Briefly Read About This A Few Years Back...
Anyone With Links To The Full Report And The Interview...???


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


~~ Project-ION Phoenix ~~ ~~ Op. IceBerge ~~ ~~ Iowa_BB61 ~~ ~~ xxKuZNeTxx ~~


--------------------

Not exactly Jane's but I found this link, it offers some perspective.

Seems like it's Theory's website?No?

Link

must be this one.....date is the same.

Singapore - Deconstruction forges ahead

Robert Karniol reports on the challenges facing Singapore's forces as new technology is introduced and industry expands.

In-depth feature on Singapore's defence in JDW

Jane's Defence Weekly Vol 35 Issue 26 - 27 - Friday, 22 June, 2001

Singapore's Permanent Secretary Defence Peter Ho describes the main influence governing overall development of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) as 'deconstruction'. A management term from the corporate world, 'deconstruction' governs a process of examining and redesigning the SAF, fully under way for a decade and continuing to gather steam.
The SAF traditionally sought to control most of Singapore's defence-related activity, but in the early 1980s it made a psychological leap to outsourcing intermediate-level aircraft maintenance to the private sector. Initial concerns were resolved with careful management and the judicious employment of civilian reservists familiar with the military's systems.
Ho said of the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and SAF: "In the early days, it was possible to be self-sufficient because our organisation and capabilities were fledgling. Now we have a more mature organisation and our capabilities are more sophisticated. We could do a lot of things ourselves because our needs were straightforward and relatively small. That's not possible today. Much of our capability and support now lies outside the hierarchy of MINDEF and the SAF. We don't have enough people to do all the things that need to be done. We don't have all the expertise and experience we require. And we are better off concentrating on our core mission, which is to build up [military] capability and ensure the SAF's operational readiness."
This experience led to the substantial expansion of outsourcing programmes during the 1990s as heightened population pressures and rapid advances in technology combined to promote commercialisation enveloping non-core activities such as catering, driver training, some types of transport and also portions of navy training and army logistics.
Civilian contractors have increasingly been granted full management responsibility, notably with the Army Logistics Warehouse.
Military research and development (R&D) was similarly affected, accounting for about 1% of the defence budget a decade ago, growing to some 4% today and likely to rise further. With the defence budget at S$7.82 billion (US$4.34 billion) for the fiscal year from 1 April, this suggests that current military R&D spending by MINDEF stands at around S$313 million. Ho strongly supports the scheme: "We cannot meet these R&D demands within MINDEF and the SAF. As a result, we outsource a lot of our R&D to universities, research institutes and the defence industry, as well as to overseas institutes under collaborative programmes."
Changes were also introduced at MINDEF's technology arm, the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), which became a statutory board last year. This allowed a separation of functions, enabling MINDEF to focus more of its energies on policy formulation and resource allocation while developing DSTA and the affiliated Defence Science Organisation (DSO) National Laboratories as pure service providers to implement the policies developed by MINDEF.
Deconstruction has also helped improve the SAF's tooth-to-tail ratio and has had an impact on defence funding as operating costs have increased against manpower-related costs. The critical challenge is to maintain the balance between recurrent expenditure relating to personnel and capital/development spending. "Given the sophisticated demands on technology, it is important that we sustain this distribution. Otherwise, it will mean a diminution of capability in the long term," he says. He goes on to say that deconstruction is also changing the way that MINDEF and the SAF are managed: "We have to get used to the idea of managing a system that is no longer monolithic or hierarchical. "Instead, it is a diverse group of entities, each with different missions and operational drivers." A concurrent trend involves the launch last year of an initiative known as MINDEF 'dot com', aimed at marrying the armed forces with the 'new economy'.
MINDEF is dedicated to a strategic transformation of the services delivered to its personnel and the way it communicates with them. MINDEF 'dot com' involves a rethink on organisation, care of personnel and how procurement is undertaken. To do this, MINDEF is re-examining governance mechanisms and is prepared to 'creatively destroy' rules and regulations which are no longer deemed relevant. As part of this process, MINDEF launched a new internet portal on 1 April. Over time, this should cover activities like national service call-up notices, distance learning, administrative work and business-to-business contacts.
Further to this, SAF emphasises the importance of having soldiers who understand technology, as demonstrated by the 'operator-maintainer' concept introduced several years ago. That saw troops using various high-tech systems and being trained to maintain them in the field.
A new initiative promoting post-graduate studies is equally ambitious. All military officers tracking senior command and staff appointments, who have an engineering or technical background, are sent for a six-month diploma course in defence technology systems. Those without any engineering or technical background will take a four-week military technology programme before attending the command and staff course. The anticipated result is the creation of a new generation of technology-aware and capable military personnel with a clear understanding of their sophisticated systems and equipment to better exploit them in the field.
Such initiatives, together with other aspects of Singapore's well-conceived defence strategy, are unique in Southeast Asia.
This prompted one foreign defence attaché to say that the SAF's development over the next decade will make them "the best force in the region". Some would argue that they already are.

Forces rise to the technology challenge

Singapore's approach to defence procurement is unusually mature in a regional context, designed to reassure its neighbours while providing a strong deterrence.
The policy rests on two pillars that initially appear contradictory: firstly, a reluctance to introduce advanced technologies to the region; and secondly, to allow its forces to keep abreast of new capabilities. MINDEF often resolves this by storing new equipment outside the immediate region, as with its initial purchase of F-16 fighters.

At the same time, Singapore is shifting its traditional defensive posture from that of a 'poisoned shrimp' resting on the assurance that any aggressor would pay a heavy price for its occupation, to more of an active and expeditionary approach. Defending Singapore in the 21st Century, a MINDEF policy document released last year, notes that the SAF concentrated on building up the individual services during the 1970s and 1980s. A period of consolidation followed, emphasising tri-service integration and creating a joint staff.

Continued force development was pursued at an evolutionary pace, the gradual approach intended to soften any political impact. Defence spending, capped at a generous 6% of gross domestic product in support of this process, normally hovers between 4 % and 5%. This produced a defence budget of S$7.82 billion (US$4.34 billion) for the fiscal year launched on 1 April, a 5.7% increase over Fiscal Year 2000 (FY00) and representing 27.8% of national spending.
Defending Singapore identifies a number of capabilities central to the Singapore Armed Force's (SAF's) future defence strategy. These areas are: stand off precision technology, protection technology, stealth technology, unmanned technology and information technology. Enhanced lift and endurance is another priority, together with advanced computer modelling and simulators.
Maj Gen Lim Chuan Poh, Singapore's Chief of Defence Force (CDF), says it is the effective introduction of new operational capabilities that will dominate the next phase of SAF development. "The 'operationalising' of our attack helicopter capability. The 'operationalising' of our new frigates, with their shipborne helicopters. Learning how to operate submarines. Introducing a new generation of fighter aircraft, evolving new land-fighting concepts as we replace the AMX-13SM1 [light tank]. These are all very challenging new capabilities that we're trying to bring to the SAF," he explains. "That should keep us busy for the next five to 10 years."

Deterrence and diplomacy remain at the core of Singapore's security policy, with deterrence promoted through MINDEF's thoughtful approach to force development and diplomacy including an extensive range of bilateral and multilateral military links.

"We believe that interacting with our foreign partners and friends allows us to enhance our professionalism. It also allows us to build relations with these foreign armed forces," Maj Gen Lim continues. "Last year we conducted over 70 exercises with our overseas friends and partners, involving about a dozen countries." Some analysts nevertheless question the SAF's fighting spirit, pointing to the heavy emphasis on scholarship among its senior officers and whether this approach produces better bureaucrats than warriors.

The Chief of Defence Staff acknowledges that the SAF has limited operational experience, but points out that its personnel have responded credibly to every challenge. "Look at [the 1991 hijacking of Singapore Airlines flight] SQ117, at the [1997] evacuation of Singaporean nationals from Cambodia, at our response to disasters in other countries," he says. "Each time we have been able to deploy our forces at the right time, do our work and withdraw effectively."

The unrest in neighbouring Indonesia is Singapore's greatest security concern. This is equally worrisome to other adjacent countries like Australia and Malaysia, but its implications extend beyond the immediate region. The international community, led by Australia and sanctioned by the UN with Jakarta's consent, deployed troops to East Timor in 1999. Singapore participated in the effort but does not view the broader unrest in Indonesia as a conventional military threat. Rather, this is perceived throughout Southeast Asia as a potentially destabilising force that could disrupt the region's economy and produce large-scale population movements triggered by violence.

Army upgrades

Equipment deliveries to the army over the last two years highlight the upgrade of existing capabilities. These include the SAR-21 assault rifle, developed to replace the US-made M16A1; the Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle to initially supplement and ultimately replace the US-made M113 armoured personnel carrier; and the articulated, armoured All-Terrain Tracked Carrier (ATTC), complementing and then replacing the unarmoured Hägglunds Vehicle Bv 206 all-terrain vehicle. Singapore Technologies (ST) Kinetics developed all three, and is currently completing the prototype of a new 8 x 8 armoured infantry fighting vehicle. The Bionix and ATTC are initially being deployed with the 4th Singapore Armoured Brigade, with deliveries of the former nearing completion as reserve units await their turn. At least two armoured battle groups, the 40th and the 42nd, have been created within this formation.

This same development process finds the army currently looking to buy six deployable hospitals, providing a hard-shelter system to replace the tents used currently. Similarly, the commando battalion is re-equipping with high-speed boats capable of reaching 70kt. Developments in artillery involve a different approach altogether and will require the introduction of new doctrine as self-propelled howitzers (SPHs) supplement towed systems. ST Kinetics has also acknowledged it is developing a 155mm/ 39-cal lightweight SPH 4 x 4, although this air-transportable system is ostensibly for export. More clearly fulfilling a local requirement, Singapore bought 54 United Defense LP M109-series SPH chassis. These will be fitted with an indigenous 155mm/52-cal turret, but the programme's timetable is not known. Firepower may eventually be further strengthened by acquiring a multiple-rocket launcher system. Although Singapore has so far hesitated to introduce such a capability to the region. A delivery of CH-47D Chinook and an order for eight AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters, funded by the army but operated by the air force, also represent new capabilities. Singapore has six CH-47s in service and, although not confirmed by MINDEF or Boeing , is widely reported to be the launch customer for Boeing' s CH-47SD with up to 12 aircraft on order or option. As for the Apaches, an additional 12 may eventually supplement the eight attack helicopters currently in service. Concurrent with the Chinook acquisition, a new army facility was built at Bedok to serve as the Guards headquarters. The guards comprise one active unit, the 7th Singapore Infantry Brigade and a reserve unit, and constitute the SAF's rapid deployment force with a brigade each focused on airborne and amphibious operations. Bedok is close to both the Chinooks, based at Sembawang and the new Endurance-class landing ships, based at Changi naval base. MINDEF sources say a replacement for the AMX-13SM1 light tank will be considered within the next five years. "We are looking at whether we should replace this with a similar class of vehicle, or introduce a new concept fulfilling the basic function of a tank but not necessarily looking like one," a source explained. "The USA has looked at the Future Combat System [FCS] and we find that to be an attractive idea. We can explore along a similar line." Though as the FCS is only just on the drawing board (Jane's Defence Weekly 13 June), a similar system for Singapore is some time away.

Meanwhile, other sources report that a new armour training simulation centre is due to open in July at Sungei Gedong, the armour headquarters.
Military infrastructure is a traditional problem for the SAF, because of Singapore's territorial limits. However, Maj Gen Lim says the army will see new facilities developed over the next decade under two guiding principles: camp complexing, and 'building upward'."Camp complexing allows us to cluster different units within the same command so that they share common facilities. The concept is not new, but it will be expanded to cover most of the army," he says. "'Building up' allows us to use the same footprint for many different purposes. It provides more benefits from the same land area."

Navy increases reach

Development of the navy, an unusually compact force for an island state, with just 4,500 full-time personnel, has seen recent acquisitions begin to move operations further offshore. This was reflected in the round-the-world deployment last year of the new landing ship tank (LST) RSS Endurance, the SAF's first circumnavigation of the globe. This expansion centres on the acquisition of four reconditioned Sjöormen-class submarines, four Endurance-class LSTs and six modified Lafayette-class frigates. Prof Lui Pao Chuen, chief defence scientist at MINDEF, noted in a May conference paper that Singapore only started to operate submarines and mine-counter measures vessels relatively recently. "We are still very low on the learning curve and have much more to learn about undersea warfare," he said. Four Bedok (Landsort)-class minehunters were ordered from Sweden in 1991 and commissioned in 1995. The Bedoks came with two PAP Mk V remotely-operated mine disposal vehicles, and analysts expect greater emphasis will be placed on such robotic systems in the future.

The SAF says the four Sjöormen-class submarines, two of which are now in Singapore and two in Sweden, were obtained for training. The boats have operational capabilities, but originally date from the mid-1960s and are fairly small, at a displacement of 1,210 tons (dived). Industry sources say the evaluation process is still under way, but they expect this to lead to an order for substantially more sophisticated submarines before the decade ends. Delivery was completed earlier this year of the four Endurance-class LSTs ordered in 1996. These vessels, displacing 8,500 tons and fitted with a platform for two helicopters, give the SAF a significant amphibious capability. The hull has front- and rear-loading doors to facilitate operations and hovercraft may be acquired to complete the package. Six frigates ordered from France's DCN International in March 2000 will give Singapore its first real blue-water capability and its first experience of naval helicopters. Design details have yet to be released, but industry sources say the first platform is due for delivery around 2003. ST Marine will build the other five locally, with some reports suggesting all should be operational by 2009. MINDEF sources say the frigates will be armed with "new-generation anti-ship missiles and anti-missile missiles", together with new electronic countermeasures systems.

A request for information issued by MINDEF in late April effectively launched the naval helicopter competition for the frigates. This should see a request for proposals early next year and contract signature around March 2003. The requirement is for "under 20" platforms, suggesting that the six to eight needed to serve the frigates will be supplemented by others for the LST. Land-based Super Pumas operate from the latter. Potential solutions include the NH 90 from NH Industries, the SH-60 Seahawk from Sikorsky and the navalised AS-532 Cougar from Eurocopter. Anti-surface capabilities are the main requirement. Five Fokker F-50 Maritime Enforcer aircraft, flown by the air force but operated by the navy, track maritime surface targets while four Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeye airborne early-warning aircraft monitor air targets. However, both Maj Gen Lim and Prof Lui talk of rethinking such solutions.

"We will have to look at replacing the E-2C, which has been with us for 14 years. I think the time has come," says Maj Gen Lim. "There are a few options to look at. There could be completely new ways of meeting the requirement. It could evolve into two different sets of platforms to meet expanded operational capabilities."

One option is a system like the LALEE, studied for three years by a team under Lui. This unmanned air vehicle is described by Lui as "an integrated airborne surveillance and communications system to provide continuous temporal and very large spatial coverage". This would "provide a task group operating in the littorals with continuous surveillance from the air [at a cost] considerably cheaper than operating current-generation surveillance and communications platforms".

Elsewhere, the efficiency of naval operations should improve with the planned completion in 2003 of Changi naval base. Much of this was finished last year but the Fleet Command Building and Changi Naval Training Base, the latter consolidating navy training at one site, are among the facilities still being built. Tuas opened in 1994 and with Changi will serve as the navy's main bases, while the Brani naval base is closed to allow expansion of the commercial port.

Air forces boost

Air force operations in support of the army are being bolstered by the introduction of Chinook and Apache helicopters while the forthcoming purchase of shipborne helicopters largely affects the navy. The air force's interest mostly lies in the planned acquisition of new fighter aircraft.

The air force operates three squadrons of T/A4-SU Super Skyhawks and three squadrons of F-5S/T Tigers, the latter including one unit configured for the reconnaissance role. There is also one squadron of F-16A/Bs based in Singapore, supplemented by 18 F-16C/Ds based in the USA, with an additional 20 F-16C/Ds ordered last year for delivery in 2003-04. The most recent F-16C/D order aims to begin replacing the Super Skyhawks. However, the remaining A-4s and the F-5 Tigers will be supplanted by a new aircraft type, the former process is likely to begin within five years and the latter within 10. The overall requirement is not known, but some speculate it could involve 40-60 platforms and it is known that the new fighter should have an unrefuelled operating radius reaching southern Thailand to the north and most of the Indonesian island of Sumatra to the south.

Contenders for the contract include the Rafale from France, the Eurofighter Typhoon from the UK and from the USA the F-15E/F Eagle and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Singapore also has an interest in the US Joint Strike Fighter programme still in development, but this is more as a potential follow-on to the F-16 fleet. Meanwhile, the air force has started building a third runway at Changi international airport purely for military use. This will be situated on reclaimed land east of the two current civilian runways, but its planned completion date is not known. The new runway will be relatively short; sources told Jane's Defence Weekly that it should be capable of handling fighters but probably not transport aircraft. Another infrastructure programme involves the construction of bunkers to shelter aircraft at Sembawang airbase, where helicopters are kept, following on from extensive work elsewhere to harden facilities against attack, including construction of reinforced aircraft shelters in blast-proof loop areas at Tengah and Paya Lebar airbases.

Among the air force's other platforms, air-to-air refuelling should be handled by four used KC-135A tankers ordered in 1996 and since modernised to KC-135R standard. The fate of four KC-130B and one KC-130H obtained earlier is unclear. They may be retired, or revert to the transport role, supplementing five C-130Hs in the current inventory.

In air defence, long-range surveillance coverage was significantly improved in 1998 as the AN/FPS 117 D-band 3-D radar system became operational. However, the Bloodhound II surface-to-air missiles withdrawn from service a decade ago have yet to be replaced although the requirement should be addressed over the next decade. There may also be moves to replace the 12 Rapier low-altitude and 12 I-HAWK medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles.

Singapore's limited population of around 4.1 million has helped dictate the nation's military character. "Given Singapore's small population, national service remains the only viable option for building up a defence force capable and formidable enough to deter an external attack," MINDEF explains in Defending Singapore in the 21st Century.

No less significant is the role of national service as a nation-building tool for a country lacking a long history of common purpose among its racially diverse people. Ethnic Chinese account for 77% of the population, ethnic Malay for 14%, ethnic Indian for 7.6% and others for 1.4%.

The SAF comprises roughly 50,000 active personnel and 310,000 reservists. Regular troops account for about 20,000 of the former, including up to 5,000 officers and some 15,000 warrant officers or specialists. The remaining active-duty personnel are national servicemen serving for 24-30 months.

Reservists, known locally as NSmen, operate on a 13-year cycle with officers liable to be mobilised until the age of 50 and other ranks until age 40. "In open mobilisations, in which pre-arranged code words are broadcast over the mass media, a response rate of 95% within the first few hours is the norm," Defending Singapore states.

Singapore's declining birth rate has had a serious impact on the annual national service intake. Reports state this dropped from 20,000 in the early 1980s to 15,000 by the decade's end and just 13,000 in 1993.

The level may have since stabilised around 15,000 but MINDEF sources acknowledge that it is unlikely to move much higher. Brig Gen Tay Lim Heng, director of National Service Affairs and commander of the army's 6th Division, says this has prompted reactions within the SAF. These include the introduction of advanced technologies to reduce manpower requirements, commercialisation of non-core functions within the armed forces and extensive use of simulators for training.

Manpower constraints were reflected in a restructuring of the army launched in the early 1990s, which saw infantry battalions reduced in strength by 25%, while armoured battalions dropped to 730 from 840. The same process affects equipment design and procurement. The FH-88 155mm/39-cal towed howitzer introduced in 1987 saw the crew reduced to eight men from 12 operating the previous system, while the follow-on FH2000 155mm/52-cal gun requires just six. Similarly, the navy's new Endurance-class landing ship tank has a complement of 65 compared with 120 required by its much smaller predecessor.

MINDEF says restructuring has so far allowed the redeployment of around 1,600 personnel. "We don't think we can raise an army of sufficient critical numbers for deterrence and for promoting national identity without national service," says Brig Gen Tay, looking to the future. "However, support for national service is not something we can take for granted."

Competitive products a bonus

MINDEF's continuing revamp of its activities relating to defence technology introduced major changes to how it manages military requirements and resulted in planning and policy formulation functions being split from the implementation process.

Reorganisation began with the March 2000 launch of the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), under Prof Su Guaning, replacing the Defence Technology Group (DTG) and incorporating two other units; the Systems and Computer Organisation and the Defence Medical Research Institute. The process was completed in July 2000 with the appointment of former navy chief Rear Adm Richard Lim Cherng Yih as MINDEF's Deputy Secretary/Technology. He now oversees strategic planning and policy-making related to defence technology.
However, responsibilities are unchanged for two key elements. Prof Lui Pao Chuen remains MINDEF's chief defence scientist with a rank equivalent to deputy secretary, and Singapore Technologies Engineering (ST Engg) remains a state-owned conglomerate with commercial interests in defence production and support services.

Finally, the Defence Science Organisation, previously under DTG and now affiliated to DSTA, was 'corporatised' as the DSO National Laboratories in April 1997 and serves as Singapore's primary defence laboratory. Rear Adm Lim says the local defence industry has traditionally had an internal focus: It "was developed to support the Singapore Armed Forces [SAF]. There is no policy on the part of MINDEF to support international sales on its behalf. If our industry can produce products to compete effectively in the international market, this is simply a bonus."

Singapore's policy of not normally introducing new defence technology has influenced the SAF to heavily upgrade its technology, making systems more capable than they appear on paper. Local industry has upgraded the A4 Skyhawk and F-5 fighter aircraft, E-2C airborne early-warning aircraft, Sea Wolf-class fast-attack craft and the AMX-13 light tank. The defence sector also develops and integrates systems to meet unique SAF requirements, including the SAR 21 assault rifle, Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle, All-Terrain Tracked Carrier (ATTC) and Endurance-class landing ship tank (LST). MINDEF has also supported study in explosive effects, allowing the SAF to undertake pioneering work in underground explosives storage in Mandai and in the design and development of high-performance magazines at Changi Naval Base with the US Navy.

The MINDEF ensures that such capabilities remain responsive to SAF needs, with development funds mainly channelled through DSTA. It also provides procurement contracts required to keep production lines active. However, the government is no captive market. ST Kinetics saw its SAR 80 and SR88A assault rifles largely rejected by the SAF before the SAR 21 gained acceptance.

Rear Adm Lim says "the rapid rate of change in technology requires good risk management practices to minimise the impact of technological obsolescence. We're still learning how to do this better. At the same time, this imposes an additional challenge to us in ensuring that the skills, knowledge and mindsets of our people can cope with this rapid pace of change." To this end, MINDEF has to address this in the way it trains and educates personnel. The SAF has increased the technology content in military training courses and developed other specific technology courses.

DSTA is MINDEF's vehicle for implementing policies relating to defence technology. It is involved in acquiring, developing and upgrading activities alongside R&D. It oversees development and maintenance of military infrastructures, as well as engineering services, and specialises in developing and upgrading computer software.

"We contract everything the ministry needs - fighter planes, ships, tanks, submarines, spare parts and buildings," says Prof Su, a former Deputy Secretary/Technology. "We also have the function of investing the long-term R&D fund. The ministry gives us this money in a block and we invest it in joint programmes with overseas partners, in universities, with research institutes and even with some [private] companies. DSO is our major R&D establishment, and we fund most of what they do. R&D that requires manufacturing generally goes to ST Engg in the form of contracts."

Some DSTA activity takes place offshore. This centres on two main areas: collaboration concerning technology, and liaison with commercial suppliers, Defence Technology Offices in Washington and Paris cover regional responsibilities. "There are just two guys in each office, but the idea is to have somebody on the ground to explore opportunities," Prof Su explains. "There are also Residence Programme Offices linked to some of our major programmes. A few of our people are put on-site to deal with the contractor and sometimes with the armed services of that particular country."

When DTG was reorganised last year to become DSTA, the latter was constituted as a statutory board by an act of parliament. This was intended to give greater flexibility in management, recruitment and other areas by freeing it from the constraints inherent to MINDEF. The new structure is organised around 10 core programmes: R&D; Aero Systems; Land Systems; Naval Systems; Armament; Guided Systems; Information Technology (IT); Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4); Sensors; and Construction.
"The most successful outcome of the change is our ability to recruit, not just at entry level but also among mid-career people and scholars. We have reversed the turnover problems of recent years, although it will take time to build up experience levels," says Prof Su of the reorganisation.

"The biggest problem relates to the integration of diverse cultures from the predecessor organisations. Also, the creation of a good model of professionalism working for customer satisfaction, as opposed to acting simply as technical authorities."

DSTA still requires some fine-tuning. Prof Su says: "IT organisation will continue to be changed as we evolve a better model of supporting the armed forces, involving more outsourcing and experimentation. Our construction arm will be reorganised for better focus on customers and on technology development. The procurement arm will be looking more at commercial practices, and will roll out electronic procurement processes more quickly for better efficiency. "Relationship management with customers also still needs work and new initiatives will be taken with owners and business partners."

Developments at ST Engg over the past year are equally significant, as the company launches a major push to establish itself internationally. ST Engg has four main subsidiary companies: ST Aerospace, ST Marine, ST Kinetics and ST Electronics. These are supplemented by several ancillary units, including ST Dynamics, formed early last year to focus on the development of unmanned air vehicles and guided weapons. After-tax profit for the group was S$288.1 million (US$160.1 million) on sales of S$2.27 billion in 2000, with market capitalisation at S$7.32 billion.

ST Engg has focused on serving MINDEF since its origin in the late 1960s, but recently it began launching ventures with broader defence markets in mind, developing a lightweight 155mm/39-cal self-propelled howitzer and an 8 x 8 wheeled armoured vehicle for export. Initially fully state-owned, it was publicly listed on the Singapore Exchange a decade ago with the government retaining a majority shareholding. As MINDEF provides only a limited market, commercial imperatives have encouraged ST Engg to diversify into civilian areas. This saw overall defence sales account for just 59% of gross sales last year.

ST Engg is now concentrating on developing the company as a 'world-class enterprise', with expansion into the US and Europe as the key. "Our market strategy is based on localising our operations in various regions," says Tan Pheng Hock, ST Engg group president.

This process formally began with the launch of Vision Technologies (VT) Systems on 23 June 2000, which saw a parallel corporate structure created in the USA. This has three subsidiaries - VT Aerospace, VT Marine and VT Electronics - with VT Kinetics as an associated unit. Several high-profile retired US military officers are among the VT directors and consultants, including retired US Air Force general Ron Fogelman, retired US admiral Archie Clemens and retired US Army general John Tilelli.

"We want to build our own brand in the US and to be seen as a US company. This operation also has to be headquartered in the US," Tan explains, adding that a business model for Europe has yet to be developed. "We have a company called ST Engineering Europe, but we may change the name. Maybe we can't have one company for the whole of Europe, as different countries may require different approaches. We're still trying to understand Europe."

The aim is to create a three-pronged growth strategy. Singapore would continue to provide the group's core business through MINDEF and the SAF and open export opportunities in Asia. The US-based company would pursue the domestic market and Latin America, and European operations would target local opportunities as well as contracts in parts of Africa and the Middle East.

JDW's interview with Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam
Jane's Defence Weekly Vol 35 Issue 26 - 27 - Friday, 22 June, 2001
Interview with Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam
- Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence of Singapore
The USA has formal defence pacts with five countries in the Asia/Pacific region: Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. Singapore, by most measures equally close to Washington, has no such ambition. "The Americans have a saying: if the machinery works, then why fix it," says Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam. "The machinery, as far as we can see, is working very well."
Singapore's defence minister nevertheless acknowledges that recent years have seen some fine-tuning of the bilateral relationship. Traditionally firm, it was broadened a decade ago when Singapore granted expanded access to the US Navy and US Air Force after Washington was forced by Manila to abandon its bases in the Philippines. Links have since strengthened further.
This expansion includes more extensive training facilities for the Singapore Armed Forces in the USA, most recently focused on the AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter; widened access for US forces to Singapore, reflected in the completion earlier this year of a naval dock capable of handling deep-draught vessels alongside; and Singapore's participation in Washington's renewed push to promote military multilateralism.

This may be Singapore's most intense defence relationship, but it is by no means exclusive. Tan argues that two basic elements are required for Southeast Asia to support a "robust" security architecture. "The first involves strong bilateral relationships, both within the region and including extra-regional countries. But we would not regard bilateral relations as being sufficient in these complicated times," he says. "We see this being supplemented by multilateral co-operation on many levels."

Collective security in East Asia traditionally involved extra-regional powers acting as guarantors of regional stability. The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) linking Singapore and Malaysia with Australia, New Zealand and the UK typify this approach. The post-Cold War period saw this change, with Washington seeking to encourage its friends to assume greater responsibility for their own security through multilateral activities.

This initiative was welcomed by Singapore when the USA first tried to introduce it a decade ago, but other East Asian countries were generally less enthusiastic. The region's mood now appears to have shifted. "We have always held a view that multilateral participation is important, and we have endeavoured to facilitate this wherever possible," Tan says. "In recent years we have seen a greater readiness by other countries to participate in such activities."

This participation is likely to occur outside the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 10-member regional group that includes Singapore. "There is no need, nor do I see any desire, among the ASEAN countries to move in that direction [of establishing a military dimension to the organisation]," the minister notes, despite the separate involvement of several member states in the continuing UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor.

"The prompt response by Australia in organising and leading the [preliminary] INTERFET [International Force for East Timor} force - to which we contributed some assets, together with other countries from within and outside the region - really was a great triumph. And I think you have to recognise that none of that would have happened in such a short time without Australia taking the lead," says Tan.

"This is where the importance of having close links is shown. We have been working very closely with the Australian armed forces, both through the FPDA and on a bilateral basis, for many years. When [Canberra] approached us to participate, we were able to respond immediately."

Singapore initially provided two landing ships for the East Timor operation. It sent medical teams, military observers and civilian police. This month it deployed a platoon of about 70 combat troops, a symbolic breakthrough (Jane's Defence Weekly 23 May). "This is the first time we've provided combat troops [to the UN]. I think we have to show our commitment to peacekeeping," says Tan. "As a member of the Security Council [since January], there is greater reason for us to show that we are playing our part."

Another change, more subtle in nature, is evident in the FPDA. Thirty years after its 1971 founding, many analysts have grown sceptical of its continued relevance. Tan disagrees, but he accepts that its activities had to be reviewed.

"Our view is that the FPDA is very important, particularly in these unsettled times," he says. "The [participating defence] ministers agreed at their meeting last year to move the FPDA toward holding more joint activities. And that we should task the FPDA military chiefs to enhance the professional value of the exercises. Joint exercises allow us to introduce greater complexity."

The remaining element vital to regional security and stability involves China. Tan says that Singapore's defence relationship with Beijing is "progressing on a step-by-step basis". More significant, he believes, is an emerging dynamic of broader consequence. "The most critical relationship in the 21st century will be the triangular one between China, Japan and the US.

"This is going to be crucial for the stability of East Asia, and for the whole world," he says. "China is the world's largest country in terms of population, the US is the world's sole superpower, and Japan is allied with Washington but a neighbour of Beijing. They must see that any conflict between them will bring no benefit. There is much more to be gained from co-operation. But this will be difficult."

Bob was in town earlier this month. Look out for his updated piece which will be in the JDW issue released around Asian Aerospace 2006. :)

Seems like it, i guessed... Was expecting more emphasize on future "expeditionary capabilities and operations" in the article, as the tittle head had suggested, hmm... Anyway, thanks a million.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No subscription to JDW which means... i have to wait for the copy to arrive in NLB... LoL...


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


~~ Project-ION Phoenix ~~ ~~ Op. IceBerge ~~ ~~ Iowa_BB61 ~~ ~~ xxKuZNeTxx ~~


--------------------

LALEE HALE UAV eh... Its been a while since i heard any news about it. Wonders how DSTA and ST Engineering is progressing along with the project...???

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


~~ Project-ION Phoenix ~~ ~~ Op. IceBerge ~~ ~~ Iowa_BB61 ~~ ~~ xxKuZNeTxx ~~


--------------------

LALEE HALE UAV


".......One option is a system like the LALEE, studied for three years by a team under Lui. This unmanned air vehicle is described by Lui as "an integrated airborne surveillance and communications system to provide continuous temporal and very large spatial coverage". This would "provide a task group operating in the littorals with continuous surveillance from the air [at a cost] considerably cheaper than operating current-generation surveillance and communications platforms.......".


Is the above -mentioned idea still kept alive? ...Any team working on it?

Since that article, the SAF has undergone a significant sea change. Huxley may need to get cracking again:)

hmm, I'm under the impression an expeditionary force is able to go anywhere to do anything...a bit like the US Marines :ph43r:

seeing SAF as it is today, it seems to make sense, we have LSTs able of carrying a battalion and its supporting elements into battle, and 4 LSTs should be able to carry about a brigade's worth of infantry...not forgetting our heliborne units and thier supporting elements (I'm pretty sure once again at least a brigade's worth), we truly can go anywhere and flex our military muscle...

I'm just not so sure how our armoured units can fit into the expeditionary picture, I need enlightenment here!

Rapid deployment with our non-existing ACV-1/LCAC?

A Platoon of the Leo2s are gonna take up a lot of space on the current LSTs...

SG's evolving expeditionary capabilities were already well demonstrated during OFE. We landed men, vehicles, equipment, supplies on unfamiliar tsunami thrashed terrain within 72 hours of "go."

Huxley doesn't have to rewrite anything as yet since his analysis still stands. Its just that the names and numbers of some of his information has changed. No point publishing a new book just to change some of those minor details.

I think there was this other article he wrote about Singapore's Military Modernization... anyone got it?

@Shotgun, do you mean this article?

[QUOTE=Grunt,Oct 12 2009, 06:53 AM] @Shotgun, do you mean this article?

[QUOTE]Singapore And The Revolution In Military Affairs: An Outsider’s Perspective
by Dr Tim Huxley


Organisational and Doctrinal Issues

In purely technological terms, Singapore is evidently acquiring many of the necessary pre-requisites for participation in the RMA. However, MINDEF and the SAF have not so far implemented the doctrinal and organisational innovations that are probably necessary to absorb these technologies into an effective “system of systems” . While there are important indications that the SAF has begun laying the foundations for major doctrinal shifts and organisational restructuring, there is clearly still a long way to go.

Even before discussion of the RMA became voguish, the SAF 2000 planning blueprint adopted in 1988 as the result of a major force structure review brought significant changes to Singapore’s military organisation and doctrine, particularly in the army. Under Army 2000, a single-service derivative of SAF 2000, army doctrine stressed offensive combined arms operations and the conduct of a “24-hour battle” . In organisational terms, the most important change under Army 2000 was the introduction of genuine (as opposed to nominal) combined arms divisions, each including an armoured brigade as well as two infantry brigades, even in peacetime. Another innovation was the establishment of 21st Division, a light rapid deployment formation trained for air-mobile and amphibious operations. In the mid-1990s, the organisational evolution went a step further with the integration of reservist and active units within the three combined arms divisions.5

[/QUOTE]
Many must be pondering ....did we clearly achieve the SAF2000 doctrine mentioned below.....e.g now and then are popping up on how to deploy assets (men, armour)...."24 hour battle"

What are those means?

".......Under Army 2000, a single-service derivative of SAF 2000, army doctrine stressed offensive combined arms operations and the conduct of a “24-hour battle” . In organisational terms, the most important change under Army 2000 was the introduction of genuine (as opposed to nominal) combined arms divisions, each including an armoured brigade as well as two infantry brigades, even in peacetime. Another innovation was the establishment of 21st Division, a light rapid deployment formation trained for air-mobile and amphibious operations......"


Anyway, SG's capability(hardware & doctrine) to defend have never been doubt.

@Callsign 24 Seira, the SAF 2000 planning blueprint definitely exists and by now is out-dated. I'm just not sure about Dr Huxley description of what it is. I don't want to comment as I'm really not sure what Dr Huxley is talking about on that specific point of the "24 hour battle". When I'm not sure, I'll just say so. I don't really want to make a wild guess at what another person means in his writing.

Hey bro (Callsign but of course...)

I agree with you on your point - Anyway, SG's capability(hardware & doctrine) to defend have never been doubt. As a nation, I seriously doubt anyone would feel other (hey bro, like you in this case I don't need the emphasis of this statement being personal view :) :P)

We truly have come a long way since the "poison shrimp" strategy....am very proud to be a Singaporean and also part of the defence apparatus... :P

I'll hazard a guess based on what I think then :P could it be the way we are able to escalate our responses, from dispatching a small sized force comprising of infantry, armour and other support units within a few hours of activation, and escalating it until the entire division is actived by the 24th hour since activation?

I'm more curious about the nominal/real division part though...I guess the 3/6/9 and other divs we are seeing now are all counted as real divisions since they have fixed, organic battlions under thier orbat, and not cobbled together from a common pool?

"As early as 1992, one young army officer (the commander of a Guards battalion) argued that the SAF could gain an edge over opponents by adopting the German military philosophy of Auftragstaktik, involving considerable decentralisation of command and control, and greater expectations of initiative on the part of lower-level commanders and even individual soldiers"

Interesting, my CO back then was commando and german trained. Coincidence?
The concept of the thinking soldier, individual initiative to complete the mission, re-writing some infantry tactics (including disagreements with the JTC jungle "experts")............Looking back, some of the missions we did will seem very unconventional compared to today's Guards units.

Any of Milnuts still have the video clip (or the link) on...." Cutting Edge" , documentary on SAF 3G transformation ?

Here you go bro,

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resources...uttingEdge.html

@Grunt : I don't think that was the article I'm referring to, but thats still a good discussion article

I think a lot can be said of that article. Firstly, SAF has evolved from the poison shrimp as Sayaret rightly pointed out. Its next revolution was combined arms operations and integrated warfare, being rather tied.

What we are seeing now is the development of battlespace dominance capabilities, and the integration of the above mentioned into it. By battlespace dominance, I refer to the BMS, IKC2 etc systems that allow commanders to minimize fog of war on our side.

Considering that BMS type of systems were only initially operationally introduced to US combat components in 1991's Gulf War, Singapore's is but 18 years behind in fielding a locally developed system.

While its great looking back at all the progress, I'd take a pause and ask "What's next and How far can we go?" We are small island republic with a lack of strategic depth. We ought maintain a "credible" (recently substituted with "cutting edge") military deterrence. Yet, such a high-tech force is not cheap to upkeep much less upgrade. Our expanding military budget is not only just because we are buying more and revolutionizing more stuff, but also because more money is and will be needed to sustain such a fighting force. Essentially, when will we see a plateau of gdp expenditure on the military?

My point is not to advocate such a course, but rather pointing out that it is an inevitability given our limited size and economic potential.

I think ironically enough we might actually see the next step being the hardest to explain to the general public or our neighbors. That is the enhancement of our expeditionary capabilities to include the latest battlespace dominance capabilities. Now, that is a scary thought if we were consider such developments as an indicators as potential defence policies to project our warfighting outside Singapore. Something that will not sit too well with our neighbours at all.

However, that position is not totally unjustifiable. Some of the islands surrounding Indonesia and Phillippines are considered to be potential terrorist breeding grounds. These states have also been considered to be weak and unable to stem these threats by themselves. The SAF might then be forced to consider to undertake expeditionary actions against these islands, with or without cooperation from that government. The ideal would be "with" and less ideal would be "without."

The next step of integrating battlespace dominance capabilities with expeditionary capabilities would be geared to the less ideal. A non-cooperative neighbouring state, that is unable to deal with a problem that threatens Singapore from their territorial boundaries. The threat would have to be sufficient to "threaten Singapore's existence" in order to win justification and sympathy internationally.

In such an ugly situation, the SAF expedition would then be required to cross into territorial boundaries, kill or arrest the terrorists, while dominating the battlespace to prevent any military intervention from the local government. Again, the importance of being able to win international support from such actions is critical. That can only be warranted by a weak state, that cannot contain a threat that affects Singapore, and yet reluctant to allow intervention.

Another rare possibility to what such an enhanced capability may be used for would be the event that Singapore island cannot be held. Whatever capabilities developed cannot be destroyed together with the possible fall of Singapore but must be able to flee to a neighboring friendly nation in order to consolidate and conduct military operations to liberate the island.

When we consider the purchase of long-endurance Strike fighters (F-16D+ w/ CFT & F-15SG), in conjunction with refueling tankers and development of LSTs, we are also looking at capabilities that can be brought out quickly to friendly countries ie Australia, India. That is, an F-15SG can take off from *ahem* Western Australia, tank up over Indonesia, interdict targets over South Malaysian Peninsular, tank up on the way back and recover. The same goes to say with our Viper D+.

It seems to me that the enhancement of our expeditionary capabilities and battlespace dominance capabilities are more than just "modernizing." They fall well within capabilities to defend and liberate Singapore from external threats and occupation. We should expect to see more on the integration of those capabilities soon enough.

I would also like to point out, that highly capable platforms such as the Typhoon could have been possibly ruled out due to its drogue and probe system, which would not have been able to refuel from our KC-135's flying boom system without modifications. Our KC-130s may not be able to provide tanker support for such a long distance as well.

Shotgun's comment is valid, we have the 3G integration capability somewhat(hardware & BMS knowhow)..what is left is really to prove that can perform under fire.........hence also my response on another thread....

http://militarynuts.com/index.php?showtopic=1945&st=30
SAF to send two medical teams to Afghanistan, Oruzgan Province

".....I wonder if SAF is willing to despatch a security unit to do support logistic convoy escort/security duties over there as well ? ....a sure way to gain real field experience......"

Practice & deploy perimeter defence
Deploy Convoy security tactics
Utilise UAV for forward recce/intel gathering
Air ground support missions
Winning the hearts and minds of the locals

...and most importantly..how to handle battlefield stress
...managing morale and casualty (the actual thing and managing the PR)
…manage battle PSTD

(of course we do not do alone, but with the coalition forces's joint effort).

@Shotgun, if I'm not wrong our KC-135 supports both the drogue and probe refueling (our F-5s) and the flying boom system (F-16s, F-15SGs & so on). That is the reason why they are useful in Iraq, where they tank both USN and USAF planes. This point has been discussed in DT.

Edit: BTW, I have a slightly different view from Callsign 24 Seira and I'm really not in favour of active combat unless it is forced upon us. This is because I don't want to attend more military funerals. I've had one in my unit during active time. I'll never forget it and the family crying and I'll never forget the guys in my unit crying. IMO, if we do support logistic convoy escort/security duties we are sure to 'kenna' IED. The tactics are to either drive thro' (more common if vehicles not disabled) or dismount and fight (when the vehicles are disabled). If we want to send people into combat, at least die fighting as a QRF rather than doing 'aiwan' job (we'll learn more as QRF). How to tell the mothers that their sons died delivering cargo. With QRF, we can say your sons died trying to rescue allies under attack (at least more 'noble') and a minister has to take care of these letters.

But please don't let my lack of enthusiasm on this point of view stop you guys. I like to hear what you guys think.

Our KC-135R can refuel both the F-16 & F-5..

If I remember correctly, the Eurofighter Typhoon dropped out in the fighter competition as its multi-role programme has not matured & delivery timeline did not meet the RSAF's requirements; leaving the Rafale & F-15SG (then designated as F-15T) in the competition.. It's not because the Typhoon could not be refuelled by the KC-135R..

Correct, but that would require modification of the KC-135 flying boom system to support a drogue and probe aircraft, AND put up 2 Tankers since a single KC-135 doesn't have multiple refueling stations to support both types of refueling system. Commonality would make more sense.

And yes, the timeline was a very valid argument as well.

Adding on --
I think the multiple refueling points to support the drogue and probe system was a fairly recent add on which I'm not sure the RSAF has acquired as well... hmm...

heh! nvm I found the answer to that.

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_...23aug02_nr.html

So the typhoon argument is not valid anymore.

Btw bro, modifications were already added to our KC-135R..

The a/c has a Multi-Point Refueling System, 2 pods (at the side of the wings) allow refueling of F-5S/T (as well as the A-4SU before decommissioned) while keeping the tail-mounted refueling boom for F-16C/Ds & the future F-15SG..

KC-135R side profile

I'm one of the many foot soldier, even filling a section level with people is quite difficult and now we're talking about an Expeditionary Force, where are these people coming in ?

I think the expeditionary force should not be consider as an additional force in the SAF but rather an "expeditionary capability" instead. Thus the footmen, or any other manpower will come from where they always came from; the Regular, NSF and NS Men pool.

The declining population is a problem indeed, hence we keep hearing the narrative that the SAF will invest into force multiplying technologies to increase its combat capabilities.

just want to add to shotgun's earlier post about battlespace dominance...an expeditionary force would need clear, updated maps of the area to upload into the BMS...while the US always has the benefit of having U-2s and Global Hawks at thier disposal for such means, SAF doesn't have that sort of recce platforms capable of high altitudes and long distances...or at least I'm not familiar with our RF-5s operating at such high altitudes :ph43r:

its rather preliminary, but I feel at least for aerial recce and mapping, our assets are not able to support an expeditionary force...can our UAVs do that, even if its a secondary role? are satellite images enough?

Last post :
"....we have the 3G integration capability somewhat(hardware & BMS knowhow)..what is left is really to prove that can perform under fire.........hence also my response on another thread....

http://militarynuts.com/index.php?showtopic=1945&st=30
SAF to send two medical teams to Afghanistan, Oruzgan Province

".....I wonder if SAF is willing to despatch a security unit to do support logistic convoy escort/security duties over there as well ? ....a sure way to gain real field experience......"

Practice & deploy perimeter defence
Deploy Convoy security tactics
Utilise UAV for forward recce/intel gathering
Air ground support missions
Winning the hearts and minds of the locals

...and most importantly..how to handle battlefield stress
...managing morale and casualty (the actual thing and managing the PR)
…manage battle PSTD

(of course we do not do alone, but with the coalition forces's joint effort).
ps.

Reply :
What will the position of SG if the proposal is for regular troops and not NSF?
If our battlespace dominance is well drilled, prepared..risks should be minimised just like many of our security teams while many high level VIP were in SG.(you can also say they were subject to potential line of fire as well).

Hence, I can understand that SG citizen need that comfort zone for the national servicemen.

BTW, Have our Medical teams returned yet ?

Any chances that the SAF will employ Gurkhas in the future just like the SPF?? So as to significantly beef up the number of regulars in elite units like Commandos, Guards, Army Development Force (ADF)..

Btw, our ADF is quite tough (Officers, Specs, Drivers, Men, etc are all regulars in there)..

I think our ADF is not large enough for active front line deployment to places like Afghanistan.

With limited resources the SAF has to save guard our security first isn't it?

ADF are seriously tough MFs, if we're talking about equipment and training I don't think they are not ready for Afghanistan, i'm guessing that the supporting logistics are not available for them, which could hamper thier effectiveness...

okay, and maybe the fact that the terrain is world's apart from SG's tropical environment (or even that of India). silly me :rolleyes:

btw if SAF isn't able to operate any kind of climate and terrain, does that still make us expeditionary?

Not sure if the regime are really as tough as other routines available in the SAF....but they should be at least more vigorous than those in place for National Service....

In any case, SG is slowly building up momentum and scope of duties for UN roles...

Not too sure about the Gurkhas taking part in these roles but their numbers sure have increased tremendously - check out their camp - as compared to 20 years ago.....could these be the ones which we took on when HK was returned to China or are these the ones which were downsized from the British Army? The Gurkhas have been with SG quite sometime.....understand that they are cross trained not only in Police duties but also military aspects too....

Shotgun: Pre-emptive strike against non-state actors, in the name of self-defence, regardless of international opinion, otherwise called the Bush (II) Doctrine ;) , is antithetical to everything Singapore has been supporting since independence: Non-interference, the sovereignty of nations and the United Nations. Such actions might improve the short term security situation, but would threaten the long term interests of the country. I do not think we will see such actions being taken by our military save a total breakdown of the international order.

This is still inline with the concept that we will move up north should the buffer up north is being perceived as lost. So should our friends in ASEAN become a serious breeding ground and perceived as a total lost of government country, both politically and militarily, it is still possible that an "expeditionary" force be sent.

But, again, this will probably come under an UN-backed move.

the IDF does that too, so Bush can't quite stake his name on that brand of foreign policy :P

ok la, i'd presume the ability to strike anywhere (or at least most parts of the world) does give us quite a bit of diplomatic leverage (albeit leaving a rather bitter aftertaste), so while we can do it, actually deploying an expeditionary force to wage war would, IMO, be the last choice for the Govt (at least this one we have now)...

personally I feel we have the technical ability already, but the icing on the cake would be ability to field an ops-ready digitized force...

For reasons of political sensitivity, even if we do, I doubt it will be wise to announce such an ability publicly.

dude be careful about opsec. some things can be said 1-1 or person to person but are never meant to be heard outside some walls.

just be careful