Canada, and Denmark. BTW, presently, Indonesian island of Pulau Bulan supplies about 23% of fresh pork to Singapore and 25% of pork sold in Singapore is imported from Australia. To give an idea of the scale of swine imports, in 2008, Indonesia exported 29,000 tons of live swine to Singapore. With AVA in concern with Avian Influenza or its subtype- H5N1, imports of poultry from Malaysia have decreased as much as 98% from 2,035 tonnes in 1999 to 50 tonnes in 2006. Therefore traditional Malaysian trade links and products sold to Singapore are being replaced permanently. For more info see this 2009 article, "Food consumption and expenditures in Singapore: implications to Malaysia’s agricultural exports" and this 2008 RSIS Commentary which deals with food safety and security for Singapore.

(3) On a positive note, things have really changed in Malaysia under the current leadership of Prime Minister Najib Razak - so much so that in June 2009 Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew made a 8-day visit to Malaysia and given access to whom he wanted to meet. As noted by Jason Tan, a Malaysian blogger:

"It is time to remove the prejudice, mistrust and undo the propaganda perpetuated and exacerbated by Mahathir... Ideally, Singapore should always have a special relationship with Malaysia. We should help one another unconditionally, but under Mahathir, the political climate made it impossible."

(4) In another example, Malaysian political leadership has moved from condemning the 2003 US led invasion of Iraq to volunteering to send 60 Malaysian troops/medical personnel to Afghanistan in support of ISAF efforts and even taking part in RIMPAC 2010 (along with other Asean countries like Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore). Thankfully, things have changed with Tun Abdul Razak as Malaysian PM. The 24 May 2010 joint statement by both Prime Ministers demonstrate the change. This agreement has been described as a new era and drew the following Malaysian reactions. However, IMO, there is no reason for premature optimism as 56.5% of the 23 Milnuts respondents polled believe that Malaysia-Singapore relations will not improve (link).

First draft, corrections and comments welcome...

P.S. weasel1962, I saw the thread on 'F15 the right choice' in the other place. The above write-up should help answer that question and point to the F-15SG's continued future relevance to air warfare.

C of CAEW should be Conformal and not Compact.

RSAF F-16s in based in the CONUS have been spotted with the ALQ-131 as early as 2000. I also believe there was a DoD contract announcement around that time confirming Singapore's purchase of the ALQ-131.

From http://www.airshowaction.com/nlls2000/nellis1.html dated Aug 2000:


Edit: I have moved this thread to General Discussion, and I urge all members to keep this thread rational and avoid jingoism/nationalism. Thank

It was an upgrade in 1996 from blk 1 to 2.

http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract....?contractid=932

The pods appear to have been acquired around the same time as the early batches of F-16s.

The later batches of F-16s can be assumed to come with the later pods as appears to be rsaf practice....

Brochure to the ALQ-131.
http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/solution...sets/ALQ131.pdf

Post amended to reflect above comments. Many thanks to those who commented and please feel free to point out mistakes.

I'm not sure if it will cause Mindef to be uncomfortable but some of the "Joint" directorates (intel, manpower, logistics, ops n planning) are also distinct features the SAF has when compared to other regional armed forces. This is especially crucial in performing the 5Ps you highlighted.

For a small country with about 45 yrs of independence, its military is certainly institutionally highly developed compared to neighbors. It possesses an approach that is more often seen in developed and experienced armed forces. Singapore's armed forces has moved beyond just the "combined arms division" which imply coordination at a divisional level, but rather established "joint" practices and protocols at the level of the entire armed forces.

I tried posting this on Marhalim's blog website previously as a comment but was not published after moderation. Maybe due to length.

It is not feasible for SG to occupy MY for the following reasons:

(a) Manpower constraint

Afghanistan and Iraq are prime examples of how many troops are required to hold territory.

MY's territory and population is almost the equivalent of Iraq. To hold even peninsular MY would require all of SG's men to maintain any occupation for any length of time without a guaranteed chance at success. The manpower constraint would render such an option unfeasible esp when an insurgency is to be expected.

Hence any invasion by SG is a dumb idea.

(b ) Sovereignty issues

3 major points that can require SG intervention has been resolved. Mainly, water, pedra branca and energy. The latter with the LNG terminal diversifies SG's energy needs (and also the gas supplies were swapped from MY to ID - which wasn't a very permanent solution considering their lack of respect to agreements). PB, as a credit to MY govt, was a concious effort to remove that obstacle.

Whilst Russia might get away with the strategy of intervention to "protect its citizens across the border", the Singaporean presence in MY is so minimal that it would not happen (even if iskandar takes off).

Things like railway land, cpf money isn't impt enough to spark a war.

( c) Defence of the peninsular

Defence of the peninsular would only be able to be effected with MY's agreement (or temporary failure of control by its government). Any attempts otherwise would create an insurgency (see (a)).

SG's planning has gone way beyond a peninsular defence in view of MY's attitudes in recent decades. One can see ties being cultivated further eg Aus/Thai/India etc.

The biggest nightmare scenario is that a religious-extremist government takes over across the causeway that can only thrive on chaos and instability (eg Taliban). Singapore makes the usual scapegoat for such entities to unite the dumb a**es that can't think beyond their nose or rear-end. Singapore's big stick rightly makes scape-goating a lot more precarious (we won't bother to hold land then).

I'm trying to find the aforementioned article written by Maj Goh Si Mien, where IIRC he stated that part of the reason why thunder runs were successful was because they could operate buttoned down. This involved the installation of RWS for the commander (can't recall, but I think there's one for the gunner/loader as well, sporting a GPMG instead of a M2 Browning), which not only gave them protection from air burst rounds or being shot at at close range, but also allowed them to use the smaller caliber weapons (smaller is relative to the main gun) on targets up in the buildings. (This can already be done using the pintle mounted GPMGs, but the VC will be exposed, putting him at risk.)

The thing about our L2s is that whilst there is upgraded armour, I'm not sure if there is this capability to fight buttoned down, specifically being able to suppress/kill enemy AT teams hiding in buildings above. I'm aware the IDF Merk4s did roll into Gaza buttoned down, but theirs have some pretty whoop-ass top armour, which our zhng-ed L2s don't seem to have. Hence I feel that SAF isn't exactly Thunder-run ready yet, until they can address the idea of being able to fight buttoned down.

Or of course they aren't telling us enough, which really isn't too surprising if that's the case.

1. Sorry about broken links. Links to part 7 fixed. So you should be able to click on them to read - this would include the master page to Maj Goh Si Mien's article (go there and see relevant PDF).

2. The Thunder Run worked in part because it was unexpected and tactically the Sadam's Fedeyee were not prepared (in terms of having the right weapons) and their obstacle plan was incompetently set up. They did not even booby trap the minefield they set up (enabling silent breaching by the Americans) but they found time to shit on the mines (literally - defecate). IMO, we should not rely on EN incompetence for mission success... so replicating another Thunder Run is not so simple.

3. In fact, I think references and background research in that article is rather poor. It seems that the writer, Maj Goh Si Mien, did not consider other articles including a interesting one on urban warfare by David Kilcullen - I can't remember where the link is at the moment (discussed this in a post with Evo in relation to getting the IDF Namer or KMW Puma, for urban ops). The issue is the quality of training and education for our Officers and NCOs (it's still poor, despite the attempts to improve). Further, IMO, there is an issue with quality of the literature review in our published articles. I would suggest that Pointer will need to change our process, this would include setting up a panel, where articles need to presented and critiqued by a panel... to subject it to proper peer review.

4. Yes, I too believe that remote weapon stations and other add-ons are necessary but they are not shown as the upgrades are incomplete (and I'm not sure if Mindef wants to show all the tricks in the bag). Plus some of the technology needed is not yet mature, so we are waiting for more inserts. The platform choice is good, it can take the current upgrades and it will be able to accommodate future upgrades.

I agree that an RWS would contribute to situation awareness in a "Thunder Run" type of "assault." But I would not attribute the success of a Thunder Run solely to that. The axis of the run and the intelligence gathering assets supporting plays a critical role.

Looking out of a RWS's sight, which in some cases are slewed to the CITV, is still akin to looking out at the world through a straw. The commander or RWS operator still needs to know where the threat axis was. During the Thunder Runs of the Iraq war, Air Force jets flew overhead giving that kinda information to the lead vehicles of the column.

Nevertheless, the RWS allowed to the gunners and commanders to engage threats, especially "technicals" without exposing themselves once they knew where they were coming from.

Btw, there was actually quite little mention of RWS in the book on Thunder Run.
http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=Cuw2g9...epage&q&f=false

Just a reminder to all,

Due to the sensitive nature of such a thread, Please kindly refrain from posting provocative and emotional statements.

thanks

best regards
Gabriel :D

You hurt my feelings! :blink:

I thought this discussion has been pretty nice so far. =D

Funny, nowadays when I see RWS I tend to think of something else... :lol:

if you have a roller coaster with cars shaped like M113, AMX-13, Leo, BX and Terrex, I guarantee all of us will go and ride every other week :lol: :lol: :lol:

and of course it will be called Thunder Run

Aiya just a reminder la :D

Wow! Pretty fierce name for a roller coaster ride! :D

it will feature two coasters that run pass and along each other, while riders are given laser SAR-21 replicas to shoot at each other's coasters. winning coaster gets to ride FREE :lol:

Ermz, think we are derailing from the original thread title.. :P

Maybe Discovery Centre is more suitable to have this ride...after all they already have SAR-21 for simulated range and paintball!

Haha, the only RWS I frequently encounter is "Range While Scan." LOL!

Hmm...no offense CJ, but right now RWS is associated with some $1200++ fish in most heart landers brain. =P

Feng Shui Inn. Pay like a sultan, feast like a soon hock.

Below is an extract from "Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat" by David Kilcullen (pages 29-40, Vol. 1 No. I, June 2003 of the Australian Army Journal). It seems that our Mindef authors writing on urban warfare have missed out on this excellent article and that we also need to share what the SAF have learnt from SAF's own exercises and simulation by writing and publishing articles on lessons learnt. IMO, at this stage of our force development, it is more important to share info effectively, across the SAF, rather than to keep everything close to the chest. This is about developing expertise and thereby adapting faster to changing conditions rather than the old mind set.

The question I have is: Are the Directing Staff at our advanced schools introducing such articles to our new company commanders and senior NCOs (when they are on course)?

Gee, I'm not sure if anyone of us can answer that question...

From the excerpts of your article, the author seems to be emphasizing on the suppression of enemy positions. From what I've read in Pioneer, it seems we are already on top of that. Instead of suppressing, we'd destroy fixed positions with fighter/apache PGMs, coupled direct and indirect fire from vehicles.

So it seems, that we're not just considering infantry operations in isolation.

LOL... We've got to read and discuss Pointer (professional journal) rather Pioneer (targeted at 15 year olds)... :D

Thanks for the response.

Having taken part in earlier infantry trials in the late '80s, I know that the trial management team would have a lot of data (I note that data is different from analysis and analysis is different from reflexivity). Mindef's data set for any new system is always quite detailed and specific. In fact, Mindef itself has declassified some of the data, when the ACMS Trial Data was published here (and I note that a version of this is not published in Pointer).

Having data does not remove the need to think about our thinking and therein our inherent biases and assumptions. Having the wrong set of assumptions in understanding a battlespace is what will get our people killed in battle. The value of David Kilcullen's article is not that it was prescriptive, as circumstances change. Rather, it was the process by which he came to examine his conventional understanding, which was turned on its head because the 'assumptions' (the then Australian way of war) was ill suited for the challenges faced in operations - his article was a reminder to rethink about 'assumptions' when leading men into battle. The way of war evolves but the foundation for successful evolution lies in the education of the officers and NCOs leading the men.

For example, when you read the above ACMS Trial Data link, one of the major findings from the trials is the saving in time ACMS has provided. In trials to measure reaction time to enemy contact while en route, time dropped from 20 minutes to less than 6 minutes. With the introduction of ACMS, with new intelligence information flowing to users almost twice as quickly, down from 13 to 7 minutes. Effective distribution of the information was also found to have improved. ACMS allows the section to call upon fire support systems that aren’t held at the section level to engage specific targets they do not have the capability to engage effectively. Further, one of the goals of ACMS is to enable the section commander to “see one block away”, via a virtual presence. The ACMS trials have used a Worn Array Sniper Detection Systems and a Round Corner Firing attachment. The latter is integrated on the SAR 21 assault rifle allowing aiming through the weapon’s optical sight via a camera, with the display having multiple positions for viewing. The camera is designed to flip sideways with just one hand action, back to a normal weapon sight configuration. Tracked and wheeled, low cost small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) and Micro Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) have also been trialled with ACMS. The integration of tactical sensors has been factored into the architecture from the start to cope with bandwidth and power consumption considerations, although the major concern in this area has been how to manage costs.

Similar to ACMS is the American Land warrior ensemble and there is data Iraq. The ability to review and understand such after action reports is absolutely critical. This data must be translated into doctrine. The US Army times has an article here.

BTW, Cpt Ong C. H., in his article called, 'The Effects of Terrain on a System of Systems', Pointer (2009) Vol 35, No. 1 found the following:

Research Data: Research models have suggested that sensor latency greatly affects casualties suffered by the attacking Blue forces. Specifically, UAV and the counterbattery radar support in urban warfare. It has been suggested that a latency in delivering information from the sensor to the shooter of more than 1.5 minutes (98 seconds) almost doubles the mean casualties (from around 90 to 170) suffered by the Blue forces.

Possible Analysis: The above date demonstrates the importance of not just accurate information, but also information that is timely. In observing the simulation runs, it is seen that if the targeting effort on the defenders' reserves is not executed well, it could result in the attacking forces having to deal with the reserves that "leaked" from the targeting effort, thus increasing casualties in the ensuing combat at the frontal positions.

Note: The urban warfare scenario used in the article was developed with the assistance of retired Marine Corp COL Edwards Lesnowiz.

In conclusion: Was a through literature review conducted in writing the Pointer articles cited in this thread? Are we learning the right lessons and how are these lessons being disseminated?

Haha, I read Pioneer cos its mandatory and it gets deducted out of my miserable NS pay anyway.

Interesting indeed. Given the heavy dependence on electronic gadgets, they'd better be able to cut down both reaction time and engagement time. In short, infantry operations with ACMS systems have to be short and decisive. The time limitation is now imposed by the electronic systems that the soldiers need to fight in closed terrain or fibua. Of course, we're not talking about 20mins, but probably about 20 hrs before the power for all individual soldier's gadgets start switching off. At that point, if they don't have spare or back up power sources, then they need to consider falling back to their vehicles.

Fully agreed on the issues of latency. That is why, indirect fire support needs to be organic and highly mobile in order to minimize network latency with dismounted troops. High bandwidth LOS networks needs to be rapidly set up (eg via wifi w/ wimax) and established at key points (LOS constructive) in Fibua (ala Tom Clancy's End War), in order to provide speedy communications between manuever elements and indirect fire support units.

My view is this. The technologies they are trying to develop for the ACMS system can still be relevant to Kilcullen's approach to infantry tactics in closed terrain battles. Focus can still shift to an approach where a larger reserve of support units provide the "killing" or "suppression" firepower. Whichever way they want to configure it, the communications and coordination capabilities doesn't hurt, unless they created only "one-way" data links between the central to node (smack forehead). Say we flip our 3G SAF ACMS system around, using the same technologies and Kilcullen's approach, we'd probably see more indirect and direct fire support vehicles, suppressing and killing fixed enemy positions that the dismounted infantry are spotting for them. If the ACMS system can't be flipped around like that, then they might have developed and stonewalled their options technologically.

:D Well spotted - on the twin issues of latency and battery power.

The Future Systems directorate has considered the battery life issue in their developmental road map - BG Tan Yih San, has said in 2008 that they are looking at fuel cells as the next generation technology insert with regards to portable power. Thankfully for the SAF, the technological road map for ACMS development is well considered. That's why my focus in the discussion/critique was on improving education and training. :P

I was actually thinking of recycling excess biomechanical energy to recharge the systems. I've seen some dynamo device that is placed on the knee joint, harnessed on below the knee and lower thigh.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7226968.stm

Whenever a soldier moves around (which they do in fibua a lot), the dynamo can recharge systems or batteries. Pretty useful for extending the amount of power available.

I think (in good faith) there definitely more re-evaluation of current tactics and approaches that are taking place or on-going. My knowledge of Mindef and the SAF is that they are quite compartmentalized. There are specific departments that handle specific things. IF there is a department that handles re-evaluation of infantry tactics and doctrines, I think it can be reasonably judged that they do focus efforts on revising education and training of troops.

If you are interested in reading more, there is a 2007 Pointer article co-authored by the current COA called, 'The Citizen-Soldier and the City Fight: Threat Entrepreneurship on the Urban Battlefield.'

Cost-wise, its easier just to work within ops distance and duration.

If a battery lasts z hrs, then either the mission last z hours, the device is only turned on for z hrs or after z hrs, effectiveness drops.

Moving towards AI is a good idea. A mother vehicle is not just centralised info, it is also a vehicle to carry excess gear eg batteries.

I'd rather focus R&D on lightening field gear weight. Lighter, longer lasting batts, lighter weapons. Recharging in the field is a distraction. The gear to recharge will probably be excess weight in other times.

Recharging may not be that much of an issue, especially if Terrexes are nearby. Speculating here, but momentum of the attack can be kept up if the battery-drained troops simply mount back onto the Terrex and fight from there whilst recharging their systems. Of course, a longer battery life would be good since infantry can operate further from their Terrexes.