Hmmmm..... I want to knoe wat is ur viable ideas on how to make our infantry more lethal at company level. Pls do not give exact figures or data on the detail orbat. But give a more general ideas and suggestions. Discard the 84 even if the MK3 is widely available. Instead come out with bigger calibre form of Matador with more advanced warhead. Form 2 groups each consisting of 3 rifleman each carrying the new weapon. Or perhaps, if u remember ST came out with the super low weight AGL which is 14kg, lighter than 84mm by 2 plus kg. Form a section consisting of 3 such weapons and 2 ammo carrier per gun. Wats ur ideas?

think we need to also look at the mechanisation of our infantry. if infantry units are also given vehicles like the Light Strike Vehicles (currently with Guards units), then there will be more options for more powerful (& also heavier) weapons.

i personally think that our troops [infantry or otherwise] are already carrying too much load. we should be very wary of the increasing weight of weapons, e.g. LAW vs MATADOR, M16 vs SAR-21, etc

i'm sure some of us here have seen the shift from 5.56mm back to 7.62mm. the SAF should think about this (but not likely for them to change since they recently changed to the SAR-21...)

i'm also interested in looking at weapon sights. the SAR-21 allows easier aiming, but what about our SAW and GPMG. options to consider could be red-dot sights...

regarding grenade weapons, recently the USMC purchase some revolver-style grenade lauchers
http://www.defensereview.com/modules.php?n...article&sid=851

One cheaper solution is not procure more heavier weapons, but enhancing current squad weaponry with accurate combat sights and aiming devices.

All SAF weapons should have the MIL-1913 rail retrofitted as standard. Accuracy in close combat is very important.

I think that is veri true that the average infantry load is getting a little too heavy. For example, those ppls from Guards and Infantry who did b4 those stand-by, weekend cannot book out type, readiness duties. You will realize the average trooper is over-cluttered with stuffs, most importantly, most of these stuffs are left hanging around outside the full-pack, in bandoliers which are hard to access. Most importantly, 84 assistant is a little overloaded. The 'x' number of rounds they carry realli make them look like a mountain turtle, poor mobility. I once had this experience during the Ex. Along one of those gravel path, a vehicle mounted with a MG suddenly chiong towards us...... I knew it was too late........ why, the load I carry make it impossible to immediately get out a round and load into the gun! Furthermore, the back blast could wipe out the troopers behind. Ironically, the jeep was taken out by a LAW gunner, in which his calibre is smaller than us. Lastly, we must seriously look into how to prevent the SAW from rusting and solve the drum mag issue. Bcos most SAW gunners complain the Magazine catch for the SAW is too shallow, drop out easily.

Make all magazines standard and interchangable as soon as possible.

Introduce a rail system for mounting of NVGs to rifles for selected troops in each section. NVGs should be able to be mounted on rifles, helmets, or handheld, etc. Newer, less bulky and lighter NVGs to replace those in the 84mm and MG teams.

Add a second MG team per platoon, or an additional new support weapon team to the existing MG team.

Keep the 84mm, but introduce newer rounds. The much lighter 84mm Mk3 is for actual operations only - considering the limits on the number of live rounds fired. Re-introduce a third crew man for each 84mm gun crew (pre 1989 orbat). Introduce a small handheld laser range finder for the team (if ever there was such a small device).

New manpacks and better ways of carrying MG and 84mm rounds please.

Introduce precision guided 120mm mortar rounds and allow each company commander or the CRT to call for point precision fire on targets of opportunity.

Improve all comms and navigation equipment (Smaller and lighter).

Intresting website about improvement ideas for future infantry weapons

http://www.g2mil.com/West-anti-armor.htm

In terms of the rifle for the infantry.....may I ask what's the trend today?

Is range plus hitting power still the main driver?

Or maybe it's going towards short range with dispersive pellets?

Leave the longer range to other support units? With all the smart munitions, I think they can probably close to 100m without any collateral damage?

Is it possible to have a light weapon that can marry the two requirements?

RLGs instead of 40mm grenades?

Please educate?

Just a Video showing the firing of the 84mm RR.

Althought it is firng a smoke round, ithe drill is the same for other Ammo,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3I4mhfzdOIw

I think we need to consider "lightening" our soldier's load seriously. Our sar-21 is seriously overweight and inadequate when compared to the Sar-21 carbine version. In my opinion, the carbine version should have been the standard issue instead!

The trend seems like most of the militaries are moving from battle rifles to carbines in the first place. Most of the troops in Iraq are issued with carbines. The Israeli military had long abandoned the galil and used the M4s extensively. Of course, now they have the new Tar-21.

Interesting website on the "light" gear used by the US Marines Recon teams

The US Marine Corps
1st Force Reconnaissance Company
The multiple missions tasked to Force require a wide variety of weapons and equipment. Many of the items in this article are mission specific, and a few are common to all missions, but in almost all scenarios, they are carried on the bodies of the members of the reconnaissance platoon. Weight is a major factor, and the Force adage is "If you can’t swim it, jump it, hump it or shoot it, you don’t need it". The increased stand off distance of the optical and communications equipment helps to ensure success in the deep battle.


http://www.forcerecon.com/strongmenarmed3.htm

There's aslo another thread on ST Page about Ideal Light Infantry gear...
Follow and reads the thread reply posts ...some do make sense.


http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/1-6249.aspx

If you were to equip a light infantry battalion for general purpose combat, what would you pick? I'm thinking of a Central/Eastern European environment that would have to encompass mud, winter, forests, plains and urban areas. Ideally the men should be well enough equipped for other deployments (e.g. desert, jungle), but your primary battlefield is Central Europe. My men would go as follows. SECTION 3x Riflemen (AK-74M) 2x Section automatic machine gunners (FN-Minimi chambered for 5.45x39 M74) 2x Grenadiers (AK-74M+GP-25) 1x Antitank grenadier (RPG-29) Platoon 3x Sections + Machine Gun section with MG-3 Company 3x platoons + ATGM section (Javelin or Khrizantema) with two launchers and 1x automatic grenade launcher section (AGS-17 rather than Mk-19 because of weight), 1x sharpshooter section (PSG-1, 2 sharpshooters). Battalion 3x Rifle Companies, 1x Mortar Company (6 tubes, probably 81mm), 1x ATGM company (6 launchers), 1x Logistics company, 1x Medical company, 1x Machine gun company (6x MG-3) Sound good? Any personal favourites?

some ideas...

soldier level
-body armour issued for peacetime training (train as u fight)
-revised SBO
-elbow pads & knee pads
-FN SCAR short barrel 7.62mm version
-improved uniform (waterproof capability)
-lighter & better-fitting helmet
-night vision equipment

section level
-intercom-type radio for every member
-milkor MGL-type grenadier

platoon level
-designated sniper
-7.62 MG or 12.7 HMG remote weapon system mounted on BV206 (we should have plenty of surplus BV206 to go around...)

company level
-LAV-type wheeled armour vehicle with SPIKE missile

Issue of Body armour maybe limited at the present moment.

Surprise. But the SBO has been revised to the Vest type, verse the "Corset" that was used in the 80s to 90s age, and the Skelaton from 80s to the early days. Can you provide more light as to what you would like to enhance in the SBO.

elbow pads & knee pads
Limited usage at the moment, it is unfortunately still very warm to use.

Pls see this Pic:http://sg.wrs.yahoo.com/_ylt=A9FJqhwSjfBEkWQAJ1ku4gt./SIG=14aa2787u/EXP=1156701842/**http%3a//www.mindef.gov.sg/etc/medialib/imindef_media_library/photos/news_release/2005/sep.Par.0031.Image.gif%3fdirect=1

Hear Hear Agree,Not populat with alot of people using the weapon. love the potential of this weapon, but maybe not short barrel, as the round has little time to achieve the full potential of this carlibre.

In service now, Gortex Jacket and pants set. Hope that someone can explain how to use the pants portion. As it is usually kept in unused condition.

Hope it can be done, but don't have high hopes for this, If you received the early batch of Kelvar Helmet, keep them, as it is among the lightest of all the "Kelvar" helmets, about few hundreds gram lighter. The Other material require more material to achieve the similar preformance. of Kelvar.

But note Kelvar degrad under UV and when wet. Most Kelvar materila are treated to reduce these effects.

I am not in the position to say the distribution of such equipment. But what I can say, it is a bummer when it comes to 1206, if you don't know 1206, either you are very lucky fellow or, different Military unit.

Patience, Patience.

This would mean that the most infantry units be partly Mechanised. Not sure about the numbers of BV206. But BV206 lack afew stuff, that require the SAF to develop the Brono.

All Infantry convert to Mechanise? Maybe.

Got a Personnel Thingy, Hope that can be improve. It will reduce the Weight loading on the Trooper very fast and easy.

Combat Ration. MRE
Food is Nice, but it is still bulky and heavy (about 1.5kg), ever try to carry 72 hrs pack, along with ammo, water and all the basic stuff. The weight adds up quickly.

True other forces ration is used in such situations, but it is hope that we can have our own high energy, low weight version of ration be made, try for half the weight of the current pack

Detail: http://www.dsta.gov.sg/home/DisplayPage/Co...e10.asp?id=1183
http://www.pasols.org/pacrat/combat%20ration.rtf
and page 77 and 78 of the attach file to see the type of combat ration thro the years.
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/ns35/pdf/bmt/BasicTraining3.pdf

Yep, quite some pointers for improvement, hope those MID gentlemen watching this forum can put these feedback to good use.

Rifle
No choice. Now that we have it, I think on balance SAR-21 is a good choice for ordinary grunts. Where to find a lighter 20" rifle with all the laser and optical sights thrown in?

I wld only add a bayonet to it. A stainless steel M9 please (not the poor quality ones the US have).

P-rails? - okay good to have, but in all honesty, how often u wld change yr scopes, etc.

Until US / NATO switches to another calibre, I think we are happy with 5.56mm for now

SAW
Pls dun change it. It's the best we have. Much better than a SAR-21 variant with a paltry 30 mag.

Upgrade it to mk4 or something. Make the mag compatible with the SAR-21

40mm GL
M203 - okay. Unreslung SAR-21 or some variant. OK
Metalstorm version w/ 3 rds - better

I only wonder where to place the laserpointer....perhaps p-rail or something.

Milkor AGL? Why not. but means more weight...and another weapon/equipment

GPMG
Good but heavy bitch. p-rails (i think already hav). Else use a US mod of it mk48 or something. Looks like the M249 but 7.62mm and lighter.

Handguard wld be good too.

LAW
Well, I guess you and I know why MATADOR. Yes, it's heavy, but show me a 90mm calibre LAW that does not weigh as much? The Brits have just adopted it - goes to show how good it is.

That said, I am inclined to believe that there is much life left in the ARMBRUST. See the revival of M72 LAW in US for MOUT / low-intensity conflicts. It's not everyday that you nid a 90mm LAW. For the weight, can carry two - provided u dun meet an MBT

Yeah - nbr trust the media on Israel-Hizabollah. I was already using the LAW against bunker / concrete targets and troops clustered together some 15 yrs back...yep infantryman's artillery

RLG
Wld prefer some Rifle-launched grenades as well. Cheaper and just as effective as an M203, if not better.

NVG
All shld have one

Comms
All shld hav one

Camo
If possible, digipattern?

LBV / Armor
Already done

84mm RR
It's a bitch. But a good bitch. Perhaps we cld produce a rd using Armbrust technology to reduce backblast and signature. Yup - there is a new laser sighting device for it in the mkt

106mm RR
Like the 84. Old but still useful. Ammo upgrade path along the 84mm RR lines. There shld be a laser sighting device for it in the mkt as well

A personel carried grenade launcher will useful at section level.

Check this out, yanks called "6 Pack" !

http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/7231/28...m8112omgl14.jpg

Singapore Technologies Enginnering (STE) - Kinectics.
'Super Light' Weight Automatic Grenade Launcher (SLW-AGL). <-- HyperLink, Click ...


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~~ Project-ION Phoenix ~~ ~~ Op. IceBerge ~~ ~~ Iowa_BB61 ~~ ~~ xxKuZNeTxx ~~


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But different class....

The Milkor AGL (6-pak) is more for as a personal infantry weapon in place of M203 type

The ST superlight AGL is more for crew-served weapon system in place of a mk19 AGL or CIS40

I'm no expert.....

Is it possible to use a modified entangler(net) grenade for disabling ATGMs in flight?

Maybe useful in Lebanon.

SAR21
One Point for SAR21, Good Balance. when firing. easy to keep on target as compare with the M16 family. It is more a sniping weapon rather than one that rock and roll with, M16 family is better at rock and rolling (Firing alot of burst of auto)

P-rails, only when units have the ability/funds to get what they need, i.e Night Sights, enhanced scopes.

SAW
Rumour , maybe replaced. SAW is good weapon, the 100 rds mag is useful for patrolling, but there are some inherent issues (Mag easily knock out, especially during fire and movenment)

What will be tabled is undergoing testing, but nothing else is heard. Don't ask for Internet resources, just coffee shop talk. time line is about 5-6yrs from now.

snowfox, i don't know where you come from... but the M-16 is not a good rifle to "Rock & Roll" with at all!

No matter what kinda elephantine grip you have, you have no way to keep aim at fully automatic fire. And if you can't aim, don't shoot. Cos u're gonna kill people u're not supposed to. It's actually quite hard for an average soldier to "double-tap" an M-16 already. Needless to say fire automatically. A good pause between each shot is about at least 2 secs to re-aim.

Conversely, because the Sar-21 has good balance, it is in a way easier to fire fully automatic, + it has light recoil.

M203
Love Hate relationship with this fellow. Provide alot of Firepower, but the underslug launcher is a headache, abit fragile.

Why no laser pointer. the round flies a fairly high trajectory as compare with a 5.56 round. With a 5 metre effective radius for the round, Guess work is fine.

A delicate Grenadier, need to study it, rather have a few more M203 fellows about, less dependant on one guy, and more firing position. alot slower rate of fire.

Not sure about Metal Storm based solution.

GPMG
SAF GPMG, American M240B are very similar weapon, with slight difference, additonal handguard, butt, tripod (some consider it part of the weapon, some consider as an accessories) and so on. But on the whole, it is the same design within the weapon.

M249 can from the ppeople whom created the GPMG, they change the proven design to be smaller (This is over simplifying the work)

LAW
Agree with your points, Armburst has alot of potential left in it, as the incident in the Middle East has shown, pump one round into a window, and see people run, and it is farly silent too.

Matador, is a ass to lug around, nosiy to fire, only good thing is it large warhead.

RLG
What if I tell you SAR21 can use/fire RLG, it is no secret. just not widely known, as RLG has fallen out of Grace since the 80s,. Not many armies are using this technology (RPG does not count, as it is fired from a delicate launcher)

Cons
1) Difficult to use, ammo loaded at the front of the weapon, rather than at the mid section, firing usually expose the firer position, unless special care is taken.
2) Lack of Range, quoting from faulty memory, max range is about 200 metres. (40x46mm range can goes to 500 metre
3) Accuracy fall, depends on luck when it goes to max range, as it is large round, it is easily influence by cross wind.

Pros
1) As the round is not limited to the 40 mm diameter, the round can be largere, and of various shape. thus offers a large varities of warheads, and have more punch as compare with the 40 mm ammo.
2) Permit a lot of firers, as every weapon is a potential launcher

Heard some RD is being done on this, (not locally) but it has been a while, no results seen yet.

From Siberia...

































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~~ Project-ION Phoenix ~~ ~~ Op. IceBerge ~~ ~~ Iowa_BB61 ~~ ~~ xxKuZNeTxx ~~


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Agree with Shotgun, that I am from a different place, but M16 is Ok for Rock and Roll, One word, Train.

You need the upper body strenght to hold and fire the M16 family of weapons in auto mode. Especially after a long day of patroling, with a large pack on your back. When the Contact starts, it is all hell break loose.

Note Rock and Roll is not the offical SAF doctine. SAF calls for Aimed firing, Rock and Roll Aimed firing can be done, not easy but achieve able.

It is an American technique, use to throw large amount of firepower, in attempt to break contact, rather than to purse.

Some American units, not names, use it to throw large amount of firepower, but rarely hitting anything.

With Training, can achieve a 4 inch group with M16 auto fire at 100 metres range. (at least 4 out of 5 rounds within 4 inch diameter, in a 5 rounds burst)

Side note, some may understand why some reservist in middle east face problems when they were call back for active duty. Working life lacjs physical activities. Rock and Roll is achievable, but need Training.

And where exactly is that other place?

I find it hard to believe that American units still practice "rock and roll" as an official doctrine. I mean, since u say some units actually train to go fully automatic and obtain a 4 inch grouping with an M-16.

I only remember the Americans going rock and roll back in vietnam when they were still unaccustomed to the M-16. And its automatic function allowed them to empty a mag way too fast. Today, the american military has so much equipment and firepower superiority in terms of vehicles and air support, to "rock and roll" would be an extreme waste of firepower.

Yes, the Americans practice winning fire superiority on contact, but not with M-16 rock n rolls.

Similarly in the SAF, we would achieve fire superiority with our SAWs, and M-16s with rapid fire rates. But never automatic, never rock and roll. The last thing you want to do in a difficult situation is run out of ammo. Liberal use of smoke grenades break contact more effectively than "Rock and rolls."

Perhaps if you can provide us with some information of where you are from and past military training if any, we'd be able to understand better.

Dun know if MU members had the past months issue of Pionner magazine whereby a counter sniper helmet is featured. It is a good item to have as long as the whole system is in acceptable weight range, user friendly, rugged and low mantience.

It was on this link before it was omitted?..................

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publicati...6/jun06_fs.html

Homin, Please refer to Soldier Sniper Detection System ...topic open by evo...that link to Pioneer magazine (whereby a counter sniper helmet is featured) is working...

Side tracking. Abit.

Recalling from faulty memory, (Don't ask for quotes) Rock and Roll was a term use to discribe an Era of Music.

In American Army (Note Army, not the other services) during the Vietnam days, and some recent conflict, the term is used to discribe pouring large amount of infantry firepower.

The Practise is generally frowned upon, as it is a waste of ammo. As people tend to spray ammo all about. Like a Mad Concert preformance.

Agree that in some situation, when all Hell break loose, the 1st instinct is to spray back. If the battle space is purely a combat situation, it maybe fine.

But in a Military Policing role, or such as the recent Middle East situation, innocnnt bystanders maybe hit. Ever occur that it could be the intention of the Aggressor, to create a rift between the popluace and your forces.

Counter Point,
Some units are still adopting this tactic, as a Break Contact Drill.

With Aimed Auto firing, a small unit can project the image of an larger unit. By projecting an image of a larger unit, the Aggressor would hesiate in pursiting the unit, allowing the team to evade.

Aimed Auto Firing
Auto firing with a 5.56mm weapon can be control, with proper training. Some large frame individuals can even pour fire from 7.62 mm GPMG, from a Hip position.

4inch Grouping is achievable in the range situation. Usually after a long day of work, will be lucky if 2 shots are within a 4 inch group. It is not just the Grip, but the overall firing position.

SAR21
Ever occur reader, as to the reason to mounting a scope on this weapon.

It is part of the SAF infantry firing philosophy, similar to the British and the American Marine philosophy.

Aimed Single Shot Firing. Was told that it was part of the reason why as to the rate of fire selector was place in a inconvient position.

So far alot have been suggested on the hardware aspects...again the doctrine and tactics may need to be REVIEW, REFRESH & RENEW.

Here is a summary of the so called "Updated Tactics Overview".

TACTICS OVERVIEW

MILITARY TACTICS is the collective name for methods of engaging and defeating an enemy in battle. Through time, military tactics have changed much under the influence of philosophy and technology.
Up until the 19th century, much of military tactics was confined to battlefield tactics, concerned with maneuvering units in battle in open terrain. In current military thought, tactics is the operational application of forces to a situation. This is different from military strategy, which is more concerned with long-term results.
Specialized tactics exist for many situations, from situations as small as securing a room to large-scale operations such as establishing air superiority in aircraft carrier battles. Today, military tactics are employed on all levels of command, from individual and group up to entire armed forces. Indeed, the units used in warfare have always been a reflection of current military tactics, and their size and composition have varied accordingly.
Common military tactics include frontal assaults, attempts to flank the enemy, keeping troops in reserve and the use of ambushes. Often deception in the form of camouflage, or misdirection using decoys, are used to confuse the enemy.

Reconnaissance is the military term for methods of gathering information about an enemy. It is often referred to as recce or recon depending on the role. The associated verb is reconnoiter.
Examples of reconnaissance include patrolling by troops, ships, submarines, or aircraft, or by setting up covert observation posts. Reconnaissance may also be carried out by satellites or unmanned aircraft.
Reconnaissance seeks to find a range of information about an enemy. This includes their locations, numbers, and intentions. Thus reconnaissance is a fundamental tactic which helps to build an intelligence picture.

Patrolling is a military tactic. Small groups or individual units are deployed from a larger formation to achieve a specific objective and then return. The tactic of patrolling may be applied to ground troops, armored units, naval units, and combat aircraft. The duration of a patrol will vary from a few hours to several weeks depending on the nature of the objective and the type of units involved.
There are several different types of patrol each with a different objective. The most common is to collect intelligence by carrying out a reconnaissance patrol. Such a patrol may try to remain covert and observe an enemy without themselves being detected. Other reconnaissance patrols are overt, especially those that interact with the civilian population.
A fighting patrol is a group with sufficient size (usually platoon or company) and resources to raid or ambush a specific enemy. It primarily differs from an attack in that it is not the aim to hold ground.
A clearing patrol is a brief patrol around a newly occupied defensive position in order to ensure that the immediate area is secure.
A number of patrols may be deployed to 'screen' a large area. This type of patrol is used by armored formations in desert theatres, and also by ground troops operating in urban areas.

An ambush is a long established military tactic in which an ambushing force uses concealment to attack an enemy that passes its position. Ambushers strike from concealed positions such as among dense underbrush or behind hilltops. The tactic is generally used to gather intelligence or to establish control over an area.

Planning an Ambush
In modern warfare an ambush is most often employed by ground troops up to platoon size against enemy targets which may be other ground troops or possibly vehicles. Ambushes are complex multi-phase operations and are therefore usually planned in some detail. First a suitable killing zone is identified. This is the place where the ambush will be laid. It is generally a place where enemy units are expected to pass, and which gives reasonable cover for the deployment, execution, and extraction phases of the ambush patrol. A path along a wooded valley floor would be a classic, if rather obvious, example.

Laying an Ambush
To be successful an ambush patrol must deploy into the area covertly, ideally under the cover of darkness. The patrol will establish secure and covert positions overlooking the killing zone. Usually, two or more cut off groups will be sent out a short distance from the main ambushing group into similarly covert positions. Their job is twofold; firstly to give the ambush commander early-warning of approaching enemy (usually by radio), and secondly, when the ambush is initiated, to prevent any enemy from escaping. Another group will cover the rear of the ambush position and this give all round defence to the ambush patrol.
Care must be taken by the ambush commander to ensure that fire from any weapon cannot inadvertently hit any other friendly unit.

Waiting
Having set the ambush, the next phase is to wait. This could be for a few hours or a few days depending on the tactical and supply situation. It is obviously much harder for an ambush patrol to remain covert and alert if sentry rostas, shelter, sleeping, sanitary arrangements, food and water, have to be considered. Ambush patrols will almost always have to be self-sufficient as re-supply would not be possible without compromising their covert position.

Executing an Ambush
The arrival of an enemy in the area should be signalled by one of the cut-off units. This may be done by radio or by some other signal, but must be done silently. The ambush commander will have given a clear instruction for initiating the ambush. This might be a burst from an automatic weapon, use of an explosive device (such as a claymore mine), or possibly a simple whistle blast. When the ambush commander judges that the ambush will be most effective he gives the signal.
After the firefight has been won, the now compromised ambush patrol will need to leave the area as soon as practical. Before this is done it is a common practice to clear the killing zone by checking bodies for intelligence, taking prisoners, and treating any enemy wounded. If communication orders permit, a brief contact report may be sent. This done, the ambush patrol will leave the area by a pre-determined route.

Frontal Assault

The military tactic of frontal assault is a direct, hostile movement of forces towards enemy forces in a large number, in an attempt to overwhelm the enemy. This is often referred to as a "suicide strike," because it is often a commander's last resort when he has run out of strategies.
Before the 19th century, a frontal assault against a line could be effective when conducted by horse cavalry. However, as the accuracy and range of firearms increased, this procedure proved increasingly suicidal.
This style of combat was used heavily in the American Civil War, for example. The type of militaries used as well as the terrain lended themselves to direct frontal assault, and most of the battles of the Civil War were fought in this manner.
Frontal assaults were also the cause of massive casualties in the trench warfare of World War One. In many cases, frontal assaults were made by thousands of men towards trenches defended by machine gun emplacements, with predictable and tragic results.
The pincer movement (double envelopment) is a basic element of military strategy which has been used, to some extent, in nearly every war. The maneuver is mostly self-explanatory; the flanks of the opponent are attacked simultaneously in a pinching motion after the opponent has advanced towards the center of an army which is responding by moving its outside forces to the enemy's flanks, in order to surround it. At the same time, a second layer of pincers attacks on the more extreme flanks, so as to prevent any attempts to reinforce the target unit.
Most infantry combat, on every scale, is based in some fashion on this military tactic and it is commonly used by aircraft as well. It was vaguely described in Sun Tzu's The Art of War, but he argued that it was best to allow the enemy a path to escape, as he felt the target army would fight with more ferocity when completely surrounded. However, the pincer is commonly employed in modern warfare.

Circumvallation is a standard military tactic of siege used in ancient and modern warfare. It describes the process of the attacking army building a line of fortifications around the besieged city facing towards the city (to protect themselves from sorties by its defenders and to enhance the blockade) and also the resulting fortifications (known as 'lines of circumvallation').
Lines of circumvallation generally consist of earth ramparts and entrenchments that encircle the besieged city. The line of circumvallation can be used as a base for launching assaults against the besieged city or for constructing further earthworks nearer the city.
In cases where the besieging army is threatened by a field army allied to the city, the besieging army may construct a second line of fortifications between themselves and the outside enemy parallel to the lines of circumvallation, known as 'lines of contravallation'. This envelopes the city in a double line of fortifications and doubly protects the besiegers. In turn, the besiegers may find themselves besieged within their lines of circumvallation and contravallation.
The circumvallation and contravallation tactic has the advantage of making it possible to redirect troops from the siege (now reinforced by the first wall of fortifications) to the defense of the besieging army itself.

A siege is a prolonged military assault and blockade on a city or fortress with the intent of conquering by force or attrition. A siege occurs when an attacking army encounters a city or fortress that refuses to surrender and cannot be taken by a frontal assault. Sieges usually involve surrounding the target and blocking the provision of supplies, typically coupled with artillery bombardment, sapping and mining to reduce fortifications.
Sieges are as old as warfare itself, with towns in the Middle East from the dawn of civilization having city walls. There are a number of tales of sieges in ancient sources, such as the siege of Jericho in the Old Testament or the siege of Troy described by Homer in the Iliad. An astonishing number and variety of sieges formed the core of Julius Caesar's conquest of Gaul.
The universal method for defending against siege is the use of fortifications, principally walls and ditches, and a sufficient supply of food and water. In the European Middle Ages, virtually all large cities had city walls -- Dubrovnik in Dalmatia is an impressive and well-preserved example -- and more important cities had citadels, forts or castles. Great effort was expended to ensure a good water supply inside the city in case of siege. In some cases, long tunnels were constructed to carry water into the city. Complex systems of underground tunnels were used for storage and communications in medieval cities like Tábor in Bohemia, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam war. In modern times, trenches have replaced walls, and bunkers have replaced castles.
The significance of the classical siege has been declining since the great Swedish white-elephant fortification of Karlsborg was completed in 1869. One single fortified stronghold, whatever the scale (Karlsborg was conceived as a reserve capital for Sweden), was no longer decisive. Whole cities have increasingly come under siege, fortified or not (eg Leningrad), and even, using blockades and the related "low-impact" attritional weapon of sanctions, whole countries (for instance, Cuba, Libya and Iraq).

Sieges in Modern Warfare
Mainly as a result of the increasing firepower (such as machine guns) available to defensive forces, First World War trench warfare briefly revived a form of siege warfare. Although siege warfare had moved out from an urban setting because city walls had become ineffective against modern weapons, trench warfare was nonetheless able to utilize many of the techniques of siege warfare in its prosecution (sapping, mining, barrage and, of course, attrition) but on a much larger scale and on a greatly extended front. The development of the armored tank at the end of World War I swung the pendulum back in favor of maneuver.
The Blitzkrieg of the Second World War showed, however, that fixed fortifications are easily defeated by maneuver instead of frontal assault or long sieges. Battles that would have taken weeks of siege could now be avoided with the careful application of air power (such as the German paratrooper capture of Fort Eban, Belgium, early in World War II). The most important sieges of the Second World War were on the Eastern Front where bloody urban warfare marked the battles of Leningrad and Stalingrad. In these battles, the ruins of an urban landscape proved to be as effective obstacles to an advancing army as any fortifications.
The battles of Dien Bien Phu (1954) and Khe Sanh (1968) possessed siege-like characteristics. In both cases, the Vietcong were able to cut off the opposing army by capturing the surrounding rugged terrain. At Dien Bien Phu, the French were unable to use air power to overcome the siege and were defeated. But at Khe Sanh a mere 14 years later, advances in air power allowed the United States to overcome the siege and win the battle.

Defensive Tactics

Scorched earth is a military tactic which involves destroying anything that might be useful to the enemy whilst withdrawing from an area. The name refers to the practice of burning crops to deny the enemy food sources. The practice may be carried out by an army in enemy territory, or by an army in its own home territory. An example of the latter occurred in World War II when the Soviet Red Army salted their own lands as the Nazis forced them to retreat back through it, preventing the Nazis from growing crops on it. This example also illustrates another important aspect to consider about scorched earth tactics: when the Soviets reclaimed the territory, they were equally unable to use it.
In warfare, a booby trap is an antipersonnel device, such as a landmine or grenade, placed in building or in a noncombat area that has a psychological draw for enemy soldiers.
A booby trap is distinguished from a land mine by the fact that it is an improvised weapon, perhaps made from an artillery shell, or a grenade, or a quantity of high explosives, whereas a land mine is manufactured for its specific purpose. A booby trap may be buried in the manner common with land mines, or not, though as a rule it is concealed in some fashion, and set to be detonated by means of pressure or a trip wire. During World War II retreating British and Canadian soldiers in France in 1940 made booby traps from artillery and mortar shells, burying them in roads behind them as they retreated, or hanging them from trees concealed by the leaves and rigged with tripwires concealed in the grass around the tree.

Booby Trap Usage
During World War II, scales in warehouses and factories were rigged with explosives. Allied soldiers securing an area would be tempted to step upon the scale to compare their weight with that of their compatriots, and would thus perish.
During the Vietnam War, motorcycles were rigged with explosives and abandoned. Soldiers would be tempted to ride the motorcycle and thus trigger the explosives. As well, Viet Cong soldiers would rig Rubber Band Grenades and place them in huts that Americans would likely torch. Another popular booby trap is the Grenade in a Can trap. This involves a primed grenade in a container and a string attached, sometimes with the grenade's fuse mechanism modified to give a much shorter delay than the four to seven seconds typical with grenade fuses. The Viet Cong soldiers primarily used these on doors and attached them to tripwires on jungle paths.
During the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Palestinian fighters used booby traps widely. The largest use of booby traps was in Jenin during Operation Defensive Shield where a large number of explosive devices were planted.
The Palestinian fighters had made their own preparations. Booby traps had been laid in the streets of both the camp and the town, ready to be triggered if an Israeli foot soldier or vehicle snagged a tripwire. Some of the bombs were huge -- as much as 250 lb (110 kg) of explosives, compared with the 25 lb (11 kg) a typical suicide bomber uses. On Day 2 of the battle, when the town had been secured but the fight in the camp was just beginning, an armored Caterpillar D-9 bulldozer rolled along a three-quarter-mile (1.2 km) stretch of the main street to clear booby traps. An Israeli engineering-corps officer logged 124 separate explosions set off by the vehicle, which was undamaged. In the camp, the explosive charges were even more densely packed, and tunnels had been dug between houses so that Palestinian fighters could move around without exposing themselves on the street. [1]


SHOCK AND AWE
Shock and awe is a military doctrine that calls for attempting to directly influence your adversary's will, perception, and understanding of events by inducing a state of Shock and Awe. It is not intended to replace the traditional military aim of destroying the adversary's military capability, but instead to integrate that destruction into a larger suite of actions intended to produce the psychological effect of "breaking the enemy's will to fight". The term was first coined by the United States in its 2003 invasion of Iraq. Opinion as to its success there remains divided as of early 2003. The expectation that most Iraqi forces would capitulate after the shock and awe campaign appeared to have been discredited when, during the second week of the invasion, coalition forces met stiff resistance from irregular infantry units in many cities of southern Iraq. However, the complete collapse of organized Iraqi resistance one week later countervails this. A military-historical consensus is thus not likely to be achieved until later, when Iraqi soldiers and officers can be interviewed and the impact of America's fighting doctrine on their actions be better ascertained.

The Doctrine of Rapid Dominance
The first detailed description of this doctrine was in Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance, a book written by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, and published by the National Defense University in 1996.
In the closing days of the twentieth century American military planners believed that the US had virtual military supremacy over any potential adversary. Looking ahead, however, it was believed that the military would be required to maintain the same level of supremacy with fewer resources, greater constraints, and an increased tempo of operations. The concept of Rapid Dominance was proposed as one way to achieve these goals.
The aim of Rapid Dominance is to reduce an adversary's understanding, ability, and will to respond to an attack; to create sufficient "shock and awe" to render the enemy impotent. Methods of inducing "shock and awe" can include direct force applied to command and control centers, selective denial of information and dissemination of disinformation, overwhelming combat force, and rapidity of action. The development of precision guided munitions is one enabling technology for the doctrine of Rapid Dominance.

"Shock and awe" in the 2003 invasion of Iraq
Shock and Awe has been referred to as the official strategy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and was widely talked about in the press in the weeks leading up to the opening of action. During this time the concept of shock and awe was not well explained by the press, which generally described it as simply being a larger version of the air campaign carried out in the 1991 Gulf War.
The campaign was, in keeping with the doctrine, aimed almost entirely at a limited set of command and control targets, a number of them in downtown Baghdad. When the air campaign opened, these targets were all hit within a period of about 15 minutes, and follow-up raids continued around the clock. In particular, key members of the Iraqi leadership were targeted.
The United States claimed that the attacks greatly interfered with the Iraqi ability to command and control troops. The complete collapse of Iraqi forces during the third week of the invasion, plus the lack of serious resistance preceding the fall of Baghdad lends ostensible credence to this view. More compelling support is found in a preliminary interview [1] of Iraqi soldiers in an April 27, 2003 article from the Washington Post. Specifically:
- The accuracy and ubiquity of coalition bombing adversely impacted Iraqi morale: "This affected the morale of the soldiers, because they were hiding and thought nobody could find them. Some soldiers left their positions and ran away... Most of the commanders were sure it was through spies, because it was impossible to find through satellite or aircraft." And: "This affected the morale of the troops. The Iraqi will to fight was broken outside Baghdad."
- The "thunder run" of U.S. tanks through southern Baghdad after the U.S capture of Saddam International Airport had its intended psychological effect: "It was a very big shock. Everyone was surprised that a military force could pass through all the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard forces surrounding the presidential palaces, and everyone became afraid."
- The Iraqi army's command and control structures were effectively targeted: "In the end, when U.S. troops entered Baghdad, everything was messed up. There were no orders. We didn't know where the commanders went. We didn't know what to do. So everyone just went home."

Criticisms and Historical Comparisons
Criticisms
The doctrine is based on the concept of robbing an enemy of the ability to properly conduct an organized battle. It is not clear that this improves the situation in many instances, as US military force is already dominant to the point that organized defensive maneuvering is likely to simply present its air power with more targets in the open.
Many of the criticisms against the doctrine have been based on an incorrect understanding of the doctrine. It has repeatedly been equated with either a larger and more concentrated general air campaign similar to the one in the Gulf War, or alternately any fast-moving tactics like the Blitzkrieg.
The most significant criticism against the concept is the high tendency for civilians and civilian structures to become targets in the effort to "break the enemy's will," an unnecessary set of actions in an era of precision weaponry. Such actions may in fact be counterproductive, inspiring anger against the invading force from the people on the ground.

Blitzkrieg
Some have compared the doctrine of "Rapid Dominance" with the doctrine of blitzkrieg, first widely used in World War II. There are similarities in terms of the tempo of actions, but key differences in the way the ends are achieved.
Blitzkrieg is based on the idea of massing the entirety of an army's mobile forces at a single point in front of the enemy, breaking through due to the local superiority, and then running to the rear areas to cut off the front lines. Executed properly, a blitzkrieg will happen so fast that the enemy will have little idea what is going on. Attempts to set up a coherent defense or counterattack are difficult to organize, by the time one is ready the battle is already behind you.
Rapid Dominance, on the other hand, is based on a direct and furious attack on the command headquarters, both at the armed forces central commands, as well as the unit headquarters closer to the front. The aim is to cut off the troops from information and command, as opposed to supplies.
So both strategies do attempt to confuse the enemy fighting force to the point of inaction, but this is where the similarities end. In one case the target is commanders, the other supplies. Another difference is where the battle takes place, one in the air hundreds of kilometers from the enemy front lines, the other at and just behind the front lines on the ground.
The magnitude of "shock and awe" that the Rapid Dominance doctrine seeks to impose is the (non-nuclear) equivalent of the impact that some claim the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese at the end of World War II. Edney, et al., wrote, "The Japanese were prepared for suicidal resistance until both nuclear bombs were used."
Ullman maintains that the impact of those weapons was sufficient to change both the attitude of the average Japanese citizen and the outlook of the Empire's leadership through this condition of shock and awe, that they were stunned by the destructive power carried by a single airplane, which produced a state of awe and the inability to resist. This view remains controversial, however, and is criticized for ignoring other major factors and being over-simplified.
It has been pointed out that Japan was defeated only at the end of a long and bloody war and that the Japanese decision to surrender was motivated not only by the atomic bomb but also by the collapse of Japanese armies in Manchuria. In addition, it has been pointed out that the Japanese surrender was greatly facilitated by the belief that the Allies would spare the Emperor of Japan upon surrender.

Carpet bombing / Strategic bombing
Some critics have even accused the Shock and Awe strategy of being a repackaging of carpet bombing. Carpet bombing deliberately targets dispersed targets with massive numbers of "dumb" bombs, and is effectively a long distance artillery. World War II British policy was to deliberately target civilian centers in order to destroy homes, thereby reducing Germany's industrial output as workers were displaced.
Rapid Dominance is not similar to carpet bombing. It has very specific targets, ones that are attacked with precision guided weapons. Other military analysts find the comparison of modern precision weapons to the indiscriminate high-altitude bombing of sixty years ago to be absurd, and ridicule the idea that the US would have any problem establishing air superiority.

Comparison with the Air-Land Doctrine of the 1991 Gulf War
There has also been confusion between the doctrine of shock and awe and the doctrine of air-land battle used in the 1991 Gulf War. In contrast to shock and awe, in air-land battle, the focus of the bombing are command and control units rather than supply lines and military units deep in the rear. Furthermore, air-land battle focuses on destroying military units and supply rather than shocking them psychologically. Finally, air-land doctrine involves a long period of bombing rather than a short period as with shock and awe.

These are General Infantry Tactics, appliable to most other arms too, with slight modifications.

But try to cater for Infantry cases, so as not attact "Misfired Shots" from other writers.

What about Recce Patrol? Do you classify under recon element on under Patrol Element?

Or as some of my friend say, what is the difference, Boss want us to get in, look see, and come out with all our "shits" in plastic bags. Forgot, no one should have know that we were any where near there.

If we are required to break contact, we do not practice automatic fire with M-16 to do so. We bound backwards, smoke, last burst of fire (rapid fire rates again, but not automatic with M-16s) n run like hell.

Like what you said, the last burst of fire is meant to discourage the enemy from pursuing through the smoke.

Generally, to empty rifle mags with automatic fire leaves a rifleman very vulnerable to sudden contacts. Eg, a flanking or cutting force. break contact from the main group, we find ourself dashing like hell, there isn't time to pull out a fresh mag.

And if we do suddenly make contact with another group on the retreat, we cannot return fire cos our weapon's dry. And due to some of our Immediate Action Drills, (on close contacts), we may be advancing TOWARDS rather rapidly. Empty rifle magazines are not a good thing. The only guys that should be in automatic are the SAW gunners.

You have to understand, our average infantry here are not issued with sidearms. Just our rifles.


On the subject of recce patrols. We have specialised battalion recce companies that take care of those kinda patrol.

Just visited a US Marine related website; these are the "Top 20 must haves" during operations.

Marine Corps Combat Veterans Top 20 Must-Haves
From Marine Corps News Service

There are some things Marines with combat experience know to be “ must-haves” when serving in a combat zone. Here is a list of the top 20 items combat-experienced Marines of 3rd Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment feel are the most important that a Marine should carry in combat, besides the standard issue of equipment and weapons. The list was compiled by Sgt. Clinton Firstbrook, and originally published in the May 2005 edition of Marines, the official magazine of the Marine Corps.

1. Advanced Combat Optical Gun Sight or Binoculars: "When you're on post, you can tell what individuals walking down the street (blocks away) are carrying," said Cpl. Michael Fredtkou, an M-203 gunner. "The enemy doesn't expect you to see them that far away."

2. Energy Bars: "They're lightweight, easy to get to," said Staff Sgt. Luis Lopez, platoon sergeant. "Plus they're not as bulky as MREs."
3. Kevlar Cushions: "The old (helmet) padding gives you a headache after wearing it for a few hours," said 1st Lt. Travis Fuller, platoon commander. "After a few minutes with the cushions on, you can't even tell it's there."

4. Elbow & Knee Pads: "If not for these things, my knees would be completely cut up by now," said Lance Cpl. Tim Riffe, a machine gunner. "You can only take so much jumping into a defensive position without them."

5. Personal Role Radio: "Communication has been a huge key in our operations," said Cpl. Tyrone Wilson, 2nd squad leader. "When my squad was across the street in a defensive position, the platoon was able to let me know insurgents were in the building next to us. Who knows what would've happened if they couldn't contact me."

6. Global Positioning System: "I'm able to pinpoint our location within 10 meters when calling in position reports and medevacs," said Lance Cpl. William Woolley, a radio operator. "We'll never get lost as long as we have it."

7. Extra Socks: "My feet are nice and dry right now," said Lance Cpl. Kaleb Welch, a squad automatic weapon gunner. "I've gone without changing my socks before on three to four day training exercises and I always regretted it later."

8. Gloves: "They're clutch because when you're climbing over a wall you don't have to worry about broken glass cutting your hands," said Cpl. Gabriel Trull, 1st squad leader. "You also don't burn your hands when changing (M-)240 Golf barrels."

9. Baby Wipes: "A multiuse piece of gear," said Petty Officer 3rd Class Irving Ochoa, a Navy corpsman. "You don't have much time out here for personal hygiene, so it's the best alternative."

10.Three-Point Sling: "When you're jumping over rooftops you don't want to worry about dropping your weapon," said Cpl. Dave Willis, 3rd squad leader. "At any time you can just reach down and grab it."

11. Alice or Day pack: "Without these I don't know how I'd carry all of my gear," said Lance Cpl. Geoffery Bivins, a SAW gunner. "It displaces all of the weight around my body, so I'm not uncomfortable. When you're running with 100 pounds on your back, that's important."

12. Night Vision Goggles: "Wearing these at night gives you the advantage over the enemy," said Lance Cpl. Marquirez Chavery, a combat engineer. "When you're on a rooftop at night you can see everything."

13. Personal Hydration System: "Water is one of the things you always need to make sure you have," said Seaman Hugo Lara, a Navy corpsman. "Instead of struggling to get your canteens out, the cord is there within your reach. Plus it holds more water as well."

14.Watch with Compass: "You get calls where you have to lay down suppressing fire in a certain direction and instead of wasting time to ask which way is north or south, you can just look at your wrist," said Lance Cpl. Lonny Kelly, a machine gunner. "Knowing the time is important because everyone pulls shifts for guard duty or standing post."

15. AA Batteries: "You use them for your NVGs and handheld radios - both of which contribute to more effective fighting," said Cpl.
Bryan Morales, 1st squad 1st fire team leader. "You wouldn't want either of those items dying on you, so having a spare set of batteries around is very important."

16. Poncho & Poncho Liner: "The temperature at night is extremely different from the day," said Lance Cpl. Jonathan Etterling, machine gun team leader. "If you don't have some sort of protection at night, you end up freezing because you're cammies are still damp from sweating during the day."

17. Ballistic Goggles: "I was the (assistant) driver of one of our convoys and we got hit by an (improvised explosive device)," said Lance Cpl. Anthony Johnson, an assault man. "Shrapnel bounced off of my glasses, saving my vision."

18. Multipurpose Portable Tool Kit: "It's like carrying a combat knife, hammer and screwdriver in one hand," said Lance Cpl. Evan Fernandez, an assault man. "Cutting open MREs, cleaning your weapon, tightening screws on your gear; it has a thousand uses."

19. Carabineers: "Anything that you might have to grab at a moments notice, you don't want to be digging through your pockets to try and find it," said Pfc. Jason Kurtz, a SAW gunner. "With these you can attach anything to your flak and have right at your fingertips."

20. High Powered Flashlight: "It does wonders," said Cpl. Chris Williams, 2nd squad, 1st fire team leader. "After you throw a fragmentation grenade into a room it's difficult to see because of all the dust floating around. No one can hide from them."

http://usmilitary.about.com/od/marines/a/combatlist.htm

Standard SAF Infantry Break Contact Drill. Contacted, Try to form up, retrogard, Smoke, and last burst. Drilled into by Casic course.

If Aggressor Low IQ, they would not be able to recongise that, once Smoke is thrown, the forces is intend to withdraw.

Maybe, played too much with/and as Aggressor Team.

Auto Firing Technique (Offically not Practised within SAF Infantry Forces)
It is counter to instinct. When does a Force display large amount of fire?
1) If it is Single shot firing, it may mean a "large" force firing. But when many single shot fire at the same time, how many people will be cool enough to distinct if it is single or auto firing.

They will just hit the dirt, and with Aimed firing, their fellow people going down, hopefully panic sets in.

2) Could the Aggessor stepped into an Ambush? The "Normal Ambush is in Dangerous terrain, hidden slopes, consealed places.

But when the firng goes thro the roof. People just take cover, try to defend themselves.

To Practise this "Rock and Roll" method, it takes Discipline, Practise, Physical Training and alot of level headed individuals. Long time since I had done this, but recall that less than 3 Mags per person is required for this drill, it is suppose to last about 90 sec, from start to end, follow by 30 mins of running like a mad fellow.

M16 t is easier to change Mag while running, two hands come into play. SAR21, No Comment.

Old Method of M16 Firing Auto.
In a Section/squad/platoon, which weapon offer the most danger to the Aggressor?

From the American Vietnam experience. it is the Automatic weapons that the NVA/VC will take out first, assuming that they cannot locate the command structure.

The American in order to hid their automatic weapon (M60) fired thei M16 in Burst.

In short Burst of Automatic firing, it is hard to distinguish within a fire fight, which is the actual automatic weapon.

Agree, although issued in Combat Ration, too few/ When reducing the Combat Ration load, it is rarely thrown away, .

SAF Helmet is slightly different on the inside, pre cushioned.

Was told some units issue them. Some have to DIY. Note Warm to wear.

Coming to a Unit near you, currently expensive to buy in Emart.

SAF give it to you, once you have "Successfully sevred your NS Term of Service. Otherwise DIY.

Kept my, although issue the Jacket. Poncho is a good piece of kit, save my stupid ass more than once. Surprise that it was remove from the standard issue, was told that groundsheet is more than enough. Want to invite that Desk chap to a monsoon rain Field exerise.

Sorry Forgot, New 3G Army don't fight in Cat 1 condition. Didn't know that when I pop back for my refresher, thought my instructors was pulling our leg, Rain is netural

Learned this outside Mindef. If budget not the issue, get the Branded stuff, otherwise Kings Safety wear is Good enough. ps get those clear, but have UV protection. Laser protection if money is not a problem.

Leatherman, expensive but Good. others so so. Some units issue SOG, very personnal item.

Good News LED light is fairly good. Especially in Low light condition.

The Serious stuff, those high power stuff, good for entry of room, but a pain when come to 1206.

Sorry, like my gadgets.

LoL! I don't wanna know what was the American contact rate back then.

But yeah, i can see where that idea comes from. When u need to get out of dodge, it doesn't matter how much ammo u spend trying to get out. Desperate circumstances call for desperate measures i suppose.

I've never gotten to try combat-loading while running at full gallop. I can imagine that I'd end up losing my empty-mag and getting charged for it.


Oh yeah, its not that 3G SAF doesn't fight in Cat 1 status. We just don't train during Cat 1 status. Getting struck by lightning during training isn't worth it.

Sorry My Mind link to your brain was not working properly. so you can LoL as much as you want, but it will be nice if you specify clearly.

Practise, there are some shortcuts to keep the empty mag, surprise that it is not taught, maybe not require in your vocation. It is easier with the SAR21 mag.

Need to drum this into the troops. Need to clear this concept with them.

There are ways to move about in the Rain without been struck by lightning, notice civilian life, don't stop when there is lightning, why?

Stay under a larger "structure", Same as normal movenment in a combact zone, stay low, move quickly, stay out of the open i.e. Let the higher structure draw the lightning, don't be the highest structure, don't stay under tree static, move in between the tress, keep moving till you reach the objective. Once there, don't tell me you stand up right for all to see, in a open ground.

Sad but follow orders, fighting in Rain situation, need to take care of footing. Be extra careful, as they can't detect you, you also can't detect them too. Handling of Sighted weapons, need extra care, or you might be staring into a small pool of water.

Erm, snowfox. We do train in the rain. We don't train under cat 1 status. There is a difference in that.

Cat 1 Status refers to whether there is lightning hazard. If we are in a well forested area, the OC may decide to carry on with training regardless of Cat 1. However, this is not applied across the board.

Eg. Bridging engineers have to stop at cat1 simply cos their exercise requires them to be out in the open on floating pontoons. Whereas infantry might still be able to carry out their navigation exercises without problem.

Me Not Combat Engineer. Just Offensive Arms trained.

Have seen quite afew exerises cancel because of some report of Cat 1.

It is not the Navigation stuff that I am worried about, but the Moving to Contact/Recce ops. Skill of operating in a wet weather, which is fairly common in Asia.

Surprise Surprise.
Water Ops in the Rain, isn't exactly trying to stay under cover.

Unless there is some Structure/pontoon, that is able to take the lightning strike, the practises of continue operation aren't exactly safe.

Weather forcasting on the Unit Level
Hint Hint, in ancient Chinese warfare text. It claims that some Generals were able to foretell the weather, and used it to their advantage.

With a host of modern equipement at our disposal, don't think that it is too far fletch idea. But beyond that of this topic line.

Maybe, have each Platoon, have a Lightning detector tie with the Medic.
(It is just a Board band radio, when a lightning strike near by, it generates a large Electromagnetic pulse that alot of cheap radio can pick up, the expensive stuff, try to filter out this noise. Note it does not fore-tell lightning, but tell that one has struck nearby)

ps Shotgun: do you want a copy of Jane's Armour 2006?

Read the main posting; click on the link below to view the responses...quite some eye opening points how the US view the foot soldier teaming effectiveness.

Subject: Re-organizing light infantry?

An interesting article that suggests breaking the infantry platoon down into big fire teams and eliminating the squad echelon. I've thought this sounded interesting for quite a while, especially since that often becomes the de-facto organization anyway after extended combat. Since platoon numbers would be way smaller, the author advocated a fourth platoon to make up the end numbers somewhat.

Comments?
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Organising Infantry

William F Owen

“Organisation should be an expression of doctrine and doctrine should be an expression of experience.”
Lt Col Robert Leonhard –20031

A small amount of study will reveal that the vast majority of the world’s infantry units are organised along roughly the same lines. This is often interpreted as being indicative of certain well-founded principles. Close examination shows this to be less than certain.

Modern infantry organisations are essentially arbitrary, and underpinned with a rationale that supports the status quo. The size and shape of squads, platoons and companies, as we see them today, were and are far more shaped by cost, career, and manpower issues than they are by doctrine or tactics. For example, the operationally proven four-section platoon of 1918 had sunk to three sections by 1938, purely to satisfy economic constraints and the need to procure less automatic section weapons2.

This leads to a debate between soldier and accountant, where the soldier states that a section must be eight men, and the accountant then asks “can 6 men with the right equipment, do the same job as 8?”

Few have yet asked, “how do I best organise infantry to perform operations?” In fact the British Army did ask this question, but only in relation to operating in Northern Ireland, where they re-organised the platoon into the multiple, which was based on “bricks” of 4 men. This was only ever done in Northern Ireland and the question has to be asked, that if the platoon cannot operate in that environment, then how valid an operational grouping is it? Do you need to re-organise for urban operations? Current operational analysis strongly suggest that you might be forced go from rural to urban as part of the same action.

The first question that has to be asked is how many men can leaders control effectively? “Regardless of the technical ability to communicate with every formation or unit within the span of command, studies have shown that a ratio of more than four or five subordinates of command to one headquarters is the maximum that a commander can effectively manage.” – Army Doctrine Publication 2 – Command, paragraph 0411.

The above is telling, in two ways. Firstly it was the product of some detailed research by the British Army in the early 1980s and secondly because it reached exactly the same conclusions as the General Ivor Maxse, who was responsible for the British Armies pre-WW1 reorganisation.

So the first principle we have is that there should be a maximum of 5 sub units under each HQ.

The second key question to be asked is what is it I want my various units to be able to do? This is near impossible to answer, unless you have a method of operation already defined. But resources also limit what you can do, so this quickly becomes a circular argument. The answer would seem to lie in looking at existing practices and drawing conclusions from them, but beware. How operationally valid is it to have platoon advancing across country, bunker busting as it goes? This might be good training, but is it a good model for your organisation?

The third question is how will we know if we are achieving our aim - that is to seek effective principles on which to organise infantry? The answer would appear to be that you do not need to re-organise for different operations or conditions, and that operations have become quicker and simpler. If not, then perhaps the principles are not coherent.

It really isn’t important how many men are in a platoon or if you call X number of men a platoon. Making statements that “you cannot have 16 men in a platoon, because a platoon is 32,” gets the process nowhere. Therefore we aim for broad principles, not absolute numbers.

Every infantry training pamphlet since 1917 states that platoons and sections will have to be able to operate with less than the optimum number of men, so we should be able to organise any number of men into viable groupings.

The Fire-Team
The smallest viable grouping of men is 3. You would not give a task or mission to a smaller group. Take any number between 3 and 15 and see how you can organise that many into viable fire-teams of 3-5 men.
Examples:
6 men – worst case, and can either remain as one team or split to 2 x 3 teams.
11 men – 2 x 4 man teams with 1 x 3 man team.
There is good evidence this works. Special forces operate for extended periods of time in 4 or 5 man teams. The British Army recommended 3-5 men as the basis for a reconnaissance patrol for many years and this is certainly borne out by men like Sidney Jary, who, based on his operational experience, is emphatic that exercising control over more than 4 others at night, on a complex and dangerous task is asking for trouble3. ‘You, you and you’ is a powerfully simple basis. Since the first core function is “FIND”, it may be very sensible to base everything on a reconnaissance function.

We know that a 4-man team can maintain 24-hour observation4, indefinitely, using one man observing and one man on guard. Five men would find the task less arduous, but 3 would find it too arduous and would have to conduct the task with less security.

A basic infantry fire-team should have one belt fed weapon and a variety of others that complement each other. In terms of the current issue 5.56mm weapons: a belt fed weapon, such as FN-Minimi, SA-80, plus SA-80 with UGL and an LSW would seem about right.

Other weapons systems can also benefit from a fire-team approach. The GPMG is often crewed by 2 men in the light role. The No1 carries the gun at 10.9kg + 50 rounds = 12.37kg and the No2 carries 360 rounds 7.62mm link at 10.6kg plus his own weapon, so he’ll have close to an equal load. But, this means that the gun has only 410 rounds immediately available. If there were a No3 and 4, also carrying 360 rounds, then the gun would have 1,130 rounds immediately available.

If you use the same 4 men to crew 2 guns, then there are 820 rounds between the two guns. And, if one of the gun team loses a man it becomes impossible to support and fire the gun over much time and distance. In other words, the 4-man gun team has true redundancy and more fighting power. The penalty is the partial loss of the services of the two riflemen as specialist riflemen. It depends on whether you see the team as a rifle force supported by a machine gun or a machine gun force supported by riflemen.

Almost any support weapon system benefits from being grouped with 3-5 men.

The Fire-Team Group (FTG) (Platoon) The fire-team group is 4 x fire-teams and a weapons-team. Four fire-teams allow for a 1st Echelon, a 2nd Echelon and a reserve. This adheres to the core functions of find, fix, strike, and exploit.
So, based on this, a full strength FTG is 30 men, - 6 groups of 5 men. (See diagram):

This suggests that a useful FTG is 4 x fire-teams, a fire GPMG support team, with an HQ. Does this mean a smaller platoon? The current establishment for the platoon is between 36 and 28 officers and men dependant on role5, so 30 men is not a manning challenge. Amateur mathematicians will note that if each group in a FTG is 4 men, then you have a total of 24. 4 x 24 is 96, and thus the same as 3 x 32. A 24 man FTG gives a company commander 4 manoeuvre units, rather than 3, and thus he can constitute a true reserve.

Nothing suggested here, is new6. It is merely an attempt at codifying an approach, already well examined by others, and proven in trials to have some considerable, though not absolute, merit7.

To those who say, “well there must be something to the 8-man section. Look at the Roman contubernium” a quick history lesson may prove useful. A contubernium 8 was in rough translation, a mess unit or “tentful”. This was purely an administrative grouping, for eating sleeping and the use of a mule for transport (one hopes). It was nothing to do with fighting. 8 men would not have lasted long on the battlefield of the day, and the basic manoeuvre unit was the cohort (460 men approx). Add to this that a contubernium was, in fact anywhere from 4-10 men and we see those who say, “Well look at the Romans,” are barking up the wrong tree.

Wilf Owen is a freelance writer and broadcaster. He is the author of Blackfoot Is Missing, Hutchinson, Pbk, £9.99.

Words:

1 Interview with author. Lt Col Leonhard is the author of “The Art of Manoeuvre”, “Fighting in Minutes” and “Principles of War for the Information Age.”

2 By 1918 each section had a Lewis Gun. By 1938 the BREN gun was introduced, but at only 3 per platoon.

3 Interview with author. Sandhurst Jan 14th 2003

4 HQ Infantry, Support Weapons Wing, Netheravon. Close Recce Course handbook 1989. and Hugh McManners, Falklands Commando.

5 This covers a description ranging from Armoured Infantry (36) to Lt Inf (V) (28)

6 Major (now Lt Col) A D Mason PARA, “Debate: Infantry Low Level Tactics”, ADTN 6. – and Maj (now Lt Col) Jim Storr KINGS “Exercise Sea Wall” BAR 119.

7 Op cit

8 William Smith, D.C.L., LL.D.: A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, John Murray, London, 1875.


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