There are a lot of hyper-links which I did not include. Go to the original page itself to find them. The only one I included is the one to the video (towards the end).

* * * * *



http://www.defensereview.com/modules.php?n...article&sid=853
Ultimax 100 MK4: Best Choice for USMC Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR)?
(Monday, March 27 @ 09:02:24 PST)

by David Crane
defrev@gmail.com

...

The Ultimax 100 LMG/SAW (5.56x45mm), designed and developed (along with its 100-shot drum magazine) from scratch in the late 1970's/early 1980's by Jim Sullivan (L. James Sullivan) and his design/development partner Bob Waterfield for then CIS of Singapore (now Singapore Technologies Kinetics Land Systems, a.k.a. ST Kinetics Land Systems), is considered by many small arms experts to be the best 5.56mm light machine gun/squad automatic weapon (LMG/SAW) in the history of the world.

DefenseReview has been writing about the Ultimax 100 LMG/SAW virtually since our inception. And, in the last year or so, we've discussed the Ultimax quite a bit. In our article on Noveske Rifleworks Weapons packages, we discussed not only what's important about he Ultimax, but also how and why it's superior to the U.S. Army's current light machine gun/squad automatic weapon (LMG/SAW), the problematic/subpar FN M249 SAW. We also mentoned the Ultimax 100 SAW in two of our articles on the Auto-Assault-12 Shotgun (AA-12 Shotgun): our first-ever blurb on the AA-12, and our more extensive article on the AA-12 and FRAG-12 12-gauge armor-piercing grenade family, published subsequently.

The reason we bring all this up is because Vincent L. Deniro (CEO) and Brian Vuksanovich (Chief Engineer) at American Defense Management, Inc. (ADM) have developed a bunch of modifications to the Ultimax 100 MK3 for VT Kinetics/Vision Technologies Systems, Inc. (VT Systems, Inc.) to create the...

Ultimax 100 MK4. One of these modifications is a 4179 STANAG AR-15/M16 magazine adapter that allows the Ultimax MK4 to accept both 30-round AR-15/M16 mags and 100-shot Beta C-MAGs.

Author's Note: The original C-MAG was also designed and developed by Jim Sullivan. Before The BETA Company (a.k.a. BETA Co.) changed the TDP (technical data package) on the C-MAG, the original design's double-drum magazine body was made from a type of nylon, and the center feed portion (box mag portion) was made of steel and rise above the double-drum portion like it does now. Both of these material aspects were on purpose. Because the double-drum portion was made of nylon, the original C-MAG worked reliably without the need for any type of lubricant. In other words, it didn't require graphite powder lubrication to move the ammo/cartridges around the drums reliably. BETA Co. changed the nylon double-drum portion to a different material (a type of plastic/polymer) and changed the center feed portion to polymer/plastic, in the process making the center feed portion taller (due to the need to reinforce this part to prevent cracking/sheering during firing). One good thing the BETA Co. has done to the BETA C-MAG recently is to make the back plate of the C-MAG clear (Lexan), just like the latest factory Ultimax 100 drum mag (also 100-shots) back plate, so the operator can keep track of his ammo supply visually, during the fight.

The Ultimax 100 MK4 fires from the open-bolt, fires at a cyclic rate/rate-of-fire (ROF) of 400-600 RPM (Rounds-Per-Minute), and can be adjusted between these two rates by the operator. The MK4 can be had with a 13-inch barrel, side-folding buttstock, and Mil-Std-1913 rail system on top of the receiver (for mounting optics, lasers, etc.) and on the forend at the 3, 6, and 9 o'clock positions for mounting additional accessories (tactical white lights, lasers, vertical foregrips, etc.). Just like all versions of the Ultimax before it, the Ultimax MK4 utilizes the "Constant-Recoil" principle (invented by Jim Sullivan specifically for the Ultimax) which allows it to outhit heavier machine guns (chambered in the same caliber) on full-auto. "Constant-Recoil" reduces felt-recoil and muzzle rise and thus increases controllability on full-auto, resulting in more hits on target. This recoil attenuation/mitigation aspect makes the Ultimax the most contollable LMG/SAW in the world, even though it's also the lightest-weight LMG/SAW in the world.

Believe it or not, the Ultimax offers an 8:1 hit ratio advantage over the M16 rifle when both are fired offhand on full-auto side by side against multiple targets, including moving targets. When both weapons are fired from the bi-pod, the Ultimax offers a 2.5:1 hit ratio advantage over the M16. The box/drum mag-fed Ultimax 100 LMG/SAW will outhit the belt-fed FN M249 SAW and MK46 MOD 0/1 at 3-times the range, on full-auto, even though it weighs considerably less (9-10.1 lbs, depending on the configuration vs. a listed 16.75 lbs for the M249 SAW).

The box-magazine/drum-magazine/double-drum magazine-fed Ultimax 100 MK4 is also much faster and easier to reload in a fight than the M249 SAW, especially in a dynamic, fluid situation like a running gun battle/firefight while the infantryman is firing on-the-move. In this situation, it's nice to be able to reload quickly and relatively easily on the move as well, which the Ultimax allows an operator to do. The Ultimax can be reloaded as quickly and easily as an assault rifle, since it's magazine-fed, rather than belt-fed. As it happens, the Ultimax 100 series is also significantly more reliable under adverse/combat conditions and high-round-count than the FN M249.

In fact, the Ultimax is so good that noted gunwriter Charlie Cutshaw, in his article on the Ultimax 100 MK4 for the latest issue of Special Weapons for Military & Police (SWMP), states that the Ultimax 100 MK3/MK4 makes for the best existing answer to the U.S. Marine Corps' (USMC) stated requirements for an "Infantry Automatic Rifle" (IAR). Defense Review wholeheartedly agrees. The Marines could certainly do a lot worse. Incedentally, the Ultimax 100 MK4 is the cover gun of this issue (#42).

Richt-Click here and then click on "Save Target As" to download and watch the boys from American Defense Management, Inc. put the Ultimax 100 SAW/LMG through its paces a little bit, and demonstrate its high controllability on full-auto (off-hand shooting).

If you'd like to get more info on the Ultimax 100 MK4 LMG/SAW, DefRev recommends that you contact American Defense Management, Inc. (ADM) by phone at 724-991-5418, by fax at 815-331-5271, or by email at adm@nowonline.net. Ask for Vince DeNiro or Brian Vuksanovich (if you can pronounce that last name...kidding).

Interesting article.

Link: Ultimax 100 SAW vs. M-249 SAW

Picture from the web link. Ultimax 100 Mk4.

NICE!!!

Cool. When is SAF going to start replacing the older Mk2 with the newer Mk4? :)

The real question is this: Can the new U100 take SAR21 mags?

It will be v. nice to see USMC take U100 as their next LMG!!! Good validation of the weapon.

Southpark
The Dude :(

Then the next question should be - can ST Kinetic build an an adaptor to take SAR21 mag? Can SAR21 takes an M16 mag?

I was hoping no adapters required..... :D

I wonder about SAF will fork out money to do changes of MK2 to MK4. I was a SAW gunner (Ultimax 100 MK2 user) in my NS days. Sadly, it cannot change barrel, fixed carriage grip and no custom Ultimax 100 sling was issued to me so i was force to use a M-16 sling (no good as the sling will drop out if thugged). Hope to get my hands on a MK4 soon in my ICT.

I dun think so as SAR 21 has a mag catch different from the M-16's. M-16 mag for SAW (Ultimax 100) has two holes for the mag catch use in the Ultimax 100 or the mag will drop out easily or unable to feed properly! (I was a Ultimax 100 MK2 user dun know about MK4 got a changes)

The Mk3 and Mk3A already had changeable barrels.

Lots of the issues in the Mk2 was resolved with the Mk3, including the butt-stock attachment.

I've trained in base level repair on all the SAWs, and the difference is quite evident.The metal used, is slightly better too.

USMC Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR) Program Enters Phase 3
Posted on Saturday, April 12 @ 09:15:59 PDT by davidc
by David Crane
defrev at gmail dot com

April 11, 2008

It's DefenseReview's understanding that the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR) program officially hit "Phase 3" (or, "Phase III") about two (2) weeks ago with a Phase 3 solicitation notice for IAR submissions (unconfirmed/unverified). As of the Phase 2 (a.k.a. Phase II) solicitation notice, the Marines were looking to acquire/procure approx. 4,500 weapons (IARs). DefenseReview doesn't yet know if this acquisition objective number has remained the same for IAR Phase III.

According to one of our industry contacts, more companies will...


be submitting weapons for Phase 3 than was the case for Phase 2. It's Defense Review's understanding at present that only FNH USA (FN Herstal USA) and General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products (GDATP) actually submitted demonstration weapons for IAR Phase 2 (unconfirmed/unverified), although we're not sure about this. This time around, Land Warfare Resources Corporation (LWRC) will be competing with its own IAR prototype weapons (6 demonstration/test weapons). DefenseReview doesn't know whether Colt Defense, LLC and/or Heckler & Koch (HK) will be submitting their own IAR concepts (concept weapons), but we're guessing Colt will be. We're going to call both companies to try to find out.

The contract specialist for the IAR program is Rick Baumgartner, so Defense Review will be contacting him.

Stay tuned...


http://www.defensereview.com/modules.php?n...rticle&sid=1117

The contenders =

COLT, LWRC, GDATP ( partnering ST ), FN

my guess - either Colt or LWRC will win, likely to be Colt

Its a loaded competition ....
Bean counting and politiking will single out Colt, LWRC soothes the beancounters only, FN and GD are just kids looking thru the glass at the candystore.

I don't think HK entered, their strategy of working with SFs against Colt backfired - the Army is forcing the SF boys to surrender their HK416s...

When and how did the USMC come up with redeploying the M249 as a platoon weapon and the need for a IAF?

The following 2004 articles from the Marine Corp Association Gazette shows the birth of the concept and the evaluation done


====================


Automatic Rifle Concept: Part I—History and Empirical Testing

by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby

‘Those German units fortunate enough to have officers who understood the effect of modern firepower went into battle in dispersed skirmish lines, with as many as six meters between each man and with each man granted the freedom to make use of whatever cover was available during his forward movement.’1

—Bruce Gudmundsson
Stormtroop Tactics


The relationship between the lethality of weapons and the dispersion of the troops found on the same battlefield has been a consideration for commanders since man first engaged in combat. From the Spartan phalanx to German stormtroop operations, combat leaders have been forced to adjust their tactics to the technology of the day. The dispersion of the troops has always been a critical aspect of the tactics employed. As the lethality of weapons has increased so has the dispersion necessary to preserve combat power.


History
Throughout history, advances in technology have driven tactical changes. As smaller units of combatants have gained greater firepower, dispersion has become a critical function of survivability on the battlefield. Dispersion is not merely a function of physical distance between elements but also incorporates the elements of mobility, command, and control. One end of the spectrum of dispersion is a massed armed force in physical contact, slow to move, and under the direct observation and control of its senior leader. The opposite end of the spectrum is a force of individual skirmishers moving quickly and guided only by a general intent. Commanders have continually adjusted the deployment of their forces in order to most effectively bring fire to bear on the enemy while simultaneously attempting to minimize the effects of enemy fire on their own forces.


The combatants of World War I learned a number of lessons as they attempted to resolve how to increase dispersion in the face of increased firepower, while still maintaining some type of control over their squads and platoons. By increasing the training standards of the individual soldier they hoped to enable themselves to decentralize command and increase dispersion.2 Better trained soldiers could operate more effectively without direct supervision.


Realizing that coordinated rushes drew fire, soldiers began advancing using stealth, microterrain, and individual rushes.3 The development of a light machinegun and trench mortar—fielded at the squad level—increased the unit’s firepower without having to resort to linear formations of riflemen.4 Without the need to “build up the skirmish line,” squads could maneuver freely, furthering dispersion while maintaining offensive momentum.5


By the beginning of World War II almost all combatants possessed squad organizations built around light machineguns and automatic rifles (ARs). Armies fielded units capable of the dispersion necessary to survive and operate on this new, more expansive battlefield in both offensive and defensive operations.


As World War II progressed, American Army and Marine Corps squads focused on gaining further firepower that improved their survivability and allowed for further dispersion and movement. Army experiences in the bocage country of Normandy and the woods of the Huertgen forest led to two and even three Browning ARs (BARs) at the squad level. The American “light” machinegun—a water-cooled, .30 caliber model—could not be used in the assault due to its weight.6


The Marine Corps developed the fire team concept. As early as the Corps’ Nicaragua experience, Marines recognized the need for a squad-level automatic weapon.7 Through World War I and into the Pacific campaigns of World War II, Marine Corps squad development continually evolved toward smaller maneuver elements, each armed with an AR. In keeping with the “triangle” concept, the Corps finished World War II with the 3 fire team, 13-man squad still utilized today.8


By Vietnam the Marine Corps rifle squad lost the BAR as an AR largely due to logistical, vice tactical, concerns.9 Attempts to replace the BAR with a modified M14, a never fielded M15, or the M60 medium machinegun proved to be failures.10


After the Vietnam War the Marine Corps led development of the M16A2 to replace the M16A1. However, with the loss of the M16A1’s full automatic capability, even the fiction of an AR at the fire team and squad level disappeared.11 As the M16A2 was fielded the Marine Corps searched for an available weapons system to fill in the AR void. While some testing apparently occurred, the vagaries of the contracting system and the urgency of fielding demands led to the selection of the FN Minimi light machinegun—the M249 squad automatic weapon (and the introduction of the term “SAW” to the Marine Corps lexicon).12


The Assessment
The relationship between lethality and dispersion has recently come under scrutiny in the context of a debate over the role of the M249 SAW within the Marine rifle squad and the need for a true automatic weapon in the infantry. Two articles will discuss the role of the M249 SAW, the need for a true automatic weapon in the infantry, and the constrained reorganization of the infantry company to best utilize the strengths of organic weapons systems. This article will address the relationship between lethality and dispersion, examine the historical background of the AR, and provide the results of a 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) sponsored assessment of three ARs and the M249 SAW.


In May 2001 the 1st MarDiv commissioned a study tasking 2d Battalion, 7th Marines to execute a quantitative and qualitative assessment of several AR candidates alongside the M249 SAW. The objective of this assessment was twofold:


• Determine if the AR is more effective than the SAW in an operational environment during day, low-light, and night in selected offensive and defensive operations.

• Evaluate the SAW through organizational change by considering constrained reorganization that will experiment with a SAW consolidation within the infantry squad and platoon.

Once the quantitative results were obtained (detailed results are included in this article), the battalion attempted to answer the following two questions:


• Will the inclusion of the AR in the infantry squad and the consolidation of the SAW at the squad level enhance the effectiveness of the platoon?

• Will the inclusion of the AR in the infantry squad and the consolidation of the SAW at the platoon level enhance the effectiveness of the company?

In attempting to answer the two questions above, several other questions were generated that created more debate on the utility of the SAW and its role in the battalion and the role of the AR in the fire team. The debate centered on the following:


• Should the M249 be replaced outright or have its role tailored to meet its capabilities (light machinegun or AR)?

• Can the historical progression of increased lethality be forwarded and, if so, how?

• How or should the Marine Corps rifle squad and platoon be organized to maximize strengths and minimize weaknesses of the SAW, increase dispersion in the face of the new lethality that might be developed with more automatic weapons in the rifle squads, and take advantage of new technologies?

Before the assessment began the following generally held weapons definitions were adopted. A machinegun is a weapon possessing interchangeable barrels in order to allow continuous high-volume fires. The high volumes are achieved by using belt-fed ammunition. The machinegun will have an effective range beyond that of rifles as impacts of rounds can be directed onto targets by other members of the machinegun team.


An AR will be designed around the battle rifle of the infantry (currently the M16A2) but may come with a heavy barrel to retard heat buildup. It will be magazine fed and possess the capacity to be employed in a fully automatic role. The effective range of the AR should be comparable to the rifle. According to Chuck Taylor, author of The Fighting Rifle:


The automatic rifle is a small arm intended for short-term automatic fire missions against point targets. It is incapable of sustained automatic fire due to the lack of a quick-change barrel, which in turn, causes overheating, and the removal of the weapon from serviceable status. The AR is also fed from a detachable box magazine, not a belt, as is a true machine gun. Automatic rifles are NOT machine guns!13

An AR should be employed by an individual shooter and used in close combat. The AR, with its lower rate of fire, buffer spring, and greatly reduced recoil, gives added advantage of accuracy and shooter endurance. Unlike a light machinegun, an AR is designed to engage point or small area targets. It is intended to be a “mobile base of fire” around which the fire team maneuvers. The AR provides the maneuver element itself with an organic, moving volume of fire in the attack.


Only infantry could gain ground. To make possible the advance of infantry in such circumstances required that some weapon, dominant in its firepower, readily mobile, extremely accurate at short range, capable of being handled by one man and easily concealed, should be available to fill in the gap between the lifting of the artillery barrage and the moment at which the arme blanche could be used.14

Based on the generally held weapons definitions adopted, three ARs were acquired off-the-shelf to participate in the assessment with the M249 SAW. These three weapons were the Colt AR, the Ultimax 100 (manufactured by Singapore Arms), and the Heckler & Koch (HK) G36.

The Weapons
The Colt is a variant of the current M16A2 with the exact same sights and commonality of parts. The Colt AR weighs 15 pounds—8 more pounds than the M16A2. The additional weight is due primarily to a heavy barrel intended to retard heat buildup. Other alterations include a pistol grip attached to the fore end, a hydraulic buffer to retard recoil and rise, and a design change enabling the automatic variant to fire from the open bolt, reducing the possibility of cookoffs from excessive heat buildup. The Colt has a rate of fire of 650 rounds per minute.


The Ultimax 100 is similar in look to the M249 SAW. Like the SAW it fires from the open bolt but does not possess a spare barrel and is fed by magazine only. Because it weighs only 9 pounds, shooters can easily employ the Ultimax in a variety of methods. An adjustable gas regulator with 3 settings allows for a rate of fire varying from 450 to 600 rounds per minute.


The HK is a lightweight rifle capable of being fired in a fully automatic role from the closed bolt. The version tested had optical sights with an over/under system. The lower sight system has a 3.5 magnified scope with multiple crosshairs. The upper system was an aim point dot variation for limited visibility shooting. Total weight of the weapons system tested was 7 pounds. The rate of fire is 650 rounds per minute.


Testing
Phase I began 21 July 2001 with the receipt of the test bed of ARs. Forty-eight Marines en route to the battalion from their recent graduation at the School of Infantry were selected as the test bed shooters in order to eliminate as much preexisting bias concerning the SAW as possible. The tradeoff for using new Marines was a lack of marksmanship understanding and a failure to grasp open-bolt firing concepts. The 48 Marines were divided into four 12-man squads labeled A, B, C, and D. Marines in each squad were then numbered 1 through 12. Each squad was armed with one of the four weapons systems (Colt, HK, Ultimax, and SAW). Each weapon was then zeroed to the individual shooter. Once a weapon was zeroed to a specific Marine, the other three Marines in his number series would shoot for an offset aim point; i.e., shooter A1 zeroed the SAW and then shooters B1, C1, and D1 used offset aim points for the SAW. All number one shooters would shoot all four of the number one weapons on each test. This allowed a much quicker transition from weapon to weapon throughout the test.

Eight separate tests were designed to assess the accuracy of the three AR candidates and the SAW in various operational situations. The main focus of these tests was to determine if the ARs were more accurate than the SAW in various attitudes, ranges, and conditions.


Test 1 was the M249 SAW paper qualification course fired from 36 yards. The purpose of this test was to use the M249’s strongest event to establish a baseline for comparison. The other weapons would compete against the SAW in its most favored environment. The most accurate weapon for this event was the Colt and the least accurate the HK. Table 1 shows that shooters using the Colt qualified in the first or second class two and a half times higher than shooters using the other weapons.


Test 2 was a quick-kill course established at Range 105A. Shooters engaged three targets from the standing, kneeling, and prone positions with nine rounds in a time frame of 20 seconds. A target hit was valued at 1; a miss was valued at 0. The quick-kill targets were established at ranges of 25, 50, and 100 yards. The purpose of Test 2 was to determine the accuracy of the weapons in the critical, last 100 yards of an assault. The Marines used all of the field firing positions to duplicate the firing methods of combat Marines in urban or jungle warfare. Table 2 shows the results of Test 2.

During Test 2 minor issues developed with each of the weapons systems. Shooters repeatedly had negligent discharges with the Colt, attributable to the Marines forgetting the difference between the closed-bolt M16A2 and the open-bolt AR. The young Marines kept riding the bolt home on a live round, thereby firing the round. With the Ultimax, the shooters realized that the sights were set too low in the rear. Once they achieved stock weld the sights proved to be lower than the eye could see, forcing stock weld to be broken and causing the shooter to search for the sights. With the HK the 3.5 power magnification proved too much at 25 and 50 yards but beneficial at 100 yards. Overmagnification at shorter ranges slowed down the presentation of the weapon onto the target. For the M249 SAW, the weight and length in general made this an extremely cumbersome weapon in field firing positions. Another problem resulted from the commonality of the Colt AR and the M16A2. The familiarity led to initial accuracy, as the young Marines had not yet become familiar with the other weapons.

Test 3 was fired from the prone position, using bipods for stability, engaging popup targets ranging in distance from 50 to 300 meters, with a varied time limit (See Table 3.) A 20-target exposure using 40 rounds was fired from Field Manual 23–9 (FM 23–9), M16A1 and M16A2 Rifle Marksmanship Table I. (See Figure 1.) This evaluation determined quick reaction from a defensive position to an attacking enemy.

Test 4 occurred on the same range as Test 3, firing Table II of FM 23–14, M249 Light Machinegun in the Automatic Rifle Role (see Figure 2), the SAW transition course of fire. A shooter in the prone position with 66 rounds engaged popup targets ranging in distance from 100 to 300 meters with a varied time limit. (See Table 4.) This test again gave the M249 the benefit of the doubt by firing a course of fire designed for the light machinegun. However, the only weapon that could qualify as a light machinegun, the M249 SAW, posted the worst results.

Test 5 was fired using long-range popup targets without team leader assistance. Targets ranged from 250 to 800 meters. (See Figure 3.) Testing employed a 20-target exposure firing 100 rounds per weapon from a supported prone position with varied time exposures. (See Table 5.)

The results from Test 5 identified difficulties for a single shooter to engage targets beyond 300 meters. To effectively and accurately engage targets at these ranges, weapons systems need to be operated by a team, fired from a tripod, and assisted by team leaders using magnified optics.

Tests 6 and 7 (see Tables 6 and 7 for test results) consisted of field firing at elevated targets (simulating urban patrol engagements) placed at distances of 100 to 150 meters. The targets were automated, three-dimensional “Ivan” popup targets. A 5-target exposure was used and engaged with 15 rounds with no time limit, but total time for each shooter was recorded. Shooters fired from standing and kneeling positions with and without the field protective mask.

Test 8 consisted of night fire on an automated range with targets arrayed from 75 to 300 meters. (See Figure 4.) Ambient light was less than 20 percent. All weapons were zeroed with PEQ–2s using the laser bore light prior to the range. (See Table 8.) The Ultimax 100 was not tested because there was no way to mount the PEQ–2 to the weapon.


The final evaluation of the assessment was aimed at capturing intangible characteristics and qualities of the weapons that numeric data could not capture. Marines involved in the test filled out a shooter evaluation questionnaire that attempted to capture the intangibles of each weapon. The comparison of these questionnaires with actual range performance produced some interesting results. On average, during Tests 1 through 4 the 48 shooters preferred the weapons in the following order: Ultimax 100, HK, Colt, and M249 SAW. The questions on the questionnaire focused on nine areas: (1) overall performance, (2) using system sights, (3) detecting and identifying targets, (4) adjusting windage, (5) adjusting elevation, (6) adjusting weapons zero, (7) maintaining zero, (8) malfunctions, and (9) stoppages. Even though the Colt fired the most accurately in most stages, it was next to last in shooter preference.

Recommendations for modifications were requested for each of the weapons systems. The M249 and Colt were viewed as too heavy. The HK failed to stay on target in burst fire while the Ultimax sight system did not present to the eye at all. When the shooter laid his cheek on the stock of the weapon and achieved a proper stock weld he found the sights of the weapon lay below the line of sight capability of his eye. Accuracy—although according to raw data better than the current M249 SAW in every test—was of such a limited amount as to be statistically insignificant. Only on Test 3 did any weapon outperform the SAW by more than 10 percent accuracy.

“Automatic fire is inherently less accurate than semiautomatic fire.”15 The difficulty becomes achieving a balance between weapons that provide a combination of the accuracy of semiautomatic fire while maintaining the ability to employ full automatic fire when required. This is the reason the Marine Corps modified its BARs so they could fire semiautomatically—to provide both capabilities.

Infantrymen feel strongly about replacing the M249 SAW with a true AR inside the fire team but feel just as strongly about keeping the M249 SAW for its automatic fire suppressive capability. Given the results of this assessment, accuracy alone is not a strong enough reason to replace the M249 SAW. However, most would argue that accuracy was never the problem with the M249 SAW. The problem with the M249 SAW was the lack of mobility when manned by an individual while attempting to move at the pace of a rifle team.


The M249 SAW provides the accuracy that fire teams and squads require. The quantitative tests of Phase I proved the variation in accuracy between the M249 SAW and its competitors small enough to not be worth the time, money, and effort to replace it. Despite the mitigation of the accuracy issue, the M249 SAW could not meet the requirements of mobility and semiautomatic fire accuracy.


Unfortunately, the competitors tested during Phase I of the AR assessment do not appear to offer what the Marine Corps needs. As stated previously, the HK failed to stay on target in burst fire while the Ultimax sight system did not present to the eye at all. The commonality of the Colt AR with the M16A2 appeared to be advantageous. Yet the Colt proved to be the only weapon that experienced negligent discharges during the firing of 120,000 rounds. This fault resulted, in part, from young Marines failing to understand the open-bolt system but also, in part, from weapon design. Open bolts are inherently dangerous. Traditionally, we fear carrying an open-bolt weapon in the condition one mode of ready to fire. The primary shooter can be trained to be safe with the weapon, but primary shooter casualties will soon place the weapons in untrained hands, quickly leading to friendly fire hazards.


Using the assessment as a “jumping off” point, at the conclusion of Phase I of the AR test, a universal need statement (UNS) was drafted and submitted through 1st MarDiv. The statement requested that the M249 be replaced with a “true” AR. The weapon envisioned would fire 5.56mm ball ammunition, be capable of receiving the M16A2’s 30-round magazine, and would possess a selector lever that went from safe to automatic to semiautomatic (in that order), weigh less than 12 pounds loaded, employ sights equal to the M16A2, use clip-on bipods, and have a 450 to 600 rounds per minute rate of fire.


Phase I testing did not provide a “yes” to the original question—“is an AR more accurate than the M249 SAW?” It did, however, highlight the need for a mobile AR, capable of semiautomatic fire at the fire team level. Further, it illuminated the need to address the future employment and role of the M249 SAW light machinegun and a “true” AR in the fire teams, squads, and platoons of the Marine Corps.


Because of the results achieved in Phase I, testing carried forth with the same automatic weapons into Phase II. Experimental squad and platoon organizations were constructed in order to examine the idea of consolidating the SAWs at various levels of command. The next article in this series will fully addresses the AR UNS submitted by 1st MarDiv and the issues that arose from the experimental organizations.

Automatic Rifle Concept: Part II—Reorganizing the Infantry Squad

by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby

This is the second article outlining the automatic rifle
assessment conducted by 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7).


The previous article summarized the relationship between weapons lethality and dispersion on the battlefield and the need for a highly mobile automatic rifle (AR)—reliable and capable of semiautomatic fire—at the fire team (FT) level. The first article also indicated that, rather than eliminate the M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) from the Marine Corps inventory, the weapon should be employed in its designed role as a light machinegun (LMG). The M249 as an LMG, coupled with a true AR at the FT level, would markedly increase the lethality of the infantry squad. It would further the historical paradigm, already outlined in the first article, of increased lethality resulting in the need for increased dispersion.



Because of the results achieved in Phase I, experimental squad and platoon organizations were constructed in order to examine how the inclusion of a true AR and the consolidation of the SAWs at various levels of command would affect tactics, techniques, and procedures at the platoon, squad, and FT level. This article will summarize the results of the constrained squad reorganization.



2/7 reorganized its rifle companies in order to better utilize the SAW and to integrate the AR into the squads. The battalion hoped that different configurations in squad and platoon organization might prove better at taking advantage of the mass, flexibility, and command and control available when removing LMGs from the assault role. Each rifle company maintained one platoon, using the current table of organization (T/O) and with current tables of equipment, to act as the evaluation’s control group. The companies then reorganized one of their platoons, integrating the ARs and consolidating the SAWs at different levels of command. The first platoon in each company reorganized a squad by replacing the SAWs in the first and second FTs with one of the AR test variants and consolidating the SAWs in the third FT.

The battalion reintroduced the billet of grenadier, since most unit leaders felt that the team leader became too preoccupied with controlling his team and paying attention to his surroundings to effectively employ the weapon. Because an AR does not require an assistant, the new organization eliminated the billet of the assistant automatic rifleman (AAR). Whereas Marines quickly fall behind with an M249 in the assault role, they can easily operate any of the AR test variants singlehandedly. The M249 SAW received the new moniker LMG, due to the increased accuracy of the description and to aid Marines in mentally separating the LMGs from ARs during discussion and employment.


Using a gunner and assistant gunner for each LMG became a variant on the LMG FT. This variant allowed the LMG to be manned and enjoy the same benefits as a medium or heavy machinegun. Rather than merely carry extra ammunition and a spare barrel, the assistant would load, direct impacts, help move the gun, and observe for maneuver encroachment on the gun target line.

The third platoon in each company consolidated their LMGs at the platoon level; i.e., the platoon organized itself into two rifle squads armed with test variant ARs, and the nine LMGs were placed into an LMG section. This configuration truly tested the principles of mass and the ease of command and control. (See Table 3.) The benefit gained from this configuration was that the squad leader turned section leader could quickly identify targets, talk the LMGs onto them and, therefore, mass overwhelming firepower. By entirely removing the LMGs from the squads and replacing them with ARs, they would not slow the movement of the rifle squads. In addition, as in the use of the LMG FT with assistant gunners, the battalion hoped to use the section leader to relieve the LMG gunner from having to remove his eyes from the sights to search and assess targets.

Conclusions
After reorganizing the companies, 2/7 exercised the modified T/Os in several venues and exercises to include battalion-level training and Combined Arms Exercise 6–02 (CAX 6–02) at Twentynine Palms, military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) training at Camp Pendleton, and helicopter operations during Weapons and Tactics Instructor Class 10–02 (WTI Class 10–02).


In October 2001 Company G conducted a 3-week urban warfare training block at the MOUT facility at Camp Pendleton. The company evaluated the separate T/Os in a variety of scenarios and discovered pros and cons for each.


The platoon with the SAWs organized at the squad level (LMG FT) proved the most effective. The LMG FT within the squad was able to effectively develop and maintain fire superiority—independent of the notional platoon fires (M240G machineguns) to cover the squad’s movement and entry into the objective. The two AR equipped FTs of the squad proved more mobile, versatile, and agile in the assault than conventionally configured squads with the M249s still in the FT. The modified squad’s ARs provided good suppressive fires at the team level while remaining light and wieldy enough to be effective during room clearing. Movement to and into the house proved rapid, decisive, and overwhelming.


The key difficulty encountered with this organization manifested itself as traditional urban casualty rates occurred. LMG gunners had to transition from security roles inside the building to actual room clearing duties. The LMG’s bulk, weight, and general clumsiness proved deadly to the Marines attempting to employ them in room clearing operations. Marines solved this dilemma by reversing the traditionally accepted maxim of always keeping an automatic weapon in the fight. When tasked with room clearing duties, LMG gunners dropped their LMGs and picked up ARs or M16A2 rifles and ammunition from casualties to accomplish their assigned mission.


The company’s third platoon used the LMG section (LMS). In order to evaluate squad and squad leader urban training conducted earlier, the LMS fought as an independent element. It did quite well due to a very capable section leader. The firepower generated by the massing of LMGs proved to be overwhelming to the FT-sized element of defenders in the house. They could do nothing to oppose entry into the building. Once inside, while suffering from many of the individual problems involved with the M249 and room clearing, the LMS did utilize the ability to answer the enemy’s individual rifle rounds with the concentrated, if imprecise, bursts of fire from three and four massed LMGs. The ARs within the third platoon’s maneuver squads performed as expected, providing local firepower to the teams but remaining light enough to use effectively in the assault.


The Camp Pendleton training provided an excellent training and evaluation opportunity. The urban environment favored ARs once inside buildings. They remained lightweight and easy to maneuver with while providing good firepower at short ranges. The LMGs proved most effective when providing longer range suppressive fire to cover movement into buildings, while experiencing expected problems when used in the assault. The combination of ARs and LMGs within the squads provided the best of both worlds—LMGs used to provide overwhelming firepower to cover the squad’s movement and ARs used to provide overwhelming firepower within the building.


Company F evaluated the new T/O while deployed in support of a number of evolutions: WTI Class 10–01 in Yuma, Exercise STEEL KNIGHT at Twentynine Palms, various squad- to company-level live fire exercises, and CAX 6–02. Company F found that the LMS provided the ability to mass firepower quickly, increased flexibility at the squad and platoon levels, and eased the command and control responsibilities of the FT, squad, and section leaders.


The company organized into assault, support, and security elements during company live fire attacks. The M240G machinegun section and the 60mm mortar section were placed in general support of the company. Company F routinely tasked the platoon with the LMS configuration as the support element. The ability of this platoon—and the mass of fire its LMS could produce—provided the suppression needed to allow the company’s M240G machinegun and 60mm mortar sections to get into action without risking a survivability fight.


Company F used the platoon with its LMGs consolidated into LMG FTs as the company’s assault element. As with Company G the LMG FTs proved adept at generating local support by fire positions, allowing the maneuver rifle teams to safely close the critical last 100 yards to the objective. As expected the ARs with the FTs provided them with the versatile automatic weapon needed in the assault role.


Upon consolidation or withdrawal—in the case of a raid—the support element’s LMS aided the displacement of the company’s general support M240G machinegun and 60mm mortar sections. Especially during raids, the support element’s LMS gave the company a high-volume firepower asset to cover the company’s withdrawal with greater survivability and maneuverability than the company’s medium machineguns.


The battalion also conducted squad and platoon combined arms live fire exercises. During the squad evaluation the squads conducted day and night security patrols, a live fire night ambush, and a day live fire attack. The squads tasked their LMG FTs as the support element for these tasks. Again, the battalion found that M249 LMGs consolidated into FTs proved more conducive to squad-level tactical operations. In all four graded tasks the LMG FTs provided the squad leader with a manageable element that could rapidly generate a lethal amount of suppression in the small unit fight.

During the platoon evaluation, platoon commanders were augmented with a section of tanks, a squad of assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs), and an 81mm mortar team (two tubes). The platoons conducted defensive operations and attack rehearsals, a day live fire attack (including consolidation, casualty evacuation, reorganization, and resupply), a night live fire ambush (fragged over the radio late in the afternoon following the daylight attack), and a night retrograde in Mission Oriented Protective Posture 4 (MOPP 4) in order to decontaminate and conduct a MOPP gear exchange. The different platoons experimented with both the LMG FT and the LMS. Although both SAW organizations were used successfully, the learning point was that the SAWs were much more effective when they were removed from the FT in the assault. All of the platoons used their 81mm mortars and M240G machineguns to advance toward the enemy during the daylight attack. The more successful platoons utilized their LMG teams and sections to provide suppression over the last 200 meters of advance as battlefield geometry and constricted terrain forced the mortars and the machineguns (both ground mounted and tank/AAV mounted) to cease or shift firing to maintain safety parameters and surface danger zones (SDZs).


In most cases the speed and rapidity of the mounted attack prevented the platoons from maintaining effective suppression from initial mortar and machinegun positions. The LMG teams and sections provided intermediate bases of fire (300 meters and in) in order to maintain the momentum of the attack. The final piece of the suppression puzzle provided by the SAW LMG squads and sections allowed the assault squads to maneuver freely without being held up due to a lack of effective suppression.


The final evaluation of the reorganized units came during CAX 6–02. The LMG FTs and the LMS proved very effective throughout CAX, but especially so during block one—the Range 400 complex—and block two—the mobile assault course (MAC) and the helicopter assault course (HAC). A recurring problem during Range 410A and Range 400 is the inability of heavy machineguns and M240G machineguns to provide effective suppression during the entire course of the attack. There are several reasons for this phenomenon, but they are for another article.


Battlefield geometry, SDZ restrictions, and excessive ammunition usage forced initial support positions to cease or shift fires causing gaps in suppression. The LMGs were able to cover these gaps and provided an indispensable tool for the small unit commander to directly influence his fight. He was able to quickly and easily direct precise, effective suppressive fire onto the objective while husbanding his assault element’s ammunition. The same effects were observed during the MACs and the HAC. The LMGs provided the small unit commander enough firepower and flexibility to directly influence the outcome of his close fight, leading to the success of the company as a whole.


The Marine Corps should never stop looking at ways to increase the lethality of Marines and their weapons. The increase of night vision capability and squad-level communications assets represents the latest steps in that search. Indeed, the fact that these force multipliers are already in place presents the infantry with even more questions as weapons lethality increases.


For example, if the historical paradigm of increased lethality resulting in increased dispersion holds true, then current communications and doctrinal capabilities allow the traditional infantry FT to be separated into autonomous two-man buddy teams. Canada, which is equipped with almost the exact same infantry weapons systems as the United States, already utilizes such organizations. Their infantry sections (squads) are broken down into four-man fire groups (FTs) consisting of two-man FTs (buddy teams).


2/7 believes that the next step in increasing the lethality of the rifle squad does not consist of replacing the M249 SAW. Rather, squad lethality, both quantitatively and qualitatively, can be greatly increased in two very cost-effective ways. First, the M249 SAW should be used in the LMG role for which it was designed, not the ad hoc AR role for which it was purchased. Second, to ensure that each rifle FT possesses the automatic weapon necessary for the close combat fight, a true AR should be acquired.


As threat forces match the firepower of the current rifle squad, the Marine Corps must maintain the innovative edge for which it is famous. While experimentation is still required, the evaluations undertaken by 2/7 definitively indicate that the Marine Corps should place the M249 into an LMG role and add a true AR to the squad’s inventory.


>Editor's Note: The author would like to thank LtCol James A. Cameron and Majs Scott Kenner and Thomas Clinton for their assistance and support during the weapons testing and preparation of this article.

When will the final decision to be made any time table? What are the chances of our Ultimax 100 of getting this contract?

with phase 1 and 2 taking a total of 7 years, I'm not holding my breath....

It'll probably be the Colt AR

LWRC's chutzpah in naming their product as IAR is not going to give it an advantage over Colt's connections

Hmm... can anyone explain why the Colt AR is so much heavier than the rest? I mean, given the heavier barrel, but the other SAWs have a heavier barrel as well! Really, it's not just nationalistic pride, but I think the Ultimax is the cheapest ready-made solution given the requirements that the USMC set out!

Politics are at work bro...defence contracts can make some companies very rich...rich enough to support political parties...

Yes, the Ultimax will be a very good candidate but ST made a version specially to compete in this IAR. Looks much more like a M4 than the ones we used in SAF.

The one with Picatinny all over the shop :lol:




But I wonder which Colt AR was submitted ?

This LMG



Or this really ugly light support weapon that was developed with diemaco some time back

caught this on my RSS this morning STK Ultimax in the contender? any1 have more info on this?

http://www.defensetech.org/archives/cat_guns.html

They got the wrong company name in any case

Check out this STK brochure with comparsion with regular Ultimax 100 Mk 4 and Ultimax 100 Mk 5:
http://www.stengg.com/upload/921FaRTTolOeehfMOcU.pdf

Ah, the MK V. Heavier, probably more suitable for M249 user roles.

but its just couple hundred grams heavier.

On paper it seems very little, however, the centre of gravity has changed and the weight perception is somewhat increased..

At least that's what I felt.. not sure about the rest. The Mk2s and Mk3s were more balanced in their CoG.

Some closeup pixs of Ultimax 100 Mk 5 by SMGLee here, with other IAR in this thread:

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showt...t=143741&page=4

Note from SMGLee:

If you are going to use my picture or Pictures, you can use them but please give credit to me where the credit is due...

PLEASE DO NOT HOT LINK TO MY PHOTO SERVER, if I continue to get my pictures posted without credits or hot link to my server, I will not post pictures in the futre for all to share....I will only keep my photos for my own enjoyment.

My apologies in advnace.

Thank you for your understanding.

I not to sure about the 100g increase of MK5 Ultimax is due to the heavier barrel or the firing mechanism inside (the 3 round firing selection).

But being a former user/NS man assigned with a MK2 Ultimax SAW, the MK5 is not see to me as a improvement to the family but a "off shoot" or "break off". A "bad" attempt to convert the "regular" SAW Ultimax into an "assault rifle"!

the brochure says the Mk V is single shot/full auto, not 3-round.

I think the folding stock looks more sturdy and heavier. The Mk 3 stock is featherweight, and flimsy as hell.

Also, the magazine housing is added where there was none previously.

And all the P-rails are made of heavier material than the original grip and forestock.

And I also wonder if this Mk 5 weight includes the Gripod, since the original grip and bipod are removed? If you add on the Gripod, what would the weight be?

Finally, the SEALS tested the Ultimax and IIRC the SEALS recommended a slightly heavier (thicker) sheet metal for the receiver.

i can testify to that.

i broke the bipod twice. (for the mkIII)

i had a chance to use the Mk1 in brunei. much sturdier stuff. different grade

When did you use the MkI ? Must be a long long time ago, because by the time I used the MkIs in service, most of them are half dead alr-- dents in the receiver, bent guide plates, etc. I agree about the receiver-- given that it is stamped steel, it is quite thin. Of course it still is one of the lightest SAWs out there, so some sacrifices had to be made.

i used them in brunei and some special missions where we got old stock stuff.

really feels sturdier than the Mk3

Hmm ok.. i had the opposite experience but maybe thats because I used old Mk1s and new Mk3s...

my mark 3 i broke the carrying handle once and the bipod once.

the mark 1 carrying handle is different. its a right angle.

the mark 3 carrying handle is angled thing with a nice hand grip.

My opinion is that if we have actually fielded the Ultimax Mk5 in our SAF, we will be better understand its strengths and weakness. Thus will be better as we can identify and rectify its faults for our sales pitch to USA.

It will also be more appealing to the US military procurement folks if we already have an excellent track record of this particular version in our current SAF.

Let's me summarised the contenders of USMC IAR competition , as not much official info has been released , so there are a lot of rumours around, here the long list of so called contenders from various sources:

1) FN Herstal USA
I heard FN IAR is based based on SCAR-L


2) General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products (GDATP)
Based on STK Ultimax 100, with new variant U100 Mk 5.
All info and pics in previous posts.

3) Land Warfare Resources Corporation (LWRC)
Basically based on a gas-piston M-16 variant.

Link

Here a video from Future Weapons:
Video

4) Colt Defense, LLC
Not sure it is still in contention though.Another gas-piston M-16 variant.

Link

5) Patriot Ordnance Factory Inc =US rep for Heckler & Koch (HK) ?
I heard it will be based on H&K416 , another gas-piston M-16 variant.

Link

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
So basically 3 are gas-piston M-16 variant except FN IAR and U100 Mk5.
And except U100 Mk5 which is a SAW in the begining into SAW cum AR, all other contenders are basically ARs with HB.

I guess the brochure maybe wrong as I did saw a 3 round indication on MK5 Ultimax displayed at STK booth early this year at the Singapore Airshow 2008. Misprint on the brochure maybe possible too. :blink: