I would like to start this thread dedicated to the assessment, discussion and study of the above-mentioned tactics from the School of Offensive Regime.

Feel free to post any information, pass any comments and ask any questions.

why done you get the ball rolling?

Very well, I will.

Introduction to Air-land Maneuver Theory

The Air-Land Maneuver Theory (ALMT) was promulgated by the United States Armed Forces after 1976 and became the standard army/air force operational doctrine in 1982. Conceived at first to deal with a potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe, it has since then grown to encompass the Korean theater.

US planners have long sinced the seventies appreciated the fact that the Warsaw Pact forces out-scale NATO in terms of material and manpower, and it would be futile to base any strategy of the defence of Western Europe on a war of attrition. However US planners also realize that with poorer lines of communications and weak logistical support, Warsaw Pact Forces were unable to utilize their full numerical advantage at a single instance and hence must deploy via echelons; essentially piecemeal on a large scale.

ALMT calls for the synchronization of all weapons and logistical systems in support of the theater commander's view of the battle. All theater tanks, infantry, artillery, attack helicopters as well as CAS and high performance aircraft would be mutually complementing and focused on a single mission objective.

The order of the day would be aggressiveness, qualitatively superior equipment, better communications, coordination, battlefield intelligence, outstanding logistical support.

Hence ALMT can be summarised as seizing the initiative and exercise it aggressively to defeat opposing forces.

The Four Tenets

The ALMT is not a full-proof point-for-point instruction manual that will offer it's reader total success if followed blindly word for word. The ALMT is more like a set of guidelines that each US theater commander should try to adopt and modify in respect to the stituation at hand. As such, four basic tenets (principles) can be derived from the ALMT;

*

*By Lt Col Donald B. Vought, US Army (Ret'd) and Lt Col David C. Vasile, instructor DJCO

ALMT Battlefield layout

The 1982 US Armed Forces Doctrine divides the battlefield into three parts; the deep-battle, the close-in battle and the rear-battle. ALMT predicted that in the initial phase of the war, a US theater commander may expect to manage all three battles simultaneously. Considerations for bio-chemical and nuclear warfare must also be taken.

deep-battle

The deep-battle refers to the pan-theater engagement of opposing forces that have yet to be committed or second-echelon reinforcements. The main objective of deep-battle is to delay or disrupt the follow-up of enemy forces and can extend to the possibility of total subjugation, if possible. Deep-battles have priorty over close-in battles because successful application would prevent the massing of unmanagable enemy forces at the critical point and time. Isolated front-line enemy units are also easier to be destroyed or rendered combat ineffective.

The term "Window of Opportunity" is most commonly associated with deep-battle. It refers to the objective of isolating and reducing the capabilities of front-line enemy units through association with second-echelon forces. The type of window is determined by the field commander at the particular moment who must decide of each of the front-line units, which poses the greatest threat and must be dealt with first.

Deep-battle does not only deal with physical enemy units proper, but also assets that would lead to the disruption or denial of link-up between enemy frontline and second echelon units. HVAs include bridges, logistical units, fuel terminals etc. Deep-battles can be fought from brigade levels upwards but is usually carried out by tactical aircraft. The corps is the command and coordination HQ for deep-battle.

Close-in battle

Close-in battle refers to the the pan-front engagement of opposing forces frontline units. It can either be defensive or offensive in nature but both styles depend on communications, intelligence and maneuver.

Close-in battles start with obtaining intelligence of opposing forces objectives and denying them the initiative through deception, aggressive obstruction and sabotage. This is then followed up by engagement of enemy frontline mainbodies by robust US forces. Firepower, maneuver and speed are the orders of the day.

Rear battle

Rear-battle refers to the scenario whereby the enemy is able to take the fight to the immediate vicinity of US decision-making, coordination and command positions with the objective of neutralizing US decision-makers or disrupt/deny flow of communication from higher levels to basic tactical levels.

Enemy means would include saboteurs, airborne assets, long-range artillery and airborne interdiction. US rear-security must ensure that key assets and facilities be adequately defended and all possible means employed to defeat enemy purposes of infiltration or sudden attack.

Tenets of Offensive Operations

US offensive operations are defined by five basic traits - concentration, surprise, speed, flexibility and audacity.

Given limited assets and faculties, US forces are expected to concentrate full offensive power at localized regions in the face of superior enemy numbers and wide engagement fronts. Concentration allows a higher density of offensive effort to be deployed and ensures higher chances of local area superiority and success. Concentration should be focused at locations/points of opposing forces' weaknesses to ensure success.

Surprise is required to seize the initiative and make the enemy respond to the actions of US forces rather than vice-versa. This will increase the number of later options for the US commander whilst reducing those of the opponent. Surprise now also encompasses avoiding enemy strengths and exploiting its weaknesses.

Speed refers to any action that contributes to enemy forces confusion and contribution to friendly maneuver.

In an offensive when US forces can cover well over 48 km, flexibility refers to the ability to recognise and invest in exploits and also reassign local objectives and effort whenever the situation demands it .

Audacity refers to the recognisation of risks but rejects gamble.

Types Of Offensive Operations

Movement To Contact

In layman terms, it means "touch and feel' and refers to initial contacts with opposing forces without engagment becoming general. Movement to contact develops the situation for the commander while retaining his freedom of action.

Movement to contact is usually carried out by reconaissance elements and advance guard of the mainbody. The main tasks of the advanced guard is to buy time for the main body to deploy, delay the actions of the enemy and eliminate minor enemy resistances. Should the decision to engage in general battle be made, the advance guard will continue to pin the enemy down and the main body will proceed to engagement in several maneuver columns.

Hasty Attacks

Hasty attacks are called for in the event of meeting engagements (usually unexpected) or after successful defense. It's objective is usually to retard opposing forces impetus of attack and buy time for the US commander to exercise his options. Concentration, speed and surprise can compensate for the lack of preparation.

The hasty attacks are usually carried out by the advance guard that can be reinforced by elements of the main body if required.

Delibrate Attacks

It refers to the main offensive effort aimed at either subjugating the opposing force or rendering it combat ineffective. The full-range of weaponry and techniques is utilized according to the commander's decision and options available. Audacity, aggressiveness and concentration are the orders of the day.

Exploitation and Pursuit

Exploitation and pursuit follows a successful attack. Commanders exploit a successful attack by moving aggressively to disrupt enemy movement when a penetration is made. Pursuit is carried out after the enemy is defeated. It calls for continued momentum of offence and constant pressure on enemy elements to prevent it form organising a delaying action.

It should be noted that the US Army Infantry formations are mostly mechanized, airborne, airmobile or light infantry, allowing for the rapid maneuvers stated in the doctrine.

Another thing to note is that such "perfect" coordinations of firepower from all elements of battle are imaginary and are often prone to human-error. A fine example is the number of "friendly-fire" cases.

More accurately, US planners envisualized the European theater to be the domain of the heavies - armored and mechanized units. ALMT seems to be solely catered for such units in its heavy emphasis on deep maneuver columns and highly robust and mobile units packed with tremendous firepower.

This is not an off-hand statement judging by the types of unit based in Europe and involved in REFORGER:

European based US 7th Army major land units (1986-1988)

1st Armored Division, V Corps (Ansbach, Germany)

3d Bgd, 2nd Armored Division, VII Corps (Stuttgart, Germany?)

3rd Armored Division, V Corps (Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany)

3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, VII Corps (Wurzburg, Germany)

8th Mechanized Infantry Division, V Corps (Bad Kreuznach, Germany)

3d Bgd, 1st Mechanized Infantry Division, V Corps (Goppinggen, Germany)

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps ( Nurnberg, Germany)

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps (Fulda, Germany)

Berlin Brigade (Berlin, Germany)

Airborne Task Force (TF), (Naples, Italy)

US Army major land units tasked for REFORGER

5th Mechanized Infantry Division (Louisiana, USA)

24th Mechanized Infantry Division (Georgia, USA)

24th Infantry Division (Georgia, USA)

1st Mechanized Infantry Division (Kansas, USA)

2nd Armored Division (Texas, USA)

1st Cavalry Division (Texas, USA)

good discussion going on

here are some of my thoughts

blitzkrieg doctrine is very appealing, but future potential conflicts in my view may not be suited to this type of warfare

urban warfare and hit & run tactics make this doctrine dangerous becos blitzkrieg tends to leave a long logistics trail, which is prone to attacks

most obviously seen in gulf war 2, but they had other problems too [like too few troops in the 1st place]

i like blitzkrieg but think it must be modified to ensure self-reliance

Origins of the US ALMT

Many students of the ALMT offer different origins that led to the development of the offensive doctrine. The US army officially attributes the creation of Field Manual 100-5 to Gen. Don A. Starry. Gen. Starry served as Deputy Director of the Operations I Directorate and Director of Manpower and Forces in 1970 and was commander of the US Armor Centre from 1973.

6 October 1973 also saw the invasion of Israeli Sinai by the 2nd and 3rd Egyptian Armies which, rolled over 15km of desert. More than 1020 Russian-built tanks were employed for the breakthrough. Israeli tank numbers totalled one-quarter that of their Arab enemy's. In response to the Egyptian invasion, the initial decision of the IDF was to send it's armored regiments piecemeal against the fronts of the Egyptians in an attempt to disrupt Egyptian schedules and blunt their offensive capabilities. This resulted in the loss and capitulation of many independent IDF units under relentless Egyptian pounding and advanced "Swagger" AT missiles. Many IAF aircraft deployed for CAS and interdiction were shot down by Russian-built SAMs also. It was only by 15 Oct could the IDF commence an effective counterstrike that brought the Egyptian advance to a halt.

The great armored struggle in the Sinai dwarfed the Battle of Kursk in the number of tanks deployed, but more importantly it turned heads of all military planners because of the number of armored vehicles destroyed. Foreign states started sending their battlefield investigators to the Sinai and Gen. Starry was one of them.

Whereas other miltary planners turned their attention on the destruction of the armored vehicles (shaped-charge warheads), Starry looked the other way and investigated on the near-miraclous recovery of the IDF and how two armored divisions coordinated and led by Ariel Sharon defeated two Egyptian armies. The answers were - audacity, speed, surprise, exploitation and maneuver.

Unlike initial Israeli counterattacks that emphasised on frontal assaults, Ariel Sharon looked and found the weak link of the Egyptian invaders (the link between the 2nd and 3rd armies). He and Avraham Eden then concentrated what firepower they had at the localized area and daringly dashed through the breach once it became evident. Once the armored spearheard had cleared the breach, the two Israeli divisions dashed across the Sinai, crossed the Suez and invaded Egypt. Sharon's main aims were revealed when he cut the lines of communication of the Eqyptian 3rd Army and destroyed its supply line - a case of bringing the giant down by his Achilles Heel.

The disproportion of forces in the Middle-East was akin to that in the European Theater and Gen. Starry was swift to notice it and apply the lessons of the Sinai to the FM.

In 1976, FM 100-5 which promoted the concept of ALMT was formulated.

Boyd

Col John R. Boyd was another influencial contributor to the ALMT. Whereas Gen. Starry concentrated on the operational aspect of ALMT, Boyd is widely agreed as the one who gave US ALMT it's strategic vision and answered how objectives on a strategic level can be achieved. Col. Boyd was a strong proponent of the pyschology of war, understanding the pysche of the enemy and the usage of time fluidity as an important asset during operations.

Introduction To The Blitzkrieg

The Blitzkrieg "Lightning War" doctrine was modern-day military's first successive application of the art of maneuver. Contrary to popular belief, the Biltzkrieg was not an application of intensive firepower and immense shock effect by hordes of armored behemoths that threatened to literally overrun what they could not blast away. What the blitzkrieg was, was the application of pyschological warfare and the appreciation of the importance of lines of communications and logistics. The formulators of the blitzkrieg understood that war was a contest of wills and that the loser was not the one that suffered the most damage - but the one who blinked and lost the will to fight. Hence bringing the enemy to total mental exhaustion and convincing him that it was pointless to fight on was the main objective of the blitzkrieg. The German armored spearhead doctrine and close air support doctrine were tools of the blitzkrieg but WERE NOT the subsets of the blitzkrieg doctrine. Engagements by attrition were frowned at.

Above all else, the blitzkrieg success depended on maneuver. Maneuver in this context can be defined as movement to an objective. The blitzkrieg demanded that velocity of maneuver be rapid (at least four times faster than the opposing forces' velocity to the German front), illusive and best kept undefined to the enemy until the objective is reached. The objective in this context is the enemy's center of gravity - the particular item/location/asset that will cause the above-said total pyschological collapse of the enemy and his will to fight.

Blitzkrieg looks at the "big picture", ie the campaign/operation and its successive/unsuccessive outcome. The results of maneuver and ability to reach the objective measures this outcome. Set-piece battles have lower priority. Battles won and battles lost carry the SAME premium, battles avoided carry a HIGHER premium the the former two.

Blitzkrieg Terminology

The following are some terms from Robert Leonhard's "The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle" that must be defined so as to achieve a clear understanding of the operations of the Blitzkrieg;

The "Expanding Torrent" Concept

First proposed by B. H. Liddell Hart during the post-World War One years, the concept of the expanding torrent takes its cue from nature. When water flows along the surface of a rock, it will naturally diverge from its original path whenever there are easier gaps to flow through or obstacles to avoid. This series of divergences and convergences will take place throughout the entire course of flow. Similarly when an army comes into contact with the opposing force, it should look for a gap of weakness throughout the enemy's front and exploit it to create the breakthrough. This is the fundamental principle of the Blitzkrieg.

Auftragstaktik

This German term is translated literally as "mission-type tactics" but it is more easily understood as "task-oriented control"

For the breakthrough location of the Blitzkrieg to be identified and exploited, the German doctrine requires that reconnaissance unit commanders show great initiative and self-decision-making when probbing for the location of the breakthrough. The location of the breakthrough and subsequent course of deep level maneuver will be dictated by field unit commanders, making agile decisions and working together in unison. The army commanders need only to brief his subordinates on what the mission objective/s is/are and rein them back should they show signs of straying from the above-said mission objectives. Other than that, the army commanders "sit back and let the juniors run the show"

Needless to say such a doctrine requires tactic commanding officers of extremely high calibre and an operational commander who would refuse the urge to micro-manage, and instead focus on the "big picture" Befehlstaktik is the direct opposite of Auftragstaktik.

Schwerpunkt

Translated literally as the "heavy point", the schwerpunkt is the point of breakthrough that is identified by the tactical commanders under Auftragstaktik. It is also usually the point of weakness of the front of the opposing force that will offer maximum chance of successful breakthrough and latter deep penetration maneuver.

Center Of Gravity

The center of gravity of the enemy is the paticular asset that once denied from him, will result in total mental collapse and the will to fight. The main objective of all blitzkrieg missions is the capture of the opposing force's center of gravity through maneuver.

The center of gravity is the critical vulnerability of the enemy and not his main strength. Usual COGs include radiation source for lines of communications and logistical supplies, but the definition of COGs also include pyschological objectives that appeal to the opposing force's beliefs, faith and mental capacity. For example, the French Army's COG during the 1940 Battle of France was not Paris (the main C&C HQ) but the violation of Sedan by the Germans within a very short time that upset all French military plans since 1926. Sedan held little tactical worth but the French inability to accept its violation led to total defeat from the top of the government downwards.

Well done my friend....very insightful....sorry if i have nothing to share....

The Blitzkrieg Doctrine

Before the commencement of all blitzkrieg operations, the campaign/operational commanders (usually at heeresgruppe general staff level) identify the opposing force's center/s of gravity/s and decide on the COGs to be made the operational objectives of the campaign. This would involve exhausting intelligence gathering and astute staff planning. All plans made correspond to the national/strategic direction of the states executive administration.

The means in which the objectives be achieve would be decided by the highest tactical level - the armeegruppe. The armeegruppe commander and his staff recieves the order of objective/s and decide on the order of the battle. Operational instructions and objectives are then briefed to armee, korps and divisional commanders who are expected to instruct their subordinates on the same mission also. The armeegruppe commander gives his subordinates free rein on how the campaign would be carried out.

At the armee and korps level how, what type and when to carry out the maneuver to achieve the objective and planning for battles to facilitate maneuver would be planned. The armee and korps commanders give the specialized reconnaissance unit and panzer division commanders the initiative to decide upon their actions independently to identify the schwerpunkt and effect the physical breakthrough.

Auftragstaktik form of command and control has been practiced throughout the chain of command (excluding the "bohemian little Corporal" phenomenon).

At the commencement of the operation, the entire opposing force's front is probed for weaknesses. Panzer and recon units tend to withdraw when faced by stiff enemy resistance rather than engage in battles of attrition (the importance of conservation of resources and time is appreciated by all). Once an unit commander identifies the schwerpunkt, he informs the other probbing and standby units of his finding through excellent C3I, which will hom-in on his location. Preceded by a "hurricane" artillery bombardment, the schwerpunkt is breached by armored spearhead and the deep maneuver to the objective/s commences. Maneuver columns would be supported by CAS and artillery fire. Velocity is of the essence here, engagements would be made only if to facilitate the maneuver.

From the moment when the schwerpunkt is identified and throughout the breakthrough maneuver, the armee and korps commander is given the opportunity to make a direct interference in the operations - to either effect a diversion to draw enemy attention and resources from the breaching of the schwerpunkt, or to engage in frontal battles of attrition to "pin" the main-body of the opposing force in position so as minimize disruption from the breaching of the schwerpunkt to the entire duration of the deep-maneuver. The diversion or frontal engagement can be withdrawn once the deep-maneuver is deemed secured. Incidentally, the campaign commander can choose to take no vigorous action if interference to the deep-maneuver is deemed insignificant.

Throughout the entire operation, terror-bomb runs and psychological warfare is waged on the general populace of the enemy's territory so as to acelerate mental collapse.

Wehrmacht Command Quality

Auftragstaktik is perhaps the greatest trademark of the German blitzkrieg doctrine. With higher command contented with only steering the entire operation in the general direction of the objective, the outlook of all tactical operations were determined by lower-level commanding officers - usually at divisional level, and these divison generals inturn make their judgement based on the findings of their organic reconaissance unit officers. Clearly the German school of offensive regime required tactical commissioned officers of extremely high calibre. Such officers must be aggressive, audacious, decisive, intelligent and above all self-confident in making far-reaching momentous good judgments. Judging by the early successes of the blitzkrieg from Poland to the initial breakthrough of the USSR in 1941, it is a fair assessment to say that the wehrmacht possessed such good officers.

Why the Germans enjoyed the services of such competent officers could be dated back to Gen. Hans von Seeckt and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. Under the treaty, the Reichsheer of the Weimar Republic could not have an army of over 100 000 strong inclusive of not more than 4 000 commissioned officers at any one time. Von Seeckt of course had no intentions of following the harsh terms of the treaty but had to tread lightly in the illegal rearmament of Germany in the early post-WWI years. What he proposed was to train 4 000 commissioned officers into highly efficient staff planners and thinkers that would aid him in the rebuilding of the German Army. The selection process of these 4 000 were stringent and often included the academic cream of the young German male population. But von Seeckt's most radical approach in recruitment was to train all the remaining allowable manpower in the Reichsheer into high calibre NCOs. A large portion of these NCOs were actually trained as commissoned officers without the state given rank. Since the mission of the Reichsheer recruitment drive was to identify potential commissoned officers and NCOs, the weeding out and training program was the most stringent and toughest in the world, but the result was a competent and highly motivated Reichsheer with a strong corps de espirit and togetherness - the perfect nucleus of a much larger army of the future.

Introduction To The Soviet School of Maneuver Warfare

From the 1920s to 1930s before Stalin's great military purge, the Soviets were making great strides in the doctrination and organization of their mechanized units. Prime-movers of the school of maneuver warfare were Marshal Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevskii and Marshal Victor K. Triandafillov, these two Russian generals were so profficient in the art of deep-maneuver and strategic warfare that what the Reichsheer initially learned of mass mechanized maneuver were from their great works, especially the doctrinal memoirs of Tukhachevskii and "The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies" written by Triandafillov. Indeed what the Germans formulated and applied in modern day warfare had strong Soviet origins, especially after the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo in 1923.

The nature of Soviet fascination with mechanized warfare and deep maneuver could be traced to the huge geographical landmass that was the USSR. With seemingly endless rolling plains, the Soviet fascination of depth for communcations and logistics was understandable. In his excellent book, "The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle" Robert Leonhard likened the pre-purge Russian strategists as people who lived all their lives in colossal Gothic Cathedrals and therefore their orientation for contact with the outside world was always directed from the arched doorway to the altar - the longitudinal length/depth of the church and not the sides despite what tasteful sculptures or tapestries there were.

For Tukhachevskii, the needs for deep maneuver and strategic objectives were born from the bitter defeat of the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. The Soviets sought battles of attrition against the Poles, only to be encircled and rendered combat ineffective by audacious Polish light infantry and cavalry. What Tukhachevskii envisioned was deep thrusts into enemy territory and encirclement and destruction of her armies - not by multi-front engagements of attrition but by cutting the encircled opponents lines of communication and suppplies.

Triandafillov preached essentially on the same lines as Tukhachevskii in his "The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies" which was written in 1929 after extensive research and discussion with his fellow officers and subordinates - many of them veterans of the Polish-Soviet War. He added another dimension in Tukhachevskii's theory by proposing the pursuit of the defeated enemy after the battle so as to prevent re-organisation and to inflict a permanent mental scar on the enemy. Triandafillov then added that for whatever engagements made, the planning should always make the "pursuit" paramount - defeat itself is not important enough.

Soviet Maneuver Warfare In Practice

The great military purge of 1937 shook the foundation of the Soviet school of offensive regime to its roots. With three out of five marshals (Tukhachevskii was one of them) and fifty out of fifty-seven corps commanders either imprisoned or executed, the maneuver warfare movement died out completely in the western theater. However as the purge was concentrated in "European" USSR, the embers of Soviet maneuver warfare were kept alive in eastern "Asiatic" USSR by Gen. Georgi Zhukov, a student of Tukhachevskii's who took the maneuver theory to heart.

Khalkin-Gol

In August of 1939 at the height of the Battle of Khalkin-Gol, Zhukov led the 57th Soviet Corps around the flanks of the Japanese 23d Infantry Division and encircled it, cutting of all the latter's contact with the outside world and all its supply lines. This brought about the rapid collapse of the Japanese besieged despite their rabid sucidal-bushido attitude. This proved the point of the believers of the maneuver warfare theory that everything had a breaking point.

Little Saturn

Operation Little Saturn of 1943 marked the first post-Khalkin-Gol attempt by the Soviets to try out their new maneuver warfare oriented tank armies in which the importance of communications and command was realized and the problem of infantry being unable to catch up with the armored spearhead was rectified (more mechanized and motorized units).

Bagration

In June 1944, the Soviets initiated Operation Bagration with the objectives of liberating Belorussia and subjugating the 100 000 strong German defenders. The Operation lasted for one week and meet all its objectives. During the pre-operation period, the Soviets decided on four fronts in which to engage the enemy frontal forces wherein, two were identified for the breakthrough.

August Storm

In August 1945 one day after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the Soviets initiated their Pacific Campaign codenamed "August Storm". The objectives were the capture of Japanese-held Manchuria and the annihilation of the greater portion of the Kwantung Army. The capture of Manchuria would open up a spring board for the Soviet invasion of the Kuril Islands and the eventual invasion of mainland Japan Hokkaido. Though Soviet grand strategic ambitions were thwarted by astute American and Japanese diplomatic overtures that ensured the capitulation of Tokyo before Soviet forces could recoil and launch the final invasion, the catalyst that was "August Storm" is widely recognised by students of maneuver warfare as till-date, history's definitive application of strategic maneuver warfare. August Storm lasted twenty days and involved over 1.5 million red soldiers, 3 704 tanks and 1 852 self-propelled artilley pieces.

Fundamental Differences Between German and Soviet Maneuver Warfare

The Wehrmacht practiced Auftragstaktik which allowed and indeed demanded that field unit commanders take the initiative and make far-reaching operational decisons. On the other hand, the Soviets insisted on Befehlstaktik (vice-control) that required total throughout plannig by the general staff on all details and absolute control of the campaign through pre-determined plans. Individual field commanders were required to follow the orders of superior headquarters to the dote and self-initiative was frowned at.

Hence the fundamental difference can be summed up as the German's requiring the enemy to fail to arrest their dynamic and tactically illusive exploitation of the schwerpunkt whereas Soviet success depended on the enemy to be overwhelmed by the imposed will of the campaign commander expressed through the irresistable momentum of his breakthrough.

The reasons for such different approaches to maneuver could be traced back to both state's post-World War I society. The Germans with their 100 000 Reichsheer required quality above all and were receptive to new ideas and innovations under a period of difficult constrains. That together with the cohesiveness of the NCO and commissoned officers corps meant that Auftragstaktik was encouraged and nutured. Indeed when the Reichsheer was replaced by the Wehrmacht in 1935, many of the new comissioned officers were promoted from the old NCO class and the same sense of self-worth, and spirit of critical creativity and innovation prevailed throughout the ranks.

Soviet culture on the other hand demanded absolute control over its huge population and vast territories, in the fear of insurgence and revolutions. Indeed during the Stalinist regime, many of the vice-like Tzarist methods of controlling the state remained. The regime required absolute obedience over all in the expense of creativity and innovation. Such a mindset was also taken into the military chain of command which ultimately led to the purge of 1937. Soviet maneuver warfare was only re-indoctrinated after Hitler's invasion of 1941 threatened to crush Stalin's regime if the army could not be reformed in time.

Soviet maneuver warfare cannot be viewed as "doctrine for idiots-in-mass". The post 1943 successes and the steps taken by the Soviets during the pre-operation periods showed great audacity, creativity and daring-to-do-so in the part of Soviet planners. Indeed in the events leading to Bagration and August Storm, Soviet high command showed higher quality of strategic understanding of operational objectives and the means to effect maneuver than any of their Western counterparts. The down-part is that once the operation commences, Soviet commanders are more or less "married" to their plans and do not enjoy deviations. But should the need be called for, brilliant spontaneous changes to the operation procedure will be maded - but by the higher command and not by the field commanders.

So in contrast to the Soviet policy of maneuver, the US ALMT/ALB is far more rigid and less-creative.

Which Path Should Singapore Take?

As the SAF comes to the age of maturity, its planners must decide on the strategic direction to steer Singapore's warfighting agency in. The choices are;

1) To arm, indoctrinate and train the SAF to engage in battles of attrition.
2) To arm, indoctrinate and train the SAF to engage in maneuver campaigns.

Past miltary operations suggest that there is no middleroad. During the duration of Operation Just Cause (a maneuver operation), the strategic worthiness of other US Army miltary options fell considerably - that was because the US Army was tailor-made for the Airland Battle (a doctrine that advocated attrition). Operation Just Cause committed the entire US 75th Ranger Regiment and a large contigent from the 82nd Airborne Division - strategically valuable assets in deep-maneuver campaigns.

And if the SAF should adopt maneuver warfare as its cornerstone, then what type of maneuver command should be emphasized on? Auftragstaktik or Befehlstaktik?

Wow, so many information. Maybe you guys should look at world war 2 Blitzkrieg. BTW, who's Germans' father of blitzkrieg? I only know that Patton is the American one. what about Patton's famous "Battle of the Bulge". He sent 3 divisions (if I remember correctly) in 48 hours notice first, follow by the remainder of his army. To your info, Germany had at that time around 20 divisions up there. With the US 1st army at further north (if I remember again, very bad memory). His army also captured 2 German armies intact in the Palatinate campaign. You guys should read his biography. I'm now trying to digest another biography about Rommel. :P

Go read up on General Heinz Guderian then, Father of the Panzer maneuver.

Cocka-what?!

The German Blitzkrieg has its roots in the Great War. Faced with the problem of trench warfare, the allies responded by fielding the tank - a technological solution. The Germans responded by initiating the 21 Mar 1918 spearhead offensive (a doctrinal/operational solution) codenamed "Michael" at the British held sector with emphasis on the Fifth Army as the Schwerpunkt. Ludendorff's forced will was applied and it worked, but the German army lost momentum and Michael failed.

THAT was the beginining of the blitzkrieg genesis - the concentration of momentum at an isolated point with the intend to breakthrough and exploit.

No one German can claim to be the sole finding father of the blitzkrieg. Hans von Seeckt contributed much to the manpower quality required for the blitzkrieg with his reformation of the Reichsheer. In his 1928 seminal "Thoughts of A Soldier", von Seeckt advocated the idea of light mobile armies supported by combat aircraft on the battlefield - combined arms warfare and the virtues of maneuver. Heinz Guderian gave the heer the means of mobility and agility with his ideas on the reform of Wehrmacht mechanized/motorized units and how to deploy tanks - the land-based tactical doctrine. Hermann Goerring and Albert Kesselring added the aerial-dimension of the Blitzkrieg based on Hugo Sperrle's experiments in Spain and finally Erich von Manstein, Guenther Blumentritt and Henning von Tresckow gave the Blitzkrieg it's strategic purpose with the Battle of France.

Guderian learned all he knew about tanks and their usage from MAJ GEN J.F.C. Fuller's "Reformation of War" (1923) and "Foundation of the Science of War" (1926), and the importance of communications and command when he was a signaller in a cavalry unit during the Great War. As for the schwerpunkt, breakthrough and encirclement - they all came from Liddell Hart's concept of "The Strategy of Indrect Approach" (1929) and Boxer in the dark analogy. The great Ardant Du Picq and his contribution on war pyschology gave rise to the concepts of "shock effect" and "terror bombing". And the great air prophets Billy Mitchell and Guilo Douhet need no introduction.

Blitzkrieg was an operational/campaign doctrine, no one can or has ever claimed credit to be its "father" - not even Guderian himself. The Blitzkrieg was the masterpiece of a group of enthusiatic military planners and students called the German General Staff.

I distain the term "Battle of The Bulge" - no doubt the 101st Airborne Div played an important role at bastogne (ie the bulge), but it undermines Gen. Troy Middleton and the heroic US VIII Corps stand at Elsenborn Ridge. If you must know, the Germans committed a total of 29 divisions and over 600 000 men for "Watch On The Rhine". Josef "Sepp" Dietrich was allocated the Sixth Panzerarmeekommando, Fifth Panzerarmeekommando was commanded by Hasso von manteuffel and Ernst Brandenberger got the Seventh Armeekommando. George Patton Jr's redirection of the US Third Army up north is what maneuverists today call application of force

I don't like memoirs, they either idolize or villanize the hero and his contemporaries while downplaying or exaggerating events. I read well-established accounts of campaigns and books on military strategies, doctrines and tactics.

Obersturmfuhrer is right. Guderian is the father of German armored warfare, but not the father of the blitzkrieg.

nah...the name was wacht on rhine.........meaning war on the rhine.....or battle of the rhine......something to that effect......most people get that wrong.

yes he was the father of the German panzer army and doctrine....but by no means the father...infact the guys i would give most credit to would be some British Generals whose name eludes me.

Really? I got the name of the operation from John Toland's "Battle of The Bulge" and John Eisenhower's "The Bitter Woods". The two writers wrote that Hitler personally chose that title which was actually a popular 1860s nationalistic anthem. The original plan was drafted by Jodl and was called "Christose"

Ed: Just toyed around with AtlaVista-babel Fish. It seems we are all wrong! :D wacht um die Rhine literally means "is awake on the Rhine" So I take it as alert/watching on the Rhine, which fits the reasons given by Toland and Eisenhower on why Hitler chose that title - it was the same as "Watch On The Rhine". Makes perfect sense. War as we know it is krieg, battle is schlacht and to fight is kampf. Anyway Obersturmfuhrer should know the direct meaning better.

General 'Fast Heinz' Guderian

Father of the German Panzer doctrine, the soldier who, more than any other, developed tank tactics and the concept of fast moving armour units supported by motorized infantry and ground-attack aircraft.

I doubt its appropriate to call an Englishman the father of the German Panzer doctrine.

wait sorry haha amazing wad a typo can do
i meant he was by no means the inventer of the Bliztkrieg or in fact the way that tanks shld be used
Oh and lap i was bloody confused with the word wehr argh ahahha that's for typing that while talking to you gf at 12am ahha

Maybe you are right about memoirs, so is LKY's memoirs. Anyway, there's plenty of commanders in the battle worth mentioning but I just don't have the time to look thru it again and list them with their accomplishments. To your info, Patton never tell his commanders how to do things, he just tell them an objective and they will do it their way. So even his commanders are worth mentioning. So what books you read, are those the ones that say they are well documented by themselves or by military historians? What I'm telling you is that never to trust your sources either.

Cheers

Why are you telling me the concept of auftragstaktik? haven't I covered it before? In any case auftragstaktik results in recon push, but Patton's encirclement and destruction campaign in Benelux was a clear cut example of command push in application, a result of befehlstaktik.

The make a point to only read books on campaigns and tactics written by historians who care to check all their facts from both sides and present them fairly and without discrimination. Needless to say, Stephen Ambrose is out of the question, and sensationists like Anthony Beevor too. Your best bet are always military thesises written by former miltary commanders and also researches by neutral writers - more often British I must admit. Checking out where these writers get their facts from will not hurt either.

What your "memoirs" of Patton tell you about his subordinates and their accomplishment from Normandy to the Rhine would most probably be covered in greater detail by other military histroy books that document their exploits and factual happenings.

Hi, I'm not here to argue anything. I'm just saying he used Blitzkrieg to great effect but never took anything thing away from those Middleton's VIII corp or others. So I also don't know why you are so hostile (at least looks hostile). So you wanted to question who wrote my book about Patton. Ok, its written by retired US army Lt colonel and distinguished military historian, Carlo D'Este. He is the ex military guy :D Of cos I know that I needed to read other stuff about the other commanders in order to get more info about them, but no money leh. Only can afford this two books. To your info, the only book Patton wrote is a diary that is published after his death.

By the way, will those German descent and non Germans stop using Deutsch here. Ok, you guys can speak Deutsch and for me, I do understand some. But please speak English or translate the German words unless it someone's name. Tactics can also be translated to English.

Vielen dank (many thanks) :P

D'Este you say? Ha! I read his WWII in the Mediterranean 1942-1945 - whole lotta crap if you ask me. I don't buy his stuff.

The fact is that despite similar linguistics between the German language and English, the vocabulary and usage of the adverbs can be quite different. Auftragstaktik literally meant "directive control" and who in the world unacqainted with maneuver warfare would know what it trully means? Like-wise for Befehlstaktik which is translated as "vice-control", people would think it was a German police doctrine for the inhabiting of drugs or prostitution!

Such concepts are a mouthful if translated into the English tongue. And also such concepts were thought of first and applied a science of war by no other than the Germans, let us pay credit where credit's due. If several french and latin terms can be incorporated into the English language for general everyday use, I don't see why a few German technical terms cannot be used for English written military discussion - especially when they are used in the correct context. In any case I have already explained what these German terms meant already. If no one here minds, I don't see why you should.

If you distain the foreign terms used in this thread and my persistance in using them, then by all means stop posting here. Thread on me and I will be one helluvae forum bastard... And stop using the sticky tongue smilies, damn irritating.

This is a good article introducing the concepts of auftragstaktik;

Auftragstaktik

The article was written by a staff officer of the Royal Canadian Army.

S.L.A Marshal was a WWI veteran and a WWII historian. His scope of works concentrate more on the human dynamics of warfare and the pyschological impact of battle on the human mind. His 1947 work "Men against Fire" was considered the greatest work on the pyschological affect firefights had on soldiers in WWII. In recent years however, historians and veterans have come up and criticized Marshall on the assertions he made in his books and also the validity of his facts and information.

Hey Ahole, did I kill your entire family, Mr Fake sergeant? Those shite you posted about the stuff I used or read are totally unwarranted. What makes you so sure that Este is full of shit. Maybe you are the one who's full of shit. What I asked is that if you wanted to used foreign terms, translate it so that other people understand it. But since you wanted to go your way, fine, so be it. About those smiles I used, its none of your business, when I used those smiles, its meant to show there's no hostilities from me. Use your head and think first before firing another salvo of yours.

Read my introduction on the blitzkrieg again, where I posted down some terminology that I deemed important to explain before I went on. Enough said.

Fake sergeant? Yes, this is the type of posting classification the administrators deemed fit for what reasons I do not know. The very fact that you are resorting to name-calling shows that you are on the teeters with nothing left to retort with.